Lewis v. Burger King , 344 F. App'x 470 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 4, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
NANCY LEWIS and LADY BROWN
DOG THE ENFORCER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 09-2160
v. (D. of N.M.)
BURGER KING, (D.C. No. 6:09-CV-00305-JCH-RLP)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
Nancy Lewis and her dog, Lady Brown Dog the Enforcer (Lady Brown
Dog), challenge the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of their civil rights
suit against Burger King. 1 Because Lewis and her dog were proceeding in forma
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Lady Brown Dog appears as a co-plaintiff on Lewis’s complaint.
pauperis (IFP), the district court reviewed their complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and concluded it failed to state a claim for relief.
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we agree that Lady Brown
Dog, as an animal, lacks standing to sue, and AFFIRM the district court’s
dismissal of Lady Brown Dog’s claims with prejudice. Because we conclude the
district court should have afforded Lewis an opportunity to amend her complaint,
we VACATE the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of her claims and
REMAND for entry of an order dismissing Lewis’s complaint without prejudice.
I. Background
On January 14, 2009, Lewis and Lady Brown Dog were apparently asked to
leave a Burger King restaurant in Espanola, New Mexico. According to Lewis,
this was “on account of . . . Lady Brown Dog’s being a dog.” R., Doc. 1 at 1.
Lewis then filed suit in federal district court alleging that Burger King had
violated their civil rights. 2 Lewis, proceeding pro se, 3 complained that Burger
King had violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) by discriminating against her, as a disabled person, and, apparently,
against her dog as a service dog. Lewis sought “punitive and compensatory
damages commensurate with the . . . civil rights violation.” Id. Lewis’s
2
Burger King was not served with process and is not a party to this appeal.
3
We construe Lewis’s pro se pleadings liberally. See Price v. Philpot, 420
F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005).
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complaint, however, did not describe her disability, nor the medical service or
assistance that Lady Brown Dog supposedly provides.
Because Lewis requested to proceed IFP, the magistrate judge reviewed
her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts existed to support the action against
Burger King. See Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir.
2005). The magistrate judge issued a report recommending Lewis’s complaint be
dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Specifically, the magistrate judge
found Lewis (1) failed to allege that she is a qualified person under the ADA or
that she has a physical or mental impairment, (2) failed to identify the particular
assistance Lady Brown Dog provided her, and (3) was improperly seeking
monetary damages. The magistrate judge’s report also noted that because “Lewis
may be able to cure some or all the problems in her Complaint,” the dismissal
should be without prejudice. R., Doc. 5 at 5.
Finally, the magistrate judge recommended Lady Brown Dog’s claims be
dismissed with prejudice as “neither the ADA nor any other civil rights statute
confer upon an animal the right to bring a civil action.” Id.Lewis objected to the magistrate judge’s recommended disposition. She
stated she suffers from several medical conditions which make her “unsteady on
her feet.” R., Doc. 6 at 2. Lewis further noted that she had trained Lady Brown
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Dog herself after rescuing the dog as a stray. According to Lewis, Lady Brown
Dog serves as her walking aid as well as a constant and protective companion.
Lewis also took issue with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Lady
Brown Dog lacked standing. Lewis, referencing news stories of animals
inheriting large sums of money upon the death of their human owners, maintained
it was unfair that “Lady Brown Dog can work her Pit Bull flanks off to earn her
keep, [but] she can’t object to being denied the right to practice her profession as
a service dog.” Id. As a result, Lewis stated it was time that courts permitted
“non-human creatures” to sue, at least via a human advocate. Id.A letter from a certified family nurse practitioner was also attached to
Lewis’s objection. The letter indicated Lewis suffers from “chronic sciatica,
diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia.” R., Doc. 6 at 5. According to the
nurse practioner, Lewis “is in a delicate condition and is often unsteady on her
feet.” Id. Apparently referencing Lady Brown Dog, the nurse practitioner stated
she believes “having the dog is good for Nancy as she has become her companion.
Nancy feels safer and more able to walk with the dog around, and the dog is
friendly. She makes an excellent companion dog.” Id.Lewis also submitted a letter from the Santa Fe, New Mexico, transit
department. This letter apparently grants her ADA paratransit eligibility,
permitting her to use the Santa Fe Ride Program—as well as similar programs
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nationwide—whenever her disability prevents her from using the regular bus
system. It further allows her to bring along her “service animal.” Id. at 6.
The district court rejected Lewis’s objection and adopted the magistrate
judge’s proposed findings. The court also adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommended disposition, but dismissed Lewis’s ADA claims with prejudice
despite the report’s recommendation the dismissal be without prejudice.
Lewis now brings this appeal.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Lewis argues the district court erred by failing to grant her an
opportunity to amend her complaint. She also contends that, with respect to Lady
Brown Dog, “the time has come for new precedent to spur Congress to give
standing to animals.” Aplt. Br. at 4.
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) permits a court to dismiss an IFP action if it “fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” Construing Lewis’s complaint
liberally, we review the district court’s dismissal de novo. Kay v. Bemis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2007). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure
to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail
on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to
amend.” Id. at 1217 (quotation omitted). “In determining whether a dismissal is
proper, we must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe th[e]
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allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quotation omitted).
To the extent Lewis’s objection to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation raised issues of fact regarding her disability and the assistance
Lady Brown Dog provides, we agree that “Lewis may be able to cure some or all
the problems in her Complaint.” See R., Doc. 5 at 5 (emphasis added). For this
reason, we cannot conclude it would have been futile to give Lewis an
opportunity to amend her complaint. Therefore, the district court erred in
dismissing Lewis’s claims with prejudice.
We agree, however, with the district court that Lady Brown Dog, as a dog
and putative co-plaintiff, lacks standing to sue under the ADA (or any other civil
rights statute). See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“If Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of
authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and
should, have said so plainly.” (minor alteration and quotation omitted)); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA
L. Rev. 1333, 1359 (2000) (“[T]he question of whether animals have standing
depends on the content of positive law. If Congress has not given standing to
animals, the issue is at an end.”). The district court, therefore, did not err in
dismissing Lady Brown Dog’s claims with prejudice.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of Lewis’s claims and REMAND for entry of an order dismissing
Lewis’s claims without prejudice. We further AFFIRM the district court’s
dismissal with prejudice of Lady Brown Dog’s claims.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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