Van Winkle v. Chater ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 25 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DONALD W. VAN WINKLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-7007
(D.C. No. 94-CV-541)
JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting (E.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before BRORBY, LOGAN, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner for the Social Security
Administration, is substituted for the former commissioner, Shirley S. Chater.
See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c).
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff-appellant Donald W. Van Winkle appeals the district court’s
judgment affirming the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying
his applications for benefits. Because the Commissioner’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence, we affirm.
Plaintiff has been diagnosed with scoliosis of the lumbosacral spine. In
February 1990, he injured his cervical spine in a car accident. X-rays taken at
that time revealed grade 2 degenerative changes in the thoracic spine at T9-T10.
After two months of chiropractic treatment, plaintiff was released to return to
work with no restrictions. He returned to his job as a pipefitter’s helper until it
ended in October 1992. In May 1993, plaintiff applied for both disability
insurance and supplemental security income benefits, alleging an inability to work
after October 15, 1992, due to back pain. After a hearing, an administrative law
judge (ALJ) found that although plaintiff cannot return to his former work, he is
not disabled because he retains the ability to do the full range of light and
sedentary work. The Appeals Council denied review, making this the final
decision of the Commissioner. The district court affirmed, and this appeal
followed.
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We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards
were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (quotations omitted). We may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute
our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s finding that plaintiff
can perform the full range of light and sedentary work is unsupported by
substantial evidence because there is no medical evidence plaintiff can either sit
or stand on a prolonged basis. We disagree. In April 1990, plaintiff was released
from treatment to “resume normal activities,” with no restrictions on walking or
sitting noted. Appellant’s App. II at 125A. In 1993, a consultative examination
revealed that plaintiff had a good range of motion in his spine and all extremities,
had a good ability to walk in terms of strength, speed, stability, and safety, had no
lower extremity symptoms or muscular weakness, and did not need an assistive
device to ambulate. See id. at 126-132. Again, no restrictions on walking or
sitting were noted. These medical findings support the Commissioner’s
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conclusion that plaintiff can perform the standing and sitting requirements of light
and sedentary work.
Moreover, even accepting plaintiff’s testimony regarding his sitting and
standing limitations, the vocational expert identified a significant number of light
and sedentary jobs which would allow plaintiff to alternate sitting and standing as
needed. See id. at 61-62. The Commissioner’s ultimate conclusion that plaintiff
is not disabled, therefore, is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff argues also that the ALJ failed to develop the record because he
did not order a current x-ray of plaintiff’s thoracic vertebrae, in which
degeneration had been noted, relying instead on remote evidence. We conclude
the ALJ adequately developed the record by ordering a consultative examination.
The ALJ had no duty to order further testing, as the 1993 examination did not
disclose medical findings suggesting that plaintiff’s disc degeneration had so
progressed that a new x-ray would materially impact his disability determination.
See Hawkins, 113 F.3d at 1167, 1169. This is especially true in light of
plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to request the ALJ to order a current x-ray, see id. at
1167-68, and in light of plaintiff’s failure to identify upper back pain as a
disabling condition either in his application or during the consultative
examination, see Appellant’s App. II at 95, 126-27. Moreover, the consultative
physician’s findings were not remote, as they were made within twelve months of
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plaintiff’s application. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d) and 416.912(d). Plaintiff’s
argument regarding who has the burden of proof in a Title XVI case will not be
considered, as it was not raised in the district court. See Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d
323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding we do not consider arguments raised for first
time on appeal absent compelling reasons).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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