United States v. Sears ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT September 22, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 10-3124
v. (D.C. No. 6:08-CV-01057-MLB and
6:04-CR-10174-MLB-1)
BRUCE SEARS, (D. Kan.)
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before KELLY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Bruce Sears, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)
motion. We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
I
In 2004, Sears was convicted on four counts relating to the armed robbery of a
Red Lobster restaurant in Wichita, Kansas. He was sentenced to life in prison. We
affirmed his conviction in United States v. Sears, 191 Fed. App’x 800 (10th Cir. 2006)
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
(unpublished). Sears later filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition advancing numerous claims.
After reviewing certain discovery materials in camera, the district court denied relief and
declined to grant a COA. This court also rejected Sears’ request for a COA. United
States v. Sears, 294 Fed. App’x 383 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
Sears then returned to the district court, alleging in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)
motion that the court’s order denying habeas relief is void because it was entered without
due process. He argued the district court failed to address each of his claims and
improperly denied an evidentiary hearing. The motion also discussed a litany of alleged
constitutional violations during his trial. The district court denied Sears’ motion and
refused him a COA. Sears now seeks a COA from this court.
II
At the outset, we must determine whether Sears’ Rule 60(b)(4) motion is actually
a “second or successive” habeas petition over which the district court would lack
jurisdiction absent prior certification from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
Distinguishing between a true Rule 60(b) motion and a second or successive habeas
petition turns on the “relief sought, not [the] pleading’s title.” United States v. Nelson,
465 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2006). If a petitioner seeks “relief from the conviction or
sentence,” his claim is a successive habeas petition. Id. at 1147. But if a pleading attacks
“some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,” it “should not be
characterized as a successive petition.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court liberally construed Sears’ motion as challenging procedural
aspects of his original habeas case. Cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
-2-
(pro se filings should be construed liberally). We agree with this characterization.
Despite Sears’ superfluous discussion of his substantive habeas claims, we will address
the two claims that can be read as procedural objections to his initial § 2255 proceeding.
A litigant must obtain a COA to appeal the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion seeking
to reopen a § 2255 proceeding. See Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1217-18 (10th
Cir. 2006). Sears may not obtain a COA unless he demonstrates “that reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(quotation omitted). Sears has failed to make such a showing.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), a litigant may obtain relief from a final judgment if
“the judgment is void.” A judgment may be void “if entered in a manner inconsistent
with due process.” Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994). Sears
advances two due process arguments. First, he alleges that the district court did not rule
on all of his claims. Our review of Sears’ petition and the district court’s orders belie this
contention. Sears’ ineffective assistance claim contained several constitutional
arguments. The district court held that many of these sub-issues were barred as
independent claims because they were not raised on direct appeal, and concluded that
each of Sears’ attorneys was effective.
Second, Sears complains that the district court did not grant an evidentiary
hearing. If a claim is “resolvable solely on the basis of the existing record,” a district
court may deny an evidentiary hearing in its discretion. Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d
-3-
715, 731 (10th Cir. 2010). The district court conducted an in camera review of evidence
sought by Sears rather than allowing the far-reaching discovery he requested. Such a
procedure is entirely permissible.
III
For the forgoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. Because
Sears has failed to advance “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in
support of the issues raised on appeal,” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505
(10th Cir. 1991), we DENY his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
-4-