Annis v. Collins , 225 F. App'x 742 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 15, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
HARVEY BRUCE ANNIS, a
W yoming national,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-8069
M ARY ANN COLLINS, Natrona (D.C. No. 06-CV-96-D)
County Clerk, (D. W yoming)
Defendant-Appellee,
and
R OSS LAY ,
Defendant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BRISCO E, M cK AY, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Harvey Bruce Annis (Annis) appeals from the district court’s dismissal of
his pro se complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Annis alleged that M ary Ann Collins
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however,
for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
(Collins), county clerk in Natrona County, W yoming, unlawfully filed tax liens
against A nnis’ property and that Ross Lay (Lay) wrongfully aided Collins in this
regard. In response to A nnis’ appeal, Collins filed a motion for sanctions,
requesting attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal. W e have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and because Annis advances no non-
frivolous grounds on appeal, we affirm the district court’s dismissal and grant
Collins’ motion for sanctions.
Annis filed a complaint, entitled “Claim of Fraudulent Conveyance and
Trespass of Land Title,” asserting that Collins, as Natrona County Clerk,
improperly filed various federal tax liens against his property which w ere
allegedly “deceptive, fictitious, fraudulent, noncompliant instruments presented
by the Internal Revenue Service.” A ppx., Doc. 1, p. 1. As for Lay, Annis
asserted that he “secured a ‘Quitclaim Deed’ . . . which has been manufactured
through [a] chain of actions which are noncompliant and unlawful.” Id. at 3.
Annis sought a declaration that his land patent was the superior title to a certain
tract of land and further sought monetary damages from the defendants. Id. at 4.
Collins filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Annis filed a
response and a one page “Notice to Recuse Judge W illiam Downs [sic],” w herein
Annis essentially argued that the district court judge exhibited prejudice against
him by considering Collins’ motion to dismiss without oral argument and by
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allowing Collins to file a reply brief. Thereafter, the district court entered an
order granting Collins’ motion to dismiss and denying Annis’ motion for recusal.
Specifically, the district court concluded that Annis’ assertion that it could
assume jurisdiction over the case based upon Collins’ oath of office, whereby she
swore to support, obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States, lacked
merit, as did Annis’ assertion that the court had jurisdiction over cases arising
from “the dignity of Land Patents issuing from the United States.” Appx., Doc.
15, p. 2. Absent any other possible basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court
dismissed Annis’ action. Alternatively, the district court found that Annis failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
W e review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action under Rule
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tsosie v. United
States, 452 F.3d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 2006). Annis contends that the district
court erred in two regards. First, he argues that the district court should have
taken up his motion for recusal before ruling on Collins’ motion to dismiss.
Second, Annis argues that the district court erred in dismissing his action without
acknowledging that Lay was in default for refusing to accept service of process.
W e conclude that neither of these arguments has any merit, but, more
importantly, Annis fails to challenge the district court’s determination that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his action. A controversy involving land
has never been regarded as presenting a federal question merely because one of
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the parties to it has derived his title from a patent or under an act of Congress.
See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 676 (1974);
Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000).
M oreover, we are unaware of any legal support for the proposition that a federal
court may assume subject matter jurisdiction over an action if a named defendant
once sw ore an oath to defend the Constitution. See Nicodemus v. Union Pacific
Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A case arises under federal law if
its ‘well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.’”) (citations omitted). Because A nnis’
complaint asserts no other intelligible basis for federal jurisdiction, the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims and properly dismissed his
complaint under Rule 12(b)(1). Accordingly, we need not address its alternative
basis for dismissal under 12(b)(6).
Collins has also filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 38 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Collins seeks a sanction against A nnis in
the amount of $1,454.55, which is the total of the attorney fees and costs
expended by Collins in the defense of this appeal. Under Rule 38, “[i]f a court of
appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed
motion . . . and reasonable opportunity to respond, aw ard just damages and single
or double costs to the appellee.” Annis’ pro se status is not a bar to such
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sanctions. Haw orth v. Royal, 347 F.3d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003).
Because Annis’ appeal is frivolous, sanctions are appropriate. Collins states
she refrained from seeking sanctions at the district court level due to A nnis’ pro
se status. However, Collins now argues that after the district court’s clear
explanation of the law, a reasonable person would have recognized the infirmities
of his position. Instead, Annis pursued his claims by filing this appeal. We note
that Annis’ appellate briefing presents arguments which are lacking in any factual
or legal support, and which again force Collins to needlessly respond. Further,
Annis’ response to Collins’ motion for sanctions merely lists a series of Collins’
alleged wrongdoings without addressing the request for sanctions on its merits.
W e grant Collins’ motion and, having received no objection to the reasonableness
of the amount requested, order Annis to pay the sanctions sought.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal, GRANT Collins’
motion for sanctions, and award Collins $1,454.55 in sanctions.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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