Thompson v. McKune , 527 F. App'x 731 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 10, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DENNIS W. THOMPSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 12-3239
(D.C. No. 5:10-CV-03242-SAC)
DAVID MCKUNE, Warden, Lansing (D. Kan.)
Correctional Facility; STEPHEN N. SIX,
Attorney General of the State of Kansas,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Dennis W. Thompson seeks to appeal the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 application challenging, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), the sentence he received for manufacturing methamphetamine. We grant
a certificate of appealability (COA), but we affirm the district court’s denial of
habeas relief.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4159 made manufacturing methamphetamine a drug
severity level 1 felony. In early 2004, the Kansas Supreme Court held that because
§ 65-4159 and another statute of lesser severity proscribed identical conduct, a
person convicted of violating § 65-4159 could be sentenced only under the lesser
penalty provision applicable to the other statute. State v. McAdam, 83 P.3d 161, 167
(Kan. 2004). In response to McAdam, effective on May 20, 2004, the Kansas
legislature amended § 65-4159 so that it would again carry penalties of level 1
severity. Accordingly, violations of § 65-4159 that occurred on or after May 20,
2004, were subject to sentences much greater than would apply to violations of
§ 65-4159 that were committed on or before May 19, 2004.
Just six days after the amendment, on May 26, 2004, police stopped
Mr. Thompson’s truck for a broken headlight. A search of the truck revealed
evidence of methamphetamine use and manufacture. A search of Mr. Thompson’s
garage that same day revealed more evidence of methamphetamine manufacture.
Mr. Thompson was charged with, and eventually convicted by a jury of,
manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of § 65-4159 “on or about” May 26,
2004. The trial court sentenced him to the standard sentence for a level 1 severity
offense—158 months of imprisonment.
On appeal, Mr. Thompson argued that the court erred in sentencing him under
severity level 1, asserting that (1) the state failed to prove that any manufacture
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occurred on or after May 20, 2004, and (2) the jury was not instructed to find that the
offense occurred on or after May 20, 2004. In support of both arguments, among
other authorities he cited Apprendi, in which the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490.
The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected his arguments. State v. Thompson,
No. 94,254, 2009 WL 764503 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished). Construing the first
argument as attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, the court held that the evidence
was sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Mr. Thompson
manufactured methamphetamine “‘on or about May 26, 2004.’” Id. at *2. The court
then reviewed the second argument for clear error because Mr. Thompson had not
objected to the jury instructions at trial. Id. It held:
Given the benefit of hindsight, justice might have been better
served if the phrase “or about” had been deleted under these
circumstances. Nevertheless, applying our standard of review, we are
firmly convinced that the exclusion of the commonly used phrase “on or
about” does not create any real possibility that the jury would have
reached a different verdict. Moreover, we are firmly convinced that any
failure to use the phrase “on or after May 20, 2004” similarly does not
create any such possibility for a different verdict. Again, the clear
evidence that Thompson had an “active” methamphetamine laboratory
in his garage on May 26, 2004, does not leave us any room to think that
there was likely any issue in the juror’s minds about the date of offense.
It may seem unfair that a mere 6 days in the commission of this offense
could change its severity level from a level 1 felony to a level 3 felony,
but we are bound by controlling precedent, clear legislative amendment
and effective date, and our limited standard of review.
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Id. The court concluded that “[t]here was no clear error in sentencing Thompson for
manufacturing methamphetamine, a level 1 offense on the date he committed this
offense.” Id. at *3. The court did not cite Apprendi with regard to either issue. The
Kansas Supreme Court denied review.
In his federal habeas application, Mr. Thompson argued that sentencing him at
severity level 1 violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as construed by
Apprendi, because by finding that he acted “on or about May 26, 2004,” the jury
never actually found that his conduct occurred on or after May 20, 2004. The district
court held that Mr. Thompson failed to show that the Kansas courts’ decision was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Apprendi, as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). The district court further stated that, “[e]ven assuming the petitioner
could fashion an arguable violation of Apprendi, the court would find this error to be
harmless” because the evidence regarding the offense date was “clear and
overwhelming.” R. Vol. 1 at 69. Accordingly, the district court denied relief and
denied a COA.
Discussion
COA Standards
To proceed with this appeal, Mr. Thompson must first secure a COA,
see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003),
which “may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). An applicant satisfies this
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requirement by “showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits
. . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id.Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude
that the issues presented by Mr. Thompson are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further. Accordingly, we grant a COA on the issue of whether
Mr. Thompson’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was
sentenced at drug severity level 1 after the jury convicted him of manufacturing
methamphetamine “on or about” May 26, 2004. Mr. Thompson’s custodian has
already filed a merits brief, so we continue to the merits of the appeal.
Analysis
As relevant to this proceeding, “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings,” a federal court may grant a writ of habeas
corpus only if the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court
has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the
merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the
contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011). “[A] state court
need not cite or even be aware of our cases under § 2254(d).” Id. at 784. “[W]e owe
deference to the state court’s result, even if its reasoning is not expressly stated.”
Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). “Under § 2254(d), a habeas
court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have
supported[] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent
with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
Mr. Thompson argues that the Kansas Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary
to Apprendi, or in the alternative, it was an unreasonable application of Apprendi.
We disagree.
1. Not Contrary to Supreme Court Precedent
Mr. Thompson first asserts that the Kansas decision was contrary to Apprendi
and its predecessor, Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), because “the
sentencing court engaged in independent judicial fact-finding” and “assume[d] the
jury’s verdict, which stated Mr. Thompson manufactured methamphetamine ‘on or
about’ May 26, 2004, implied that Mr. Thompson manufactured methamphetamine
after May 20, 2004.” Aplt. Br. at 17. A state-court decision is contrary to clearly
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established law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set
forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405-06 (2000).
Mr. Thompson notes the state court’s determinations that (1) it “was ‘firmly
convinced that the exclusion of the commonly used phrase “on or about” [did] not
create any real possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict,’” and
(2) there was no clear error in submitting the “on or about” instruction to the jury
because “‘the clear evidence that Thompson had an “active” methamphetamine
laboratory in his garage on May 26, 2004, does not leave us any room to think that
there was likely any issue in the juror’s minds about the date of offense.’” Aplt Br.
at 17-18 (quoting Thompson, 2009 WL 764503, at *2). He treats these holdings as
examples of how the state court’s ruling was contrary to Apprendi and Jones. To the
contrary, however, the state court’s analysis was consistent with Supreme Court
precedent regarding Apprendi error.
In Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-22 (2006), the Supreme Court
held that Apprendi error is subject to a harmless-error analysis. Recuenco indicates
that the proper question is “whether the jury would have returned the same verdict
absent the error.” Id. at 221. The Kansas Court of Appeals addressed this very
question, concluding that there was no “real possibility that the jury would have
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reached a different verdict” had it been instructed to determine whether the offense
occurred on or after May 20, 2004. Thompson, 2009 WL 764503, at *2.
Accordingly, the state court’s analysis was not contrary to Recuenco, but instead was
consistent with it.
Further, in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-32 (2002), the Supreme
Court determined that an unpreserved Apprendi error is subject to plain-error review.
The Cotton Court then concluded that “the error did not seriously affect the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” and therefore did not require
correction, because the evidence of the omitted element “was overwhelming and
essentially uncontroverted.” Id. at 632-33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, here the Kansas Court of Appeals determined that in light of the weight of
the evidence, there was no clear error. Again, instead of being contrary to Supreme
Court precedent, the state court’s approach was consistent with it.
For these reasons, the district court correctly denied relief on § 2254(d)(1)’s
“contrary to” prong.
2. Not an Unreasonable Application of Supreme Court Precedent
In the alternative, Mr. Thompson contends that the Kansas decision was an
unreasonable application of Apprendi. A state-court decision involves an
unreasonable application of clearly established law “if the state court identifies the
correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably
applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case” or “if the state court
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either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a
new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that
principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. The
unreasonable-application standard “‘is ‘difficult to meet’: To obtain habeas corpus
relief from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the challenged state-court
ruling rested on ‘an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781,
1786-87 (2013) (quoting Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87). Importantly, “an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of
federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410; see also Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855,
1862 (2010) (reiterating this point).
As discussed above, the Kansas Court of Appeals applied principles consistent
with Recuenco and Cotton. Even if that court erred in determining that the evidence
was overwhelming, as Mr. Thompson contends, an incorrect application of federal
law is not an unreasonable application of such law. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862;
Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. Because these circumstances present ample “possibility
for fairminded disagreement,” the Kansas decision fails to satisfy the
unreasonable-application standard. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“It bears repeating
that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion
was unreasonable.”); see also Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1865 (holding that when the state
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court’s interpretation of trial record was subject to varying reasonable interpretations,
the state court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying relief on § 2254(d)(1)’s
“unreasonable application” prong.
3. Harmless Error
Having concluded that Mr. Thompson is not entitled to relief under
§ 2254(d)(1), we need not consider the district court’s alternative determination that
any Apprendi error was harmless.
Conclusion
The district court’s denial of Mr. Thompson’s § 2254 application is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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