United States v. Forsythe ( 2005 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-1541
SHANNON FORSYTHE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Filed February 15, 2006
Appellant’s motion to publish the order and judgment filed December 23,
2005, is granted. The opinion is hereby filed as amended by the court, and is
attached to this order.
Entered for the Court
Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk of Court
By:
Amy Frazier
Deputy Clerk
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
December 23, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-1541
SHANNON FORSYTHE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 04-CR-00252-WDM)
Submitted on the brief: *
Edward A. Pluss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, (Raymond P. Moore, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Before HARTZ, SEYMOUR, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case
is therefore submitted without oral argument.
Shannon Forsythe pleaded guilty in 2004 to possession of a weapon by a
previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Seven years
earlier, he had entered a plea of guilty to third-degree burglary under New Jersey
law. During sentencing on the 2004 possession charge, a question arose as to
whether his prior conviction was for burglary of a dwelling, and therefore
constituted a “crime of violence,” as defined in § 4B1.2(a) of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. Relying on a preliminary complaint, the government
asserted that Mr. Forsythe had burglarized a residence and therefore should be
subjected to the higher guidelines range. The district court accepted the
government’s argument and sentenced Mr. Forsythe to 51 months’ imprisonment.
Mr. Forsythe appeals. We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court with
instructions to vacate his sentence and impose a new sentence in accordance with
this opinion.
I. Background
During the 2004 plea negotiations, Mr. Forsythe acknowledged his prior
burglary conviction, but informed the prosecutor that he did not believe that it
constituted a “crime of violence” because it did not involve the burglary of a
dwelling. The parties negotiated a plea agreement contemplating a guideline base
offense level of 14, the offense level for firearms defendants who have no prior
convictions for crimes of violence. See U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(6). However, the
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Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) prepared after Mr. Forsythe entered his
guilty plea indicated that his prior burglary conviction involved a dwelling, and
therefore qualified as a crime of violence. This change in classification raised his
base offense level from 14 to 20. Mr. Forsythe filed a written objection, arguing
that his prior conviction was not a crime of violence because both the New Jersey
statute and the charging documents were ambiguous as to whether the burglary
was of a dwelling. The government acknowledged that the statute covered
burglaries of both dwellings and non-dwellings, but argued that the Accusation
and preliminary complaint established that the burglary was of a dwelling. The
PSR also indicated that Mr. Forsythe qualified for a three-point reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.
The district court held an initial sentencing hearing on November 23, 2004,
at which it considered whether the 1997 conviction constituted a crime of
violence. At the hearing, the government stated that if the district court found
that the prior burglary conviction was a crime of violence, it would not file a
motion requesting an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. The government explained that it would not seek the additional
reduction because by failing to disclose during plea negotiations that the burglary
was of a dwelling, Mr. Forsythe had failed to ensure “the certainty of his just
punishment in a timely manner.” The court deferred ruling on the acceptance of
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responsibility issue, but determined that Mr. Forsythe’s prior burglary conviction
involved a dwelling. In reaching that conclusion, the district court found that
both the statute and the Accusation were ambiguous, but that the preliminary
complaint, which stated that the burglary was of a residence, qualified as a
charging document. Accordingly, the district court determined that Mr.
Forsythe’s base offense level was 20 and granted a continuance to address the
additional one-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
The district court held a second sentencing hearing on December 9, 2004.
At this hearing, Mr. Forsythe argued, among other things, that the government’s
denial of the third acceptance of responsibility point violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. After requesting additional briefing
on the Fifth Amendment issue, the district court held a final sentencing hearing at
which it found that the Fifth Amendment was not implicated by attaching
consequences to Mr. Forsythe’s apparent misrepresentation. The district court
further held that it could not authorize an additional reduction for acceptance of
responsibility because the decision to make a reduction is left to the government.
Finding that Mr. Forsythe’s offense level was 18 after a two-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, the district court sentenced him to 51 months’
imprisonment. Mr. Forsythe now appeals his sentence.
II. Discussion
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Mr. Forsythe raises three claims on appeal. First, he claims that the district
court erred in relying upon a preliminary complaint, containing allegations that he
did not admit, to determine that his 1997 burglary conviction was of a dwelling,
and therefore a crime of violence. Next, he claims that the district court erred in
holding that it was precluded from awarding a third point reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. Finally, he argues that, in light of United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the district court plainly erred in holding that the
guideline provision requiring a government motion to award an additional point
for acceptance of responsibility was mandatory.
The government has properly conceded that the district court erred in
relying upon a preliminary complaint to classify Mr. Forsythe’s prior burglary
conviction as a crime of violence. To determine whether a prior conviction
constitutes a crime of violence, we must use a “categorical approach,” in which
we look “only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior
offense.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). If the statute’s
language “is ambiguous or broad enough to encompass both violent and
nonviolent crimes, a court may look beyond the statute to certain records of the
prior proceeding, such as the charging documents, the judgment, any plea thereto,
and findings by the court.” United States v. Vigil, 334 F.3d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir.
2003). Although charging documents may be relevant in determining whether a
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prior conviction was a crime of violence, “[t]he conduct of which the defendant
was convicted [not charged] is the focus of the inquiry.” United States v. Bennett,
108 F.3d 1315, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis and addition in original)
(quoting U.S.S.G. Manual § 4B1.2, cmt. (n.2)). Thus, a district court may rely on
a charging document only if the crime charged was the same crime for which the
defendant was convicted. See also Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254,
1260-61 (2005) (finding that facts contained in a police report may not be
considered to determine whether the elements of generic burglary are satisfied
because they are not “records of the convicting court approaching the certainty of
the record of conviction”).
The New Jersey statute under which Mr. Forsythe pleaded guilty in 1997
provides:
A person is guilty of burglary if, with purpose to commit an offense
therein he:
(1) Enters a research facility, structure, or a separately secured or
occupied portion thereof unless the structure was at the time open to
the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter; or
(2) Surreptitiously remains in a research facility, structure, or a
separately secured or occupied portion thereof knowing that he is not
licensed or privileged to do so.
N.J.S.A. § 2C: 18-2. “Structure” is defined as “any building, room, ship, vessel,
car, vehicle or airplane, and also means any place adapted for overnight
accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a
person is actually present.” Id. at 18-1. The New Jersey statute encompasses
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burglaries of both dwellings and non-dwellings, and is therefore broad enough to
encompass both violent and non-violent crimes. Neither the accusation nor the
judgment clarifies whether Mr. Forsythe’s prior conviction was for burglary of a
dwelling. The only document that charges Mr. Forsythe with burglarizing a
dwelling is the preliminary complaint, completed by a police officer. However,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Forsythe was convicted of the
crime charged in the preliminary complaint. As the government concedes, there is
no explanation why the formal charging document, to which Mr. Forsythe pleaded
guilty, omitted that the burglary occurred at a dwelling. Without such
information, the district court improperly considered the preliminary complaint to
find that Mr. Forsythe’s prior conviction was for a crime of violence.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
The government requests that we remand for de novo resentencing so that it
can provide new evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Forsythe’s prior burglary
conviction was a crime of violence. Although a remand for resentencing
generally allows the district court to conduct de novo review, see United States v.
Keifer, 198 F.3d 798, 801 (10th Cir. 1999), we exercise our discretion under 18
U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) and limit our remand to the record as it now stands. See
United States v. Campbell, 372 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004). As this Court
stated in Campbell:
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Under well-established Tenth Circuit precedent, the government has
the burden of proving sentence enhancements and increases. The
government failed to meet its burden of proof on [a] clearly
established element [required for the enhancement], and we decline
to give it a second bite at the apple. Although Defendant alerted the
government to the deficiency in its evidence, the government did not
seek to cure the deficiency . . . . Our reversal and remand for
resentencing here does not invite an open season for the government
to make the record that it failed to make in the first instance.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The facts and reasoning in
Campbell are applicable here and we exercise our discretion similarly.
Because we are remanding for resentencing, there is no reason to consider
Mr. Forsythe’s remaining two claims concerning the district court’s failure to
award a third-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado is REVERSED and the case is partially REMANDED for
resentencing based on the record as it stands.
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