Chitwood v. Davis , 434 F. App'x 741 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 11, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID CHITWOOD,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 11-1120
v. (D. Colorado)
JOHN DAVIS, Warden; JOHN (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-02474-ZLW)
SUTHERS, Attorney General of the
State of Colorado,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
David Chitwood (Defendant), a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of his application
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)
(requiring COA to appeal denial of application). We deny his request for a COA
and dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 1993, after being temporarily transferred from the custody of
the Missouri Department of Corrections, Defendant pleaded guilty in the District
Court of Jefferson County, Colorado, to one count of second-degree burglary and
one count of second-degree forgery. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms
of 20 years on the burglary count and 8 years on the forgery count, the “sentence
. . . to run consecutive to [his] sentences in Missouri.” R., Vol. 1 at 21. He then
was returned to prison in Missouri and remained there until he was returned to
Colorado in November 1998. In January 2009 he pleaded guilty to felony
menacing in a separate case in the District Court of Adams County, Colorado, and
the next month he was sentenced to a term of six years in prison consecutive to
his Jefferson County sentence.
In August 2009 Defendant filed an unsuccessful petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court of Chaffee County, Colorado. Although he did not
appeal that decision, he filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus with
the Colorado Supreme Court, which was also denied.
In October 2010, Defendant filed his § 2241 application in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. He filed an amended
application in November. The amended application raises three claims, all based
on an alleged mistake by the Colorado Department of Corrections in not setting
the start of his prison term until his 1998 return to Colorado from Missouri. On
February 15, 2011, the district court entered an order dismissing the application
without prejudice on the ground that Defendant had failed to exhaust his state
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remedies; it also denied a COA on his claims. Defendant now seeks a COA from
this court. 1
II. DISCUSSION
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard
requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant must
show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either
“debatable or wrong.” Id. If the application was denied on procedural grounds,
the applicant faces a double hurdle. Not only must the applicant make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, but he must also show
“that jurists of reason would find it debatable . . . whether the district court was
1
Although Defendant’s notice of appeal was due on Friday, March 18,
2011, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (requiring that a notice of appeal “be filed with
the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is
entered”), his motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, which the district
court treated as a notice of appeal, was not docketed until March 21. Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c)(1), however, provides that “[i]f an inmate
confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil or a criminal
case, the notice is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system
on or before the last day for filing.” Because Defendant has submitted evidence
that his motion was mailed on March 17, we will treat his appeal as timely.
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correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and
the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist
could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or
that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” Id.
A state prisoner generally may not raise a claim for federal habeas corpus
relief unless (1) he “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), or (2) exhaustion would be futile because
either “there is an absence of available State corrective process” or
“circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the applicant.” Id. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii). To exhaust a claim, a habeas
applicant must pursue it through “one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process,” giving the state courts a “full and fair opportunity” to
correct alleged constitutional errors. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999). The applicant bears the burden of proving that he exhausted state-court
remedies or that exhaustion would have been futile. See Clonce v. Presley, 640
F.2d 271, 273 (10th Cir. 1981).
Defendant has not shown that he exhausted his state remedies. Although
Colorado authorizes a state prisoner to appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court a
state district court’s denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, see Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-4-102(1)(e) (2011); Tuller v. Neal, 886 P.2d 279, 279 n.1 (Colo. 1994),
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Defendant did not appeal the state district court’s denial of his petition. He
contends that he exhausted his remedies by filing an original petition for writ of
habeas corpus with the Colorado Supreme Court. But that did not suffice. The
exercise of the Colorado Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction appears to be
limited to correcting errors “that cannot be later remedied on appeal,” and it “is
extraordinary relief, limited in purpose and availability, and the court retains the
discretion to choose not to exercise it.” People v. Martinez, 22 P.3d 915, 921
(Colo. 2001) (en banc); see Colo. App. R. 21(a)(1). In particular, a petition
seeking the exercise of the supreme court’s original jurisdiction is “not a
substitute for appeal.” Bell v. Simpson, 918 P.2d 1123, 1125 n.3 (Colo. 1996) (en
banc). Because Defendant’s petition in the state supreme court sought
extraordinary and discretionary relief, it did not fairly present the issues to that
court, and it does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Castille v. Peoples,
489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Esquibel v. Williamson, No. 10-1357, 2010 WL
4912310, *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2010) (unpublished); Edmiston v. Colorado, 158 F.
App’x 980, 981–82 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
Thus, Defendant did not exhaust his state remedies. And he has not argued
that exhaustion would have been futile. We therefore hold that no reasonable
jurist could debate that the district court erred in dismissing the Defendant’s
§ 2241 application.
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III. CONCLUSION
We DENY the application for a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We also
DENY Defendant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion for
appointment of counsel.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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