Vigil v. City Of Las Cruces ( 1997 )


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  •                                           PUBLISH
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    MARY ANN ROCHA VIGIL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                       No. 96-2059
    CITY OF LAS CRUCES,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER
    Filed July 24, 1997
    Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
    The petition for rehearing is denied by the panel of judges who decided the case
    on the ground that the petition was not timely filed. A member of the active court sua
    sponte called for a poll of the court to determine whether the court would rehear the
    case en banc. Judges Seymour, Ebel, and Lucero voted to grant rehearing en banc. All
    other active members of the court voted to deny rehearing en banc. The petition for
    rehearing is therefore denied.
    Entered for the Court
    PATRICK FISHER, Clerk of Court
    by:
    Deputy Clerk
    No . 96-2059, Vigil v. City of Las Cruces
    PORFILIO, Circuit Judge
    Because I find no precedence for the publication of an order denying
    rehearing and rehearing en banc, I have no idea what to label this missive.
    Nonetheless, an issue has been made over the denial of rehearing en banc, and I
    am stirred to state for the record the reason why I have voted to deny. I hope in
    so doing I do not create a custom for this court, because there already being
    enough judicial verbiage in print to confound practioners, I find opprobrious this
    whole notion of publishing non-precedential matters.
    Lest there be a misapprehension, my vote has absolutely nothing to do with
    the merits of the case. Guided by what I believe are the controlling principles of
    Fed. R. App. P. 35(a), I simply do not believe the appeal over which this
    controversy has arisen is appropriate for en banc consideration.
    I take to heart those portions of Rule 35(a) which say rehearing en banc is
    “not favored” and will not be ordered unless the case involves a “question of
    exceptional importance.” Recalling that the disposition of this matter was by an
    unpublished order and judgment, indicating a panel determination the case has no
    value as precedent, 10th Cir. R. 36.1, and rendering the decision virtually
    uncitable, 10th Cir. R. 36.3, I believe the panel decision presents no question of
    exceptional importance. What the panel determined makes no impact upon the
    jurisprudence of this circuit; therefore, it has no value except to the parties
    themselves. Accordingly, in my opinion the proceeding does not reach the high
    standard for en banc rehearing required by Rule 35(a). I have never voted to
    grant rehearing en banc in such a case, and I find nothing about this one to change
    my practice.
    -2-
    PUBLISH
    96-2059, Rocha Vigil v. City of Las Cruces
    LUCERO, Circuit Judge, Dissenting
    In an unpublished order, a panel of this court recently decided that a pro se
    plaintiff’s allegations of racial and sexual harassment are insufficient to resist
    summary judgment under Title VII. Vigil v. City of Las Cruces, No. 96-2059,
    
    1997 WL 265095
     (10th Cir. May 20, 1997). Mary Ann Vigil claims that when
    working as a department clerk typist at the Las Cruces International Airport, her
    supervisor “frequently” referred to Hispanics as “wetbacks,” and, in response to
    complaints that Hispanic customers were overcharged, stated, “I didn’t know that
    Mexicans had rights.” She further claims that this same supervisor offered her
    pornographic software, left pornographic photographs in her desk, and
    “constantly” requested that she accompany him flying despite her repeated
    statements that she was not interested in doing so. Assuming the truth of these
    contentions, Ms. Vigil has presented an adequate case of a racially and sexually
    hostile work environment, as defined by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
    Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
    477 U.S. 57
    , 66 (1986), and Harris v. Forklift Systems,
    Inc., 
    510 U.S. 17
    , 21 (1993).
    In ruling against Ms. Vigil’s racial harassment claim, the panel relies on
    Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 
    833 F.2d 1406
     (10th Cir. 1987), which states:
    It is well established that a working environment dominated by racial
    slurs constitutes a violation of Title VII. To establish a racially
    hostile work environment, however, plaintiffs must prove more than
    a few isolated incidents of racial enmity. Casual comments, or
    accidental or sporadic conversation, will not trigger equitable relief
    pursuant to the statute. Instead, there must be a steady barrage of
    opprobrious racial comment. Title VII is violated only where the
    work environment is so heavily polluted with discrimination as to
    destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the minority
    employee.
    
    Id. at 1412-13
     (internal quotations and citations omitted). In light of Meritor and
    Harris, the panel errs in relying on Hicks. I have therefore requested the court to
    reconsider en banc the current status of Hicks in Title VII hostile work
    environment cases and the application of a corrected standard to Ms. Vigil’s
    racial and sexual harassment claims. 1 From the court’s decision not to rehear the
    case en banc, I respectfully dissent.
    In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that Title VII is violated where
    harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the
    victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” 
    477 U.S. at 67
     (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). Subsequently, the Court stressed
    1
    The panel does not formally rely on Hicks in affirming summary judgment against
    Ms. Vigil on her sexual harassment claim. However, the panel does rely on Lowe v.
    Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 
    87 F.3d 1170
    , 1175 (10th Cir.1996), for the proposition that
    “[c]asual or isolated manifestations of discriminatory conduct, such as a few sexual
    comments or slurs, may not support a cause of action.” This erroneous conclusion rests
    squarely on Hicks. See Lowe, 
    87 F.3d at
    1175 (citing Hicks, 
    833 F.2d at 1414
    ). Under
    the correct standard for actionable hostile work environment claims, as stated in Meritor
    and Harris, Ms. Vigil’s sexual harassment suit withstands summary judgment.
    -2-
    that this standard does not require a plaintiff to show that the conduct complained
    of caused “tangible psychological injury.” Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 21
    . The Harris
    Court was careful to note that:
    [t]he appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in that
    case to environments “so heavily polluted with discrimination as to
    destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of
    minority group workers,” merely present some especially egregious
    examples of harassment. They do not mark the boundary of what is
    actionable.
    
    Id. at 22
     (quoting Meritor, 
    477 U.S. at 66
    ) (further quotation omitted) (emphasis
    added). Thus our claim in Hicks that “Title VII is violated only where the work
    environment is so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy the emotional
    and psychological stability of the minority employee,” 
    833 F.2d at 1412-13
    (quotation omitted), cannot stand.
    Moreover, although Tenth Circuit cases subsequent to Harris have repeated
    the requirement of Hicks that “there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious
    racial comment,” 
    id.,
     for a Title VII claim to lie, see, e.g, Bolden v. PRC Inc., 
    43 F.3d 545
    , 551 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 92
     (1995), Harris must at
    a minimum color our interpretation of what constitutes a “barrage.” A “barrage”
    cannot, consistent with Harris, be found to exist only in cases where the
    psychological well-being of a Title VII plaintiff is tangibly affected. See Harris,
    
    510 U.S. at 22
     (“So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and
    -3-
    is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be
    psychologically injurious.”). If we are to require a “barrage” at all, then we
    must purge the term of its historically-entrenched overtones of psychological
    injury. 2
    But we should go further and dispense with the requirement of a “steady
    barrage” altogether. The Supreme Court has made clear that racial or sexual
    harassment is actionable under Title VII whenever the conduct at issue is “severe
    or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
    environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
    abusive.” Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 21
     (emphasis added). If sufficiently severe,
    harassment is actionable under Title VII—regardless of its pervasiveness or
    frequency. See Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 23
     (determination of objective hostility is
    made “by looking at all the circumstances,” including “the frequency of the
    discriminatory conduct [and] its severity,” but “no single factor is required.”)
    (emphasis added).
    2
    Harris does require that the victim of actionable harassment “subjectively perceive
    the environment to be abusive,” 
    510 U.S. at 21
    , and to that extent affirms that some
    minimal psychological component must be alleged for a Title VII hostile work
    environment claim to lie. Here the appellant regarded the terms used by her supervisor as
    “derogatory” and amounting to “discrimination.” I R, tabs 5 & 7. Given appellant’s pro
    se status, these allegations should be construed liberally to hold that appellant has put
    forward facts sufficient to satisfy the subjective requirement of a hostile work
    environment claim.
    -4-
    In line with Harris, other circuits have recognized that Title VII hostile
    work environment plaintiffs need not prove a pattern, “steady barrage,” or other
    minimum quantum of discriminatory conduct in order to establish actionable
    harassment. See Torres v. Pisano, No. 96-7939, 
    1997 WL 290196
    , *4 n.4 (2d Cir.
    June 3, 1997) (“Of
    course, even a single episode of harassment, if severe enough, can establish a
    hostile work environment.”); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 
    858 F.2d 345
    , 349
    (6th Cir. 1988) (“[P]laintiff need not prove that the instances of alleged
    harassment were related in either time or type. Rather all that the victim of racial
    harassment need show is that the alleged conduct constituted an unreasonably
    abusive or offensive work-related environment or adversely affected the
    reasonable employee’s ability to do his or her job.”); Rodgers v. Western-
    Southern Life Ins. Co., 
    12 F.3d 668
    , 674 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Within the totality of
    circumstances, there is neither a threshold “magic number” of harassing incidents
    that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of
    incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.”)
    (emphasis added); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 
    937 F.2d 1264
    , 1274 n.4 (7th Cir.
    1991) (recognizing that single, isolated incident of harassment can give rise to
    -5-
    employer liability for racial harassment under Title VII). 3
    In its continued reliance on Hicks, this court appears to believe that only
    the most egregious cases will give rise to an actionable claim of a hostile work
    environment under Title VII. Such a belief is entirely without foundation. As the
    Second Circuit has noted even since I requested an en banc rehearing in this case,
    Harris stands for a very simple and straightforward proposition: “Whenever the
    harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find
    the conditions of her employment altered for the worse, it is actionable under
    Title VII, so long as the employee subjectively experienced a hostile work
    environment.” Torres, 
    1997 WL 290196
    , *5 (citing Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 21
    )
    (emphasis added). To prove harassment, employees are held only to a standard of
    3
    Those circuits that continue to insist on a quantitative requirement do so in
    purported reliance on the Supreme Court’s admonitions in Harris and Meritor that “mere
    utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee . . . does
    not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.” Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 21
    ; Meritor, 
    477 U.S. at 67
    . See, e.g., Kimzey v. Walmart Stores, 
    107 F.3d 568
    ,
    573 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Meritor, 
    477 U.S. at 67
    , for the proposition that “[m]ore than a
    few isolated incidents are required.”). Such cases fail to recognize that some epithets do
    far more than engender offensive feelings. As the Supreme Court recognized in Harris,
    when “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . is sufficiently severe or
    pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
    working environment, Title VII is violated.” Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 21
     (quoting Meritor, 
    477 U.S. at 65, 67
    ) (emphasis added). Thus, if “insult” is “sufficiently severe,” Title VII is
    violated whether or not the insult “pervades” the workplace. The cautionary language of
    Meritor does no more than point out that the single utterance of a term that engenders
    offensive feelings cannot substantiate a hostile work environment claim. That does not
    mean that severely degrading, racially derogatory insult of the worst kind escapes
    actionability under Title VII simply because it is used only occasionally.
    -6-
    reasonableness. 
    Id.
     That standard is designed to protect the individual
    employee’s statutory right to work in an environment free from racial and sexual
    abuse. It is not intended to legitimate the discriminatory practices of a
    majoritarian culture. See 
    id.
     at *5 n.7 (“What is, is not always what is right, and
    reasonable people can take justifiable offense at comments that the vulgar among
    us, even if they are a majority, would consider acceptable.”); King v. Hillen, 
    21 F.3d 1572
    , 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The purpose of Title VII is not to import into
    the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to liberate the
    workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination.”); Ellison v. Brady,
    
    924 F.2d 872
    , 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (harassment should be analyzed from the
    perspective of the victim else “[h]arassers could continue to harass merely
    because a particular discriminatory practice was common”) (citing EEOC
    Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615, ¶ 3112, C at 3242 (1988) (courts “should
    consider the victim’s perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable
    behavior.”)); see also Winsor v. Hinkley Dodge, Inc., 
    79 F.3d 996
    , 1001 (10th
    Cir. 1996) (“Just as we would not sanction an industry term that is facially
    derogatory to a particular racial or ethnic group, we cannot accept the argument
    that industry use of an inherently sex-related term neutralizes its detrimental
    effect on women.”).
    -7-
    In affirming summary judgment for the City of Las Cruces, the panel holds
    that it is per se unreasonable for a Hispanic worker to consider what she describes
    as her supervisor’s “frequent” references to “wetbacks” as being hostile or
    abusive. I am disappointed that the panel reaches that conclusion; more
    importantly, I can see no legal or factual basis to support it. Cf. Rodgers, 
    12 F.3d at 675
     (“Perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of
    employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an
    unambiguously racial epithet such as ‘nigger’ by a supervisor in the presence of
    his subordinates.”) (citations omitted); see also Winsor, 
    79 F.3d at 1000
    (recognizing that sexual epithets are intensely degrading to women); Steiner v.
    Showboat Operating Co., 
    25 F.3d 1459
    , 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (derogatory use of
    sexually explicit and offensive terms, such as “dumb-fucking broad,” sufficient to
    establish actionable hostile work environment claim), cert. denied, 
    513 U.S. 1082
    (1995); id. at 1464 (use of term “UFOs—ugly fucking orientals” to refer to Asians
    sufficient to state actionable racial harassment claim); Boutros v. Canton
    Regional Transit Auth., 
    997 F.2d 198
    , 202-204 (6th Cir. 1993) (allegations that
    supervisors repeatedly referred to Syrian-born bus driver as “camel jockey,”
    “camel rider,” “rug peddler,” “heeb,” and instructed him to depart from standard
    bus routes, then disciplined him for doing so, sufficient to state Title VII hostile
    work environment claim); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 
    989 F.2d 959
    ,
    -8-
    964 (8th Cir. 1993) (obscene name-calling constitutes harassment based on sex);
    Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 
    772 F.2d 1250
    , 1256 (6th Cir. 1985)
    (“repeated” use of racial slurs against Mexican-American sufficient to support
    hostile work environment claim under Title VII standards).
    The term “wetback” is severely degrading. See Katz v. Dole, 
    709 F.2d 251
    ,
    254 (4th Cir. 1983) (degrading epithets “deriv[e] their power to wound not only
    from their meaning but also from the disgust and violence they express
    phonetically”) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, its use hardly needs to be
    pervasive for a Hispanic employee to find her work environment hostile and
    abusive—and reasonably so. See Rodgers, 
    12 F.3d at 675-76
     (use of term
    “nigger” twice by supervisor, in conjunction with three other racially-motivated
    statements, sufficient to satisfy “objective prong of the test for Title VII racial
    harassment claims.”); cf. Ellison, 
    924 F.2d at 878
     (“[T]he required showing of
    severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the
    pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”); EEOC Compliance Manual, § 615. ¶
    3112, C at 3243 (CCH) (same); Bolden, 43 F.3d at 551-52 (“infrequent” racial
    slurs and jokes by coworkers insufficient to defeat summary judgment). While
    Ms. Vigil’s pro se allegations that the term was used “frequently” are
    understandably not a model of specificity or legal draftsmanship, I cannot see
    how the panel is able to construe those allegations to mean that the term may have
    -9-
    been used so infrequently as to preclude Ms. Vigil’s subjective perceptions of a
    hostile work environment from being objectively reasonable. 4 See Celotex Corp.
    v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986) (summary judgment only appropriate where
    non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
    element essential to [her] case”) (emphasis added). Her relative lack of evidence
    as to specific individual incidents of harassment may make a jury less likely to
    find her work environment objectively hostile, but that does not justify summary
    judgment for the defendant on grounds that her allegations of “frequent” usage
    are too conclusory. See Torres, 
    1997 WL 290196
    , at *4 (“If a jury were to credit
    [the] general allegations of constant abuse, . . . it could reasonably find pervasive
    4
    Ms. Vigil’s allegations do not make clear which Hispanics her supervisor referred
    to as “wetbacks,” and in particular whether these terms were specifically directed at her.
    That omission is immaterial. See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 
    61 F.3d 777
    , 782 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[E]vidence of a general work atmosphere, including evidence
    of harassment of other [minority members], may be considered in evaluating a claim.”);
    Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 
    104 F.3d 822
    , 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[S]ex-based comments
    need not be directed at a plaintiff in order to constitute conduct violating Title VII.”).
    Where a supervisor refers frequently to minority members using gross racial slurs, a
    fellow minority member working under that supervisor and directly exposed to his abuse
    would be entirely reasonable were he or she to take such comments “personally.” I note
    in this context that we have already held that “even a woman who was never herself the
    object of sexual harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an
    atmosphere where such harassment was pervasive.” Daemi v. Church’s Fried Chicken,
    Inc., 
    931 F.2d 1379
    , 1385 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Rogers v. EEOC, 
    454 F.2d 234
    , 238-
    39 (5th Cir. 1971) (racially discriminatory treatment of patients may give rise to Title VII
    claim by worker). The Supreme Court has held that where “the workplace is permeated
    with discriminatory . . . insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to . . . create an
    abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.” Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 21
     (emphasis
    added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    - 10 -
    harassment, even in the absence of specific details about each incident.”); Fernot
    v. Crafts Inn, Inc., 
    895 F. Supp. 668
    , 677 (D. Vt. 1995) (“The fact that the
    testimony indicated that [the supervisor] was ‘always’ making sexual remarks and
    regularly leered [at the plaintiff], rather than giving specific dates, does not
    negate its role in establishing a work environment of sufficiently pervasive sexual
    harassment.”); see also DiLaurenzio v. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc., 
    926 F. Supp. 310
    ,
    314 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (pervasiveness of harassing conduct “is the sort of issue that
    is often not susceptible of summary resolution.”). The bottom line is that
    appellant’s racial harassment claim is far more specific than it is conclusory. We
    have the what, the where, the why, and a solid enough idea of the how often. 5
    Ms. Vigil’s sex-based claim is also actionable. She alleges she was
    subjected to constant unwelcome invitations, and exposed to pornographic,
    sexually explicit pictures, and sexual jokes by her immediate supervisor and other
    5
    At the very least, if courts are to grant summary judgment against pro se litigants
    on the basis of such nuanced formalisms, they should take care to inform non-movants of
    their evidentiary burden under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e). See Timms v. Frank, 
    953 F.2d 281
    , 285 (7th Cir. 1993) (all pro se litigants entitled to notice of R. 56 evidentiary
    requirements); cf. Jaxon v. Circle K. Corp., 
    773 F.2d 1138
    , 1140 (10th Cir. 1985)
    (allowing pro se litigant “a meaningful opportunity to remedy the obvious defects in . . .
    summary judgment materials,” and instructing district courts to “take care to insure that
    pro se litigants are provided with proper notice regarding the complex procedural issues
    involved in summary judgment proceedings”). All the indications are that Ms. Vigil
    failed to translate widely-used and commonly-understood terms like “frequently” and
    “constantly” into precise, specific numerical equivalents because she had no knowledge
    of any evidentiary need to do so.
    - 11 -
    airport workers. More specifically, she alleges that her supervisor regularly
    requested that she go flying with him, and that when she first arrived at her job,
    she found pornography in a manilla folder in her desk drawer. When asked about
    the pornography, her supervisor stated that it had belonged to the desk’s previous
    occupant. Another employee, however, indicated that the supervisor had given it
    to that previous occupant. Ms. Vigil also alleges that her supervisor offered her
    pornographic and “X-rated” software.
    “Sexual harassment is behavior that would not occur but for the sex of the
    employee . . . .” Winsor, 
    79 F.3d at 1000
     (quotation omitted). From her
    testimony, it is obvious Ms. Vigil perceived her supervisor’s invitations to be of a
    sexual character. Given that her would-be host allegedly offered pornographic
    material to appellant and may have lied about providing such material to a
    previous female employee, I cannot say her perception was unreasonable. We
    should therefore assume for summary judgment purposes that her supervisor’s
    invitations were on account of her sex. See 
    id. at 1000-01
    .
    Moreover, I see no basis to conclude that her supervisor’s invitations could
    not amount to an objectively “intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
    environment.” Hirase-Doi, 
    61 F.3d at 782
     (quotation omitted). Considering the
    record as a whole and the totality of circumstances, including the nature of the
    sexual advances and the context in which they occurred, see Gross v. Burggraf
    - 12 -
    Constr. Co., 
    53 F.3d 1531
    , 1537 (10th Cir. 1995), appellant has alleged
    harassment severe or pervasive enough to constitute an objectively hostile work
    environment. Appellant’s male supervisor constantly invited her flying despite
    her frequent disclaimers of interest in flying. He allegedly offered her
    pornographic materials and may have lied to her about his provision of similar
    materials to a previous female employee. Reasonable minds may differ in
    analyzing the sum of these facts. Ultimately, therefore, the question of whether
    the supervisor’s sexual behavior was abusive or merely offensive should also have
    been left to a jury.
    The test established by the Supreme Court for actionable harassment looks
    to “all the circumstances” of the harassment, including a number of factors that
    contribute to abusiveness, none of which is required or determinative. Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 23
    . As Justice Scalia has recognized, “objective abusiveness” is therefore
    an inherently “vague” standard that provides few parameters for juries to decide
    when legal harm has been suffered. Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 24
     (Scalia, J.,
    concurring). But, as Justice Scalia notes, there is “no test more faithful to the
    inherently vague statutory language,” of Title VII. 
    Id. at 25
    . Today, this court
    continues to put forward a standard for actionable harassment that is far more
    specific: severely degrading racist epithets must “barrage” a plaintiff before she
    may have recourse to the protections of federal law. In so doing, we ignore the
    - 13 -
    Supreme Court’s faithfulness to the language of Title VII. Our reliance on Hicks
    contravenes the spirit and the letter of the Supreme Court’s considered
    jurisprudence on hostile work environment claims. I respectfully dissent from my
    colleagues’ refusal to correct this misplaced reliance.
    - 14 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-2059

Filed Date: 5/20/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016

Authorities (22)

Inger WINSOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HINCKLEY DODGE, INC., ... , 79 F.3d 996 ( 1996 )

39-fair-emplpraccas-1260-38-empl-prac-dec-p-35708-gilbert-jaxon , 773 F.2d 1138 ( 1985 )

Robert DANIELS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESSEX GROUP, ... , 937 F.2d 1264 ( 1991 )

31-fair-emplpraccas-1521-32-empl-prac-dec-p-33639-deborah-ann-katz , 709 F.2d 251 ( 1983 )

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 106 S. Ct. 2548 ( 1986 )

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 367 ( 1993 )

Debra Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc. , 104 F.3d 822 ( 1997 )

Lisa Ann BURNS, Appellant, v. McGREGOR ELECTRONIC ... , 989 F.2d 959 ( 1993 )

James B. King, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. ... , 21 F.3d 1572 ( 1994 )

Kerry Ellison v. Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the ... , 924 F.2d 872 ( 1991 )

Barbara L. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Company, D/B/A ... , 25 F.3d 1459 ( 1994 )

68-fair-emplpraccas-bna-88-66-empl-prac-dec-p-43689-42-fed-r , 53 F.3d 1531 ( 1995 )

Kim Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., and ... , 61 F.3d 777 ( 1995 )

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 106 S. Ct. 2399 ( 1986 )

DiLaurenzio v. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc. , 926 F. Supp. 310 ( 1996 )

Jesse B. Davis and Richard Lorence Harris v. Monsanto ... , 858 F.2d 345 ( 1988 )

Ali DAEMI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHURCH’S FRIED CHICKEN, ... , 931 F.2d 1379 ( 1991 )

David S. Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Authority , 997 F.2d 198 ( 1993 )

Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc. , 87 F.3d 1170 ( 1996 )

Fernot v. Crafts Inn, Inc. , 895 F. Supp. 668 ( 1995 )

View All Authorities »