Zaricor-Ritchie v. Astrue , 452 F. App'x 817 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 15, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DENISE L. ZARICOR-RITCHIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 11-5074
v. (D.C. No. 4:08-CV-00075-TLW)
(N.D. Okla.)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
Denise L. Zaricor-Ritchie appeals the Commissioner’s denial of disability
benefits and Supplement Security Income. We exercise jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie claimed she was disabled by bipolar disorder and
depression with an onset date of March 23, 2004. After administrative denials of
her claims for benefits, she had two hearings before an ALJ, who concluded she
was not disabled at step four of the five-step sequential evaluation process. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052
(10th Cir. 2009) (explaining the five-step process). The ALJ found she had two
severe impairments, depression and personality disorder, but none that met or
equaled one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (the “Listings”). Of particular relevance to this appeal, the ALJ
found that she did not meet the “Paragraph B” criteria of certain adult mental
impairment Listings because she was not markedly or severely limited in any
functional areas and had no episodes of mental decompensation of extended
duration. He also considered her obesity in combination with her depression, but
concluded that she still did not meet or equal any of the Listings. The ALJ then
found that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie possessed the residual functional capacity (RFC)
“to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: only perform simple, repetitive tasks and incidental
contact with the public.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 305 (bolding omitted). The ALJ
found at step four that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie could return to her past relevant work
as a dishwasher. The Appeals Council denied review, and a magistrate judge,
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acting on the parties’ consent, affirmed. Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie then appealed to this
court.
II. DISCUSSION
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie raises three issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ erred in his
treatment of the medical source evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in his credibility
assessment; and (3) the ALJ failed to perform a proper analysis in concluding that
she could return to her past relevant work as a dishwasher. We address the issues
in order. Our task in reviewing the Commissioner’s decision is to determine
“whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial
evidence.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quotation marks omitted). In conducting our
review, “[w]e consider whether the ALJ followed the specific rules of law that
must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence . . . , but we [do] not
reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the Commissioner’s.” Cowan
v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
A. Medical Source Evidence
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie first contends the ALJ erred in his treatment of a
Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (MRFCA) prepared in
September 2006 by Ms. Honeyman, a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist
(LMFT) she saw at the Edwin Fair Community Mental Health Center.
Ms. Honeyman concluded that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie was mildly impaired in one
functional area, markedly impaired in six functional areas, and severely impaired
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in thirteen functional areas. At the second ALJ hearing, a vocational expert (VE)
testified that a person with such severe limitations could not perform any work.
In his decision, the ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie routinely saw
Ms. Honeyman but stated that her opinion was “inconsistent with the evidence of
record, as well as the counselor’s own treatment notes (Exhibits 6F/9F/10F).”
Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 308.
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie argues that the ALJ erred by not stating how
Ms. Honeyman’s opinions differed from other substantial evidence in the record
or her own treatment notes. This argument implicates two of the factors that can
be used to evaluate the opinions of “other sources” such as therapists: “the
degree to which the . . . opinion is supported by relevant evidence” and
“consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole.” Krauser v. Astrue,
638 F.3d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted) (summarizing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d)(3)-(4) and 416.927(d)(3)-(4)); see also Frantz v. Astrue, 509 F.3d
1299, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4
(Aug. 9, 2006), which states that the regulatory factors used to determine the
weight to be afforded to the opinion of an acceptable medical source, set out in
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d), can be applied to the opinions of “other
sources” such as therapists).
We see no error. The ALJ discussed other evidence in the record, none of
which showed that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie was markedly or severely limited in any
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areas of mental functioning. First, the ALJ discussed the November 2004 report
of psychologist Robert S. Schlottmann, Ph.D., a consulting examiner, noting that
“Dr. Schlottmann found [her] to be functioning in the low average range of
intelligence.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 307. The ALJ also recited Dr. Schlottmann’s
findings that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie suffers “from major depression, moderate,
recurrent; dysthymic disorder; polysubstance abuse; personality disorder with
histrionic and dependent features; . . . with a GAF [Global Assessment of
Functioning score] of 50.” Id.In addition to the specific details set out in the ALJ’s decision,
Dr. Schlottmann recorded that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie “feels suicidal all the time.”
Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 136. She was “oriented to time, person, and place,” but had
“some difficulty concentrating and attending.” Id. at 137. “She was able to
repeat five digits forward and four backward and able to count backward from
100 by 3’s, but she had some difficulty repeating sentences and following a
simple three-step command.” Id. It appeared “her recent memory [was] intact”
because “[s]he was able to learn a list of five words on two trials, and later she
was able to recall all of them.” Id. Dr. Schlottmann observed that
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s “responses to questions involving general knowledge
indicated that she seems to have a poor fund of information,” and she achieved
“mixed” results in her response to “questions involving common sense and
judgment in practical situations.” Id.-5-
We see nothing in Dr. Schlottmann’s report tending to support the marked
or severe functional limitations in Ms. Honeyman’s MRFCA. Even the GAF
score of 50 does not amount to substantial evidence supportive of the degree of
limitation reported in Ms. Honeyman’s MRFCA. This is because a GAF score of
50 indicates “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional
rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational,
or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” Am. Psych. Ass’n,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (Text Rev. 4th ed.
2000) (DSM-IV) (italic emphasis added) (bolding omitted). Thus,
Dr. Schlottmann could have based the GAF score on either his awareness of
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s claimed suicidal ideation or a serious impairment in social
or occupational functioning of the sort Ms. Honeyman reported. However, as
recounted, nothing in his report indicates a serious impairment in social
functioning.
The ALJ also discussed the report of Burnard L. Pearce, Ph.D., a
non-examining source who completed a Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT)
form and an MRFCA in November 2004. In his PRT, Dr. Pearce’s evaluation of
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s specific mental impairments largely tracked
Dr. Schlottmann’s. Dr. Pearce also checked boxes that she was mildly restricted
in activities of daily living (ADLs); had moderate difficulties in maintaining
social functioning; had mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence
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or pace; and insufficient evidence of episodes of decompensation of extended
duration. Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 150. As Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie points out,
Dr. Pearce’s written comment that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie was “moderately
restricted” in her ADLs, id. at 152, was inconsistent with his checked-box finding
that she was only mildly restricted in her ADLs. We see no consequence to this
internal inconsistency, as even moderate restrictions in ADLs are insufficient for
a mental impairment to meet or equal the “Paragraph B” criteria of the mental
impairment Listings the ALJ considered at step three. Further, to the extent
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s activities of daily living affected the ALJ’s RFC, the ALJ
made his own assessment of her ADLs based not only on the medical evidence
but on his evaluation of her credibility (discussed below). Accordingly, the minor
inconsistency in Dr. Pearce’s PRT had no discernible substantive effect on the
ALJ.
In his MRFCA, Dr. Pearce found nothing more severe than moderate
limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed
instructions, id. at 154, and in her ability to interact appropriately with the public,
id. at 155. Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie argues that Dr. Pearce’s finding that she was not
significantly limited in understanding, remembering, and carrying out short and
simple instructions conflicts with Dr. Schlottmann’s finding that she had
difficulty performing a simple three-step command. However, Dr. Schlottmann
found only that she would have “some difficulty” in performing such a command,
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id. at 137, and the ALJ’s RFC accounted for this difficulty by limiting
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie to “simple, repetitive tasks,” id., Vol. 3 at 305 (bolding
omitted).
Turning to Ms. Honeyman’s own treatment notes, the ALJ cited to the
exhibit containing them but provided no discussion of them. We see no reason to
depart from our general practice “to take a lower tribunal at its word when it
declares that it has considered a matter.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168,
1173 (10th Cir. 2005). We have reviewed those notes signed by Ms. Honeywell,
which amount to six progress notes from treatment sessions for low self esteem
and communication problems in July and August 2006, see Aplt. App., Vol. 2
at 229, 231-33, 235-36; and two referrals to a medication clinic, see id. at 230,
234. Nothing in those notes indicates marked or severe limitations in any
functional areas as reported in Ms. Honeyman’s September 1, 2006, MRFCA.
The notes contain comments such as “low self esteem,” “poor hygiene,” “no
energy or motivation,” “eye contact was continual & her posture was relaxed,” id.
at 236; “using rapid speech and eye contact was good,” “she switched subjects
frequently,” “moderate progress was made due to short attention span,” id. at 235;
“rigid & stiff posture & movements, elevated speech, clenched fists, narrow eye
contact,” “posture was relaxed & eye contact was continual,” id. at 233; “eye
contact was sporadic & her posture was rigid,” “moderate progress was made due
to needing reminders to stay focused,” id. at 232; “eye contact was continual &
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her posture was slumped,” “moderate progress was made due to being distracted
easily & forgetting her objectives & needing reminders,” id. at 231; “eye contact
was continual & her posture was slumped,” “moderate progress was made due to
short attention span & changing subjects frequently,” id. at 229. Thus, because
Ms. Honeyman’s notes do not contain any evidence that the ALJ had to reject or
weigh in order to discount the severity of the restrictions in her MRFCA, his
failure to discuss those notes in detail is not error. See Howard v. Barnhart,
379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that, when the medical evidence does
not conflict with an ALJ’s conclusion, “the need for express analysis is
weakened”).
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie also contends that the treatment notes of other Edwin
Fair therapists substantiate Ms. Honeyman’s MRFCA. In support, she references
large swaths of the record “as summarized in [her] Statement of Facts.” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 23. However, the notes she describes in detail in her statement of
facts consist primarily of her own subjective reports. The only other “note” to
which she refers that might “substantiate” Ms. Honeyman’s MRFCA is a
discharge summary dated January 19, 2007, on which Ms. Honeyman noted that
her GAF score was 25 at both admission and discharge. A GAF score in the
21-30 range indicates “[b]ehavior [that] is considerably influenced by delusions
or hallucinations OR serious impairment in communication or judgment (e.g.,
sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) OR
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inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home,
or friends).” DSM-IV at 34 (bolding omitted). However, an October 2006
treatment note reports that although depressed, Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie “was not
delusional,” “did not report any hallucinations,” and denied suicidal thoughts.
Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 444. And nothing in that note or any others in the months
leading up to her discharge suggests more generally any impairment consistent
with the DSM-IV’s description of a GAF score in the 21-30 range. Moreover, in
the “needs and preferences” section of the discharge summary itself,
Ms. Honeyman stated only that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie needs “anger management.”
Id. at 438. Thus, we see nothing supporting a GAF score of 25, and therefore the
score itself does not substantiate Ms. Honeyman’s MRFCA.
B. Credibility Determination
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie next takes issue with the ALJ’s credibility
determination. She first claims the ALJ applied an incorrect standard of proof
when he stated that one of “two factors [that] weigh against considering [her
allegations of fairly limited ADLs] to be strong evidence in favor of finding [her]
disabled” was that her “allegedly limited daily activities cannot be objectively
verified with any reasonable degree of certainty.” Id. at 308. We rejected the
same argument concerning the identical wording in Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048(10th Cir. 2009). We noted that the ALJ “made this statement subsequent to, and
thus in light of, his adverse [credibility] determination.” Id. at 1069. We then
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concluded that the ALJ’s statement “did not state a standard by which the ALJ
made his adverse [credibility] determination” but was instead “merely a common
sense observation that the ALJ would not treat Claimant’s testimony as ‘strong
evidence’ of her disability due to his prior determination that [her] testimony was
not ‘fully credible.’” Id. at 1070. We ultimately determined that the ALJ
fulfilled his duty to “closely and affirmatively link[]” his credibility
determination to “substantial record evidence.” Id.For the reasons explained in Wall, we conclude that the ALJ did not rely on
an improper standard by his reference to “objectively verified with any reasonable
degree of certainty.” Further, we conclude that the ALJ’s credibility
determination was “closely and affirmatively linked to substantial record
evidence.” Id. The ALJ considered Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s ability to perform
certain ADLs, specifically to do some household chores, attend to her personal
hygiene, and drive. Although minimal ADLs alone do not constitute “substantial
evidence that a claimant does not suffer disabling pain,” an ALJ may consider
ADLs as part of his evaluation of a claimant’s credibility. Hamlin v. Barnhart,
365 F.3d 1208, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The ALJ did
not solely rely on Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s ADLs but instead evaluated them as part
of his credibility analysis. The ALJ also noted that record evidence showed
medications effectively controlled Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s symptoms. For example,
she informed her therapist at a session on March 7, 2005, that she was feeling
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“really good,” and that her “meds [were] kicking in.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 255.
On another occasion, apparently when she had been off her medications for two
months because she couldn’t afford them, she reported that she thought her
“medication was working” and that she could not “function without it.” Id.
at 187. And an Edwin Fair psychiatrist noted that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie thought the
antidepressant Lexapro “worked well for her.” Id., Vol. 3 at 444. Although
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie testified that medication did not seem to fix her bipolar
disorder, id. at 320, the ALJ was free to disbelieve her in light of her other
statements to her therapists.
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie also raises a number of complaints about the ALJ’s
handling of certain other evidence allegedly related to her credibility. She claims
it was improper for the ALJ to rely on the fact that her “doctors did not write in
their notes that she was disabled or that she had a[n] RFC less than the one he had
assigned.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 26. This is a selective reading of the ALJ’s
statement that “other than [Ms. Honeyman’s MRFCA], the record does not
contain any opinions from treating or examining physicians indicating that the
claimant is disabled or that she even has limitations greater than those determined
in this decision.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 308. We read the ALJ’s observation to be
part of his analysis of why the marked and severe limitations in Ms. Honeyman’s
MRFCA were inconsistent with the other record evidence—because none of the
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other evidence suggested similarly severe limitations—and not part of his
credibility determination.
Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie next takes issue with the ALJ’s observation that her
treatment was “conservative in nature,” id. at 309, claiming this violates the
familiar principle that an ALJ may “not interpose his own ‘medical expertise’
over that of a physician.” Kemp v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 1469, 1476 (10th Cir. 1987).
We disagree. An ALJ can take note of the level of treatment in assessing a
claimant’s credibility. See Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1173 (approving ALJ’s reliance
on fact that claimant “had responded to conservative treatment” as part of
credibility evaluation); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v) (listing “[t]reatment” as one
factor that may be considered when evaluating symptoms); id. § 416.929(c)(3)(v)
(same). He did no more than that here. On a related note, Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie
faults the ALJ for noting that “she has required no inpatient hospitalizations,”
Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 309, claiming this overlooks that she was twice hospitalized
after suicide attempts. However, the only record evidence related to any such
hospitalizations is a June 2006 note recording that she told her counselor about it.
Id., Vol. 2 at 240. Lacking any record substantiation of these alleged
hospitalizations, we cannot say the ALJ erred in observing “she has required no
inpatient hospitalizations.” Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie further contends the “ALJ
ignored [her] visits to doctors and emergency rooms for various injuries, which
makes her testimony credible.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 27. But the evidence she
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cites in support relates to a variety of physical injuries, including a broken foot
and a strained neck, and lends no support to the credibility of her testimony
regarding the severity of her mental impairments.
The ALJ also considered Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s testimony that her husband
described her as “lazy,” from which the ALJ reasoned that, “if [her] disabilities
were as severe as [she] professes, the husband would see this and not simply state
she was lazy.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 309. Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie complains that her
husband is not a qualified medical expert. However, an ALJ may consider lay
witness statements. See Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 914-15 (10th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, the ALJ made his observation with regard to her allegations of
disabling physical impairments, which Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie did not press in the
district court or in this appeal, not with regard to her credibility concerning the
severity of her mental impairments.
Next, Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie claims the ALJ miscast the record evidence when
he “faulted [her] for not going to free clinics, ignoring that she did.” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 28. We assume she is referring to the ALJ’s observation that, “at
the time of the hearing,” she was “‘unable to see a doctor,’ because she has no
insurance,” and his conclusion that “it [is] reasonable to assume that if the
claimant were truly in need of medical care, she would exhaust every means
possible to obtain such services,” including “public facilities available to those
who do not have insurance or who are unable to pay for medical care. . . . [T]here
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are no references within the record that [she] has sought out these types of
facilities.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 309 (emphasis added). Clearly, the ALJ was
referring to her failure to seek free treatment at the time of the hearing. It is
equally clear that the ALJ did not ignore that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie had received
free treatment at Edwin Fair in the past, commenting earlier in his decision that
she had not returned to Edwin Fair for more than six months after moving back to
the clinic’s locality, and that her explanation was “that she has meant to go back,
but she hasn’t been able to get up and do that. She would have to go through
input and all that.” Id. at 307. Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie claims the ALJ overlooked
her testimony that she was too depressed to return to Edwin Fair, but the ALJ’s
remark that she was not “able to get up and [return]” to Edwin Fair, id., indicates
otherwise.
Finally, Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie claims the ALJ ignored the side effects of her
medication, apparently increased appetite that allegedly resulted in a weight gain
of forty pounds. However, she has not argued that the ALJ overlooked or
improperly evaluated her obesity. She also claims the ALJ overlooked her
testimony that her medications made her “wirey,” but she has not indicated how
being “wirey” might affect the ALJ’s decision.
In sum, the ALJ closely and affirmatively linked his adverse credibility
finding to substantial evidence in the record and did not employ an incorrect legal
standard. “Our precedents do not require more, and our limited scope of review
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precludes us from reweighing the evidence or substituting our judgment for that
of the agency.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1070 (quotation marks omitted) (brackets
omitted).
C. Past relevant work
The ALJ determined at step four that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie could return to
her past relevant work as a dishwasher. She complains that the ALJ’s failure to
make a specific finding about the mental demands of the dishwashing job or
inquire of the vocational expert about those demands runs afoul of our decision in
Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1025 (10th Cir. 1996). We disagree.
In Winfrey, we described the three-phases of a step-four analysis. At phase
one, an ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC. It is uncontested that the ALJ
did so. At phase two, “the ALJ must make findings regarding the physical and
mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work.” Id. at 1024. To make
such findings, an ALJ must obtain adequate “factual information about those
work demands which have a bearing on the medically established limitations.’”
SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3 (1982). The ALJ’s phase-two task is
case-dependent. See id. (“Detailed information about . . . mental demands [of
past relevant work]. . . must be obtained as appropriate.” (emphasis added)).
The only medically established limitations at issue in our Winfrey analysis
are the ALJ’s findings that Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie could “only perform simple,
repetitive tasks” and have only “incidental contact with the public.” Aplt. App.,
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Vol. 3 at 305 (bolding omitted). Thus, the ALJ needed only to obtain enough
information regarding those limitations to determine whether Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie
could perform her past relevant work as a dishwasher despite them. Winfrey,
92 F.3d at 1025. This he did. The VE agreed with the ALJ that the dishwashing
job was unskilled. As relevant to the identified mental limitations, an unskilled
job is “work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1568(a) (emphasis added). Such work “ordinarily involve[s] dealing
primarily with objects, rather than with data or people.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL
56857, at *4 (1985) (emphasis added). Thus, the ALJ had sufficient information
regarding the mental demands of Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s dishwashing job relevant
to the mental limitations in her RFC—“simple, repetitive tasks” and only
“incidental contact with the public.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 305.
In phase three of the Winfrey analysis, the ALJ must make findings about a
claimant’s “ability to meet the mental demands of [her] past relevant work despite
[her] mental impairments.” Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1025. In making the phase-three
findings, an “ALJ may rely on information supplied by the VE at step four,” but
“the ALJ himself must make the required findings on the record, including his
own evaluation of the claimant’s ability to perform [her] past relevant work.” Id.In his written decision, the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony, which was
consistent with the information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, in
comparing Ms. Zaricor-Ritchie’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of
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the dishwashing job and found that she could perform that job as actually
performed despite the identified mental impairments. Such reliance is entirely
permissible. See Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 761 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding
no Winfrey error where ALJ relied on VE’s testimony in support of the ALJ’s own
phase-two and phase-three findings). Consequently, we conclude that the ALJ’s
Winfrey analysis was sufficient.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Senior Circuit Judge
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