Johnston v. Ardmore Ind. School ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 15 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TERESA L. JOHNSTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-7117
(D.C. No. 97-CV-218-S)
ARDMORE INDEPENDENT (E.D. Okla.)
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 19,
a Political Subdivision; ROBERT
“BOB” HAYNES, an Individual,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BARRETT, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Teresa L. Johnston appeals from the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Ardmore Independent School
District No. 19 and Robert Haynes. We affirm.
In 1995, plaintiff was a high school science teacher employed by the
defendant school district. In January, 1995, she also began teaching science in
the school’s alternative education program, known as “Take Two,” on Wednesday
evenings. On March 9, 1995, Johnston was assaulted by a student during the
performance of her duties at the high school. She was injured and filed a workers
compensation claim. On April 13, 1995, plaintiff was informed that, because of
dwindling enrollment, her Take Two teaching assignment had been discontinued
and her class would be combined with another. Plaintiff continued her
employment in her job as daytime science teacher, and she teaches in the school
district today.
Plaintiff filed, then dismissed, a state court lawsuit claiming she was
discharged from her Take Two teaching assignment in retaliation for filing the
workers compensation claim. She then filed suit in federal court alleging state
and federal due process violations; breach of contract; violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (FLSA); violations of state wage and
labor laws; and retaliatory discharge. However, the pretrial order set forth
plaintiff’s claims as breach of contract of employment; retaliatory discharge under
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Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 5, and retaliation prohibited by the FLSA; and violation of
state and FLSA wage and labor laws.
Because the pretrial order did not list a civil rights or Fourteenth
Amendment claim based on due process violations, the district court concluded
that plaintiff had not specified any federal due process claims, nor had she pled
such a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. The only federal
question was her allegation of FLSA violations, as to which the district court
granted summary judgment. Finally, because there was no basis other than the
FLSA claims for federal jurisdiction, the district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s pendent state law claims.
I. Federal Due Process Claim
Plaintiff first argues the district court erred in holding that she had not
specified a civil rights or Fourteenth Amendment due process claim upon which
relief could be granted. Plaintiff’s complaint included a brief, conclusory
assertion that defendants violated her federal due process rights. However, the
pretrial order did not include any federal due process cause of action in its listing
of claims, and defendants did not address, nor did plaintiff assert, any federal due
process claim in the summary judgment motions filed after the pretrial order.
A pretrial order supersedes the complaint and controls the subsequent
course of litigation. See Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th
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Cir. 1993); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Plaintiff’s opening brief on appeal did
not dispute the district court’s finding that the pretrial order did not include a
federal due process claim. Although plaintiff argues in her appellate reply brief
that certain statements in the pretrial order could be construed to state a federal
due process claim, issues raised for the first time in a reply brief will generally
not be considered. See Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822, 830 (10th
Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s arguments on this point do not compel us to abandon that
rule here. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the pretrial order did
not include any federal civil rights or Fourteenth Amendment claim based on due
process violations.
II. Summary Judgment Dismissal of the FLSA Claims
The district court found that the only FLSA provision applicable to the
facts pled by plaintiff was a claim for FLSA retaliation under 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3), which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
employee because she has filed a complaint or instituted any proceeding under the
FLSA. The district court held that plaintiff had not established a FLSA
§ 215(a)(3) retaliation claim because she had not filed a complaint or proceeding
under the FLSA at any time prior to the alleged retaliation.
A. FLSA Wage Claim
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Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in dismissing her FLSA claim
because, in addition to her claim that defendants retaliated against her in violation
of the FLSA, she also alleged that defendants failed to properly pay her and
account for her leave in violation of the FLSA. In their motion for summary
judgment, defendants conceded that they initially did not properly pay plaintiff or
account for her leave following her assault in March 1995, but they presented
evidence demonstrating that they subsequently fully reimbursed plaintiff and that
she had received all the pay to which she was entitled.
In response, plaintiff made only a conclusory allegation that defendants did
not properly pay her for her Take Two teaching assignment and that such failure
constituted violations of the FLSA. See Appellant’s App. at 213. Plaintiff did
not specify the FLSA wage requirements she claimed had been violated. Plaintiff
agreed that defendants “did reimburse [her] leave days and salary and they did
pay for her Take Two salary before she was fired,” but added only that defendants
“did not pay her correctly.” Id. at 209. Her brief does not explain how
defendants failed to pay her correctly. The evidence plaintiff cites for this
allegation consists of the letter she sent to defendants about her pay prior to the
reimbursement and the allegations in her affidavit that she was improperly paid
prior to the reimbursement and “still [has] not been properly reimbursed for
docked days or salary.” Id. at 224-25, 283. This evidence is insufficient to refute
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defendants’ evidence that, following the reimbursement, plaintiff received all the
pay to which she was entitled.
If the party moving for summary judgment carries its burden of showing
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, “the
non-movant may not rest upon [her] pleadings, but must set forth specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which [she]
carries the burden of proof.” Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir.
1996) (quotation omitted; emphasis added). Although the district court did not
address plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated the FLSA’s wage requirements,
it is clear that plaintiff failed to set forth any specific facts demonstrating that
defendants’ reimbursement was improper or that defendants otherwise violated
the FLSA’s wage requirements. See Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417,
1422 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[t]o survive summary judgment, ‘non-movant’s affidavits
must be based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not
sufficient’”). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s summary
judgment dismissal of her FLSA wage claim. See Medina v. City & County of
Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) (appellate court may “affirm a
district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to
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permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court”)
(quotation omitted).
B. FLSA Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in holding that plaintiff had
not filed a complaint or instituted any proceeding under the FLSA, a prerequisite
to liability under § 215(a)(3) retaliation claim. She asserts that her complaints to
the school that it had not properly paid her or accounted for her leave following
her assault constituted her FLSA complaints.
Plaintiff’s FLSA retaliation claim before the district court focused on her
allegation that defendants failed to properly pay her and account for her leave in
retaliation for her workers compensation claim and state lawsuit. See Appellant’s
App. at 210-13. Plaintiff does not dispute the district court’s conclusion that
neither the filing of the workers compensation claim nor the state court action
constituted a complaint or proceeding asserting violations of the FLSA.
Plaintiff points to a single statement in her motion opposing summary
judgment that she was “making claims pursuant to the provisions of the FLSA for
her wages and leave claims and for the retaliation she has experienced since she
made those claims in 1995.” Id. at 213. Plaintiff’s wage complaints in 1995 may
be sufficient to constitute protected activity under § 215(a)(3). See Conner v.
Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (the “‘unofficial
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assertion of rights through complaints at work’ is protected” under § 215(a)(3)).
However, plaintiff’s conclusory statement that defendants retaliated against her
for her wage complaints is unsupported by any evidence.
The only retaliatory action that plaintiff arguably linked to her wage
complaints was her allegation that defendants did not pay her properly during the
1995-96 and 1996-97 school years. See Appellant’s App. at 212. 1 The evidence
in the record that plaintiff cites to in support of this allegation consists of letters
from her doctors explaining her medical status, a letter she sent to the school
requesting several hours of sick time in September 1996, and her conclusory
statement in her affidavit that she “still [has] not been properly reimbursed for
docked days or salary.” Id. at 193, 211-13, 225, 263-268, 303-05, 306. “The
conclusory allegations in [p]laintiff’s [affidavit], are of as little help in carrying
her burden under Rule 56(e) as are the conclusory arguments in her brief.” Adler
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 97-1026, 1998 WL 247700, at *4 (10th Cir. May 18,
1
Plaintiff also argues, for the first time on appeal, that defendants’ failure to
call her for an interview when a Take Two teaching position opened up two years
later constitutes continued retaliation for her FLSA wage complaints. Plaintiff
did not link this action to her wage complaints in her arguments to the district
court, see Tele- Communications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 1005, 1007 (10th
Cir. 1993) (as a general rule, an appellate court will not consider an issue
raised for the first time on appeal), nor would such action be sufficient to justify
an inference of causation; see Conner, 121 F.3d at 1395 (four-month time lag
between participation in protected activity and termination not sufficient to justify
inference of causation).
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1998). The doctors’ notes and the letter to the school demonstrate nothing, in the
absence of some evidence that the defendants inappropriately disallowed plaintiff
sick leave; nor would an inappropriate denial of sick leave in September 1996 be
sufficient to justify an inference of causation between such denial and her wage
complaints in 1995. See Conner, 121 F.3d at 1395 (four-month time lag between
participation in protected activity and termination not sufficient to justify
inference of causation). Because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence
demonstrating that defendants retaliated against her for engaging in protected
activity, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s
FLSA claims.
III.
Plaintiff contends the district court erred in dismissing her state claims. In
reviewing a district court’s decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Anglemyer
v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 541 (10th Cir. 1995). Judicial economy,
fairness, convenience, and comity are all considerations that will guide a district
court’s decision to defer to a state court rather than retaining and disposing of
state law claims itself. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726-27 (1966); Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1990);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have held that when federal claims are resolved
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prior to trial, the district court should usually decline to exercise jurisdiction over
state law claims and allow the plaintiff to pursue them in state court. See Ball v.
Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 1995). Having disposed of the federal claims
on which jurisdiction rested, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the state law claims. See § 1367(c)(3) (stating that when all federal
claims are dismissed, district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
remaining state claims).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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