Ray v. Simmons , 125 F. App'x 943 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 7 2005
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    ORVAL NATHAN RAY,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    No. 04-3290
    v.                                                  (03-CV-3006-GTV)
    (D. Kan.)
    CHARLES SIMMONS, ATTORNEY
    GENERAL OF KANSAS,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
    Before SEYMOUR , LUCERO , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
    Orval Nathan Ray, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate
    of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas
    corpus petition. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court
    in its Order of July 19, 2004, we DENY Ray’s request for a COA and DISMISS.
    Following a 1997 jury trial, Ray was convicted of conspiracy to commit
    aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and kidnaping in
    Kansas state courts. During state appellate proceedings, the Kansas Court of
    Appeals (“KCA”) reduced the aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit
    aggravated robbery convictions to the lesser included offenses of robbery and
    conspiracy to commit robbery, and affirmed the remainder of the convictions.
    The Kansas Supreme Court denied further review on March 22, 2000.        Ray then
    sought post-conviction relief in state court pursuant to 
    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507
    ,
    which was denied. The KCA affirmed the denial, and Ray’s counsel sought to
    file a petition for review out of time with the Kansas Supreme Court, which it
    denied.
    In January 2003, Ray filed the instant petition in federal district court
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    , raising seven claims encompassing the following:
    (1) insufficient evidence to support his kidnaping, robbery, and conspiracy to
    commit robbery convictions; (2) prejudice resulting from the trial court’s failure
    to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant; (3) ineffective assistance of
    counsel because his counsel failed to contemporaneously object to the admission
    of three pieces of evidence; (4) violation of his Fifth Amendment right against
    self-incrimination; (5) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
    by admitting evidence establishing his prior felony conviction despite Ray’s
    willingness to stipulate to the underlying conviction; (6) the state court’s
    erroneous admission of evidence of his prior crimes; and (7) cumulative error.
    Ray’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
    Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”); as a result, AEDPA’s
    provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 
    173 F.3d 1278
    , 1282 n.1
    -2-
    (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 
    521 U.S. 320
     (1997)). AEDPA
    conditions a petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under § 2254
    upon a grant of a COA. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(1)(A). A COA may be issued “only
    if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
    right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires Ray to show “that reasonable jurists could
    debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
    resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
    deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    ,
    484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
    Under AEDPA, if a claim is adjudicated on the merits in state court, we
    will grant habeas relief only if that adjudication resulted in a decision “that was
    contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
    Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was
    based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
    presented in the State court proceeding.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1)–(2). Because
    the district court denied Ray a COA, he may not appeal the district court’s
    decision absent a grant of COA by this court. After careful review of Ray’s
    application, the district court’s order denying relief, and the material portions of
    the record on appeal, we conclude that Ray’s claims are without merit.
    Accordingly, Ray has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a
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    constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2).
    In response to Ray’s allegations of insufficiency of the evidence, the
    district court determined that the KCA decision on these claims was neither an
    unreasonable determination of facts or an unreasonable application of the
    standards for determining sufficiency of the evidence, and denied habeas relief on
    that basis. We agree. Federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law
    absent a determination that the state court’s finding was so arbitrary and
    capricious as to constitute an independent due process violation. Fields v. Green,
    
    277 F.3d 1203
    , 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 
    497 U.S. 764
    , 780
    (1990)). We conclude that is not the case here.
    The district court next ruled that the KCA reasonably concluded that the
    evidence against Ray and his co-defendant were “similar,” and therefore properly
    determined that Ray had not shown a constitutional deprivation on his severance
    claim. We agree.
    Finally, the district court determined that Ray’s claims based on ineffective
    assistance of counsel, self-incrimination, due process, and the admission of prior
    crimes were procedurally barred. When a petitioner seeks a COA to review the
    district court's application of procedural bar, "a COA should issue only when . . .
    jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
    its procedural ruling." Slack, 
    529 U.S. at 484
    .
    -4-
    Federal courts may not review claims defaulted in state court in accordance
    with an independent and adequate state procedural rule “unless the petitioner can
    demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
    violation of federal law, or demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims will
    result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 
    501 U.S. 722
    , 750 (1991). “An independent state procedural ground is ‘adequate’ if it has
    been strictly or regularly followed and applied evenhandedly to all similar
    claims.” Rogers, 
    173 F.3d at 1290
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    The district court determined that Ray’s ineffective assistance and self-
    incrimination claims were procedurally defaulted because he untimely appealed
    the denial of his § 60-1507 (post-conviction relief) motion to the Kansas Supreme
    Court. It also determined that Ray’s due process claims and his objection to the
    admission of prior crimes were procedurally barred because Ray had failed to
    comply with Kansas’s contemporaneous objection rule, thereby waiving his right
    to directly appeal these claims.
    Ray contends that because Kansas created an exception to the
    contemporaneous objection rule permitting courts, in exceptional circumstances,
    to review alleged trial errors affecting constitutional rights, see Kan. Ct. R.
    183(c)(3); see also Johnson v. State, 
    271 Kan. 534
    , 
    24 P.3d 92
    , 93 (Kan.2001);
    -5-
    State v. Sperry, 
    978 P.2d 933
    , 948 (Kan. 1999), the rule is not “strictly or
    regularly followed and applied evenhandedly to all similar claims.” Ray fails to
    argue that specific exceptional circumstances excused the default of his
    constitutional claims, and therefore fails to show that his case falls within the
    ambit of this narrow exception. Ray does not establish that Kansas’s
    contemporaneous objection rule is not strictly or regularly followed or that it is
    not applied evenhandedly to claims similar to those he raises. Jurists of reason
    would not debate whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling
    that the state courts resolved the issues upon independent and adequate state
    procedural grounds.
    Having determined that the procedural default was based on independent
    and adequate state grounds, the district court next considered whether Ray:
    1) showed cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
    violation of federal law; or 2) demonstrated that failure to consider the claim will
    result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, usually evidenced by actual or
    factual innocence. See Demarest v. Price, 
    130 F.3d 922
    , 941-42 (10th Cir. 1997).
    To show cause, Ray attempts to rely on his attorney’s ineffectiveness at the state
    post-conviction relief appeal, which can constitute cause only if it is an
    independent constitutional violation. See Coleman, 
    501 U.S. at 755
    . Because
    Ray had no constitutional right to counsel on appeal from the state post-
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    conviction relief district court judgment, see Coleman, 
    501 U.S. at 757
    , we agree
    with the district court’s conclusion that Ray failed to establish cause for the
    procedural default. 1 We also agree that Ray’s conclusory claim of actual
    innocence does not establish the required showing that applying the procedural
    bar will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
    Finally, Ray claims cumulative errors rendered his trial fundamentally
    unfair. The district court correctly noted that in a cumulative error analysis, a
    court may consider only actual errors in determining whether the defendant’s right
    to a fair trial was violated, and may not consider claims that are procedurally
    defaulted. (Order at 18). Because we find no constitutional errors in this review,
    no prejudicial cumulative error can exist. See Workman v. Mullin, 
    342 F.3d 1100
    , 1116 (10th Cir. 2003).
    1
    The Kansas Supreme Court has clarified that the right to counsel under 
    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507
     is statutory, not constitutional, and that therefore “Kansas
    law is clear that in collateral post-conviction proceedings, an inmate does not
    have a constitutional right to counsel and without a constitutional right, there can
    be no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”   McCarty v. Kansas , 
    83 P.3d 249
    , 251, 252 (Kan. 2004); see also Robinson v. Kansas , 
    767 P.2d 851
     (Kan.
    1989) (holding no ineffective assistance of counsel by counsel’s failure to file a
    timely appeal of the denial of a § 60-1507 motion because no constitutional right
    to counsel).
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    Ray’s application for a COA is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
    Ray’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees is GRANTED.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
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