United States v. Sanchez-Sanchez , 108 F. App'x 593 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
AUG 23 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 03-3175
v.
(D.C. No. 02-CR-20073-02-JWL)
(Kansas)
LEONARDO SANCHEZ-SANCHEZ,
also known as Ne Ne,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Pending before this court are Leonardo Sanchez-Sanchez’s direct appeal
and the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We clearly have subject matter jurisdiction. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 2004). Because Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez voluntarily entered
into a valid waiver barring this appeal, however, we dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez pleaded guilty in Kansas district court to “knowingly
and intentionally distribut[ing] and aid[ing] and abett[ing] . . . [in the distribution
of] 100 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount
of heroin.” Rec., vol. I, doc. 87, at 5, 10. The plea agreement he signed included
a waiver of appeal. Aplt. App. at 12. He nevertheless now complains that the
government objected to the sentencing calculation in his presentence report,
introduced relevant conduct increasing that sentencing calculation, and refused to
move for an adjustment for substantial cooperation, all in violation of the contract
principles governing his plea. Aplt. Br. at 4-5.
We set forth the analytical framework for such claims in Hahn:
[I]n reviewing appeals brought after a defendant has entered into an
appeal waiver, [we] determine: (1) whether the disputed appeal falls
within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and
(3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of
justice . . . .
359 F.3d at 1325. Clearly, this appeal falls within the scope of Mr. Sanchez-
Sanchez’s waiver. The plea agreement plainly states that he “waives any right to
appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline range determined
appropriate by the court.” Aplt. App. at 12. Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez’s sentence is
within that range. Rec., vol. III, at 19-20. And Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez knowingly
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and voluntarily waived the right to appeal. See Aplt. App. at 12.
In determining whether the waiver constitutes a miscarriage of justice, we
consider:
[(1) whether] the district court relied on an impermissible factor such
as race, [(2) whether] ineffective assistance of counsel in connection
with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [(3)
whether] the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [(4)
whether the waiver is otherwise unlawful, . . . [meaning] error . . .
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (citations and quotations omitted). Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez
points to no such failings in his plea.
Rather, Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez claims “the purpose of the plea agreement
was frustrated,” and the government “should have been estopped . . . from
presenting evidence of relevant conduct.” Aplt. Br. at 5-6. He requests that we
remand so he may be sentenced according to the sentencing calculation on record
prior to the introduction of relevant conduct. Id.
The difficulty with Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez’s argument is that his plea
agreement explicitly allowed introduction of relevant conduct evidence and
permitted the government to determine whether he had provided substantial
assistance prior to moving for a downward departure. Aplt. App. at 8, 10. Mr.
Sanchez-Sanchez’s attorney also recognized the admissibility of relevant conduct
evidence in district court. Rec., vol. II, at 68 (“I’m not suggesting the plea
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agreement prohibits the government from presenting evidence regarding relevant
conduct.”). Although the government did not move for a downward departure,
which it was not bound to do, the district court gave Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez credit
for some cooperation in sentencing him to the low end of the applicable range.
Rec., vol. III, at 19-20.
Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez’s arguments that this course of events frustrated the
purpose of his plea, Aplt. Br. at 5, and that the government was “unjustly
enriched” thereby, id. at 6, do not comport with the record. “The plea agreement
must be construed according to what defendant reasonably understood at the time
he made the agreement.” United States v. Prince, 204 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir.
2000). We cannot conclude that what transpired in district court is anything other
than what Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez reasonably should have contemplated.
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the government’s motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and DISMISS Mr. Sanchez-Sanchez’s
appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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