Mays v. Astrue , 487 F. App'x 459 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                             FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS     Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      July 2, 2012
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    REBECCA L. MAYS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                          No. 11-5103
    (D.C. No. 4:10-CV-00506-FHM)
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner,                            (N.D. Okla.)
    Social Security Administration,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
    Rebecca L. Mays appeals from orders denying her motions to remand to the
    Social Security Administration and to alter or amend the order denying remand.
    Upon our request, the parties filed memorandum briefs addressing whether the orders
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    are final and appealable. Because no final, appealable order has been entered, we
    dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    Ms. Mays sought review in the district court of the Social Security
    Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits. After the Commissioner filed the
    administrative record, Ms. Mays filed a motion to remand for a de novo
    administrative hearing pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). She asserted that the
    administrative record improperly included an incorrect, withdrawn page and omitted
    the corrected, substituted page of her doctor’s report.
    The magistrate judge denied the motion to remand, finding the omitted page
    was not material and would not have a reasonable likelihood of changing the
    administrative decision.1 The magistrate judge set a briefing schedule. Rather than
    file a brief, Ms. Mays filed a motion to alter or amend. The magistrate judge denied
    the motion. Ms. Mays appealed.
    We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final decision. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . A final decision “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
    court to do but execute the judgment.” Riley v. Kennedy, 
    553 U.S. 406
    , 419 (2008);
    see Utah v. Norton, 
    396 F.3d 1281
    , 1286 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A final judgment is one
    that terminates all matters as to all parties and causes of action.” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    1
    Upon the parties’ consent, the case was referred to the magistrate judge to
    conduct all proceedings and to order entry of final judgment.
    -2-
    The orders denying the motion to remand and the motion to alter or amend that
    order did not end the litigation on the merits and leave the magistrate judge with
    nothing to do but execute a judgment. Rather, the magistrate judge set a briefing
    schedule so the case could continue to final judgment. Clearly, the magistrate judge
    has not reviewed the merits of the administrative denial of benefits and has not
    entered a final judgment. The orders therefore are not final under § 1291.
    Nor are they appealable under the collateral order exception to the final
    judgment rule. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    , 546 (1949).
    Under that exception, a small number of interlocutory orders may qualify as final
    under § 1291 if the orders “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
    important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are]
    effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v.
    Livesay, 
    437 U.S. 463
    , 468 (1978); see also United States v. Pickard, 
    676 F.3d 1214
    ,
    1217 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he collateral-order doctrine does not allow a party to
    appeal an order merely because it creates some inconvenience or disadvantage.”).
    Because all three of these factors must be shown, if one is not met, we need not
    address the other two. Magic Circle Energy 1981-A Drilling Program v. Lindsey
    (In re Magic Circle Energy Corp.), 
    889 F.2d 950
    , 954 (10th Cir. 1989).
    Here, we need only address the third factor, and we conclude that collateral
    review is not available because future review is still possible. See 
    id.
     The magistrate
    judge’s orders denying the motions to remand and to alter and amend are reviewable
    -3-
    upon entry of final judgment after the magistrate judge reviews the merits of the
    Commissioner’s denial of social security disability benefits. See Miami Tribe of
    Okla. v. United States, 
    656 F.3d 1129
    , 1137 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Through an appeal of
    a final judgment, a party can obtain appellate review of both the final judgment and
    any interlocutory orders.”); cf. Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 
    194 F.3d 1072
    ,
    1076 (10th Cir. 1999) (“This court has jurisdiction over a denial of a motion to
    remand to state court when coupled with the appeal of a final judgment.” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we conclude the collateral order exception does not
    apply to this case.2
    Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    Bobby R. Baldock
    Circuit Judge
    2
    Because we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we need not address Ms. Mays’
    argument that the allegedly inaccurate record denied her due process.
    -4-