United States v. Williams ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JAN 24 2005
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    DAVID BRYAN WILLIAMS,
    Defendant-Appellant,           Nos. 04-5077, 04-5078, 04-5079,
    04-5080, 04-5081
    v.                                           (N.D. of Okla.)
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        (D.C. Nos. 87-CR-68-C,
    87-CR-174-C,87-CR-175-C,
    Plaintiff-Appellee.              87-CR-176-C, 88-CR-53-C)
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before KELLY , O’BRIEN , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.          **
    David Brian Williams, a prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his motion to reconsider suspending payment of more than
    $11,000,000 in fines and restitution. Williams was convicted on three counts of
    bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000), one count of making a false
    *
    This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
    the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    statement to a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2000), and one count of
    “bail jumping” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1) (2000). We exercise
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) and AFFIRM.
    I. Background
    In 1987, Williams was indicted on three counts of bank fraud and one count
    of making a false statement to a bank. The cases were consolidated for plea and
    sentencing in the Northern District of Oklahoma. Williams pled guilty to all
    counts, but failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently indicted for “bail
    jumping.”
    Williams spent the next fourteen years as a fugitive, and when authorities
    arrested him in 2002, he pled guilty to the “bail jumping” charge. He was
    sentenced to five years for each of the three bank fraud charges, two years for the
    false statement charge, and one year for bail jumping, with all sentences to be
    served consecutively. He was also ordered to pay a fine of $100,000 and
    restitution in the sum of $11,653,448.98.
    Williams appealed his conviction; however, counsel for Williams filed an
    Anders brief and moved to withdraw.    See Anders v. California , 
    386 U.S. 738
    ,
    744 (1967) (permitting counsel who considers an appeal to be wholly frivolous to
    advise the court of that fact, request permission to withdraw from the case and
    submit a brief referring to portions of the record that arguably support the
    -2-
    appeal). In response, Williams contended that he received ineffective assistance
    of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. This court
    examined the proceedings as required by        Anders , 386 U.S. at 744, and concluded
    that the issues raised on appeal were wholly frivolous.       United States v. Williams ,
    No. 02-5175, 
    2003 WL 21652634
    at **2 (July 15, 2003) (unpublished opinion).
    We affirmed Williams’s conviction and dismissed his claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel.   
    Id. at **2.
    On June 16, 2003, Williams filed a motion to suspend payment on his
    restitution and fines until he was released from incarceration. The district court
    denied the motion on June 23, 2003, and Williams did not appeal. On March 8,
    2004, Williams filed a motion to reconsider.      1
    The district court denied his
    motion.
    On appeal, Williams additionally asserts that (1) he was “coerced” into
    pleading guilty to his crimes; (2) his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for
    There was initially some confusion as to the nature of Williams’s March 8,
    1
    2004 filing. He styled it a “Motion to Adjust Payment Schedule” and a “Notice of
    Change of Status,” but the district court concluded that the filing was properly
    considered a motion to reconsider the district court's June 23, 2003 order, and the
    motion was denied on May 11, 2004. Williams’s current appeal before this court
    does not clearly indicate that it is based on this denial. However, because
    Williams proceeds pro se, we shall construe his filing liberally and view it as an
    appeal of the district court's denial of the motion to reconsider. See Haines v.
    Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972), Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 
    318 F.3d 1183
    ,
    1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
    -3-
    his sentencing hearing; (3) the clerk’s office at the district court deliberately
    failed to properly file his motions; (4) the district court had an improper conflict
    of interest; and (5) he was denied due process.
    II. Discussion
    A. The Motion to Reconsider
    Under 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and 18 U.S.C. § 3664, a monetary fine or
    monetary restitution may be imposed on a criminal defendant by a district court.
    Both provisions permit the district court to “adjust the payment schedule, or
    require immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice require,” but both
    provisions also require a defendant to notify the court of a material change in the
    defendant’s economic circumstances. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3572(d)(3), 3664(k).
    Williams has not shown that he has experienced the requisite change in
    circumstances. Furthermore, even if Williams met this requirement, the language
    of “ adjust[ing] the payment schedule” clearly does not compel the district court
    to authorize an 18-year   suspension of all payments.
    We review the district court’s denial of the motion to reconsider for an
    abuse of discretion.   See United States v. Castillo-Garcia   , 
    117 F.3d 1179
    , 1197
    (10th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by       U.S. v. Ramirez-Encarnacion   ,
    
    291 F.3d 1219
    (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc n.1)). Finding no abuse of discretion,
    we affirm the district court’s denial of Williams’s motion to reconsider.
    -4-
    B. Additional Claims
    Most of Williams’s remaining claims have already been addressed by         this
    court in earlier proceedings. In Williams’s previous appeal, this court held that
    his claim to have been coerced into pleading guilty “lack[ed] merit,” and that his
    claim of effective counsel could not be brought in a direct appeal.       Williams at
    **1. We decline to revisit these two claims in this appeal. Williams’s remaining
    three claims are frivolous and have no grounding in law or fact.
    Accordingly, the district court’s denial of the motion to reconsider is
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-5077

Filed Date: 10/12/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021