Moncada v. Gibson ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 16 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EARNEST MONCADA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
vs. No. 00-6460
(D.C. No. 99-CV-1766-C)
GARY L. GIBSON, Warden, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. **
Mr. Moncada, a state inmate appearing pro se, applies for a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus
petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Moncada was convicted of assault and battery
with a deadly weapon and second-degree burglary in Oklahoma state court. II R.
at 134. He received concurrent sentences of 999 and 979 years for the respective
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
crimes. Id. at 135.
In his petition for habeas relief filed in federal district court, Mr. Moncada
asserted four grounds for relief, including a claim that his conviction violated his
double jeopardy rights. I R. doc. 1, at 5-9. The matter was referred to a
magistrate judge, who recommended that the petition be denied. I R. doc. 22, at
16-17. The magistrate judge advised Mr. Moncada that “failure to make timely
objection to th[e] Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein.” Id. at 17 (citing
Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Mr. Moncada objected only to the magistrate judge’s resolution of his
double jeopardy claim. I R. doc. 23, at 2-3. The district court affirmed and
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, I R. doc. 24, at 1-2,
and subsequently denied Mr. Moncada’s request for a COA. I R. doc. 32, at 1.
Mr. Moncada now applies to this court for a COA, asserting that he is
actually innocent and that his conviction violated double jeopardy. We consider
only the latter argument because Mr. Moncada did not object to the magistrate
judge’s finding that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.
Moore, 950 F.2d at 659. The essence of Mr. Moncada’s double jeopardy claim is
that he was punished twice for the same crime insofar as his “conviction of
burglary is premised upon his intent to commit an assault . . . .” Pet. Amend. Br.
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at 6.
To obtain a COA, Mr. Moncada must make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We have reviewed the
record, including Mr. Moncada’s habeas petition, the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation, the district court’s order, and Mr. Moncada’s COA
application, amended application, and opening brief. Having done so, we hold
that a COA should not issue for substantially the same reasons given by the
district court.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the
imposition of cumulative punishments for separate crimes that arise from the
same sequence of events, so long as such punishments are not greater than the
legislature intended. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). “ In assessing
whether a state legislature intended to prescribe cumulative punishments for a single
criminal incident, we are bound by a state court's determination of the legislature's
intent.” Birr v. Shillinger, 894 F.2d 1160, 1161 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted). The OCCA has held that the Oklahoma legislature did not intend for
“[b]urglary and other offenses committed within the structure burgled” to merge.
Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 339 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). “The burglary . . .
perpetrated [is] complete when [the perpetrator] enter[s] the victims' residence
with the intent to commit a crime.” Id. Accordingly, Mr. Moncada has not
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“demonstrate[d] that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment
of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000).
We therefore DENY Mr. Moncada’s COA application and DISMISS his
petition.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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