United States v. Meeks , 439 F. App'x 736 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 3, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 11-6183
v.
(D.C. Nos. 5:09-CR-00221-F-1 and
5:11-CV-00043-F)
MICHAEL COLEMAN MEEKS,
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Michael Meeks pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms
and ammunition. His plea agreement stated that the maximum penalty that could
be imposed for his possession count was ten years imprisonment and two years of
supervised release. But the plea agreement also went on to say that, if he
qualified for an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),
he could face up to life in prison. Plea Agreement at 2-3. Eventually, the district
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
court found that his criminal history did qualify him for the ACCA enhancement,
and sentenced him to a term of fifteen years in prison.
In response, Mr. Meeks filed a motion seeking relief from his conviction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that his counsel was ineffective in
investigating the basis for the ACCA enhancement and that he is not eligible for
the enhancement. The district court ultimately denied the petition, finding that
Mr. Meeks had waived any collateral review of his sentence in his plea agreement
and that, in any case, his counsel was not ineffective. The district court also
declined to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Mr. Meeks now seeks
from us a COA to appeal this decision.
We may grant a COA only if Mr. Meeks makes a “substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard,
Mr. Meeks must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal
quotation omitted).
Mr. Meeks fails to meet this high threshold. A plea agreement waiver of
post-conviction rights is “generally enforceable where the waiver is expressly
stated in the plea agreement and where both the plea and the waiver were
knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179,
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1183 (10th Cir. 2001). Mr. Meeks’s plea agreement unambiguously waived his
right to collaterally challenge his sentence. See Plea Agreement at 6-7 (stating
that Mr. Meeks waived his right to “collaterally challenge . . . his sentence as
imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined,
provided the sentence is within or below the advisory guideline range determined
by the Court to apply to this case”). And there is no suggestion that Mr. Meeks
made this waiver either unknowingly or involuntarily. To the contrary, Mr.
Meeks acknowledged during his thorough Rule 11 plea colloquy that he
understood he was waiving his right to appeal or challenge his sentence so long as
it was within or below the advisory guideline range. See Change of Plea Tr. at
12-13.
Mr. Meeks’s current claims also fall within the scope of this waiver. Mr.
Meeks’s § 2255 motion asserts two claims, one alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel and the other arguing that he was not eligible for the ACCA
enhancement. The latter argument clearly falls within the scope of the plea
agreement’s waiver, as it expressly seeks to challenge his sentence collaterally.
As to the former (ineffective assistance) claim, it is of course the case that a “plea
agreement waiver of postconviction rights does not waive the right to bring a
§ 2255 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims challenging the
validity of the plea or the waiver.” Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1187. But it is also
true that “[c]ollateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims
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that are characterized as falling outside that category are waivable.” Id. And Mr.
Meeks’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this case falls squarely in the
latter (waivable) category. Mr. Meeks asserts that his attorney did not adequately
investigate the crimes on which his ACCA enhancement was predicated. This
claim does not challenge the validity of his plea but only the adequacy of
counsel’s performance following the plea in defending against the enhancement.
See id. (challenges to “counsel’s performance at sentencing” are waivable).
In light of all this, we conclude that no reasonable jurist would debate the
district court’s disposition of Mr. Meeks’s claims and so deny Mr. Meeks’s
application for a COA and dismiss this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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