Mathews v. McKune ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 31, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GARY L. MATHEWS,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 04-3220
v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-3286-JTM)
DAVID McKUNE, Warden, Lansing (D. Kansas)
Correctional Facility; ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF KANSAS,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Applicant Gary L. Mathews was convicted of aggravated kidnapping in
Kansas state court. The Court of Appeals of Kansas affirmed his conviction on
direct appeal. Applicant filed a postconviction motion in state court under K.S.A.
60-1507, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The state district court
denied the motion and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. State v.
Mathews, 40 P.3d 342 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
Applicant then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas,
raising similar ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Applicant also raised a
sentencing issue before the federal district court, claiming that his sentence was
improperly enhanced based on a criminal history that was not supported by the
record. The district court denied the petition and denied a certificate of
appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (“Unless a circuit justice or
judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court
of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]”). We
deny the application for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
The opinion of the state district court in the proceeding under K.S.A.
60-1507 recited the following facts: The victim testified to having been abducted
off the street, forced into an apartment, choked, beaten, and forcibly raped by
Applicant. She did not know Applicant, but identified him in a lineup. The
police investigation and medical examination, showing bruising on her face and
body, confirmed that she had suffered recent trauma. In addition, DNA evidence
indicated that semen samples from the victim’s clothes were that of Applicant.
After his arrest Applicant submitted a written statement, in which he denied
knowing or having any physical contact with the victim. The prosecution
introduced this statement at trial. On advice of counsel, Applicant did not testify.
His trial counsel presented expert testimony challenging the prosecution’s DNA
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evidence. The jury deadlocked on the rape charge but convicted Applicant of
aggravated kidnapping.
Applicant’s brief in support of his request for a COA claims ineffective
assistance of counsel on the following grounds: (1) failure of counsel to advise
Applicant that he had the right to testify, (2) failure of counsel to present a
defense to the aggravated-kidnapping charge, (3) failure to interview or call two
witnesses, and (4) failure to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included
charge of battery. In his motion for a COA he briefly asserts that his sentence
was improperly enhanced based on prior criminal history; but he does not brief
the issue, so it has been abandoned. See Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d
1555, 1558 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 995 F.2d
992 (10th Cir. 1993) (an issue mentioned in brief but not addressed is waived).
“A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a
district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits . . . [t]he
[applicant] must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We recognize that in determining whether to issue a
COA, a “full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the
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claims” is not required. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Instead,
the decision must be based on “an overview of the claims in the habeas petition
and a general assessment of their merits.” Id.In addition, AEDPA establishes deferential standards of review for state-
court factual findings and legal conclusions. “AEDPA . . . mandates that state
court factual findings are presumptively correct and may be rebutted only by
‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Saiz v. Ortiz, 392 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir.
2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). If the federal claim was adjudicated on
the merits in the state court, “we may only grant federal habeas relief if the
habeas petitioner can establish that the state court decision ‘was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or ‘was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and (2)).
Furthermore, our concern is only whether the state court's result, not its rationale,
is clearly contrary to or unreasonable under federal law. Id. at 1176.
In evaluating Applicant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, the state
district court, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, applied the standard
announced in Chamberlain v. State, 694 P.2d 468 (Kan. 1985) (adopting the two-
prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), which requires
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a showing that the defense attorney provided deficient performance that
prejudiced the defense. Applicant agrees that this is the proper legal standard.
The state court first rejected Applicant’s argument that his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to advise him of his right to testify in his own defense. The
court pointed out that trial counsel testified that although he had no independent
recollection of advising Applicant of his right to testify, he routinely does so in
all his cases. The court also noted counsel’s extensive experience in the practice
of criminal law.
As for Applicant’s claim that his trial counsel was deficient in not
presenting a defense to the aggravated-kidnapping charge, the state court
concluded that counsel pursued a valid trial strategy. Counsel “believed that if he
were . . . able to defeat the rape charge the jury most probably would find in favor
of the [Applicant] on the closely related aggravated kidnapping charge. . . .”
Mathews v. State, No. 99-C-3300, at 3 (Dist. Ct. of Wyandotte County, Kan.,
Feb. 1, 2001) (Journal Entry) (unpublished). Counsel therefore focused on
refuting the state’s DNA evidence. Doing so obviously would damage the
victim’s credibility.
With regard to the failure to call two witnesses, the state court determined
that neither witness would have been helpful to Applicant’s case. One testified at
the hearing, and his version of the events on the night of the kidnapping was
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directly contrary to Applicant’s statement to the police. The second witness was
Applicant’s girlfriend, who would have testified that she went to the apartment
where the kidnapping occurred and did not see or hear anything at around the time
the attack took place. The state district court expressed the view that her
testifying would not have helped Applicant, and Applicant himself concedes that
this testimony alone would not have changed the outcome of the trial.
Finally, the state court found no merit in Applicant’s argument that counsel
was deficient in failing to request a jury instruction for misdemeanor battery as a
lesser-included crime. The court noted that battery is not a lesser-included
offense of aggravated kidnapping, and even if it were, “if the jury found that in
fact the petitioner had beaten the victim, they certainly would have further found
that this was done to facilitate the crime of rape which was the basis of the
aggravated kidnapping charge.” Id. at 4.
In assessing the overall merit of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims, the state court held that Applicant’s trial counsel was not deficient under
Chamberlain. In our review of the state-court decision, we find nothing “contrary
to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Nor has Applicant demonstrated that the state court
decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). Indeed,
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no reasonable jurist could determine otherwise. See Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d
935, 937-38 (10th Cir. 2004) (standard of review for COA). We therefore DENY
Applicant’s application for a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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