Sneed v. Barnhart , 88 F. App'x 297 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 30 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JIM W. SNEED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-6156
(D.C. No. 02-CV-431-T)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (W.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant Jim W. Sneed appeals from the district court’s order
affirming the Commissioner’s denial of his applications for disability benefits and
supplemental security income benefits. Mr. Sneed argues the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) failed (1) to adequately develop the record regarding his mental
impairments and (2) to properly analyze his credibility. “We review the
Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied.”
Angel v. Barnhart , 329 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003). Applying these
standards, we affirm.
Mr. Sneed asserts disability beginning March 21, 1995, 1
due to depression,
seizures, inability to read and write, low I.Q., post-traumatic stress disorder,
confusion, neck pain and back pain. 2
The ALJ denied benefits at step five of the
1
Mr. Sneed previously filed an application for disability benefits that was
denied by an ALJ decision on January 20, 1997, and not appealed. See Aplt.
App., Vol. II at 15 (ALJ decision). This decision does not appear in the record.
The Commissioner asserts that, due to the prior denial of benefits, disability could
not commence before January 20, 1997. We disagree. Although the ALJ
acknowledged the prior decision, he proceeded under Mr. Sneed’s asserted
disability date of March 21, 1995. Id. at 16, 21. We construe this as a de facto
reopening of the prior denial of benefits. Cf. Taylor ex. rel Peck v. Heckler , 738
F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1984) (ALJ de facto reopened prior decision by
reviewing case on merits and considering additional evidence).
2
In his disability benefits application, Mr. Sneed listed seizures, back pain
and the inability to read and write as the basis for disability. Because the record
before the Commissioner indicated the other possible impairments, we consider
these to have been properly before the ALJ. See Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d
(continued...)
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five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. See
generally Dikeman v. Halter , 245 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
that at step five Commissioner has burden of proving claimant can perform work
existing in national economy). Before doing so, the ALJ found that Mr. Sneed
suffered from the severe impairment of epilepsy and could not return to his prior
very heavy, unskilled pipeline construction work. The ALJ decided Mr. Sneed
had no transferable job skills, a limited eighth-grade education and must avoid
ladders, heights and moving machinery. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded
Mr. Sneed was not disabled because he could perform light or sedentary work
such as a car wash attendant, housekeeper and microfilm preparer, jobs suggested
by the vocational expert (VE). When the Appeals Council denied review, the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Mr. Sneed then appealed to the district court. In a very thorough report and
recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended affirming the
Commissioner’s final decision. After reviewing de novo, the district court
affirmed. This appeal followed.
2
(...continued)
1162, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997).
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I.
Mr. Sneed first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately and
properly develop the record regarding his mental impairments. Specifically, he
submits the ALJ should have ordered an additional consultative examination for
I.Q. testing.
An ALJ has the responsibility “in every case ‘to ensure that an adequate
record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the issues
raised.’” Hawkins , 113 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Henrie v. United States Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. , 13 F.3d 359, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, 416.1444 (requiring ALJ to look fully into issues); Social
Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 n.3 (requiring ALJ to develop
“evidence regarding the possibility of a medically determinable mental
impairment when the record contains information to suggest that such an
impairment exists”). This duty is heightened when the claimant proceeds pro se.
See Henrie , 13 F.3d at 361.
We agree with Mr. Sneed’s assertion that the heightened duty applies to
this case. Throughout the administrative proceedings Kenneth Clason,
Mr. Sneed’s friend, who is not an attorney, represented him. Also, Mr. Clason
testified at the hearing on Mr. Sneed’s behalf. Although Mr. Clason had personal
experience with Social Security disability matters because he had been receiving
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benefits himself, he had previously helped another individual obtain benefits
when he called the Social Security Administration seeking guidance, and he had
completed some college courses in social work, he probably did not have
knowledge of the Regulations, definitely had no prior experience with ALJ
hearings, and asked Mr. Sneed very few questions at the hearing. Thus, we
conclude Mr. Sneed did not have representation comparable to that of an attorney.
Under the circumstances, the ALJ was required to take a more active role in
developing the record.
In developing the record, the ALJ “has broad latitude in ordering
consultative examinations.” Hawkins , 113 F.3d at 1166. For further investigation
to be required, however, there must be “some objective evidence in the record
suggesting the existence of a condition [that] could have a material impact on the
disability decision.” Id. at 1167. A claimant’s “[i]solated and unsupported
comments . . . are insufficient.” Id.
Mr. Sneed made minimal references to a possible low I.Q. in his requests
for reconsideration and for an ALJ hearing. See Aplt. App., Vol. II at 87 (noting
in request for hearing that I.Q. was not addressed), 144 (questioning I.Q. in
reconsideration disability report), 150 (noting I.Q. is one reason for inability to
work). Also, he relies on several isolated medical statements to support his claim
that the ALJ should have ordered I.Q. testing. Dr. France, a psychologist who
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conducted a consultative mental examination, indicated that Mr. Sneed may have
a learning disability, has low-average intelligence, could not understand proverbs,
could not spell “world” backwards, could not count by threes, could not repeat six
and seven digits forward and made errors in computing change. Id. at 206, 207.
Dr. Sullivan, who conducted a consultative physical examination, surmised that
Mr. Sneed is probably mildly retarded. Id. at 210. Dr. Lawton, also a
consultative physical examiner, suspected Mr. Sneed’s I.Q. is less than average.
Id. at 169. And Dr. Rienschmiedt, a treating doctor, reported that Mr. Sneed is
mentally slow secondary to a childhood brain injury. Id. at 267. The latter three
doctors made no further assertions concerning intelligence.
Other medical evidence from Dr. France, however, suggests that Mr. Sneed
did not have a sufficiently low I.Q. to impact the disability decision. See
generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(5), 416.927(d)(5) (giving greater weight to
medical specialist’s opinion in area of specialty than to opinion of non-specialist).
Dr. France also reported that Mr. Sneed had goal-directed language, good
responses to spoken words, no gross thought disorder, good general information
and long term memory, good judgment, full orientation, ability to give his history,
fair abstract thinking, fair concentration and fair short term memory. Aplt. App.,
Vol. II at 206, 207. Significantly, neither Dr. France nor any other doctor
recommended that Mr. Sneed undergo intelligence testing.
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In addition, the Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT) and Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment (RFC) forms do not suggest Mr. Sneed’s I.Q.
would impact the disability decision. The PRT form indicated that Mr. Sneed
would have no restriction of activities of daily living; moderate difficulty in
maintaining social functioning; mild difficulty in maintaining concentration,
persistence or pace; and no repeated episode of decompensation. Id. at 226. The
RFC form indicated that except for marked limitations in the ability to
understand, remember and carry out detailed instructions, Mr. Sneed is not
significantly limited in understanding and memory, sustained concentration and
persistence, social interaction, or adaptation. Id. at 238-39, 250-51.
Likewise, Mr. Sneed’s activities suggest he is not so mentally impaired that
he cannot work. Although he cannot make change and can only write his name,
he can read “somewhat,” id. at 45-46. He lives alone, takes care of his personal
grooming, does some house cleaning, cooks, drives, attends church twice a week,
shops twice a week, and visits friends. To the extent he does not do household
cleaning, laundry or other tasks, he stated he lacks the incentive and interest to do
so. See id. at 138. He testified that his main complaints were seizures, which he
admitted are minor because his medications work for him, and depression. Id. at
39, 56. He did not indicate that he had had problems working due to his
intelligence. Overall, the ALJ asked sufficient questions to learn of Mr. Sneed’s
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alleged impairments and the impact they had on his activities. See Musgrave v.
Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1992).
Furthermore, in reaching a decision, the ALJ did not ignore the intelligence
evidence. Rather, the ALJ took into account the record evidence concerning
Mr. Sneed’s asserted low intelligence when he posed hypothetical questions to the
VE. The ALJ asked the VE to consider Mr. Sneed’s inability to make change and
do basic math and his ability to understand and perform routine tasks and follow
simple instructions.
The isolated comments about Mr. Sneed’s possible limited intelligence,
when viewed as part of the entire record, do not sufficiently raise a question about
his intelligence. See Pierre v. Sullivan , 884 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1989). The
“few instances in the record noting diminished intelligence [did] not require that
the ALJ order an I.Q. test in order to discharge his duty to fully and fairly develop
the record,” id. , even under the heightened standard we apply here.
Because the record before the ALJ contained sufficient evidence to
evaluate Mr. Sneed’s mental impairments, the ALJ did not err in failing to
purchase an additional consultative examination to test Mr. Sneed’s I.Q.
Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ did not fail to develop the record. And,
contrary to Mr. Sneed’s assertion, the ALJ did consider any mental impairments
in combination with his physical impairments.
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II.
Mr. Sneed argues that the ALJ applied incorrect legal standards in
assessing his credibility and that the ALJ’s resulting credibility findings were not
based on substantial evidence. Mr. Sneed contends the ALJ failed to link any
evidence to the credibility findings or explain how the evidence demonstrated he
was not credible, as is required by Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *3.
“‘Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of
fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial
evidence.’” McGoffin v. Barnhart , 288 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)). Nonetheless, the ALJ must
“closely and affirmatively link[ his credibility findings] to substantial evidence
and not just [make] a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Huston v. Bowen ,
838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988).
After setting forth the objective medical evidence and then summarizing
Mr. Sneed’s testimony at the hearing, the ALJ found that Mr. Sneed’s
“impairments related to functional limitations are not supported by objective
medical findings to the extent alleged.” Aplt. App. vol. II at 19; see also id. at 21
(“[Mr. Sneed’s] allegations regarding his limitations are not totally credible for
the reasons set forth in the body of the decision”). In light of the recitation of the
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relevant evidence, we cannot say that the ALJ simply rejected Mr. Sneed’s
credibility in a conclusory fashion. See Qualls v. Apfel , 206 F.3d 1368, 1372
(10th Cir. 2000) (“So long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on
in evaluating the claimant’s credibility, the dictates of Kepler are satisfied.”).
Instead, it was sufficiently specific to satisfy Social Security Ruling 96-7p and
Tenth Circuit requirements. Nonetheless, we remind the ALJ of his duty to
“closely and affirmatively link” his credibility findings to the objective medical
evidence. Huston , 838 F.2d at 1133.
Mr. Sneed also argues that substantial evidence shows he is credible
because his testimony demonstrated he relies extensively on family and friends to
help with daily duties and he does minimal tasks himself. He believes his
testimony was supported by objective evidence that he has a broad-based disc
bulge and changes consistent with degenerative disc disease in his lumber spine, a
seizure disorder, a small area of atrophy in his left posterior parietal cortex,
abnormal neurological examination findings, limited range of motion in his low
back and pain with straight leg raising.
The medical evidence, however, also shows that Mr. Sneed has mild spinal
degeneration, no significant functional limitations, no problems walking and a
good range of motion in his back and extremities. Notably, no doctor
recommended back surgery; all recommended conservative treatment. With
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respect to seizures, Mr. Sneed testified and the medical evidence showed that they
are minor and controllable with medication.
We conclude both that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s credibility
findings. Accordingly, we defer to the ALJ’s credibility findings. See Kepler ,
68 F.3d at 391.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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