United States v. Elizalde-Altamirano , 226 F. App'x 846 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 20, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AM ERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4143
(D.C. No. 1:05-CR -157-TS)
JUA N C AR LOS ELIZALD E- (D. Utah)
ALTAM IRANO, a/k/a Jorge Islas-
Perez,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before M cKA Y, L UC ER O, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Juan Carlos Elizade-A ltamirano pleaded guilty to illegal re-entry
of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and was sentenced to twenty-
four m onths’ imprisonment and twelve months of supervised release. At
sentencing, the district court followed the recommendation provided in the
presentence report and classified Defendant’s prior Utah misdemeanor joyriding
conviction as an “aggravated felony.” As a result, the district court imposed an
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
eight-level sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
Defendant appeals the imposition of this sentencing enhancement.
W e review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo. United States v. M artinez-M acias, 472 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).
Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) calls for an eight-level sentencing increase where a
defendant previously was deported following a conviction for an aggravated
felony. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, “aggravated felony” has the same
meaning given that term by Section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. 3(A). According to IN A
§ 101(a)(43)(g), the term “aggravated felony” includes “a theft offense (including
the receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year.” See 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(g). The phrase
“theft offense (including the receipt of stolen property)” is not further defined.
Defendant previously received a one-year suspended sentence following his
conviction in Utah state court for joyriding, a class A misdemeanor. See Utah
Code Ann. § 41-1a-1314(1). Under the INA, a misdemeanor conviction may
qualify as an aggravated felony if a one-year sentence is imposed, even if that
sentence is entirely suspended. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B). Thus, the
question facing this court is whether the term “theft offense” as employed by the
INA includes the crime of joyriding as defined by Utah law, such that joyriding
must be labeled an “aggravated felony” warranting the eight-level sentencing
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enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
In analyzing this question, we employ the “categorical approach”
established by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-
600 (1990), and need “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory
definition of the prior offense” to resolve the issue. Id. at 602; see also United
States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 388 F.3d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 2004).
Under Utah law, a person is guilty of misdemeanor joyriding if he
“exercise[s] unauthorized control over a motor vehicle that is not his own,
without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian, and with the intent to
temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor
vehicle.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-1314(1). W e compare this definition to that
set forth in United States v. Vasquez-Flores, 265 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2001),
which stated that:
distilled to its essence, . . . the modern, generic, and broad
definition of the entire phrase “theft offense (including receipt of
stolen property)” is a taking of property or an exercise of control
over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive
the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such
deprivation is less than total or permanent.
Id. at 1125 (alteration in original) (quoting Hernandez-M ancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d
1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Defendant argues that joyriding involves so limited a deprivation that it
falls outside the generic definition of “theft offense.” A ccording to Defendant,
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joyriding “could entail only a brief borrowing of a vehicle without any significant
interference with ownership rights” and “the reference in Vasquez-Flores to
deprivations w hich are ‘less than permanent’ is dicta.” (D ef.’s Reply Br. at 2; see
id. (“In ruling on this issue, the court in Vasquez-Flores did not need to consider,
and did not consider, whether a minor, temporary deprivation of property should
be considered as a theft offense.”).) Rather, Defendant urges this court to apply
the reasoning of the M odel Penal Code, which “draws a fundamental distinction
between a temporary unauthorized use of a vehicle and a theft.” (Def.’s Opening
Br. at 15 (citing M PC § 223.9).)
Defendant’s position that the generic definition stated in Vasquez-Flores is
mere dicta is w rong. The fact that Vasquez-Flores dealt with a different Utah law
does not alter the importance or necessity of its statement. Defining “theft
offense” in the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) context 1 was essential to the determination of the
issue on appeal in Vasquez-Flores. See Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d
1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Dicta are ‘statements and comments in an opinion
concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor
essential to determination of the case in hand.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
454 (6th ed. 1990))).
M oreover, Vasquez-Flores acknowledged the role the M PC played in the
1
Vasquez-Flores concerned the predecessor to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), then
designated § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
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reasoning of other courts in deriving the broader generic definition and implicitly
elected to define “theft offense” more broadly than the M PC definition. See
Vasquez-Flores, 265 F.3d at 1124-25; see also United States v. Corona-Sanchez,
291 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Although use of the M PC is certainly a
plausible approach, adoption of the standard established by the two other circuits
that have construed the phrase makes more sense in a national context.”). As we
concluded in Vasquez-Flores, “‘theft offense (including receipt of stolen
property)’ includes more crimes than just ‘theft’” because Congress’ intentional
use of the phrase “theft offense” “‘signal[s] that it was not presenting an
exhaustive list of offenses (i.e. just theft and receipt).’” Vasquez-Flores, 265
F.3d at 1124 (quoting Hernandez-M ancilla, 246 F.3d at 1008). Accordingly, we
interpret the phrase broadly. See id.Our interpretation leads us to conclude that the state statute fits within the
federal generic definition. The fact that Section 41-1a-1314(1) criminalizes
joyriding based in part on an “intent to temporarily deprive the owner . . . of the
motor vehicle” is completely in line with Vasquez-Flores’s “less than total or
permanent” intent language. 2 Cf. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, --- U.S. ----, 127
2
W hile we have rejected the view that whether a particular crime
constitutes an aggravated felony under the definitions referred to in the
Sentencing Guidelines depends upon how the crime is characterized under state
law, see United States v. Frias-Trujillo, 9 F.3d 875, 876 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993), w e
observe that Utah law treats both misdemeanor and felony joyriding as a lesser-
(continued...)
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S. Ct. 815, 822 (2007) (“[T]o find that a state statute creates a crime outside the
generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the
application of legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a
realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”).
Based on our determination that a Utah misdemeanor joyriding conviction
constitutes an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(g), we AFFIR M
Defendant’s conviction and sentence.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
2
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included-offense of theft, see Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-1314(5); see also State v.
Cornish, 568 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1977).
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