Watson v. Howard , 123 F. App'x 910 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 17 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
KENNETH WATSON,
Plaintiff-Petitioner, No. 04-6074
v. Western District of Oklahoma
BRUCE HOWARD, Warden, (D.C. No. 03-CV-1340-F)
Defendant-Respondent.
ORDER *
Before EBEL , MURPHY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
Kenneth Watson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district court’s order
which denied his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1
See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A). Because we conclude that Mr. Watson has failed to make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request
for a COA, and we dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
1
We grant Mr. Watson’s motion to amend his opening brief and address in
our order the additional issue he raises.
On January 19, 2001, Mr. Watson was in a car driven by William
Richardson. Evidently irritated by the slow speed at which the van in front of
them was moving, Mr. Richardson first tailgated the van, then passed it. While
Mr. Richardson’s car was overtaking the van, Mr. Watson leaned out of the
passenger window, making obscene comments and gestures. When Mr.
Richardson parked in a convenience store parking lot, the van pulled in behind
them, blocking his car. As Mr. Watson made a rapid exit from the car, he was
confronted by six uniformed members of the Oklahoma City Police Department’s
Impact Narcotics Squad emerging from the van. One of the narcotics officers
approached the car and observed a baggie containing five rocks of crack cocaine
between the driver and passenger seats. Messrs. Watson and Richardson were
arrested and charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.
Mr. Richardson pled guilty and testified against Mr. Watson at the latter’s jury
trial.
On July 19, 2001, Mr. Watson was convicted on a charge of possession of a
controlled dangerous substance after former convictions of two or more felonies,
Okl. Stat. tit 63, § 2-401, and was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Mr.
Watson appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(OCCA), which affirmed it on June 12, 2002. Mr. Watson then made an
application for post-conviction relief in the state district court, which denied his
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application June 9, 2003; this denial was affirmed by the OCCA on August 26,
2003. Undeterred, Mr. Watson filed a petition for habeas relief in federal district
court. The district court denied the petition January 30, 2004, and subsequently
denied his motion for a COA. Mr. Watson now requests a COA of this Court.
The dismissal of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may be
appealed only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal
quotations omitted).
Mr. Watson alleges four grounds of error in this appeal. First, he claims he
had ineffective assistance of counsel for various reasons related to the testimony
of his co-defendant. Second, Mr. Watson contends that his rights to due process
and equal protection were violated by infractions of Oklahoma law requiring
notice of prosecution witnesses and of certain types of evidence. Third, Mr.
Watson argues that, properly disregarding uncorroborated accomplice testimony,
the prosecution offered insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Finally,
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Mr. Watson claims that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury, in
accordance with Oklahoma law, that accomplice testimony must be corroborated
before it can be relied upon to convict a defendant.
The government argued before the district court that Mr. Watson’s first,
second, and fourth grounds of appeal have been procedurally defaulted, since they
could have been raised on direct appeal but were not. Oklahoma law generally
dictates that any claims not raised on direct review are waived. Okla. Stat. tit. 22,
§§ 1086, 1089. Although the Oklahoma courts have strictly applied this
procedural bar, Walker v. State , 933 P.2d 327, 332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997),
under appropriate circumstances we have considered on the merits claims
otherwise barred under Oklahoma law, Smith v. Mullin , 379 F.3d 919, 926 (10th
Cir. 2004). Rather than addressing the complexities of the relationship between
Oklahoma’s procedural bar rule and the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction, the
district court disposed of Mr. Watson’s claims on their merits. In order to obtain
a COA, Mr. Watson must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate the
propriety of the district court’s decision to dispose of his claims on their merits or
show that he raised issues that deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack ,
529 U.S. at 484. If a claim involves Oklahoma’s procedural bar rule and is most
easily disposed of on the merits, a district court may exercise its discretion to do
so. Romero v. Furlong , 215 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to
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address “complex issues concerning the applicability of Colorado’s procedural bar
. . . . because the case may be more easily and succinctly [resolved] on the
merits”). Reasonable jurists thus would not dispute the district court’s manner of
resolving the case. As to whether Mr. Watson has raised issues worthy of
encouragement, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Watson’s
first, second, and fourth claims are without merit. The OCCA did adjudicate Mr.
Watson’s third claim for relief on its merits; we address this claim, and the
standards that govern our review of it, last.
Mr. Watson’s inadequate assistance of counsel claims relate primarily to
trial counsel’s treatment of his co-defendant, Mr. Richardson. Mr. Watson
contends that his lawyer failed to prepare adequately for Mr. Richardson’s
testimony, failed to object to the use of accomplice testimony, and failed to object
when Mr. Richardson offered evidence of “other crimes” committed by Mr.
Watson shortly before his arrest. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was so deficient as to
“f[a]ll below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668,
688 (1984).
Mr. Watson’s contention that his lawyer failed to prepare for Mr.
Richardson’s testimony and was surprised by its substance is without support in
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the record. Defense counsel ordered a transcript of the preliminary hearing to
prepare for trial. At the beginning of the trial, defense counsel stated that she
anticipated Mr. Richardson would testify. During cross-examination, defense
counsel questioned Mr. Richardson regarding his plea arrangements, exploring his
motive for untruthful testimony in the established mode. Mr. Watson has pointed
to nothing in the record that suggests counsel was surprised by the content of Mr.
Richardson’s testimony or that some additional form of preparation would have
permitted her to handle Mr. Richardson’s testimony differently or more
effectively.
At the heart of Mr. Watson’s ineffective assistance claim is his belief that
Mr. Richardson’s testimony should not have been admitted because he was the co-
defendant and because he testified that Mr. Watson made two other sales the
evening of his arrest from the same baggie of crack police later found in the car.
His lawyer was therefore ineffective, in Mr. Watson’s estimation, for failing to
object to Mr. Richardson’s testimony and move for a mistrial.
Contrary to Mr. Watson’s argument, accomplice testimony is admissible
under Oklahoma law, its character going to the weight of the evidence rather than
to its admissibility. Frick v. State , 509 P.2d 135, 136 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
An objection to the content of Mr. Richardson’s testimony would have been
similarly unsuccessful. Since knowledge is an element of the offense with which
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Mr. Watson was charged, Okl. Stat. tit 63, § 2-401, evidence of the earlier sales
was relevant. While inadmissible as propensity evidence, evidence of other
uncharged crimes is admissible under Oklahoma evidence law to prove intent or
knowledge. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2404(B); Douglas v. State , 951 P.2d 651,
673 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (evidence of uncharged other crimes “may be
admitted if it proves motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity or absence of mistake or accident”).
Defense counsel’s failure to object could also be characterized as a tactical
decision to acquiesce in the admission of evidence of other acts connected to the
charged conduct to avoid the possible admission of more damaging evidence.
Before Mr. Richardson testified, the trial judge and counsel discussed the scope
of his testimony. Mr. Richardson was prepared to testify that he had known Mr.
Watson for some time, that Mr. Watson was a crack-dealer by profession, that he
had purchased crack from Mr. Watson, and that both Mr. Watson and he had sold
crack for the same people. In light of the government’s proffer of this extensive
and damaging evidence, defense counsel’s decision to accept the government’s
offer to limit its evidence to the two sales the evening in question could well be
characterized as sound trial strategy, upon which no claim of ineffective
assistance may be predicated. See Strickland 466 U.S. at 696-97 (indicating that
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defendants must overcome the “strong presumption” that challenged decisions can
be characterized as sound trial strategy).
Mr. Watson’s final ineffective assistance argument is that counsel did not
object to an instruction he claims required the jury to find Mr. Watson had
committed two prior felonies. Mr. Watson maintains that state law required the
jury first to determine his guilt of the present crime and then determine whether
the prior convictions had in fact taken place. We do not grant habeas relief
simply on the basis that a jury instruction was defective under state law. Parker
v. Scott , 2005 WL 19489 (10th Cir. 2005). Only if the impugned instruction so
infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process may that
instruction serve as a basis for habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 72
(1991).
Even if we assume the trial court’s instruction violated the requirements of
state law, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the instruction rendered
Mr. Watson’s trial fundamentally unfair. Mr. Watson’s admission on direct and
cross-examination that he had been convicted on five other occasions, as well as
the admission into evidence of the court records of four of those convictions, left
no fact question for the jury to decide. In whatever order the questions were
presented to the jury, the evidence permitted only one conclusion. Even if we
further assumed his lawyer’s failure to object was unreasonable, Mr. Watson
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cannot have been prejudiced by a failure to present the jury with a foregone
conclusion.
Mr. Watson’s second claim for relief is that the government’s violation of
Oklahoma law requiring timely endorsement of government witnesses and notice
of the use of other crimes evidence deprived him of his rights to due process and
equal protection under the federal Constitution. A state court’s failure to follow
its own law, even if proven, does not ordinarily warrant habeas relief, although
habeas relief may be available if the state law violation resulted in a
fundamentally unfair trial. Boyd v. Ward , 179 F.3d 904, 921–22 (10th Cir. 1999).
While Oklahoma law requires the timely endorsement of most prosecution
witnesses, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 303, a co-defendant whose name appears on the
information is excepted from this requirement: “[t]he appearance of the name on
the face of the information answers every requirement of the law and any
defendant is put on notice that a named co-defendant may testify against him at
trial.” Skelton v. State , 564 P.2d 656, 658 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). Mr.
Richardson was named on the information charging Mr. Watson; the requirement
of endorsement therefore does not apply to him. Mr. Watson’s claim to a
violation of his rights under the federal constitution must founder for want of an
underlying violation of state law.
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Mr. Watson also argues that the prosecution’s failure to provide him with
notice that it intended to offer other crimes evidence rises to the level of a
constitutional violation. It is true that Oklahoma law requires advance notice to
criminal defendants when the government intends to offer evidence of other
crimes. Burks v. State , 594 P.2d 771, 774 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (requiring ten
days’ notice and summary of other crimes evidence to be offered at trial) ,
overruled in part on other grounds in Jones v. State , 772 P.2d 922, 925 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1989). This rule is not absolute, however; it is intended to prevent the
defendant from being surprised by the use of such evidence, and when there is no
surprise, violations of the rule may be excused. See Malicoat v. State , 992 P.2d
383, 402–03 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); Powell v. State , 995 P.2d 510, 527 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2000).
Mr. Watson was aware that knowledge was an element of the offense with
which he was charged. Indeed, his trial strategy consisted largely of insisting that
he knew nothing of the drugs in the car and that they must have belonged to Mr.
Richardson. Given the government’s burden to prove each element of the
offense, its offer of evidence tending to show knowledge is very far from
surprising. If Mr. Watson was unaware that Mr. Richardson would testify to other
acts of cocaine distribution before the trial, the government put him on notice
before Mr. Richardson’s testimony began and the defense did not request a
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continuance. Under these circumstances, it is far from clear that Mr. Watson can
establish a violation of state law.
If Mr. Watson could prove that the prosecution had violated Oklahoma’s
requirement of Burks notice, he must still establish that that violation rendered his
trial fundamentally unfair. Federal law does not require advance notice to
defendants of the government’s intention to use other crimes evidence. U.S. v.
Kendall , 766 F.2d 1426, 1440 n.6 (10th Cir. 1985) (expressly declining to adopt
the rule in Burks ). Cross-examination and instructions alerted the jury to the
possibility that Mr. Richardson could have motives to testify falsely, about Mr.
Watson’s activities earlier in the evening as well as about other matters. There is
nothing in the record or in Mr. Watson’s arguments to suggest that defense
counsel could have handled Mr. Richardson’s testimony more effectively with ten
days’ notice. Mr. Watson has not demonstrated that the lack of Burks notice of
other crimes evidence rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, and this claim
therefore does not warrant habeas relief.
Mr. Watson’s fourth claim 2
is that the trial judge violated Oklahoma law by
failing to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony, if uncorroborated, was
insufficient for conviction, thereby depriving him of due process and the right to
Since Mr. Watson’s third claim was adjudicated on the merits by the
2
OCCA, we discuss it separately.
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a fundamentally fair trial. The Oklahoma rule serves to ensure juries are aware of
the motives an accomplice may have to testify falsely. Glaze v. State , 565 P.2d
710, 712 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Howard v. State , 561 P.2d 125, 130 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1977). This Court has found that purpose is adequately served by
vigorous cross-examination and instructions informing juries of their
responsibilities to make credibility determinations, bearing in mind the potential
for bias, interest or prejudice. Foster v. Ward , 182 F.3d 1177, 1193–94 (10th Cir.
1999).
As there is no constitutional requirement for an accomplice instruction,
habeas relief for a failure to provide such an instruction is warranted only if the
omission of the instruction “had the effect of rendering the trial so fundamentally
unfair as to cause a denial of a fair trial.” Id. at 1193. Mr. Watson cannot make
such a showing. The trial judge instructed the jury that determining witnesses’
credibility was their province and that they could properly consider bias,
prejudice, or interest in the outcome of the trial. On cross-examination defense
counsel inquired into Mr. Richardson’s plea arrangements, making the jury aware
of possible bias or motives to testify falsely. In closing arguments defense
counsel again referred to Mr. Richardson’s motivations to lie. The trial court’s
instruction on credibility and defense counsel’s arguments alerted the jury to the
possibility that Mr. Richardson might be lying and informed them of their duty to
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make a determination as to his credibility, satisfying the rationale for, if not the
letter of, the Oklahoma rule and ensuring that the trial was not fundamentally
unfair.
Mr. Watson’s final claim, that the evidence was inadequate to sustain a
conviction (disregarding the uncorroborated accomplice testimony), was reviewed
by the state courts on the merits. We accordingly apply the extraordinarily
deferential standard of review required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Dockins v. Hines , 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir.
2004) (applying AEDPA deference to a state court decision in considering a
habeas petitioner’s request for a COA). A federal court can grant a habeas
petition on a claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court only if the state
court judgment (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law; or (2) reflects an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence before the court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The OCCA’s rejection of Mr. Watson’s claim of insufficient evidence was
not contrary to clearly established federal law. Federal law does not require
independent corroboration of accomplice testimony: “a jury may convict based on
the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator.” United States v. Torres , 53
F.3d 1129, 1140 (10th Cir. 1995). The OCCA’s application of the more
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demanding Oklahoma standard requiring independent corroboration is not
contrary to the less rigorous federal standard.
Neither did the OCCA’s ruling reflect an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence before it. We are not required, as was the OCCA, to
inquire into whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict absent
Mr. Richardson’s testimony. Federal law governing insufficiency claims requires
a reviewing court to determine only whether “any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
The elements of drug possession, of which Mr. Watson was convicted, are
knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance. Okl. Stat. tit. 63, §
2-401. Mr. Richardson testified that the bag of crack cocaine found in the car
belonged to Mr. Watson and that he had made two sales from the baggie on the
night of the arrest. One of the arresting officers testified that the baggie was
found between the driver and passenger seats, and that it could not have been in
this position throughout the drive due to Mr. Richardson’s erratic driving;
someone had to have moved the baggie after the car stopped. He also testified
that Mr. Richardson’s hands did not leave the steering wheel once the car had
stopped. Finally, he testified to his belief that Mr. Watson had placed the drugs
where they were found because, in his experience, suspects who are trying to hide
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drugs attempt to place the greatest distance possible between themselves and the
contraband.
“So long as the testimony is not incredible on its face and is otherwise
capable of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it remains solely within
the province of the jury to determine the credibility of each witness.” Foster , 182
F.3d at 1193 (internal quotations omitted). According the deference required by
federal law to jury credibility determinations, we find ample evidence to support
the jury’s verdict, and the OCCA did not make an unreasonable determination of
the facts in so finding. Mr. Watson’s final claim therefore suffers the same fate
as the first three, and we accordingly DENY Kenneth Watson’s request for a
COA and DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Patrick Fisher, Clerk
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