Dunn v. Harper County ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 5, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ROBERT DAVID DUNN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 12-6222
v. (W.D. of Okla.)
HARPER COUNTY, GEORGE H. (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00587-HE)
LEACH, Judge, CRIEG
RITTENHOUSE, Assistant District
Attorney for Harper County, HENRY
A. MEYER, III, Counsel, TWILA
EASTERWOOD, Court Clerk; LINDA
CROUCH, Deputy Court Clerk,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Robert David Dunn, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his civil rights suit alleging a conspiracy to imprison
him for longer than the terms outlined in his plea agreement. He has also moved
to proceed with this appeal in forma pauperis.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of this suit, deny Dunn’s renewed motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, and assess Dunn two strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 2
I. Background
Twenty-one years ago Dunn pleaded guilty to two counts of rape and two
counts of sodomy. He received concurrent life sentences for the two rape counts
and concurrent twenty-year sentences for the two sodomy counts. The sentences
for rape and sodomy were to be served consecutively to each other. 3
1
Because Dunn is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)).
2
Dunn previously filed a habeas petition raising essentially the same
allegations as here, which we dismissed as untimely. See Dunn v. Parker, 389 F.
App’x 787 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1051, reh’g denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1722 (2011). He has filed a second habeas petition which we have similarly
dismissed in an order also issued today. See Dunn v. State of Oklahoma, No. 12-
6280 (10th Cir. April 5, 2013).
3
Although it is not entirely clear from the record, Dunn also appears to
have pleaded guilty to two charges of child sexual abuse resulting in two one-year
sentences to run concurrently with the two life sentences that Dunn received for
the rape convictions.
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Relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in this case Dunn sued nearly everyone
involved in his sentencing—the judge, various clerks of the court, the assistant
district attorney, the municipality where he was charged and sentenced, and his
appointed defense attorney—alleging that all these actors had conspired to extend
his term of imprisonment beyond what was contemplated by the original plea
agreement. Although Dunn’s reasoning is difficult to follow, he suggests that,
under the terms of his plea agreement, he was to serve his life sentences for the
rape charges first and the sentences for sodomy second. Yet because the district
court listed the sodomy sentence first, Dunn argues that he will somehow serve a
longer sentence, in contravention of the plea agreement and in violation of his
right to due process.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2), the district court dismissed
Dunn’s complaint, reasoning that it was barred under the doctrine announced by
the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which precludes
recovery of damages under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid. Further,
the court noted that, even absent the Heck bar, most of the defendants named in
the suit were entitled to absolute immunity because they were acting in their
capacities as prosecutors, clerks, or judges, and Dunn relied on nothing more than
conclusory allegations to suggest that they would not enjoy such immunity.
Finally, as to the claims against the municipality and Dunn’s defense attorney, the
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district court dismissed the claims because of Dunn’s failure to allege facts
sufficient to show that these actors were even liable under § 1983.
After the district court dismissed Dunn’s suit, he requested certification to
appeal in forma pauperis. The district court denied the request on the ground that
the appeal was frivolous. Dunn appealed anyway, reiterating allegations before
this court that the defendants violated his due process rights by conspiring to
reverse the sequence of his sentences. He also argues for the first time on appeal
that the defendants have violated his right to equal protection by making him
serve the sentences in this particular order while allowing others to serve their
sentences in a different manner. Finally, he renews his request to proceed in
forma pauperis.
II. Analysis
As an initial matter, we decline to reach Dunn’s claims against Harper
County and his equal protection claim. Dunn has waived his claim against Harper
County by failing to dispute the district court’s conclusion that Dunn had failed to
allege a “municipal policy, practice, or custom” causing him injury. Further,
Dunn raises an equal protection claim for the first time on appeal but fails to
articulate any reason why this court should sway from the “general rule that we
do not address arguments presented for the first time on appeal.” United States v.
Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002).
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As to the claims against the remaining parties to the plea agreement, we
review the district court’s sua sponte dismissal de novo because it turned on a
matter of law. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006).
Further, because absolute immunity is properly viewed as “immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985), when feasible, we have held that it is appropriate to resolve a question of
whether absolute immunity applies before addressing whether Heck dictates
dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410,
413–14 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Mitchell). Thus, we address the question of
whether the defendants are immune from suit before addressing Heck’s potential
application.
We agree with the district court that the judge, court clerks, and prosecutor
are all entitled to absolute immunity under well-established precedent from the
Supreme Court and this court. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807
(1982) (absolute immunity for judges acting in their judicial capacity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (same for prosecutors during the “judicial
phase of the criminal process”); Trackwell v. U.S. Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1247
(10th Cir. 2007) (same for court clerks in the “discharge of judicial functions”).
Dunn offers only conclusory allegations of extra-official behavior, asserting that a
conspiracy can be inferred from the defendants’ assent to his guilty plea. These
bald assertions are insufficient to strip these defendants of absolute immunity.
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Further, it is well established that neither private attorneys nor public
defenders act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when performing
their traditional functions as counsel to a criminal defendant. See Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th
Cir. 1983); see also Ellibee v. Hazlett, 122 F. App’x 932, 934 (10th Cir. 2004).
While a private actor who conspires with a judge to deprive someone of a
constitutional right can be acting under color of state law, see Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1980), a plaintiff pursuing such a theory of liability must
rely on something more than conclusory allegations to state such a cause of
action. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Finally, while dismissal without prejudice is normally appropriate for
failure to plead a cause of action with sufficient specificity, dismissal with
prejudice is proper “when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail
on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint
would be futile.” Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Dunn relies on nothing more than baseless assertions that his defense
attorney conspired with court personnel and prosecutors to deprive him of his
constitutional rights. Such assertions do not pass muster under Iqbal, and
allowing Dunn the opportunity to amend his claim would prove futile. We
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therefore agree with the district court that the claim should be dismissed with
prejudice.
It is also clear, as the district court reasoned, all of Dunn’s claims are
barred by Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. Under Heck, criminal defendants seeking
economic damages for alleged unconstitutional imprisonment who cannot show
their sentences have been invalidated are not entitled to relief under § 1983. Yet
Dunn is a criminal defendant seeking economic damages under this statute and
cannot point to any rule allowing him to escape this obstacle to relief. The claim
therefore fails.
Even if a prisoner is not proceeding in forma pauperis, “dismissal under
§ 1915A counts as a strike [under § 1915(g)] when the action was dismissed as
frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, the same grounds listed in
§ 1915(g).” Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir.
2011). A claim barred by Heck is frivolous and counts as a strike under
§ 1915(g). Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2007).
A district court’s reliance on additional grounds for dismissal beyond Heck does
not prevent a dismissal under Heck from counting as a strike. Smith v. Veterans
Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir. 2011). If we affirm the district court’s
dismissal on strike-worthy grounds and find the appeal frivolous, we should
assess two strikes total. Davis, 507 F.3d at 1249.
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We also agree that Dunn’s claims would be dismissed under Heck and
additional grounds, so we determine that Dunn should be assessed one strike for
the district court’s dismissal. Because Dunn’s claims were based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory and his appeal is based on his conclusory
rejection of the district court’s dismissal, we determine Dunn’s appeal to be
frivolous and accordingly assess him a second strike.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal
of this suit, DENY Dunn’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ASSESS Dunn
two strikes pursuant to § 1915(g), and REMIND Dunn that his filing fee must be
paid in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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