Muniz v. Boulder Cnty Comm'r ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 15 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CARMELITA T. MUNIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1325
(D.C. No. 97-S-2092)
CHRISTINE HIGHNAM, individually (D. Colo.)
and as Director of Boulder County
Department of Social Services;
BOULDER COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Carmelita Muniz was the Human Resources Manager for the
Boulder County Department of Social Services until her termination in July 1996.
She brought this action against defendants asserting claims for discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, for violation of her First, Fifth,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. She appeals the district court’s order of September 2, 1998, dismissing
her due process claim and the court’s order of July 18, 2000, granting summary
judgment to defendants on her Title VII and § 1981 claims. Plaintiff does not
appeal the court’s disposition of any of her other claims. We exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 1
At the outset, we must address defendants’ contention that we do not have
jurisdiction to review the disposition of plaintiff’s due process claim because
plaintiff did not designate the court’s order of September 2, 1998, in her notice of
appeal. The notice stated only that plaintiff was appealing from the judgment and
order of dismissal entered July 18, 2000.
“Our jurisdiction is limited to the judgment, order, or part thereof
designated in the notice of appeal, but the notice of appeal is not to be given a
wooden interpretation.” Perington Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp. , 631
F.2d 1369, 1379 (10th Cir. 1980) (on rehearing) (citation omitted). “[W]e
construe notices of appeal liberally in order to avoid denying review of issues the
parties clearly intended to appeal.” Dupree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 956 F.2d
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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219, 220 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Thus, we have permitted a
notice of appeal that names only the final judgment to support review of earlier
interlocutory orders that merge in the final judgment “under the general rule that
appeal from a final judgment supports review of all interlocutory orders.” Cole v
Ruidoso Mun. Sch. , 43 F.3d 1373, 1382 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff clearly intended to appeal the district court’s dismissal of her due
process claim, and we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review that dismissal
even though plaintiff did not specifically designate the dismissal order in the
notice of appeal.
The facts of this case are well known to the parties, and we will not repeat
them here except as necessary to our analysis. The district court dismissed
plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant Christine Highnam in her official
capacity as the Director of the Department of Social Services on the basis of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s claim
against Ms. Highnam in her personal capacity on the basis of qualified immunity.
Plaintiff challenges only the latter dismissal.
“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “In
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analyzing qualified immunity claims, we first ask if a plaintiff has asserted the
violation of a constitutional right at all, and then assess whether that right was
clearly established at the time of a defendant’s actions.” Clanton v. Cooper , 129
F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1997).
The district court concluded that plaintiff’s claim failed on the first prong
of the analysis, because she failed to assert the violation of a constitutional right.
Defendant Highnam placed plaintiff on administrative leave on July 5, 1996, and
told her she was considering firing plaintiff. On July 8, Ms. Highnam wrote
plaintiff a letter informing her that a pre-disciplinary conference was scheduled
for July 12 to discuss the facts that might lead to termination. In the letter,
Ms. Highnam informed plaintiff of the information she currently had before her
and of the reasons she was considering firing plaintiff. Plaintiff appeared at the
conference with counsel. She objected to Ms. Highnam conducting the
conference, on the ground that she was not impartial, and to the presence of a
County Attorney who had been involved in the circumstances leading up to the
disciplinary proceedings. The conference went forward, nonetheless, and plaintiff
was given an opportunity to defend her actions. On July 17, Ms. Highnam sent a
letter to plaintiff and her counsel informing them of her decision to terminate
plaintiff effective July 19, and setting forth her reasons for doing so. Plaintiff
subsequently appealed her termination administratively and received a
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post-termination hearing before an administrative law judge at which she had an
opportunity to subpoena witnesses, present her own testimony, and present
argument in support of her position. The administrative law judge affirmed the
termination decision.
The district court determined that plaintiff could not assert a due process
violation because she had received all the process she was due. See, e.g., West v.
Grand County , 967 F.2d 362, 367-70 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing pre-termination
and post-termination process due a public employee). Accordingly, the court
concluded that defendant Highnam was entitled to qualified immunity. Based on
our own careful review, we affirm the district court’s determination that plaintiff
received all the process to which she was entitled and, therefore, failed to
establish that defendant Highnam violated her due process rights.
We turn, then, to plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 claims for discrimination
and retaliation. Plaintiff contended that she was terminated because she was
Hispanic and because she spoke out against discrimination against other minority
employees within the Department of Social Services. Defendants contended that
plaintiff was neither discriminated against nor retaliated against, but was
terminated for her exceedingly poor judgment and negligence in connection with
the hiring of several employees who had criminal records.
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Plaintiff relied upon indirect evidence to support her claims of
discrimination. Accordingly, the district court analyzed the case under the
burden-shifting approach established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973). This analytical framework applied equally to plaintiff’s
Title VII and § 1981 claims. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc. , 220
F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000).
In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff relying on
McDonnell Douglas bears an initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case intended to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons that might account for the adverse employment action. Once
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden then
shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action
against the plaintiff. If the defendant successfully meets its burden
of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to put forth
evidence sufficient to allow a jury to find that the defendant's reason
is pretextual, e.g. , that it is unworthy of belief.
English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr. , 248 F.3d 1002, 1008 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation
and citations omitted; alteration in original).
In moving for summary judgment, defendants assumed for the sake of
argument that plaintiff could establish her prima facie case. They then came
forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff. In
her letter of July 17, 1996, setting forth her decision to terminate plaintiff,
defendant Highnam stated that she made the decision “after much deliberation,
after considering Ms. Muniz’ ten year history with the Department, and after
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consideration of the alternatives.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 46, Ex. 3 at 2. Ms. Highnam
further explained:
Unfortunately, the recent incidents described in my July 8, 1996
letter . . . have shattered my trust in Ms. Muniz’ judgment and
willingness to provide me with information essential to make human
resources decision[s]. In these circumstances, progressive discipline
is not “practicable,” and the Merit System permits immediate
dismissal, due to the seriousness of the offense.
The bases for terminating Ms. Muniz, as described in my
July 8, 1996 letter, are her repeated failures to provide me critical
information concerning employees. While Ms. Muniz attempts to
portray the issue as a concern for routine police records checks, the
issues here were not routine, and a Human Resources Manager
should have brought these matters to my attention. Ms. Muniz
admits that she was informed by Veda English and Curt Butler on
March 8, 1996 that Ms. English, a social worker, had been convicted
of assault on a developmentally disabled patient. She did not
disclose this critically important information to me for over two
months, and instructed Mr. Butler not to disclose this information to
his manager. Similarly, with Ms. Guidry, Ms. Muniz knew that
Ms. Guidry had been fired from her job with the Denver Police
Department, and convicted of crimes relating to misuse and sale of
government information. Ms. Muniz either deliberately withheld this
information from me, or showed extremely poor judgment in failing
to provide this information to me prior to Ms. Guidry’s hiring, and
for almost two months thereafter. Ms. Muniz also failed to provide
me accurate information about the time required to obtain criminal
records checks on employees. These are such extreme situations that
my trust in her ability to act as Human Resources Manager for the
Department has been destroyed. Ms. Muniz’ withholding of
information may have jeopardized the safety of Department clients,
exposed the Department to liability, and jeopardized the security of
the Department records.
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Once defendants articulated this legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating plaintiff, the burden shifted to plaintiff to raise a material issue of
fact as to whether the reason articulated by defendants was pretextual.
A plaintiff typically makes a showing of pretext in one of three ways:
(1) with evidence that the defendant’s stated reason for
the adverse employment action was false; (2) with
evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written
company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the
defendant under the circumstances; or (3) with evidence
that the defendant acted contrary to an unwritten policy
or contrary to company practice when making the
adverse employment decision affecting the plaintiff. A
plaintiff who wishes to show that the company acted
contrary to an unwritten policy or to company practice
often does so by providing evidence that he was treated
differently from other similarly-situated employees who
violated work rules of comparable seriousness.
English , 248 F.3d at 1009 (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff relied on a variety of factors to establish pretext. First, she argued
that she did not really violate a work rule, because the policy on criminal
background checks (which she developed and implemented) did not have a
required time frame for conducting the background checks, the policy did not
require her involvement until after the Department received the results of the
background check from the police, and her assistant was the one responsible for
sending the routine requests for background checks to the police and she fell a
month behind in doing so without plaintiff’s knowledge. Plaintiff also presented
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a different version of what was said during her meeting with Mr. Butler and
Ms. English concerning Ms. English’s conviction. Plaintiff tried to justify her
handling of the Guidry matter by pointing out that she did not hire Ms. Guidry,
her assistant did; Ms. Guidry’s name came from the Merit System register; and
the criminal case against Ms. Guidry was dismissed after she complied with the
deferred judgment and sentence, which was before she was hired by the
Department.
Plaintiff also presented evidence that up until shortly before he was
terminated, she had received above-standard and outstanding performance
evaluations, and in February 1996 she was reappointed to the Benefits Advisory
Board and she was awarded a longevity recognition award by defendant Highnam.
Plaintiff also relied on the fact that in ruling on her uncontested application for
unemployment benefits, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment
found that she did not commit any volitional act that could be construed as the
cause for her separation. Plaintiff also argued that similarly situated employees
were not disciplined as harshly for what she believed to be similar infractions,
and she submitted a report by the Colorado Institute for Hispanic Education &
Economic Development indicating that racism existed in the workplace at the
Department. Finally, plaintiff presented affidavits from four other Department
employees expressing their opinions that racism existed within the Department.
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The district court concluded, for various reasons, that none of the evidence
presented by plaintiff raised a material fact as to pretext. We have carefully
reviewed the entire record in this case and, based upon our review, we affirm the
district court’s determination that plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to pretext. Accordingly, the district court properly entered
summary judgment against plaintiff on her Title VII and § 1981 claims of
discriminatory discharge.
Plaintiff also asserted Title VII and § 1981 claims for retaliatory discharge.
She alleged that she was retaliated against for continually speaking out against
discrimination she witnessed against other employees in the Department and, in
particular, against Susie Goodloe, the only black supervisor in the Department.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [a plaintiff] must establish
that: (1) he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.” O’Neal v. Ferguson
Constr. Co ., 237 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001). “These elements are identical
for § 1981 and Title VII actions.” Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc. , 149 F.3d
1098, 1103 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998).
“As with claims for discriminatory discharge, if the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
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nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer
satisfies this burden of production, then, in order to prevail on her retaliation
claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s articulated reason for the
adverse action is pretextual, i.e. unworthy of belief.” Selenke v. Med. Imaging of
Colo. , 248 F.3d 1249, 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish her prima facie
case because she did not make the requisite showing of a causal connection
between her termination and her alleged protected activity. Our review of the
record supports the district court’s determination. Moreover, even if we were to
assume that plaintiff established her prima facie case, her claim would fail
because she failed to raise a triable issue of fact with regard to pretext, as
discussed above. Therefore, we conclude the district court properly entered
summary judgment against plaintiff on her Title VII and § 1981 claims of
retaliatory discharge.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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