Earthman v. Hines , 119 F. App'x 206 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 10 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HOMER GENE EARTHMAN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 04-6224 and 04-6225
vs. (D.C. No. 04-CV-556-M
and 04-CV-557-M)
REGINALD HINES, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, HENRY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Homer Gene Earthman, a state inmate appearing pro
se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the district
court’s orders dismissing his petitions for writs of habeas corpus as time-barred
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). We deny a COA and dismiss the consolidated
appeal.
By June 2000 Mr. Earthman had been convicted of two or more felonies.
Then, on June 9, 2000, an Oklahoma jury convicted Mr. Earthman of three counts
of forgery in the second degree, three counts of attempting to obtain money under
false pretenses, one count of obtaining money under false pretenses, and two
counts of concealing stolen property. Mr. Earthman was sentenced to 55 years for
each count, to be served consecutively, for a total of 495 years imprisonment.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed his conviction on
July 17, 2001. On October 22, 2002, Mr. Earthman filed an application for post-
conviction relief in state district court.
On June 29, 2000 in a separate proceeding, an Oklahoma jury convicted
Mr. Earthman of five counts of obtaining money under false pretenses and one
count of attempting to obtain money under false pretenses. Mr. Earthman was
sentenced to 47 years for each count, to be served consecutively, for a total of 282
years imprisonment. The OCCA affirmed his conviction on July 26, 2001. On
October 22, 2002, Mr. Earthman filed an application for post-conviction relief in
state district court.
Mr. Earthman initiated two separate petitions challenging the convictions in
each case no earlier than April 23, 2004. 1 The magistrate judges to whom the
cases were referred recommended that the district court dismiss the actions as
time-barred, determining that Mr. Earthman was not entitled to statutory or
equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
1
The petition is deemed filed when Mr. Earthman gave it to prison
authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988); Hoggro v.
Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1226 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998). We assume arguendo that Mr.
Earthman submitted the petition for mailing the same day that he verified it. See
United States v. Gray, 182 F.3d 762, 766 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Over Mr. Earthman’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judges’
reports and recommendations and dismissed both petitions. After appealing both
dismissals, Mr. Earthman’s motion to consolidate the appeals was granted. Fed.
R. App. P. 3.
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), a state prisoner generally has one year from the date his conviction
becomes final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Mr. Earthman’s June 9, 2000 conviction became final on
October 17, 2001, ninety days after the OCCA affirmed his conviction. Locke v.
Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001). No statutory tolling occurred with
regard to the June 9, 2000 conviction because Mr. Earthman failed to file a post-
conviction action in the state district court until October 22, 2002, five days after
the expiration of the one-year limitation period. Thus, under § 2244(d)(1), Mr.
Earthman had until October 17, 2002 to file his federal habeas petition to
challenge the June 9, 2000 conviction. As noted above, Mr. Earthman initiated
both actions no earlier than April 23, 2004.
Similarly, Mr. Earthman’s June 29, 2000 conviction would have become
final on October 26, 2001, ninety days after the OCCA affirmed his conviction.
However, Mr. Earthman filed an application for post-conviction relief on October
22, 2002, prior to the expiration of the limitations period on a habeas action. The
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state court denied relief on January 7, 2003, and Mr. Earthman filed a Petition in
Error with the OCCA. This petition was denied on May 6, 2003. Thus, since
AEDPA provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the limitation
period was tolled from October 22, 2002 to May 6, 2003. As noted above, Mr.
Earthman initiated both actions no earlier than April 23, 2004. Consequently, in
the absence of equitable tolling, both of Mr. Earthman’s petitions are untimely.
Where a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a
COA should issue only if the prisoner can show that “jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000). We need not reach the former issue, however, because the
record establishes that petitioner’s habeas corpus claims are untimely. Thus, the
district court’s ruling was procedurally correct, and COA is not warranted.
Mr. Earthman recognizes that his petitions have been untimely filed, and he
argues that the one-year limitation period should be equitably tolled. We have
held that equitable tolling is available only in “rare and exceptional
circumstances,” Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation
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omitted), and that for equitable tolling to apply, an inmate must “diligently
pursue[] his claims and demonstrate[] that the failure to timely file was caused by
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d
1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). In discussing each of Mr. Earthman’s arguments
that the limitations period should be tolled, the magistrate judges held that
equitable tolling was not available. Specifically, the magistrate judges held that
Mr. Earthman failed to establish the existence of “extraordinary circumstances”
justifying the application of equitable tolling, and that in any case, Mr. Earthman
did not diligently pursue his claims. After carefully reviewing the magistrate
judges’ reports and recommendations, the district court’s orders of dismissal, and
the record on appeal, we are satisfied that the district court’s conclusions are not
reasonably debatable given the difficult legal standard applicable to equitable
tolling.
Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, petitioner’s
motion for a certificate of appealability is DENIED, and this consolidated appeal
is
DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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