Allen v. Briggs ( 2009 )

FILE D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
U N IT E D STA T E S C O U R T O F A PPE A L S June 19, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
T E N T H C IR C U IT Clerk of Court
JOEL W . ALLEN ,
Plaintiff - Appellant ,
No. 09-7027
v.
(D.C. No. 6:08-CV-334-FHS )
( E.D. Okla.)
RUDY BRIGGS, Sheriff ,
Defendant - Appellee.
JOEL W . ALLEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 09-7032
(D.C. No. 6:09-CV-121-FHS)
JOE PAUL ROBERTSON, Executor (E.D. Okla.)
of Estate of Lloyd Payton,
Defendant - Appellee.
O R D E R A N D JU D G M E N T *
Before T A C H A , T Y M K O V IC H , and G O R SU C H , Circuit Judges.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Joel W . Allen was convicted by an Oklahoma state court of rape,
kidnapping for extortion, and forcible sodomy in 1990. He was released from
prison in 1998. The record before us is unclear, but it appears likely that he is
currently on probation. As a pro se litigant, M r. Allen brought these two lawsuits
in forma pauperis challenging various aspects of the trial that led to his
conviction. The district court dismissed them as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and M r. Allen appeals. W e have consolidated the two cases
for decision.
Proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court is a privilege, not a right.
The district court has power to police abuses of that privilege by dismissing
“frivolous” claims brought without payment of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is frivolous under § 1915 if it “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
This standard means much more than just merely wrong. The district court may
not dismiss a claim as frivolous just because it would be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6), id. at 328, or because it finds the plaintiff’s factual allegations
“unlikely,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). It must be the kind of
suit that “paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing
suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Thus, a legally
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frivolous claim rests on “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as a claim
that a non-existent legal interest has been infringed. Id. A claim is factually
frivolous if it depicts “fantastic or delusional scenarios,” id. at 328, where “the
facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton,
504 U.S. at 33.
W e review the district court dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint on
grounds of frivolousness for abuse of discretion. Id. at 34. In deciding whether
an abuse of discretion has occurred, we are instructed to consider “whether the
plaintiff was proceeding pro se, whether the [district] court inappropriately
resolved genuine issues of disputed fact, whether the court applied erroneous
legal conclusions, whether the court has provided a statement explaining the
dismissal that facilitates intelligent appellate review, and whether the dismissal
was with or without prejudice.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
M r. Allen is a pro se litigant, which requires us to construe his pleadings and
other papers generously. Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th
Cir. 2007). W e turn now to the two pending appeals.
***
W e begin with No. 09-7032. In this case, M r. Allen alleges that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. But rather than sue his
custodian or at least some other representative of the state, M r. Allen has sued his
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trial lawyers, Joe Paul Robertson and Lloyd Payton (actually, M r. Payton’s
estate). He alleges that they failed to contest the government’s case in various
ways, that “they ‘sold him out,’ and that is why he got convicted.” No. 09-7032,
D. Ct. Order at 3. He seeks relief for this alleged conduct under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and by writ of habeas corpus. The district court
dismissed this action as frivolous. First, it found that habeas corpus was an
inappropriate remedy because, it concluded, M r. Allen is not in custody. No. 09-
7032, D. Ct. Order at 2. It also found that M r. Allen failed to explain his claims,
which were unconnected to any “recognizable legal theory of recovery.” Id. His
factual allegations were “vague and at times completely incoherent,” as well as
“fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Id.W e agree with the district court that M r. Allen’s suit against his lawyers is
frivolous. Among many other problems, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only authorizes relief
against those who violate a person’s civil rights while acting under color of state
law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Defense lawyers do not even
arguably fit this description. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 may
not even be used to sue defense attorneys who are state employees; “a public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (dismissing § 1983 suit against
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public defender). Neither can M r. Allen fare better under § 1985. That statute
permits suits against those who conspire to deprive others of their civil rights.
Unlike § 1983, it does not require a showing of state action because it was
enacted pursuant to the Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971). But because its object is to
punish the “deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to
all,” id. at 102 (emphasis supplied), section 1985 does require “that there must be
some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators’ action,” id.; see also Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683,
686 (10th Cir. 1993). M r. Allen has no arguable basis for imputing invidious
discrimination to his attorneys’ alleged ineffectiveness. He claims only that they
“sold him out,” not that they conspired to deprive of him the equal protection of
the laws. The district court was within its authority to dismiss these claims as
frivolous.
Then there is the matter of habeas corpus. M r. Allen’s complaint lists
habeas corpus among the many remedies he seeks against his attorneys. Because
he is in custody, if at all, pursuant to the judgment of a state court, M r. Allen
cannot appeal the district court’s denial of habeas relief without a certificate of
appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will not issue unless
the applicant makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
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28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To satisfy this standard, a petitioner must demonstrate
that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation omitted). W here the district court
dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds, as it did in this case, we may
issue a COA only if “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.Concededly, one reason given by the district court for rejecting the habeas
application may be wrong. Though the district court concluded that habeas was
inappropriate because M r. Allen is not in custody, No. 09-7032, D. Ct. Op. at 2, it
appears from the record in the related proceeding (pending before the same
district judge) that M r. Allen may be on probation. The record shows that M r.
Allen was originally sentenced to a term of at least forty years in prison (which
are not yet up), No. 09-7027, R. vol. I, at 40, and that he was released to
probation in 1998, id. at 33. The Supreme Court has held that a paroled prisoner
is still “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction because he is
subject to significant restraints on his liberty not shared by the general public.
M aleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236(1963).
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However, we think the COA must nevertheless be denied because M r.
Allen’s habeas petition remains frivolous as a matter of law. W hether or not M r.
Allen is in custody, he is certainly not in his defense attorneys’ custody –
particularly given that one of those defense attorneys is apparently now deceased.
Generally, the proper respondent of a habeas petition is the person having
“immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body of
such party before the court or judge, [so] that he may be liberated if no sufficient
reason is shown to the contrary.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004)
(quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)). This immediate custodian
is invariably an official of the government, not a private person. W e do not think
it arguable that M r. Allen’s defense attorneys, much less his attorney’s estate, are
holding him “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), or that they could produce his body and
answer for the legality of his detention. W e do not suggest that every habeas
petition that names the wrong respondent must or can be dismissed as frivolous;
only those, like this one, whose choice of respondent “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; see also Billa v. United States,
1992 W L 73491 (D.D.C. 1992) (unpublished) (dismissing as frivolous habeas
petition not brought against petitioner’s immediate custodian). Because the
habeas petition was undoubtedly frivolous, the COA will be denied.
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***
W e turn now to M r. Allen’s other appeal, No. 09-7027. This lawsuit also
concerns M r. Allen’s criminal trial. M r. Allen first sued two defendants, Lynette
Lee and Dwight Adams, alleging that they destroyed potentially exculpatory
evidence in their custody that would have allowed famed O.J. Simpson defense
attorney Barry Scheck to exonerate M r. Allen. No. 09-7027, R. vol. I, at 10. It is
unclear from the record whether M r. Adams was ever served with process in this
case, but M s. Lee appeared and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The
district court denied that motion in order to allow M r. Allen to amend his
complaint. But the amended complaint did not name either M s. Lee or M r.
Adams as defendants, so the district court dismissed them from the lawsuit. No.
09-7027, R. vol. I, at 1-2. Instead, the Amended Complaint names Sheriff Rudy
Briggs as the sole defendant. It alleges that Sheriff Briggs had an affair with M r.
Allen’s wife, and that the two conspired to frame M r. Allen for the alleged rape.
Specifically, M r. Allen claims that his wife allowed Sheriff Briggs to obtain a
pair of her underwear containing M r. Allen’s DNA, and that the Sheriff then used
that DNA to implicate M r. Allen. Like his lawsuit against his attorneys, this
action seeks relief under §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as a writ of habeas corpus.
And like the other lawsuit, the district court dismissed this action as frivolous.
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Unfortunately, M r. Allen’s brief on appeal is inadequate to permit us to
consider most of his claims. Because he is a pro se litigant, M r. Allen filed Form
A-12 in lieu of a formal brief on appeal. This form runs five pages, including the
cover sheet and the certificate of service. It asks a pro se appellant to answer
nine questions about his appeal. M r. Allen gave answers to only three of these
questions, and those answers were almost entirely unresponsive. Though his
signature appears at the bottom of page 4 of the form, M r. Allen left all six
questions on that page blank. These questions ask the appellant to identify the
specific errors committed by the district court. No. 09-7027, Br. at 4. M r. Allen
also declined to tell us what issues he presents on appeal. Id. at 3. Instead, M r.
Allen wrote: “I’m not able to out litigate these people, so I’m asking you to
review all the records, all the way back to the trial, the trial judge made a lot of
mistakes – in records & appeal brief.” Id. at 2. W hen asked what argument and
authorities he presents in support of his appeal, he responded, “Proceed without
due to my mental illness and anxiety getting worse, so please help and proce[ed]
with evidence you have access to[].” Id. at 3.
M r. Allen’s exhortation to us to scour the record – not only of this
proceeding, but of other proceedings before other courts – in search of error is
beyond what our rules permit. W e have repeatedly said that while pro se
litigants’ pleadings will be construed solicitously, they must “follow the same
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rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor M addux
& Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d
1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994)). W hile we can excuse a pro se party’s “‘failure to
cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax
and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,’ the
court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in
constructing arguments or searching the record.” Id. (quoting Hall v. Belmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092,
1099 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Under our rules we are not permitted to invent arguments
even for pro se litigants.”). A pro se brief “must contain . . . more than a
generalized assertion of error, with citations to supporting authority.” Garrett,
425 F.3d at 841 (internal quotation omitted).
The only item in M r. Allen’s brief that could be considered argument for
reversal is his statement that “Briggs tampered and destroyed evidence,” which
(along with a list of other allegations having nothing to do with the defendant in
this case) led to a wrongful conviction. No. 09-7027, Br. at 2. This was among
the many allegations the district court found to be frivolous, and we could not say
that this was an abuse of the court’s considerable discretion.
The Supreme Court has told us that district courts are in the best position to
judge the frivolousness of factual allegations. Section 1915 confers on them “the
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unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss
those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Denton, 504 U.S. at
32 (quotation omitted). By itself, there is perhaps nothing obviously incredible
about the allegation that an investigating officer tampered with evidence in a
criminal case. But in the context of M r. Allen’s “laundry list” of conspiracy
theories of wrongdoing, see No. 09-7027, D. Ct. Order at 2-3, we think the
district court was within its rights to conclude that “[M r. Allen’s] complaint is
nothing more than inflammatory rhetoric.” Id. at 3. The court noted that the
complaint was “devoid of any factual data linking [Briggs] to [M r. Allen’s]
perceived persecution, much less to any recognizable legal theory of recovery,”
and concluded that each of its allegations was “fanciful, fantastic, and
delusional.” Id. This conclusion was certainly not “an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment” amounting to an abuse of
discretion. Attorney Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 776 (10th
Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). The district court’s dismissal of M r. Allen’s
complaint is therefore affirmed. Because reasonable jurists could not debate
whether the district court abused its discretion, to the extent M r. Allen’s lawsuit
against Sheriff Briggs is a petition for habeas corpus, the COA needed to appeal
the dismissal of that petition is denied.
***
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In both cases decided today, our mandate is the same. To the extent M r.
Allen seeks a writ of habeas corpus in each case, we deny his application for a
COA and dismiss the appeal in part. As for what remains, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. M r. Allen’s pending motion to supplement the record on appeal
is denied.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M . Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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