Leo v. Garmin International, Inc. ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    February 28, 2012
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    ALEX HUAQIANG LEO,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    No. 11-3213
    v.                                          (D.C. No. 2:09-CV-02139-KHV)
    (D. Kan.)
    GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O’BRIEN and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Alex Huaqiang Leo, pro se, appeals from the district court’s order that
    denied his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the court’s previous
    judgment. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    The parties are familiar with the procedural history of this case. When
    Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin) decided not to hire Mr. Leo as a software
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    engineer in 2008, he filed suit in which he claimed discrimination on the grounds
    of age and national origin. That suit was disposed of by the district court’s orders
    granting Garmin’s motion to dismiss and its later-filed motion for summary
    judgment. Mr. Leo appealed those orders to this court. (Case no. 11-3146).
    Nearly ten months after filing his appeal, on April 18, 2011, Mr. Leo filed a
    Rule 60(b) motion in the district court in which he asked the court to vacate its
    judgment. That same day, Mr. Leo filed essentially the same document in Case
    no. 11-3146 in this court.
    The district court denied Mr. Leo’s Rule 60(b) motion on June 21, 2011.
    On June 24, Mr. Leo filed a motion for reconsideration. He filed his notice of
    appeal from the court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, which is this appeal, on
    July 21. In the meantime, on July 22, this court issued an order and judgment in
    Case no. 11-3146, which affirmed the district court’s orders and summarily
    denied Mr. Leo’s motion asking that we direct the district court to vacate its
    judgment. Leo v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 431 F. App’x 702, 705 (10th Cir. 2011)
    (Leo I). 1
    1
    The pleading Mr. Leo filed with this court on April 18, 2011, was titled
    “Appellant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief From the Judgment
    and Orders Because the Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter.” This
    was, for all intents and purposes, the same memorandum Mr. Leo filed on April
    18 in the district court in conjunction with his Rule 60(b) motion. Apparently
    Mr. Leo forgot to file a motion to accompany the memorandum filed in this court
    until May 12, when he filed “Appellant’s Motion to Remand the Cause to the
    (continued...)
    -2-
    On July 25, 2011, this court entered an order abating this appeal pending
    notification that the district court had entered an order disposing of Mr. Leo’s
    motion for reconsideration. The district court entered an order that denied the
    motion for reconsideration on July 25, and this court lifted the abatement order on
    July 27. Mr. Leo pressed forward with his appeal.
    Garmin argues that Mr. “Leo’s Rule 60(b) [motion] to the District Court
    (which is the subject of this appeal) is materially indistinguishable,” Aplee. Br. at
    16, from “Appellant’s Motion to Remand the Cause to the District Court With
    Directions to Vacate Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction,” which he filed in the
    prior appeal. According to Garmin, our denial of that motion is the law of the
    case and bars Mr. Leo’s appeal. We disagree. Our disposition of Mr. Leo’s
    motion in the prior appeal was a summary order and did not establish any rule of
    law. See Copart, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 
    495 F.3d 1197
    , 1201 (10th Cir.
    2007) (explaining that the law of the case doctrine applies where, among other
    things, a court has decided a rule of law; not where an order does not explicitly
    decide an issue). Our decision in the prior appeal to deny the motion was
    a general one and did not necessarily decide that the district court
    correctly denied Mr. Leo’s Rule 60(b) motion. Leo, 431 F. App’x at 705
    1
    (...continued)
    District Court With Directions to Vacate Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction.”
    That is the motion this court summarily denied in Leo v. Garmin International,
    Inc., 431 F. App’x 702, 705 (10th Cir. 2011).
    -3-
    (“We DENY . . . ‘Appellant’s Motion to Remand the Cause to the District Court
    With Directions to Vacate Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction.’”). Accordingly,
    we turn to the merits of Mr. Leo’s appeal and address whether the district court
    properly denied his Rule 60(b) motion.
    Relief under Rule 60(b) is “extraordinary and may only be granted in
    exceptional circumstances.” Dronsejko v. Thornton, 
    632 F.3d 658
    , 664 (10th Cir.
    2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, the abuse-of-discretion
    standard applies to the review of a district court’s decision to deny a Rule 60(b)
    motion; however, a de novo standard of review applies where a party moves for
    relief on the ground that the judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4). Hukill v.
    Okla. Native Am. Domestic Violence Coal., 
    542 F.3d 794
    , 796-97 (10th Cir.
    2008). In its June 21, 2011 order, the district court carefully examined the factual
    background of the case against each of the grounds for relief cited by Mr. Leo and
    concluded that the motion should be denied. We affirm for substantially the same
    reasons articulated by the district court.
    Mr. Leo cited Rule 60(b)(1), which provides that the district court may
    grant relief from a judgment on the grounds of mistake. But as the court pointed
    out, “the ‘mistake’ which [Mr. Leo] claims – that he has only recently realized
    that he sought a different position than what he alleged in his complaint – is not
    the type of mistake contemplated by Rule 60(b)(1),” R. Vol. 17 at 4, citing
    Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 
    98 F.3d 572
    , 576 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that
    -4-
    Rule 60(b)(1) relied is available “only where: (1) a party has made an excusable
    litigation mistake or an attorney in the litigation has acted without authority from
    a party, or (2) where the judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in
    the final judgment or order.”).
    Mr. Leo next argued that he was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(2) on
    the ground of newly discovered evidence. The district court explained that
    Mr. Leo’s “‘newly discovered’ evidence . . . [a 2007 advertisement in the
    Kansas City Star] is completely irrelevant because he did not respond to the 2007
    advertisement when he applied for a position at Garmin. Rather, he responded to
    a blind email from [a recruiter] relating to software engineering opportunities at
    Garmin.” R. Vol. 17 at 5. Because the “newly discovered” evidence was
    immaterial, the district court correctly determined that Mr. Leo was not entitled to
    relief under Rule 60(b)(2). See Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 
    426 F.3d 1281
    , 1290 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be entitled to relief under Rule
    60(b)(2), the moving party must show, among other things, that “the newly
    discovered evidence is material”) (brackets omitted).
    Last, Mr. Leo argued under Rule 60(b)(4), that the judgment was void
    because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his age and
    national origin discrimination claims. This argument obviously lacks merit.
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
     (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
    -5-
    civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
    States.”).
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We DENY the following
    motions filed by Mr. Leo: “Appellant’s Motion or Petition to Appeal Order [290]
    From the Captioned District Court”; “Appellant’s Motion (1) to Issue an Order to
    Show Cause Why Discipline Should Not be Imposed by This Court on Appellee’s
    Attorney”; “Appellant’s Motion (2) to Issue an Order to Show Cause Why
    Discipline Should Not be Imposed by This Court on Appellee’s Attorney”;
    “Appellant’s Motion (3) to Issue an Order to Show Cause Why Discipline Should
    Not be Imposed by This Court on Appellee’s Attorney in fabricating of Rejection
    Document”; “Appellant’s Motion (4) to Issue an Order to Show Cause Why
    Discipline Should Not be Imposed by This Court on Appellee’s Attorney in
    Misrepresentation”; and “Appellant’s Motion (5) to Issue an Order to Show Cause
    Why Discipline Should Not be Imposed by This Court on Appellee’s Attorney in
    misrepresentation of the scope of the 2008 EEOC Charge.” We GRANT
    Mr. Leo’s motion to supplement the record with pleadings numbers 270, 271, 272,
    273 and 275. We DENY Garmin’s motion for sanctions. We are cognizant of
    Mr. Leo’s tactics and the time spent by Garmin in responding to his filings.
    And while it is true that Mr. Leo’s briefs and motions contain irrelevant and
    -6-
    redundant arguments, we cannot say that his pro-se arguments concerning the
    district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion are frivolous.
    Entered for the Court
    Wade Brorby
    Senior Circuit Judge
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-3213

Judges: O'Brien, McKay, Brorby

Filed Date: 2/28/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024