Toppins v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co. , 460 F. App'x 768 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 2, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA LEIGH TOPPINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-5062
(D.C. No. 4:10-CV-00426-GKF-FHM)
MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE (N.D. Okla.)
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Melissa Leigh Toppins appeals the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of Minnesota Life Insurance Co. (“Minnesota Life”) on her claims that
Minnesota Life breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by not paying her
the proceeds of a life insurance policy for 47 days after its receipt of her claim.
We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
Ms. Toppins’s husband Timothy Toppins took out a million-dollar life
insurance policy with Minnesota Life. The policy was issued on August 26, 2008.
Mr. Toppins was killed when the private aircraft in which he was a passenger
crashed on February 28, 2010. Ms. Toppins submitted the necessary claim form
and death certificate, which Minnesota Life received on March 17, 2010. Also on
March 17, 2010, because Mr. Toppins had died within two years of the policy
issue date, Minnesota Life began a routine investigation by referring its
investigation to a third-party vendor who, in turn, requested Joe Jolly to interview
Ms. Toppins. Mr. Jolly then interviewed Ms. Toppins by telephone on March 23,
2010.
Legal counsel for Ms. Toppins became involved on March 29, 2010, and
directed Mr. Jolly to contact him, not Ms. Toppins. On March 31, 2010, Mr. Jolly
sent to counsel his report and a medical information release form, asking that
Ms. Toppins sign them. Rather than have his client sign the documents, counsel
demanded immediate payment and disputed Minnesota Life’s right to conduct an
investigation. Counsel filed the underlying lawsuit in Oklahoma state court on
April 22, 2010.
On April 27, 2010, Ms. Toppins’s counsel informed Minnesota Life that his
client did not have any changes to Mr. Jolly’s proposed written report. Based on
that representation and without requiring Ms. Toppins to sign the statement or
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provide medical authorizations, on April 29, 2010, Minnesota Life determined
that it would pay the policy, and contacted its reinsurer to confirm the decision.
On April 28 and 29, 2010, Minnesota Life informed Ms. Toppins’s attorney that it
was awaiting confirmation from its reinsurer. On Friday, April 30, 2010, the
reinsurer confirmed the payment decision and on the following Monday, May 3,
2010, Minnesota Life sent a check in the amount of $1,007,043.76 to
Ms. Toppins, which represented the one-million dollar policy amount plus
statutory interest.
Minnesota Life removed the lawsuit to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Eventually, the district court granted
Minnesota Life’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Minnesota Life
did not act unreasonably or in bad faith. Ms. Toppins appeals, asserting that
summary judgment was improper on her claim that Minnesota Life breached the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. 1
Standards of Review
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standards that the district court should have applied.”
Cohen-Esrey Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 1300,
1
Ms. Toppins has waived all other claims by not arguing them in her
appellate briefs. Issues not argued to the appellate court are deemed waived.
Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1182 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002).
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1302 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “We examine the record and all reasonable inferences that might
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Cohen-Esrey Real Estate Servs., Inc., 636 F.3d at 1302 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In this diversity case, we must “apply Oklahoma law with the objective
that the result obtained in the federal court should be the result that would be
reached in an Oklahoma court.” Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1228
(10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Analysis
Ms. Toppins challenges the district court’s conclusion that Minnesota Life
did not act unreasonably or in bad faith. She argues that Minnesota Life breached
its duty of good faith and fair dealing as follows: (1) it delayed payment while
waiting for the reinsurer’s confirmation of its decision to pay, (2) it delayed
payment while it waited for Ms. Toppins to sign her statement and complete the
medical records authorizations, (3) it engaged in a standard practice of conducting
underwriting review after an insured’s death, and (4) it did not pay on the policy
within 30 days of receipt of the claim. Ms. Toppins further argues that under
Oklahoma law, the question of whether an insurance company has violated the
duty of good faith and fair dealing is a jury question, disputed material facts
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precluded summary judgment, the fact that Mr. Jolly destroyed his interview
notes gives rise to a negative inference, and she was entitled to damages.
In Oklahoma, tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing requires “a clear showing that the insurer unreasonably, and in
bad faith, withholds payment of the claim of its insured.” Christian v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla. 1977). The essence of the tort is failing
to promptly pay a claim “unless the insurer has a reasonable belief that the claim
is legally or factually insufficient.” Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105,
1109 (Okla. 1991). “[T]o determine the validity of the claim, the insurer must
conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances. The
knowledge and belief of the insurer during the time period the claim is being
reviewed is the focus of a bad-faith claim.” Newport v. USAA, 11 P.3d 190, 198
(Okla. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). To make out a prima facie case
against an insurance company for a bad faith delay in payment, a plaintiff must
establish:
(1) claimant was entitled to coverage under the insurance policy at
issue; (2) the insurer had no reasonable basis for delaying payment;
(3) the insurer did not deal fairly and in good faith with the claimant;
and (4) the insurer’s violation of its duty of good faith and fair
dealing was the direct cause of the claimant’s injury. The absence of
any one of these elements defeats a bad faith claim.
Beers v. Hillory, 241 P.3d 285, 292 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Ms. Toppins has the burden of proof. McCorkle v. Great
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Atlantic Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 587 (Okla. 1981).
Ms. Toppins claims that Minnesota Life unreasonably withheld payment in
bad faith by seeking its reinsurer’s confirmation of its decision to pay. She
contends that she was not a party to any contract between Minnesota Life and its
reinsurer and the delay of four business days was unreasonable. We disagree with
both of Ms. Toppins’s contentions, particularly because she has cited no authority
for her proposition that an insurer is not entitled to take a few days to confer with
its reinsurer. It was not unreasonable for Minnesota Life to obtain confirmation
from its reinsurer, nor was the four-day delay unreasonable.
Next, Ms. Toppins objects to Minnesota Life’s decision to delay payment
pending her signature on the statement she gave to investigator Jolly and
completion of the medical records authorizations. She asserts that the policy did
not allow for an investigation, so she was not required to sign these documents.
But because Mr. Toppins died within two years of the policy issue date, the
policy’s provision concerning incontestability applied. That provision provided
for the policy to become incontestable, except for nonpayment of premiums, after
it “has been in force during the insured’s lifetime for two years from the policy
date.” Aplt. App. 130; see also Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 4004 (“There shall be a
provision that the policy . . . shall be incontestable, except for nonpayment of
premiums, after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period
of two (2) years from its date of issue.”). “It was not bad faith for [Minnesota
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Life] to investigate a claim when the insured died within the two year
incontestable period.” Marshall v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 651, 653
(Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
Ms. Toppins next asserts that Minnesota Life breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing by engaging in a standard practice of conducting
underwriting review after an insured’s death. We must reject this claim. “The
tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract must be based upon an insurer’s
wrongful denial of a claim; it cannot be based upon the conduct of the insurer in
selling and issuing the policy.” Hays v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 105 F.3d
583, 590 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Claborn v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co., 910 P.2d
1046, 1051 (Okla. 1996)). Therefore, any evidence that Minnesota Life engaged
in post-death underwriting was irrelevant to the issue of whether Minnesota Life
acted tortiously in paying Ms. Toppins’s claim. See id.
Ms. Toppins complains that Minnesota Life did not pay on the policy
within 30 days of receipt of the claim, thus demonstrating its bad faith. She relies
on Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 4030.1(B), which provides: “An insurer shall pay the
proceeds of any benefits under a policy of life insurance not more than thirty (30)
days after the insurer has received proof of death of the insured. If the proceeds
are not paid within this period, the insurer shall pay interest on the
proceeds . . . .” Although Ms. Toppins does not assert that an insurance
company’s failure to pay within 30 days is automatically bad faith, she says that
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the statute, coupled with evidence that Minnesota Life’s employees were unaware
of it, does show bad faith. We disagree; under the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that the payment of the full amount of the life insurance policy, plus
interest, 47 days after receipt of proof of death did not constitute bad faith. Cf.
Hall v. Globe Life and Accident Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 603, 604, 605 (Okla. 1999)
(judgment was entered in claimant’s favor three years after insured’s death;
applying section 4030.1 to “the issue of late payment of insurance proceeds”).
Ms. Toppins contends that disputed material facts precluded entry of
summary judgment. She relies on the following allegedly disputed facts:
(1) whether investigator Jolly’s written report reflected everything they discussed
during the telephone interview, and (2) whether Mr. Jolly’s questions had “started
to get badgering.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 30. Aside from the fact that Ms. Toppins
had ample opportunity to correct Mr. Jolly’s report, she has failed to demonstrate
why any omissions were material. Similarly, her complaint that she may have felt
badgered does not preclude summary judgment on her bad-faith claim because it
is irrelevant to the delay in payment. See Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d
1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding disputed fact must be material to avert
summary judgment). In addition, her assertion that Mr. Jolly’s destruction of his
interview notes entitles her to an adverse inference is unavailing. She has not
shown that she sought sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; accordingly, she is
limited to “seek[ing] sanctions under a spoliation of evidence theory [which
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requires] proo[f] of bad faith” where “the aggrieved party seeks an adverse
inference.” Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). Ms. Toppins had not made a showing that Mr. Jolly, or
anyone else, destroyed the notes in bad faith.
Conclusion
We conclude that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Ms. Toppins on
her claim that Minnesota Life violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Consequently, she was not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages. The
district court’s judgment in favor of Minnesota Life is therefore AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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