United States v. Angelos ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 29, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 09-4224
v. (D.C. Nos. 2:07-CV-00936-TC and
2:02-CR-00708-PGC-1)
WELDON H. ANGELOS, (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Weldon H. Angelos appeals from the district court’s order denying his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. We
previously granted him a certificate of appealability (COA), see id.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B), limited to three issues: (1) whether his attorney provided him
with ineffective assistance during plea negotiations; (2) whether his attorney
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
provided him with ineffective assistance during trial; and (3) whether he should
have received an evidentiary hearing in district court relating to his
ineffective-assistance-at-trial claim.
Having now had the opportunity to consider the government’s responsive
briefing and Angelos’s reply, the relevant law, and the appendices filed by the
parties, we affirm the district court’s denial of § 2255 relief. Angelos has not
sustained his burden in showing his attorney’s conduct was constitutionally
deficient so as to violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nor, for reasons
we will explain, is he entitled to a COA on the additional issues he had raised.
BACKGROUND
Angelos sold marijuana to a confidential informant, a fellow gang member,
who claimed Angelos carried a firearm during two of the transactions. Angelos
was arrested and subsequent searches of his apartment and his girlfriend’s house
revealed additional evidence of drug trafficking and weapons. He was indicted on
a variety of drug distribution and gun charges. A jury convicted him of multiple
drug, firearms, and money laundering crimes.
Among the offenses of conviction were three counts of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). “Section 924(c) mandates . . . five years of imprisonment for any
person who ‘uses’ or ‘carries’ a firearm during and in relation to a federal drug
trafficking crime, as well as for anyone who ‘possesses’ a firearm in furtherance
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of any such crime.” United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2881 (2009). Second or subsequent convictions under
§ 924(c) carry a mandatory term of twenty-five years, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C),
and run consecutively to one another, id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
At sentencing, the district court reluctantly concluded it was obligated by
statute to sentence Angelos to a total of fifty-five years for the three § 924(c)
convictions alone. It sentenced him to one day for all the remaining offenses, for
a total sentence of fifty-five years and one day.
On direct appeal, Angelos presented multiple arguments: evidence was
improperly admitted against him; evidence in his favor was improperly excluded;
the gun counts should have been “grouped” together for sentencing purposes since
they all arose out of the same basic transaction; and his sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment. We disagreed and rejected all these challenges to his
convictions and sentence. United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir.
2006). Angelos then brought this § 2255 motion, asserting numerous challenges
including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining and at
trial. The district court denied without an evidentiary hearing all claims except
his claim of ineffective assistance during plea bargaining; held an evidentiary
hearing concerning that claim; then denied it as well.
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ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
“We review the district court’s legal rulings on a § 2255 motion de novo
and its findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792,
796 (10th Cir. 2006). Under § 2255, the district court is required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing “unless the motion and files and records of the case
conclusively show that prisoner is entitled to no relief,” and the denial of an
evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000).
II. Ineffective Assistance During Plea Negotiations
A. Applicable Law
1. Strickland Standard
Angelos’s ineffective assistance claims, both concerning plea bargaining
negotiations and counsel’s performance at trial, are governed by the two-part test
described in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland,
we first ask whether counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88. We then ask whether “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
Counsel renders deficient performance when he makes “errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
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Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. When assessing claims of deficient performance,
we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. “The proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.” Id. at 688. We ask “whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. To establish deficient
performance, it is not enough for Angelos to show that his attorney’s strategy was
merely wrong, or his actions unsuccessful; he must demonstrate that the actions
his attorney took were “completely unreasonable.” Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d
1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
2. Strickland in the Plea Bargaining Context
“Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to the
effective assistance of competent counsel.” Padilla v. Ky., 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1480-81 (2010) (quotation omitted). Effective performance in this context
requires “counsel’s informed opinion as to what pleas should be entered.” United
States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1442 (10th Cir. 1997). The prejudice component
in this context “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Where, as here, a petitioner chose to reject a plea offer,
he must show a “reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s erroneous
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advice . . . he would have accepted the [government’s] offer.” Magana v.
Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 2001) (§ 2254 case).
B. District Court’s Credibility Findings
The district court held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the witnesses
included Angelos; his trial counsel, Mr. Mooney; and the prosecuting attorney,
Mr. Lund. The court also accepted affidavits regarding their participation from
Mooney and Lund, and an affidavit from Angelos. After considering all of the
evidence, the court made a general credibility finding adverse to Angelos.
After noting Angelos’s testimony concerning the plea bargaining process
differed in significant respects from Mooney’s and Lund’s, the district court
concluded Angelos was “not credible.” As a general matter
the statements made by Mr. Angelos, particularly in his affidavit,
that contradict the testimony and declarations of Mr. Mooney and
Mr. Lund are not credible. Mr. Mooney’s testimony was
corroborated by that of Mr. Lund. Moreover, the exhibits received at
the hearing further support Mr. Mooney’s testimony.
Aplt. App., Vol. II at 375 n.3 (citing to exhibits such as affidavits and
correspondence between counsel).
We review the district court’s decision to credit Mooney’s testimony over
Angelos’s for clear error. See United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 417-18
(10th Cir. 1996). The district court’s credibility findings in particular are entitled
to considerable deference: “[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his
decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses . . . that
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finding . . . can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
Throughout his briefing Angelos cites his own testimony pertaining to the
plea-bargaining process. But he fails to show the district court erred by
determining that his testimony lacked credibility where it contradicted that of
Mooney and Lund. In our review of this issue, we therefore discount the factual
allegations that contradict the testimony of Mooney and Lund.
C. Application of Strickland
Angelos contends Mooney performed deficiently throughout the plea
bargaining process to his prejudice in two ways: (1) failing to advise him
concerning the adverse sentencing consequences he faced if he did not accept the
plea offered by the government, and (2) affirmatively misrepresenting to him the
sentence he faced if he went to trial.
The district court rejected these contentions, concluding that
Mr. Mooney gave Mr. Angelos competent and thorough
representation. The record shows that Mr. Mooney explained to
Mr. Angelos the nature of the charges against him, the possible
penalties (including the effect of the “stacking” of the § 924(c)
charges), and the consequences of rejecting the government’s plea
offer. Although Mr. Mooney told Mr. Angelos that the decision to
accept the government’s plea rested with Mr. Angelos, Mr. Mooney
made sure that Mr. Angelos understood the harsh penalty he faced if
he refused the offer.
Aplt. App., Vol. II at 375 (footnote omitted).
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Reviewing this claim de novo while accepting the factual predicates under
the clear error standard, we agree with the district court’s reasoning and
disposition. For reasons we will discuss, Angelos has failed to show that Mooney
provided him with deficient representation during plea bargaining.
1. Initial Plea Negotiations
On November 13, 2002, the government obtained an indictment against
Angelos based on his three sales of marijuana to a confidential informant. This
indictment contained six counts: three counts of distributing marijuana to the
confidential informant; one count of possession of a firearm under § 924(c); and
two less-serious firearms counts. The § 924(c) count was based on his first sale
to Ronnie Lazalde, the confidential informant, which occurred on May 21, 2002.
During this sale, Lazalde allegedly saw a Glock pistol lodged between the seat
and center console of the black BMW car in which he and Angelos consummated
the drug deal.
Department of Justice policy at the time required a defendant to plead
guilty to the most serious provable offense, which in this case was the § 924(c)
count. After Mooney opened negotiations with the prosecuting attorney, Lund, he
was informed of the “most serious provable offense” requirement. Aplt. App.,
Vol. V at 1602. The prosecutor also told Mooney of the government’s position
that any required disposition would require a plea to the § 924(c) charge, which
carried a minimum five-year term of imprisonment. Id.
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Angelos contends that Mooney “failed to grasp and effectively
communicate the grave federal sentencing realities working against Angelos,
which included the Government’s policy-driven position on accepting only a
924(c) plea and their belief that they were dealing with a major drug dealer.”
Aplt. Opening Br. at 37-38. 1 The record does not bear out this contention.
Mooney’s testimony shows that he did discuss with Angelos the government’s
position that a plea to the § 924(c) firearm charge would be required as an initial
matter. In addition, Mooney testified that this discussion took place near the
outset of negotiations. Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1602-03, 1612. The problem was
that while Angelos was willing to concede his guilt on the drug charges, he
vehemently denied the factual basis for the § 924(c) charge involving the
confidential informant. Mooney testified, for example, that Angelos was
“adamant” and “credible” in asserting that he did not possess a firearm during his
transactions with Lazalde. Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1568. In fact, Angelos was
“angry,” “very upset” and “very disturbed” about being accused of possessing a
firearm during those transactions. Id. at 1569. Angelos confirmed this by
testifying at the evidentiary hearing that he told Mooney that he did not have a
1
Throughout his briefing, Angelos emphasizes Mooney’s alleged
incomprehension of various legal and factual realities pertinent to the plea
bargaining process. We do not read these allegations to state a freestanding basis
for an ineffectiveness claim. It is counsel’s performance that forms the gravamen
of an ineffectiveness claim, not his level of understanding. We are only
concerned about Mooney’s alleged lack of comprehension to the extent Angelos
has shown it led to performance that fell short of professional norms.
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firearm with him during the May 2002 transaction. “And did you tell
Mr. Mooney that you would not plead guilty to a crime you did not commit?
A. [Angelos] Yeah.” Id. at 1527-28. 2
As a result, Angelos told Mooney that he was willing to plead to the
distribution of marijuana charges. Mooney considered these charges indisputable.
Angelos was unwilling, however, to plead to the § 924(c) count. Given the
government’s position that any plea agreement would require a plea to a § 924(c)
count, there was seemingly no basis for the parties to come to terms.
Angelos asserts, however, that he also communicated to Mooney his
willingness to provide substantial assistance to the government in order to get the
2
Also at the evidentiary hearing, Angelos admitted he might have had a gun
during at least one of the transactions:
Q: Were you carrying a firearm on May 21 st, 2002 when you
sold marijuana to Mr. Lazalde?
A: I don’t remember, but I know I didn’t have one on the
console or anywhere visible in the car.
Q: So you may have been carrying a firearm?
A: It’s a possibility, but I know I didn’t have one anywhere
visible.
* * *
A: I couldn’t really remember for sure, but I was almost
positive I didn’t have one.
Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1526-27.
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firearms charges dropped or otherwise obtain a reduced sentence. Mooney passed
on this information to the government, and set up a meeting to discuss
cooperation.
Significantly, by the time of the meeting about cooperation, Angelos faced
other serious charges for which he had not yet been indicted. On November 15,
2002, police officers acting on the indictment had arrested Angelos in his
apartment, where he consented to a search of the premises. This search
uncovered marijuana, a large sum of money, and more firearms, including a
loaded Glock pistol and a stolen Walther pistol. 3 In addition, on the day before
his meeting with government agents, a search of the house where Angelos’s
girlfriend lived, found additional guns and drugs attributable to Angelos. The
search revealed body armor, a rifle, two dozen large duffel bags containing
3
These factual circumstances undermine Angelos’s argument to the district
court that “the soundest and most sensible plea choice that should have been
suggested by counsel” at this point “would have involved Angelos pleading
‘blind’ to the original indictment’s three marijuana charges and then contesting at
trial the single 924(c) count set forth in the original indictment.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I at 121 n.4. To the extent Angelos continues to press this argument on
appeal (he argues in his appellate briefing that Mooney “failed to understand that
Angelos’s sentencing exposure might have been significantly reduced even
without a fully developed plea agreement with the Government,” Aplt. Opening
Br. at 40), we simply note that a “blind” plea (reached without a plea agreement
with the government) would have been a very risky proposition. A blind plea
would not have prevented Angelos from being indicted and prosecuted on
additional drug and firearms charges resulting from the November 15, 2002,
search or the subsequent search of his girlfriend’s house. It is unsurprising that
Mooney did not recommend this option to Angelos. Mooney’s testimony was that
he believed it was necessary to have all of the charges on the table to succeed in a
settlement.
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marijuana residue, and accounting sheets for the drug transactions. The agents
also found the black BMW used in the controlled buys; a gun was in the trunk of
the car. 4
The cooperation interview with the government on December 17, 2002 did
not go well. It is uncontested that Angelos presented misleading information to
the government about his drug suppliers. In the opinion of government agents
present at the meeting, he presented himself as an insincere and untrustworthy
person. The agents also believed he had misled them about another factual
matter, the location of the BMW involved in the drug transactions, at the time of
the arrest. The November 15 search also likely suggested to them that Angelos
was a larger player than he let on. To the extent Angelos blames the failure of
this meeting on Mooney (who he alleges did not inform him of the imperative
need to reach a cooperation agreement with the government in order to obtain a
reduced sentence, given the enormity of the § 924(c) charges), he fails to show
that Mooney’s performance was constitutionally deficient.
Mooney, for example, testified that he explained the value of a cooperation
agreement in obtaining a reduced sentence. Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1585. But
Angelos claims he did not adequately emphasize the severity of the sentence he
4
In light of this evidence, Angelos’s defense that he only dabbled in small-
time marijuana sales finds scant support in the record.
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faced prior to the meeting concerning cooperation. 5 Angelos’s cooperation
argument boils down to this: had Mooney informed him of the gravity of
potential charges he faced, including more potential § 924(c) counts based on the
additional searches, 6 he would not have misled the government. But even if he
had been forthcoming at the interview, it would have been the government’s
choice whether to enter into a cooperation agreement, which the record discloses
as implausible. He thus fails to show either constitutionally deficient
performance by counsel, or prejudice.
Angelos also argues that Mooney discouraged him from considering
cooperation after the first effort failed, and that he failed to renew attempts to
obtain a cooperation agreement. This argument cannot succeed because both
Mooney and Lund testified that once Angelos demonstrated his lack of credibility,
the government was unwilling to work with him. Further offers to cooperate
would have been futile.
5
At some point before the cooperation interview, Mooney informed Angelos
that based on the charges in the initial indictment, he was facing a potential
sentence of seven to eight years, including five years for the single § 924(c)
charge. Id. at 1589. He also told Angelos that “he shouldn’t be surprised to see
the government continuing to give us additional information and continuing to try
to do things that make it look worse.” Id. at 1591.
6
Mooney testified that he did not know about all the § 924(c) charges
Angelos potentially faced until he received a plea offer from Lund in January
2003. Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1613-14.
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2. The Government’s Written Plea Offer
After the failed cooperation talks, Lund sent a letter to Mooney outlining
the government’s position and its proposal for a plea agreement. This letter,
dated January 20, 2003, made it crystal clear that Angelos faced serious prison
time if he failed to reach a plea agreement with the government. Lund began the
letter by reminding Mooney that the single 924(c) count for which Angelos had
already been indicted “carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years and a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment.” Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I at 440. He
then proposed that Angelos plead guilty to one count of distribution of marijuana,
and one 924(c) count, and that he stipulate to a joint sentencing recommendation
of sixteen years’ incarceration. In exchange, the government would dismiss the
remaining counts of the indictment and would agree not to supersede the
indictment.
If Angelos did not agree to these terms, however, Lund stated that the
government would seek a superseding indictment including five additional 924(c)
counts, potentially exposing Angelos to 130 years of prison time. Lund’s letter
explained that “[s]ubsequent [924(c)] convictions . . . carry a mandatory minimum
sentence of twenty-five (25) years each” and that “[t]he statute mandates that
these sentences run consecutively to each other and to the underlying drug
trafficking crimes.” Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I at 441.
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Angelos claims Mooney “dissuad[ed him] from giving due consideration to
the government’s plea offer.” Reply Br. at 4. He argues that Mooney did not
understand the basis for the government’s offer and “expressly and consistently
indicated to [him] that a better deal was possible and that the prosecution was
being ‘completely unfair,’” id., and “completely unreasonable,” id. at 7. He
further asserts that Mooney “failed to understand the legal and practical
consequences of rejecting the Government’s plea offers, and thus failed to
effectively inform and advise Angelos concerning his plea options and their likely
consequences following the Government’s offer.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 39.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mooney testified that he showed Angelos the
letter from Lund. Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1618. He “went through and discussed
with him each of the ten charges” that were detailed in the letter. Id. Mooney
admitted that he did not present Lund’s sixteen-year proposed sentence in a
positive light. In fact, he recalled that he may have “used an improper anatomical
reference to Mr. Lund” in connection with this proposed sentence. Id. He
expressed to Angelos that he believed the sixteen-year proposal was
unreasonable. In fact, by the time of the evidentiary hearing, he continued to
believe that sixteen years was too long, given the two offenses to which the
government would have required a guilty plea. He believed an appropriate
guideline calculation would have required a sentence of only twelve years.
Id. at 1621.
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Mooney did not, however, consider his expression of opinion to be a
recommendation to reject the proposed plea agreement or to stop trying to reach a
deal with the government. Id. at 1619. He left the decision whether to accept the
offer to Angelos. Furthermore, contrary to Angelos’s contentions, Mooney did
not suggest a light sentence was probable if he went to trial. He explained to
Angelos that it would be very difficult to avoid at least one 924(c) conviction at
trial if he were indicted for the guns found in his home. Id. at 1622. He further
explained that even one additional 924(c) conviction would bring an additional
sentence of 25 years.
We agree with the district court that Mooney adequately explained the
government’s offer to Angelos. The fact that Mooney put a negative spin on the
offer and suggested that the government was being “unfair” or “unreasonable” did
not represent deficient performance. We accept the district court's view that
Mooney made it clear to Angelos the decision to accept the proposed plea
agreement was his. Moreover, he encouraged Angelos to submit a counter-offer
that included pleading to a 924(c) count, but Angelos was unwilling to do so.
Instead, Angelos authorized Mooney to make a counteroffer of a plea that
would not include a 924(c) charge. Mooney explained to Angelos that such an
offer would be unacceptable to the government. Mooney nevertheless conveyed it
to Lund, who rejected it. Mooney even asked Lund, without specific
authorization from Angelos, to consider the possibility that Angelos would plead
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to the two counts and receive a lower sentence than the sixteen years Lund had
suggested, but Lund vetoed that idea as well.
Angelos contends that Mooney strung him along by contending that he
could get a better offer from the government if he just kept negotiating. But on
the other hand, he also asserts that Mooney cut off plea negotiations too early and
began preparing for trial without adequately exploring the possibility of a
negotiated plea. Mooney’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing explains these
seeming inconsistencies. He did expect to talk the government down from its
initial offer. But without the key bargaining chip—Angelos’s consent to a plea
containing a 924(c) count—his hands were tied. It would have been irresponsible
for him not to prepare for a trial, given Angelos’s unwillingness to plead to a
924(c) count and the government’s insistence on such a plea.
Angelos further suggests, however, that his reluctance to plead to a 924(c)
count would have evaporated if Mooney simply had understood and conveyed to
him with more mathematical precision the risks associated with failing to take the
government’s offer. On the other side of the “plead or go to trial” scale, he faults
Mooney’s estimate that “if we were victorious at trial on most of the charges and
lost the things that looked like were going to be problematic, we probably were
looking at something that would be between seven and twelve years.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. V at 1627.
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Angelos makes a number of specific arguments on these points, none of
which ultimately has merit. He asserts that:
• Mooney “misunderstood and/or mis-communicated to Angelos how
the operation of federal sentencing statutes and guidelines
dramatically increased his mandatory minimum sentence even if he
were to partially prevail at trial.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 38. Angelos
does not flesh out this argument, but it appears that he is referring to
the 924(c) counts. In this regard, it is incontestible that Lund’s letter
specifically detailed (1) the mandatory minimum sentences, (2) the
maximum sentences, and (3) the effect of stacking associated with
924(c), which Mooney in turn discussed with Angelos. See Aplee
Supp. App., Vol. I at 441. By discussing Lund’s letter with Angelos,
Mooney adequately conveyed the risks associated with conviction on
these counts.
• Mooney failed to convey to Angelos that even if he prevailed on all
the contested gun counts at trial, he faced nearly a twenty-year
sentence. Reply Br. at 6. Mooney bases this contention on the
government’s position at sentencing that relevant conduct involving
marijuana alone required a corresponding guideline range of 168 to
210 months. Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I at 69. He does not mention,
however, that the presentence report, prepared after conviction,
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recommended a sentence of only six and one-half years for the drug
and money laundering convictions. See Angelos, 433 F.3d at 743. It
appears, therefore, that Mooney’s estimate was closer to the
appropriate sentence on these counts than the government’s
sentencing position.
• Mooney “repeatedly and prejudicially suggested to Angelos that he
was unlikely to serve more than a few years in prison even if they
lost at a trial.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 38. The evidentiary hearing
testimony does not support this claim.
• Mooney failed to effectively advise Angelos that “he was certain to
receive a longer sentence—and probably a much longer sentence—if
he went to trial than if he pleaded guilty even on the specific terms
proposed by the Government.” Id. at 39. Angelos fails to explain or
detail his argument on this point. Had he been successful at trial in
limiting his convictions to only a single 924(c) count related to the
guns at his home and the marijuana and money laundering offenses,
he would not have received a “much longer sentence” than the
sixteen years offered by the government.
• Mooney failed to explain to Angelos that “despite his assertions that
he did not possess a gun during marijuana sales to an informant, he
could still be convicted of one or more § 924(c) counts based on the
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discovery of guns in his home and other locales.” Aplt. Opening Br.
at 39. On the contrary, Mooney “explain[ed] how hard it would be
were [Angelos] indicted for the guns in his home to avoid at least
one 924(c) conviction.” Aplt. App., Vol. V at 1622. This estimation
proved correct. The jury acquitted Angelos of two 924(c) charges
involving guns found at his girlfriend’s residence, but convicted him
for guns in his home and in connection with sales to the confidential
informant.
• Mooney failed to explain to Angelos that “despite his assertions that
he did not possess a gun during marijuana sales to an informant, he
would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 50 years or
more if a jury did not believe his assertions.” Aplt. Opening Br. at
39-40. The letter from Lund explained how the 924(c) counts
worked, including the mandatory minimums. Mooney was not
constitutionally required to calculate every possible contingency, but
it is clear that Angelos had information disclosing the worst case
scenario.
* * *
In sum, Angelos fails to show that Mooney performed deficiently during
plea bargain negotiations. In light of this, we need not consider further whether
he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance.
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III. Ineffective Assistance at Trial
Angelos also raises a number of instances of Mooney’s alleged
ineffectiveness in preparing for and representing him at trial. We find no merit in
these arguments.
A. Lazalde’s Gun Testimony
Angelos first points to the testimony of the confidential informant, Ronnie
Lazalde. Two of the 924(c) counts on which the jury convicted Angelos involved
his possession of firearms during sales to Lazalde. In his direct appeal, we
previously held that the “evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury’s findings
that Angelos knowingly carried and possessed the pistol during [these] controlled
purchases.” Angelos, 433 F.3d at 749. Angelos contends, however, that with
adequate pre-trial investigation, Mooney could have raised a reasonable doubt
concerning Lazalde’s testimony about the presence of firearms during these
transactions.
1. May 21, 2002 Sale
Lazalde testified that during the controlled buy of May 21, 2002, he saw a
pistol lodged between the seat of the BMW and the center console when he and
Angelos consummated the drug purchase. Angelos contends Mooney should have
better impeached this testimony because (1) the initial police reports concerning
the controlled buy did not mention a pistol; and (2) a later report by a detective
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who recorded Lazalde’s statement stated that the pistol was on the car’s console,
not tucked in a seat as Lazalde testified at trial.
Mooney cross-examined both the detective and Lazalde at some length
about the contradictions in the police reports and their trial testimony concerning
the existence, whereabouts, and visibility of the gun. See Aplt. App., Vol. IV at
1059, 1062-65, 1135-39, 1143. He then argued to the jury that the contradictions
made the testimony unworthy of belief. Id., Vol. V at 1482-83, 1485-87.
Although Angelos argues about the need for more effective investigation and
cross-examination concerning these contradictions, it is clear from the trial record
that Mooney adequately impeached Detective Mazuran and Lazalde concerning
these issues.
2. June 4, 2002 Sale
Lazalde testified that he saw a firearm in an ankle holster on Angelos’s leg
during the June 4, 2002 sale. Angelos argues that the government’s surveillance
photos prove that it would have been impossible for Lazalde to see the firearm
during the transaction. He contends the position of Angelos’s car blocked
Lazalde’s line of sight.
But Mooney did question Lazalde at trial, using the surveillance photos,
about whether he could see the gun in the ankle holster given his position and that
of the car. See Aplee. Supp. App., Vol. I at 317-18. He also argued about
Lazalde’s line of sight in his closing argument to the jury. See Aplt. App., Vol. V
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at 1483-85. Even so, Angelos contends he should have done more to impeach
Lazalde. Specifically, he argues Mooney’s cross-examination “should have
included the use of an expert witness to examine and assess the government’s
surveillance photos” and to provide expert testimony concerning line-of-sight
issues. Aplt. Opening Br. at 44.
“Federal Rule of Evidence 702 instructs us to admit specialized knowledge
if it will ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence.’ That Rule dictates a
common-sense inquiry of whether a juror would be able to understand the
evidence without specialized knowledge concerning the subject.” United States v.
Becker, 230 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). Angelos fails
to make the case that expert testimony was required to impeach Lazalde’s
testimony, particularly when the surveillance photographs were available to the
jury.
3. New Arguments Made in Reply Brief
In his reply brief, Angelos raises a number of new arguments pertaining to
the 924(c) charges in connection with the controlled buys. First, he argues that
counsel was ineffective in failing to explain to the jury why Lazalde changed his
story. See Reply Br. at 17-19. He contends Mooney should have argued the
inconsistencies in Lazalde’s story were attributable to his desire to conform his
testimony to the 924(c) gun statute and to avoid contradicting the statements of
other witnesses. Angelos fails to show he made this argument to the district court
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in the context of his ineffective assistance claim. We could decline to consider
the argument on that basis alone. But we note in addition that Angelos fails to
explain how trial counsel who points out numerous contradictions in a witness’s
account is constitutionally ineffective merely by failing to offer a theory to
explain the inconsistencies. In any event, it was no mystery at trial that Lazalde
had received substantial benefits from the government in exchange for his
testimony (“[H]e was doing all this to tell the truth because he had a motive to
stay out of jail and turn his life around.” Aplt. App., Vol. V. at 1504.)
We decline to consider two other arguments. (1) that Mooney
unconstitutionally failed to impeach Lazalde about changing his story in the
police report from one stating he saw Angelos wearing a holster, to testimony that
he “allegedly witnessed and was even able to make out the model of the gun,”
Reply Br. at 22; and (2) Mooney unconstitutionally failed to cross-examine
Officers Bailey and Cottam concerning their failure to observe what Lazalde
claimed to see during their surveillance of the June 4, 2002, controlled buy. We
see no indication Angelos made these arguments to the district court. “Absent
extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments raised for the first
time on appeal.” Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation
omitted).
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B. Admission of Police Report
Angelos also argues that counsel should have obtained “admission of the
original police reports that failed to reflect any mention of weapons during any of
the hand-to-hand sales.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 49. Mooney did seek admission of
the police reports, and the district court rejected his request. We upheld this
evidentiary decision on appeal. Angelos, 433 F.3d at 749-50. 7 But even without
the police reports in evidence, Mooney was able to cross-examine the officer who
prepared the reports about the omissions. Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 1047-1052,
1054-67.
C. Impeachment of Chelsea Davenport
In his reply brief, Angelos argues that “Mooney failed to investigate and
effectively impeach Chelsea Davenport, a key government witness and estranged
girlfriend of Angelos who testified at trial that Angelos frequently carried a
firearm.” Reply Br. at 23. He also contends (1) Mooney incompetently opened
the door to Davenport’s testimony that Angelos beat her while she was pregnant,
leading to the premature birth of their child and forcing her to mace him in self-
defense, and (2) Mooney was unprepared to present an accurate account of these
7
In upholding the district court’s decision, we did state that “Angelos’s
counsel made no attempt to explain why the reports were admissible or to
question the district court’s ruling.” Angelos, 433 F.3d at 750. This does not
demonstrate constitutionally ineffective assistance, however. Angelos fails to
show that there was a legally-sufficient basis for admission of the reports that
Mooney should have pursued.
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events based on the actual police reports and other evidence. The government
argues Angelos failed to raise these latter claims before the district court, and we
agree. 8 We therefore consider only the issue raised in the district court: whether
counsel failed to subject Davenport’s testimony to adequate impeachment “for
bias and for inconsistent statements.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 129.
We agree with the district court that Mooney’s performance in impeaching
Davenport was not constitutionally deficient. He cross-examined her thoroughly
about her bias and irrational behavior toward Angelos. See Aplee. Supp. App.,
Vol. III at 976-94. He also elicited testimony from other witnesses about her
angry and threatening behavior toward Angelos. Id. at 1001-02, 1029-30,
1103-04. For example, he obtained testimony she drove outside a recording
session Angelos was conducting with a female singer, and “persistently honk[ed]
[her car] horn maybe for 45 minutes at a time” to interfere with the recording
session. Id. at 1029. Another witness testified Davenport “would throw big
tantrums, pull – rip her hair out, cry, cut her face with a razer [sic]. She was
crazy. Just sickly obsessed.” Id. at 1104. Counsel also questioned Davenport
about prior inconsistent statements. See id. at 979, 983, 991.
In short, Mooney’s performance at trial was not constitutionally deficient.
8
Angelos contends in his reply brief that he did raise the claims; his
citations to the record, however, are unconvincing on this point. See Aplt. Reply
Br. at 23-24 n.12 (citing Aplt. App., Vol. I at 129-30, 237 n.2).
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IV. Evidentiary Hearing
As we have shown, Angelos’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial do not meet the Strickland threshold. The district court therefore did not
abuse its discretion by failing to grant him an expanded evidentiary hearing
concerning them. (Nor, for reasons we will describe, did any of his other issues,
on which we deny COA, require an evidentiary hearing.)
Angelos makes one additional argument worth noting. He contends our
grant of a COA on his ineffective assistance at trial claim is inconsistent with the
district court’s determination no evidentiary hearing was necessary on the claim
because “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). This argument
misperceives the nature of a COA. The grant of a COA involves only a threshold
inquiry that “does not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases
adduced in support of the [petitioner’s] claims. In fact, the statute forbids it.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). In granting Angelos a COA, we
conducted only “an overview of the claims in [his] petition and a general
assessment of their merits.” Id. This overview did not permit us to make any
conclusive assessment of the state of the record or its bearing on the ultimate
question of whether an evidentiary hearing was required.
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V. Procedurally-Defaulted Claims
We now turn to the claims on which we deny Angelos a COA. The district
court barred his Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims, finding that this
court had previously considered and rejected them in his direct appeal. See
United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding issues
disposed of on direct appeal will not generally be considered in § 2255 collateral
attack, absent intervening change in law). It also barred his Second Amendment
claims, Fifth Amendment vindictive prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct
claims, and separation-of-powers claims because they could have been raised on
direct appeal. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). Angelos argues that all of these
claims should be considered on the merits because “they involve claims for which
a procedural bar is inappropriate and/or because [he] can readily satisfy one or
more of the established exceptions to procedural bar rules.” Aplt. Opening Br.
at 26. 9
“There are . . . two well recognized exceptions under which a defendant
may escape application of the procedural bar against consideration of defaulted
claims.” United States v. Cervini, 379 F.3d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 2004). First, he
may show “cause and prejudice,” that is, that he had “both good cause for failing
9
Angelos makes no argument specific to his separation of powers and equal
protection claims. Accordingly, we need not address the issue of whether he is
entitled to a COA as to these claims.
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to raise the issue earlier, and that the court’s failure to consider the claim would
result in actual prejudice to his defense[.]” Id. 10 Alternatively, if he can show
that “failure to consider the federal claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, the court may reach the merits of the claimed
constitutional deficiencies despite the procedural bar.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We now consider whether he has satisfied either of these exceptions with respect
to his barred claims.
A. Second Amendment Claim
In his § 2255 motion, Angelos advanced a claim that “the 25-year term of
imprisonment as applied in this case for having firearms in his home raises
serious concerns under any individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment’s protection of the right to ‘keep and bear arms.’” Aplt. App., Vol. I
at 158. He contends that he demonstrated cause for failing to raise this Second
Amendment claim on direct appeal, because the claim did not become available to
10
Angelos makes a two-sentence argument that his trial counsel’s failure to
raise certain claims constitutes cause and prejudice that should excuse his
procedural default. Aplt. Opening Br. at 32-33. His default extends, however,
not only to arguments omitted at trial, but more importantly to those omitted on
direct appeal. Since his trial counsel also represented him in his direct appeal, it
is unclear whether he contends that counsel’s failure to raise certain claims on
direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. But he has failed to
show that counsel’s failure to raise his Second and Fifth Amendment arguments
on direct appeal represented deficient performance, given the apparent lack of
merit of these claims. (Counsel did, of course, raise his Eighth Amendment
claims on direct appeal and therefore could not have been ineffective for omitting
them.).
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him until the Supreme Court granted certiorari in District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). He asserts it would have been both futile and frivolous to
have raised his claim prior to Heller, which was issued after disposition of his
direct appeal.
Angelos’s argument that he could not have raised his claim prior to Heller
is unavailing. Futility does not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default if
it means simply that a claim would have been unacceptable to a particular court at
a particular time. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Angelos
has failed to “demonstrate that his claim was so novel [at the time of direct
appeal] that its legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel.” United
States v. Wiseman, 297 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 2002). Nor was there anything
particularly novel about a Second Amendment attack on a conviction under
§ 924(c) at the time he filed his direct appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Hager,
22 F. App’x 130, 132 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Box v. United States,
904 F. Supp. 773, 777 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff’d, 106 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1997).
Angelos has therefore failed to show cause to excuse his procedural default based
on the alleged novelty or futility of his Second Amendment claim.
Moreover, even if he could show cause for omitting this claim from his
direct appeal, he fails to show prejudice. The majority in Heller made it clear
that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited” and that
“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
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prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings[.]” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17. More importantly, the
charges against Angelos were not simple felon-in-possession claims, but charges
of possessing and using firearms to facilitate large-scale drug trafficking.
Since Heller was decided, circuit courts have uniformly rejected Heller
challenges to convictions under § 924(c). See, e.g., Costigan v. Yost,
334 F. App’x 460, 462 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating Heller’s reasoning “does not render
[§ 924(c)(1)(A)] unconstitutional”); United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 147 (2009); United States v. Frazier,
314 F. App’x 801, 807-08 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1652 (2009).
Cf. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding
statutory prohibition on possession of firearm by felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
against Heller challenge).
In sum, Angelos has failed to show his entitlement to a COA on his Second
Amendment claim.
B. Fifth Amendment Claims
Angelos contends a defendant should not be required to bring Fifth
Amendment claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness and misconduct until collateral
review proceedings. His view is that the factual basis for such claims often is
unavailable to the defendant until after his direct appeal is complete. He
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analogizes such claims to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, for which
the record generally is not developed until collateral review. See United States v.
Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Ineffective assistance
of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct
appeal [because the] factual record must be developed in and addressed by the
district court in the first instance for effective review.”) We decline to adopt a
categorical rule excusing defendants from bringing prosecutorial vindictiveness
and misconduct claims on direct appeal. Angelos’s argument that these claims
are of the type that cannot adequately be raised until collateral proceedings is
unpersuasive.
The appropriate remedy available to a defendant who discovers evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct or vindictiveness after completion of his direct appeal is
to use that evidence as cause to excuse his procedural default. Angelos argues he
has new evidence “that federal prosecutors decided to pursue multiple charges
against Angelos with the threat of extreme mandatory minimum sentencing terms
only after--and perhaps only because--prosecutors came to believe Angelos was
unwilling to cooperate with authorities.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 22 n.11. He
contends that he “has reason to believe that the government’s aggressive and
oppressive approach to plea bargaining following the original indictment was
motivated, at least in part, to punish Angelos for his interest in exercising his
constitutionally protected right not to cooperate with authorities.” Id. at 34.
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Even assuming such allegations show cause to excuse his procedural
default, he has failed to show the required prejudice. As the district court noted,
nothing in the record or in Angelos’s arguments suggests that the prosecution
behaved unconstitutionally in its charging decisions. Angelos made a tactical
choice to reject the plea bargain offered by the government with its associated
terms and requirements, and to proceed to trial. He does not assert the
government lacked probable cause to charge him with the offenses identified in
the second superseding indictment. See United States v. Sarracino, 340 F.3d
1148, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2003). While he suggests the prosecution in his case
may have persuaded the confidential informant to lie about his possession of a
firearm during one of the controlled buys, his contentions about government-
sponsored lying remain just that--unsupported speculation.
In sum, he has failed to show actual prejudice that would excuse the
procedural bar.
C. Eighth Amendment Claim
The district court barred Angelos’s Eighth Amendment claim because it
was raised and rejected in this court’s decision on his direct appeal. He contends,
however, that “landmark intervening changes in applicable Supreme Court law
and relevant constitutional facts” make his Eighth Amendment claim, considered
in tandem with his Second Amendment argument, “ripe and proper for review on
the merits.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 28. This argument lacks merit.
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The alleged landmark changes on which Angelos relies include the Second
Amendment Heller case, and two new Eighth Amendment cases, Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) and Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011
(2010). Neither Kennedy nor Graham, alone or in tandem with Heller’s Second
Amendment conclusions, however, requires us to alter the proportionality analysis
contained in our previous opinion. See Angelos, 433 F.3d at 750-53. We
therefore deny Angelos a COA on his Eighth Amendment claim.
D. Miscarriage of Justice
Angelos contends that he has shown a “fundamental miscarriage of justice”
requiring this court to “reach the merits of the claimed constitutional deficiencies
despite the procedural bar.” Cervini, 379 F.3d at 990-91. He argues that he
meets this standard because he is “actually innocent” of one of the gun possession
convictions. To meet this exception to procedural bar, however, he must show
that the constitutional errors he asserts likely “resulted in the conviction of one
who was actually innocent.” Id. at 991 (emphasis added) (quoting Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995)). Neither his Second Amendment nor his Eighth
Amendment claims, both of which target the severity of his sentence rather than
the fact of his conviction, satisfy this causal nexus. Addressing the alleged
constitutional sentencing errors would not vitiate his convictions; at best, it would
require that he be re-sentenced. Cf., e.g., United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369,
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1371 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating one “cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital
sentence”).
His Fifth Amendment claims, if successful, could conceivably affect the
disposition of the § 924(c) count as to which he claims actual innocence. But as
we have seen, these Fifth Amendment claims fail on the merits, because he has
failed to show that the prosecution violated the Constitution in its charging
decisions.
Angelos also argues that separate and apart from any concern about
innocence, he meets the miscarriage of justice standard because the district court
concluded the mandatory sentence he received on the firearm counts appeared
“cruel, unjust, and irrational.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 33 (quoting United States v.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004)). He identifies no authority
that would treat an “unfair” sentence alone as a grave miscarriage of justice
sufficient to excuse procedural default. He has not shown his entitlement to a
COA on this issue.
VI. Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing
Angelos also argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
permit him to conduct discovery or otherwise to submit evidence in support of his
claims. He makes two separate arguments concerning the development of the
evidentiary basis for his claims. In the first argument, Angelos contends that he
already possesses evidence he wished to present for the district court’s
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consideration, but was denied leave to do so. In the second, he requests an
opportunity to develop additional evidence through discovery.
Angelos complains that he alerted the district court in his motion for
reconsideration that he had additional evidence he wished to present in support of
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims. He contends that the district court “issued
an order denying the motion without reference to the new evidence.” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 25 n.13. 11 This contention misstates the record. In response to his
motion, the district court specifically stated:
[Angelos] also claims he has obtained new evidence since the
December 3, 2007 filing of his § 2255 motion and contends he has
the right to introduce the evidence into the record at an evidentiary
hearing.
In his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Angelos does not
describe the evidence he has since collected or why such evidence
was unavailable before the filing of the § 2255 motion. He does not
clarify why he was unable to present the unidentified evidence, or at
least alert the court to such evidence, more than two days before an
evidentiary hearing which all understood to be limited to a separate
issue. Given the vagueness of Mr. Angelos’s motion for
reconsideration, and its timing . . . the court denies his request to
submit evidence and arguments during the [evidentiary] hearing that
do not relate to the issue for which the hearing was originally set.
Aplt. App., Vol. II at 296-97.
11
Angelos attempts to split hairs by arguing that the district court’s order
only addressed new evidence acquired before October 2008, not the evidence that
he acquired after that date and indicated a desire to present in his motion. See
Aplt. Opening Br. at 24-25 n.13. There is no indication in the district court’s
order, however, that it did not intend to address all of the new evidence Angelos
purported to possess at the time he filed his motion.
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Angelos fails to show that this analysis represents an abuse of discretion.
We therefore deny him a COA on his claim that the district court improperly
denied him leave to submit additional evidence on his Fifth Amendment claims.
Angelos also asserts that the district court erred in denying his requests for
discovery. The district court reasoned that he (1) failed to provide any proposed
discovery to the court, in violation of Rule 6(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255
Proceedings, and (2) failed to show “good cause” for discovery as required by
Rule 6(a) of those rules. It noted that although Angelos had presented some
circumstantial evidence relating to the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness or
misconduct, the alleged evidence did not rise to a showing of “good cause” for
discovery as to these issues. There is no abuse of discretion in this determination,
and we therefore deny COA on this issue.
Finally, Angelos fails to show anything in the files and records of the case
that would warrant an evidentiary hearing on his Fifth Amendment claims. The
issue of whether his Second Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims were
procedurally barred involved issues of law that did not warrant an evidentiary
hearing.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED concerning Angelos’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and trial, and
concerning the district court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
ineffective assistance at trial claims. We DENY him a COA pertaining to the
other issues raised on appeal, and DISMISS the appeal as to those issues.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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