Prathan v. Autoliv ASP, Inc. , 117 F. App'x 650 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 15 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SAM O. PRATHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 03-4255
v. (D.C. No. 1:01-CV-104-DAK)
(UTAH)
AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Sam O. Prathan brought an action against his former employer,
Autoliv ASP, Inc., claiming he was terminated effective October 19, 2000 in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
seq., and an implied contract. The district court granted summary judgment
against Mr. Prathan on all claims. He appeals with respect to the ADA and
implied contract claims. We affirm.
We review de novo the grant of a summary judgment to determine whether
any genuine issues of material fact were in dispute and, if not, whether the district
court correctly applied the substantive law. Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157
F.3d 785, 792 (10th Cir. 1998). “When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(e); Geoffrey E.
Macpherson, Ltd. v. Brinecell, Inc., 98 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1996).
We have thoroughly reviewed the briefs on appeal, the entire record, and
the relevant caselaw. Mr. Prathan has provided us no basis on which to reverse
the district court’s careful consideration of his case. In particular, we note there
is no medical evidence in the record that Mr. Prathan’s disability was anything
other than temporary. In fact, Mr. Prathan testified in his deposition that he was
no longer disabled as of November 2000. Aplt. App. at 448-49. It is clear that a
temporary disability does not meet the standards of the ADA; rather, “[t]he
impairment’s impact must . . . be permanent or long term.” See Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (citing 29 CFR §§
-2-
1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii)).
Nor is there any evidence that Autoliv regarded Mr. Prathan as disabled.
Rather, the evidence is to the contrary, given that the company terminated Mr.
Prathan because they believed he was claiming to be disabled when, in fact, the
videotaped evidence showed he was not.
We also agree with the district court that Mr. Prathan failed to establish a
claim for breach of implied contract or implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and/or that these claims are preempted by ERISA and the Utah
Antidiscrimination Act. See U TAH C ODE § 34A-5-107(15).
In sum, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court substantially for the
reasons given by the court in its Memorandum Decision and Order filed
September 26, 2003.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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