Parker v. Jones , 423 F. App'x 824 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 20, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
BILLY E. PARKER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 10-6219
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CV-00176-C)
(W.D. of Okla.)
JUSTIN JONES,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Billy Parker, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arising from his
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Because Parker is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally.
See Van Deelan v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
conviction for first degree murder. He also requests an evidentiary hearing and
moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we DENY
Parker’s request for a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We also DENY his request
for an evidentiary hearing and motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
I. Background
The record shows that in 1999, police discovered the body of 16-year-old
Sherman Jackson on an Oklahoma City street. He had been shot once in the
chest. Early that morning, Jackson, a known drug dealer, was seen driving a
brown Buick Century, which he had recently borrowed from Petitioner Billy
Parker in exchange for cocaine. That same morning, in response to Jackson’s
failure to return the car at the appointed time, Parker had asked his mother to
drive around to look for the Buick. Parker’s niece, Dakota Davis, and Davis’s
friend, Alvone “Apple” Moore, accompanied Parker’s mother.
Parker’s mother stopped at a Burger King not far from the crime scene and
took into the restaurant a paper sack containing something heavy. Parker’s
mother drove off and, soon thereafter, saw Parker driving the Buick Century.
Parker drove back to his mother’s house, parked in the garage, and closed the
door. Parker’s mother followed him home.
Upon arriving home, Parker, his mother, and his brother attempted to clean
splattered blood off of the vehicle’s side window, windshield, and front seats.
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Shortly after Parker dropped off the car in his mother’s garage, Parker’s brother
doused the front seat with what appeared to be lighter fluid—and an hour later, a
witness saw the car in the backyard with smoke coming from it. A forensic
examination confirmed that blood spots on the Buick’s seats and floorboards
matched Jackson’s DNA, and Parker’s DNA was found on a blanket covering the
car’s charred seats.
It took Oklahoma City police several years to develop the case. Finally, in
2007, after locating the brown Buick and speaking with Moore, the government’s
key witness, Oklahoma charged Parker with first-degree murder.
Following a jury trial, Parker was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Parker’s conviction on direct appeal.
In 2008, however, the OCCA modified Parker’s sentence to life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole. In 2009, the state trial court denied Parker’s
request for post-conviction relief, and he did not appeal this decision to the
OCCA. Later that year, Parker filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the
Western District of Oklahoma, which was referred to a magistrate judge. The
magistrate judge recommended the district court reject Parker’s petition on the
merits, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation in its entirety. The district court subsequently declined to issue
a COA and denied Parker’s request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
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Parker now seeks a COA from this court to enable him to appeal the denial
of his federal habeas petition. Specifically, he raises five issues: (1) he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel; (2) the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to sustain a first-degree murder conviction; (3) his rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated; (4) the district court
erred in declining to grant an evidentiary hearing on Parker’s ineffective
assistance of counsel and Confrontation Clause claims; and (5) the OCCA erred in
failing to consider the accumulation of trial errors in assessing whether to issue a
COA. 2
II. Analysis
Without a COA, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas
appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We may issue a COA only if “the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id.
§ 2253(c)(2). Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional
claims on the merits—as is the case here—the petitioner must demonstrate that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
2
In his Application for a COA, it is not clear whether Parker contests only
the district court’s failure to grant an evidentiary hearing, or whether he also
contests the district court’s substantive holdings that his counsel was
constitutionally adequate and that he suffered no Sixth Amendment violation.
Parker supplements his Application for a COA with what appear to be several
excerpts from his direct appeal briefs. Because Parker appeals pro se, we
construe these materials as a brief in support of his Application and address all
arguments raised in the Application and the supporting materials.
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petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotation omitted).
Because the OCCA addressed the merits of Parker’s claims, “[the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)]’s deferential
treatment of state court decisions must be incorporated into our consideration of
[his] request for [a] COA.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004).
Under AEDPA, we may grant a habeas petition on a claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in state court only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude Parker is not entitled
to a COA for substantially the same reasons discussed by the district court.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether
the decisions of the state courts reviewing his case were contrary to or based on
unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Parker first contends his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to (1) investigate and prepare for trial; (2) properly submit evidence
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inculpating third parties; (3) call Dakota Davis to refute the testimony of Alvone
“Apple” Moore, the state’s key witness; (4) object to prosecutorial questioning
that injected hearsay statements into the proceedings; 3 and (5) advocate Parker’s
cause.
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Parker must
show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). A petitioner demonstrates deficient performance by showing counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688.
To establish prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
Contrary to Parker’s contentions, his trial counsel’s performance was not
constitutionally deficient. In fact, as the other courts reviewing this matter
acknowledge, in many ways Parker’s counsel was astute and diligent. First,
although Parker’s counsel did not call witnesses at trial, he asked for and obtained
an evidentiary hearing on witness availability, gathered considerable evidence,
3
Parker also frames this argument as an evidentiary issue. He says the
trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to ask questions by
paraphrasing extrajudicial statements made by witnesses. However, as a
constitutional challenge on federal habeas, we construe Parker’s argument as
taking issue with his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s
questions—and not any action of the court.
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traveled to California to interview witnesses, and effectively used police reports
in his cross-examination of the police detective in charge. In the end, Parker
quibbles only with his counsel’s trial strategy—and not his competency.
The problem for Parker is that strategic decisions are constitutionally
ineffective only if they are “completely unreasonable, not merely wrong, so that
[they] bear no relationship to a possible defense strategy.” Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d
1286, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). Indeed, under Strickland,
“strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 466
U.S. at 690–91. The decision making of Parker’s counsel, even if questionable,
certainly was not completely unreasonable.
Second, Parker’s challenge to his counsel’s decision not to submit evidence
inculpating third parties is simply a corollary of his charge that counsel failed to
investigate. In Parker’s direct appeal and federal habeas petition, he alleges his
counsel failed to investigate the alibis and criminal records of other potential
suspects. For the reasons set forth above, we do not find Parker’s counsel’s
investigative efforts constitutionally inadequate. And we find, just as the
magistrate judge did, that Parker’s counsel effectively used cross-examination to
propound the theory that third parties were responsible for Jackson’s murder. See
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Parker v. Jones, No. CIV-09-176-C, 2010 WL 3729976, at *8 (W.D. Okla. July
12, 2010). The Sixth Amendment requires counsel to make only reasonable
investigations, or to make a reasonable decision that a particular investigation is
unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1289
(10th Cir. 2000). Counsel’s performance in this case was not unreasonable.
Third, Parker’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Dakota Davis
as a witness. Parker suggests Davis’s statements would have called into question
Moore’s testimony. On direct appeal, the OCCA questioned the value of Davis’s
testimony:
Davis . . . told police that she did not know anything about the
crime and was not present afterwards, even though Moore and
others said she was. However, the remainder of Davis’s
statement corroborated . . . testimony about Parker’s drug habits
and his cars. Assuming without deciding that Davis’s statement
to police could form a basis for questioning, the decision not to
use a statement which largely corroborated the State’s case was
a reasonable strategic decision.
Parker v. Oklahoma, No. F-2007-510, at *11 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2008).
The OCCA was correct. Given questions regarding the utility of Davis’s
testimony to Parker’s case, Parker’s counsel made a reasonable strategic choice
not susceptible to a Strickland challenge.
Fourth, Parker’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to
prosecutorial questioning that injected hearsay into the proceedings. During trial,
the prosecutor introduced hearsay statements during the examination of Parker’s
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mother and brother by paraphrasing their statements to the police. For example,
the prosecutor asked Parker’s mother: “[W]hen Detective Veasey interviewed
you, isn’t it true that you told Detective Veasey that some time around 7:00 a.m.
on November the 17th of 1999, that you took your son Billy Parker to some
apartments to look for his car.” Trial Tr. at 634. As the OCCA found, although
Parker could have objected to the prosecutor’s method of questioning, his
assistance was not ineffective because the underlying statements to the police
were themselves admissible. Indeed, in all but one instance, either Parker’s
mother or brother was the declarant in each of the statements, and both witnesses
testified and were the subject of cross-examination. 4 And it was not unreasonable
for the OCCA to find no plain error and hold that “[t]he statements were used not
to impeach the witnesses by showing their testimony was inconsistent with
previous statements, but to refresh their memories concerning what they told
investigators several years earlier.” Parker, No. F-2007-510, at *9. Thus, as the
district court properly held, because the evidence at issue was admissible under
Oklahoma law, Parker’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to its
admission. See Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1321–22 (10th Cir. 2005).
Further, even if Parker’s counsel was deficient in this regard, there was no
4
As the OCCA explained, in one statement Parker’s mother repeated to
police a statement Dakota Davis made to her. Even if it was error to admit this
statement, it was significantly less damaging to Parker than his mother’s own
statements, and thus any error was harmless.
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–94.
Finally, we find Parker’s counsel did not make improper concessions
during closing argument. Although conceding a client’s guilt can be deficient
performance, Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1304 n.12 (10th Cir. 2002), that is
not what Parker’s counsel did here. Rather, as the OCCA recognized, Parker’s
counsel made a strategic decision to concede certain facts that could not
reasonably be denied and emphasize Parker’s lack of direct connection to the
murder. Parker’s argument is further belied by his counsel’s repeated emphasis
that the jury could not convict unless the evidence showed guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In sum, it is plain that, “in light of the entire record, [Parker’s counsel]
remained a legal advocate of the defendant who acted with undivided allegiance
and faithful, devoted service to the defendant.” United States v. Williamson, 53
F.3d 1500, 1511 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Parker also renews his claim that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction.
The Due Process Clause protects a criminal defendant against conviction
“except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
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(1970). On habeas review, the question whether evidence was sufficient to
support a conviction “does not focus on whether the trier of fact made the correct
guilt or innocence determination, but rather whether it made a rational decision to
convict or acquit.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993). Thus, “the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In determining whether evidence was sufficient, we
“may not weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the credibility of witnesses”;
rather, we must “accept the jury’s resolution of the evidence as long as it is
within the bounds of reason.” Messer v. Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1013 (10th Cir.
1996) (quoting Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993)).
In this case, as the magistrate judge found, the record reveals that a rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of first-degree murder.
Oklahoma’s first-degree murder statute provides: “A person commits murder in
the first degree when that person unlawfully and with malice aforethought causes
the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully
to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external
circumstances capable of proof.” O KLA S TAT . tit. 21, § 701.7(A) (1976).
Accordingly, the elements of first-degree murder are (1) the unlawful, (2) death
of a human, (3) caused by the defendant, (4) with malice aforethought.
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The jury reasonably concluded these elements were satisfied. Although
there is no direct evidence Parker killed Jackson, the record reflects the extensive
circumstantial evidence introduced at trial. Among other evidence, the jury heard
that (1) the last time Jackson was seen alive, he was driving Parker’s brown Buick
Century on the morning of his murder; (2) Parker was looking for the Buick on
the morning of Jackson’s murder, and he may have been carrying a gun; (3)
Jackson was found dead in the vicinity of where Parker was later seen driving the
Buick; (4) Parker quickly drove the car back to his mother’s house, where others
attempted to clean blood from the passenger compartment, which had been clean
only a few days earlier; (5) Parker and his family burned the seats of the Brown
Buick to destroy evidence; and (6) DNA analysis confirmed Jackson’s blood was
in the car, and that the blanket covering the charred seats contained DNA
matching Parker’s.
Thus, the jury heard ample evidence to convict Parker. Given our
presumption that the jury resolved conflicting reasonable inferences in favor of
the State, Parker has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, and he is not entitled to a COA on this issue.
In relation to his sufficiency of the evidence challenge, Parker also
contends that on direct appeal, the OCCA erred in viewing Moore’s preliminary
hearing testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, given that Moore
was unavailable to testify at trial. As the Supreme Court explained in Jackson v.
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Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319, when a court hears a criminal defendant’s appeal, the
general rule is that it must view trial testimony in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. The purpose of this rule is to protect the discretion of the jury and
give “full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in
the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “Once a defendant has been found guilty of the
crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved
through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id.
Parker argues the OCCA erred in applying this standard to Moore’s
testimony, because she was not available to testify at trial. According to Parker,
because Moore was unavailable, the OCCA was in the same position as the jury
with respect to judging Moore’s credibility, and thus it erred in adhering to the
Jackson rule. Parker’s argument fails, however, because Jackson applies to all of
the evidence—not just testimony offered by witnesses present at trial. Parker
points to no authority—and we find none—suggesting that the Jackson rule is
inapplicable to testimony such as Moore’s.
Thus, Parker has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.
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C. Confrontation Clause
Parker claims the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses against him when it allowed the State to present Moore by reading the
transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony at trial. The Sixth Amendment
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. C ONST . amend. VI. Thus,
the Confrontation Clause bars the “admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54, 59 (2004). The Confrontation Clause applies to
Moore’s statements at the preliminary hearing, because they were testimonial
hearsay. Id. at 68 (explaining that, at a minimum, testimonial hearsay includes
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing”).
Although Moore was not present at trial for cross-examination, her
testimony was admissible because the trial court determined she was unavailable,
and because Parker’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined her at the preliminary
hearing. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54 (“[T]he Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless
he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.” (emphasis added)); see also Sandoval v. Ulibarri, 548 F.3d 902,
912 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is well established that prior testimony may be used
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against an accused in a criminal trial where the accused had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness at the earlier proceeding and the state has shown that
the witness was unavailable for trial.”). “[A] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for
purposes of the . . . exception to the confrontation requirement unless the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at
trial.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980), overruled on other grounds,
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 (quotations omitted). “The lengths to which the
prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of reasonableness,”
and “[t]he ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-
faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness.” Id.
(quotations omitted).
There is no doubt Moore’s testimony was crucial to the prosecution. Her
statements provided the State’s clearest connection between Parker and the
murder. Recognizing this, Oklahoma worked assiduously to locate Moore in
advance of trial. Indeed, the trial court rightly stated that “as far as due diligence
on this end I think that [the State] ha[s] done all [it] can possibly do.” Tr. of Mot.
Hr’g at 48–49.
The record reflects the State’s considerable efforts to produce Moore at
trial. The trial court held a hearing to determine whether Moore was unavailable,
and the State established that among other actions, it employed an investigative
analyst; contacted Moore’s mother; traced one of Moore’s telephone numbers;
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sent a letter to Moore’s supposed address; attempted to locate Moore by checking
her driver’s license, license tag, and utilities records; filed a petition for
certification of materiality; and sent the petition and a letter to the Travis County,
Texas district attorney, in an attempt to secure Moore’s presence. Further,
Oklahoma employed a victim-witness advocate, who had located Moore in
advance of the preliminary hearing, to search for Moore. Finally, as the district
court recognized, Parker’s Confrontation Clause concerns are mitigated by the
fact that his counsel extensively cross-examined Moore at the preliminary
hearing.
Based on these facts, Moore was “unavailable despite good-faith efforts
undertaken prior to trial to locate and present [her].” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74
(quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 189 n.22) (quotations omitted). The OCCA did not
unreasonably apply Supreme Court law in concluding Parker’s Sixth Amendment
rights were not violated by the admission of Moore’s preliminary hearing
testimony, despite her absence at trial.
D. Evidentiary Hearing
Parker next argues the district court should have granted his request for an
evidentiary hearing before deciding multiple issues in his petition. Specifically,
Parker seeks an evidentiary hearing to establish his trial counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance and the alleged denial of his right to confront a key
governmental witness.
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We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny an evidentiary
hearing in a habeas proceeding for abuse of discretion. Vigil v. Zavaras, 298 F.3d
935, 943 (10th Cir. 2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court
bases its ruling on an erroneous conclusion of law or relies on clearly erroneous
fact findings,” Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th
Cir. 1998), or when the court’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical,”
Cox v. Sandia Corp., 941 F.2d 1124, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991).
Further, AEDPA provides that “[i]f the applicant has failed to develop the
factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim” unless the applicant shows “the claim relies on
a new rule of constitutional law” or “a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2)(A). To develop the factual basis of a claim, “the prisoner, at a
minimum, [must] seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner
prescribed by state law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000).
If the prisoner has developed a claim, a hearing is appropriate where the
allegations, “if true, would entitle [the prisoner] to federal habeas relief.” Schriro
v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Consistent with this standard, “an
evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if the claim can be resolved on the record.”
Anderson v. Att’y Gen. of Kan., 425 F.3d 853, 859 (10th Cir. 2005).
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On direct appeal, the OCCA denied Parker’s application for an evidentiary
hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The OCCA held Parker
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, because he “fail[ed] to show by clear
and convincing evidence there [was] a strong possibility that counsel was
ineffective . . . .” Parker, No. F-2007-510, at *11. For the reasons set forth by
the district court, and as explained above, the OCCA’s analysis was sound: Parker
has simply made no showing that his counsel’s purported errors were anything
other than strategic decisions unsusceptible to a Strickland challenge.
Accordingly, Parker’s ineffective assistance claim could be resolved on the basis
of the record alone, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to hold evidentiary hearings.
Parker did not, however, request that the OCCA grant him an evidentiary
hearing on his Confrontation Clause claim. Even if he had, such a hearing would
have been unnecessary and redundant, given that the trial court held a hearing
precisely to address the key Confrontation Clause issue—the availability of
Moore to testify at trial. For this reason—and because Parker has not presented
evidence that the factual predicates for his Confrontation Clause claim could not
have been discovered through due diligence, or that his habeas claim is based on a
new rule of constitutional law—the district court’s decision not to hold an
evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion.
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E. Accumulation of Errors
Finally, Parker renews his claim that an accumulation of errors—which
taken in isolation may not have required reversal—deprived him of a fair trial
such that his petition should have been granted. The OCCA did not err in
denying this claim. Because neither the district court nor the OCCA found any
errors at all, it would have been pointless to assess whether the aggregate impact
of a series of non-errors somehow affected the fairness of the trial.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we DENY Parker’s request for a COA and
DISMISS the matter. We also DENY his request for an evidentiary hearing.
Finally, because Parker has failed to identify a non-frivolous argument on appeal,
we DENY his request to proceed in forma pauperis. See McIntosh v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812–13 (10th Cir. 1997).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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