United States v. Sitlington , 527 F. App'x 788 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 13, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 12-6273
CODY ALLEN SITLINGTON, (D.C. No. 5:11-CR-00360-HE-1)
(W. D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
submitted without oral argument.
Cody Sitlington entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 235 months of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. He appeals from the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
On the night of October 10, 2011, Officer Dustin Spiwak and Corporal Kimberly
Dibble of the Shawnee Police Department were on duty when they heard a be-on-the-
lookout call for a dark gray Toyota pickup truck traveling at a high speed. Later, this
same truck drove towards them, head on. The officers activated their patrol car’s
emergency overhead lights, at which point the truck changed lanes, passed the officers,
and ultimately stopped. When the officers approached the truck, they came into contact
with the driver, Cody Sitlington. Sitlington’s speech was slurred and he had trouble
comprehending what Corporal Dibble was asking him. When asked if he had consumed
alcohol, Sitlington said he had not, but admitted he had taken Xanax earlier that night.
The officers placed Sitlington under arrest for driving under the influence of narcotics.
After placing Sitlington under arrest, the officers impounded the truck as Sitlington
could not drive it and it needed to be removed from the roadway. As is the Department’s
routine procedure after a vehicle is impounded, the officers conducted an inventory
search. Officer Spiwak began to inventory the truck from the front to the back of the
truck, and he filled out a Shawnee Police Department inventory form regarding the
contents of the truck. In the cab of the truck, Officer Spiwak found packages of
controlled dangerous substances, a rifle case, and spotlights. In the bed of the truck,
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Officer Spiwak found a locked toolbox. The key to the toolbox was located on the key
ring of the ignition, and Officer Spiwak used the key to unlock the toolbox. Inside the
toolbox, he found a Sig Sauer rifle, which he immediately seized.
Officer Spiwak did not write down every single item that he found in the truck.
The inventory form that Officer Spiwak filled out listed the following items:
2 spotlights
Rifle Scope SIN STM432G
Stanley Tool Kit 201 pc
2 Gun cases
misc household items
knife (SOG)
misc chemicals & beakers from tool box
Aplt. App. at 152.
It was Officer Spiwak’s failure to take a more detailed tally of the truck’s contents
that gave rise to Sitlington’s challenge of the search. Sitlington filed a motion to suppress
with the district court, arguing that the inventory search violated his Fourth Amendment
rights because the officers did not follow the Department’s standardized procedures when
they conducted the inventory search of his truck. Id. at 21. At the suppression hearing,
Officer Spiwak explained that the category of “miscellaneous household items” included
matchbooks, miscellaneous tools, bolt cutters, and a four-way lug wrench. Id. at 73. He
also explained that the category of “miscellaneous chemicals and beakers” included
hydrogen peroxide, organic solvents, rubbing alcohol, plastic tubing, glass beakers, and
glass test tubes. Id. Officer Spiwak could not recall whether he found other items,
including a brand new tire and wheel that Sitlington claimed were in the truck. Id. at 89-
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90.
The district court denied Sitlington’s motion to suppress, finding that the inventory
search did not violate Sitlington’s Fourth Amendment rights:
[T]he inventory process that was conducted here, it
seems to me, was far from ideal. I would not expect an
inventory process to . . . minutely describe every conceivable
thing that you would find in somebody’s toolbox or trunk or
glove compartment. . . .
But it does, it seems to me, require a sufficient level of
detail to be reasonably related to the purposes that were
indicated, and enough to suggest that the whole process just
wasn’t some kind of a sham to justify rummaging through the
stuff. Here, I think the question is close because there were
items in the toolbox . . . that I would have thought would have
been listed on an inventory. . . .
....
But the ultimate question, it seems to me, is whether or
not there was a sufficient effort to accomplish an actual
inventory such that the process wasn’t essentially a sham.
And it seems to me that on the showing here I’m persuaded
that there was still essentially an inventory process that was
conducted here, and that the circumstances don’t show this to
have been simply a sham. The inventory listing did include in
it a number of items that would appear to be the most valuable
....
So for those reasons, it does seem to me that the search
was of such a nature that it would comply with the Fourth
Amendment exception relating to inventory searches, and the
defendant’s motion to suppress will, therefore, be overruled.
Id. at 133-35.
II
Sitlington appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He
argues that the inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment because the police
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officers failed to provide a more detailed inventory of the contents of the truck pursuant
to Shawnee Police Department policy. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress de novo. United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 8 (10th Cir. 2013). “We accept
the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Id.An inventory search is “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement,”
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976)), that “serve[s] to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody
of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard
the police from danger.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). An inventory
search is “reasonable only if conducted according to standardized procedures,” and it
“must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.”
United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769, 772-73 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Bertine,
479 U.S. at 376; Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
Sitlington does not contend that the impoundment of his truck violated the Fourth
Amendment. However, Sitlington argues that the inventory search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because the search was not conducted in accordance with Shawnee
Police Department policy. The impound and inventory policy of the Shawnee Police
Department states:
A record shall be maintained of all vehicles impounded at the
direction of an officer and the contents of each impounded
vehicle shall be completely inventoried prior to the removal
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of the vehicle from the scene to the place of impoundment.
The inventory shall include all items of value and other
tangible personal property . . . . The inventory shall include
all areas of or in the vehicle that are capable of being opened,
locked or unlocked containers or compartments when on a
lawful impound with minimum force, absent of exigent
circumstances. In the event that exigent circumstances exist,
officers may use whatever force is necessary to enter a
locked, sealed or otherwise secured compartment, container
or any other area in or of the vehicle. The inventory shall be
recorded on the impoundment sheet.
Aplt. App. at 154 (emphasis added). According to Sitlington, Officer Spiwak’s “general
notations” on the inventory form were incomplete and inaccurate, which did not fulfill the
purposes of an inventory search. Instead, Sitlington argues, the search amounted to a
pretextual investigatory search. Sitlington contends that the items listed on the inventory
sheet were generally items that could be deemed suspicious, and once Officer Spiwak
found the rifle bag and rifle scope in the cab of the truck, Officer Spiwak searched the rest
of the truck until he found the rifle. Aplt. Br. at 29-30.
This court has not addressed the question of whether a police officer’s catalog of
an inventory search that lacks sufficient detail is violative of the Fourth Amendment.
Other circuit courts that have addressed this issue are in disagreement. Compare United
States v. Kindle, 293 F. App’x 497, 500 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder the totality of the
circumstances . . . an incomplete inventory list does not establish that the inventory was
subterfuge for an unconstitutional investigatory search.”), and United States v. Lopez,
547 F.3d 364, 371 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The concept of an inventory does not demand the
separate itemization of every single object.”), with United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d
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774, 780-82 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that an inventory search was invalid when law
enforcement failed to follow standardized procedures and searched the vehicle for only
incriminating evidence).
Without reaching the question of whether the officers’ inventory search of
Sitlington’s truck was constitutionally sound, we conclude that the rifle would have been
inevitably discovered in a properly-conducted inventory search. Although the
government did not raise the inevitable discovery doctrine in district court but instead
raised it on appeal for the first time, “[w]e are free to affirm the district court’s decision
on any ground supported by the record.”1 United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1185
(10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 844-45 (10th Cir.
2012). The inevitable discovery doctrine establishes that when “the evidence in question
would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or
1
Sitlington argues that because the government did not raise the inevitable
discovery doctrine in district court, the government has waived its argument based on the
inevitable discovery doctrine on appeal. Aplt. Reply Br. at 18-19. In determining
whether to consider an alternative theory on appeal, we are guided by the following
factors: “‘[1] whether the ground was fully briefed and argued here and below; [2]
whether the parties have had a fair opportunity to develop the factual record; and [3]
whether, in light of factual findings to which we defer or uncontested facts, our decision
would involve only questions of law.’” United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 844 (10th
Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th
Cir. 2004)). All three factors weigh in favor of considering the inevitable discovery
doctrine. First, although the inevitable discovery doctrine was not raised in district court,
both parties argued the inevitable discovery doctrine before this court. Second, both
parties were afforded a fair opportunity to develop the factual record. And third, our
decision would involve only questions of law because the ultimate determination of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a legal question that we review de novo. United
States v. Forbes, 528 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2008)
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misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.”
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984).
We have repeatedly applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to cases involving, as
here, an improper inventory search that was preceded by a lawful impoundment. See,
e.g., Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d at 773-74; United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 732 (10th
Cir. 1992); but see United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir. 1992)
(declining to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine where an inventory search was
preceded by an unlawful impoundment). In applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to
cases involving improper inventory searches, we have held that “‘[e]ven assuming
arguendo that the post-arrest search . . . was improper and should have been conducted in
a different manner, had the search been conducted in the manner defendant suggests is
proper, it was inevitable that the weapons would have been discovered.’” Haro-Salcedo,
107 F.3d at 774 (alteration in original) (quoting Horn, 970 F.2d at 732).
Here, police officers lawfully impounded Sitlington’s truck after his arrest in
accordance with Shawnee Police Department policy. See Aplt. App. at 153 (“When the
operator of a motor vehicle is taken into custody . . . [t]he vehicle will be impounded.”).
Sitlington does not dispute that a properly-conducted inventory search would have
uncovered the firearm in the truck. The material facts of this case are indistinguishable
from Haro-Salcedo, in which the defendant argued that “the officers’ deviation from
standard departmental procedures revealed the impermissible purpose of the [inventory]
search.” 107 F.3d at 774. In Haro-Salcedo, we applied the inevitable discovery doctrine
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and affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. We conclude that the
same reasoning applies in this case, and we conclude that the rifle would have been
inevitably discovered.
III
Accordingly, we affirm.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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