Energy West Mining v. Johnson ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 23, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
EN ERGY WE ST M IN IN G
C OM PA N Y ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 06-9573
(No. 05-0477-BLA)
D O N C. JO H N SO N ; (Petition for Review)
B EN EFITS R EV IEW B O A RD ,
Respondents.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, M cKA Y, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Energy W est M ining Co. (“Energy W est”) seeks review of a final
order of the Benefits Review Board (“Board”) directing it to make black-lung
compensation payments to respondent Don C. Johnson. The Board’s order was
predicated on the findings and conclusions of an administrative law judge
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
(“ALJ”) who held that M r. Johnson was entitled to benefits under the Black Lung
Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, because he was completely disabled by
pneumoconiosis 1 contracted, at least in part, as a result of his coal mine
employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.204. Energy W est asserts that reversal is
warranted because the Board improperly resolved conflicting evidence about the
causes of M r. Johnson’s breathing difficulties – and that the true cause of M r.
Johnson’s troubles w as his longstanding smoking habit. Because we owe
deference to the Board when its decision is supported by substantial, even if not
uniform, evidence, we affirm.
t t t
At the time of the hearing before the ALJ, M r. Johnson was 79 years old
and a retiree who suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”).
Prior to retirement, M r. Johnson worked as an underground coal miner for some
44 years. Although the record contains conflicting reports given by M r. Johnson
to various doctors at various times regarding his smoking history, the ALJ
credited M r. Johnson’s hearing testimony, supported by two physicians’ reports,
that he began smoking at age 19 and had “a substantial, prolonged history of
1
Pneumoconiosis, otherwise known as black lung, is “a chronic dust disease of
the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments,
arising out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201.
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smoking of ½ to 1 pack per day for about 48 years ending in 1991, or a 24 to 48
pack year smoking history.” R. ALJ’s decision at 16.
Upon review of the entirety of the medical evidence presented – reports by
five physicians, two of whom were deposed, as well as treatment notes from
various other medical sources – the ALJ determined that M r. Johnson had
established his COPD was the result of pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.202(a)(4). Applying the rebuttable presumption afforded M r. Johnson by
regulation, the ALJ further concluded that M r. Johnson’s pneumoconiosis arose at
least in part from his coal-mine employment and not solely because of his
smoking habit. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(a), (b). Finally, the ALJ held that
M r. Johnson’s pneumoconiosis was itself a “substantially contributing cause” of
his disability and thus that M r. Johnson qualified under regulation for a finding of
“total disability.” See 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1).
In working his way through these various steps, the ALJ accorded great
weight to Dr. Jean-M aurice Poitras’ opinion that M r. Johnson suffered from
pneumoconiosis and that the disease was caused by both coal dust and smoking.
At the same time, the A LJ discounted the competing opinions of D rs. Robert J.
Farney, David M . Rosenberg, and Jeff Elmer that M r. Johnson’s condition was
caused solely by smoking. The A LJ took this course because, in his view, these
latter physicians failed to explain adequately why they ruled out coal-mine
employment as a potential cause of M r. Johnson’s breathing troubles.
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Along these same lines, the ALJ found that although M r. Johnson’s treating
physician, Dr. David Nichols, was in a unique position to render an opinion, his
opinion was equivocal and thus w arranted less w eight. As it happens, Dr. Nichols
initially stated that he had no opinion as to the cause of M r. Johnson’s CO PD
because he w as concerned only with treatment. Later, he opined that M r.
Johnson’s condition resulted from a combination of smoking and coal-dust
exposure. W hen informed of a normal spirometry study done at the time of
M r. Johnson’s retirement and an inflated smoking history, Dr. Nichols finally
stated that coal dust probably was not the cause, though he added that he could
not rule out the possibility that M r. Johnson’s extensive coal-dust exposure
played some role in his COPD.
Having found that M r. Johnson satisfied all requirements for entitlement,
the ALJ awarded benefits and the Board affirmed.
t t t
On appeal to this court, Energy W est argues: (i) the Board’s decision to
affirm the ALJ was in error because the ALJ improperly resolved the conflicting
evidence of M r. Johnson’s smoking history; (ii) in making its determination that
pneumoconiosis was a “substantially contributing cause” of M r. Johnson’s
disability, the Board and ALJ likewise erred by failing to fully credit the opinions
of Drs. Elmer, Farney, and Rosenberg, and improperly credited the opinion of
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Dr. Poitras; and (iii) the Board and ALJ failed to consider all of the relevant
medical evidence.
W e review the Board’s order only to determine whether it “correctly
concluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and not
contrary to law,” N. Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 100 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir.
1996); our review under this standard is “quite narrow,” Hall v. Dep’t of Labor,
476 F.3d 847, 850 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Substantial evidence
need not be commanding or even the most convincing proof; indeed, we will not
upset an administrative decision for lack of substantial evidence so long as the
record contains “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938). The reasons for this deferential standard of review stem from the
expertise of the agency charged with administering Congress’s directives in the
field and its unrivaled opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses;
respecting these realities, we will “not sit as a super trial examiner,” reweighing
the evidence and comparative credibility of witnesses. Ready Mixed Concrete Co.
v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 1546, 1551 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted).
Energy W est first contends that the Board’s reliance on the A LJ’s
assessment of M r. Johnson’s smoking history was in error because the record
contains conflicting reports about how much M r. Johnson smoked, and many such
reports indicate a more serious history than that found by the ALJ. W hile the
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ALJ determined that M r. Johnson had smoked one-half to one pack of cigarettes
per day for 48 years, Energy W est points to statements M r. Johnson made to
Dr. Elmer and to other physicians that he smoked one and one-half packs per day
or one to two packs per day, as well as statements equating to 100 pack years and
50 pack years. Energy W est further charges the Board and the ALJ w ith failing to
reconcile M r. Johnson’s erroneous statement to Dr. Elmer that he quit smoking in
1987 with other evidence that he quit in 1991.
But overlooked in all this is that the ALJ candidly acknowledged the
discrepancies in the smoking-history records and credited M r. Johnson’s hearing
testimony, as well as the medical histories given by Drs. Poitras and Farney, only
after finding the competing evidence supplied by Energy W est to be less
convincing. It was within the ALJ’s province to resolve the conflicting evidence
regarding M r. Johnson’s smoking history, and we may not disturb the A LJ’s
credibility determinations, adopted by the Board, absent clear error; merely
pointing to competing testimony inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding neither
satisfies this high standard nor negates the existence of the evidence on which the
ALJ and Board relied. See Double Eagle Hotel & Casino v. NLRB, 414 F.3d
1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Although there was also testimony . . . contrary [to
the Board’s finding], the substantial evidence standard of review does not permit
us to question the Board’s balancing of this conflicting evidence.”); Hall, 476
F.3d at 854 (“the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
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evidence does not prevent the Board’s findings from being supported by
substantial evidence”).
In a similar argument, Energy W est maintains that the A LJ’s
characterization of Dr. Nichols’ opinion as equivocal caused it to discount
erroneously the seriousness of M r. Johnson’s smoking history. Energy W est
asserts that, notwithstanding his initial view that the disease was the result of a
combination of smoking and coal-dust exposure, Dr. Nichols’ ultimate opinion
was that smoking caused M r. Johnson’s COPD. As discussed above, however,
Dr. Nichols’ opinion changed depending on the factors he was asked to consider
and we thus are unable to say that the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Nichols’ opinion
was equivocal was clearly erroneous, or that its presence in the record diminished
the substantial evidence supporting the A LJ’s findings.
Energy W est also faults the Board and A LJ for crediting Dr. Poitras’
opinion and discrediting what it believes to be the more reliable opinions of
Drs. Elmer, Farney, and Rosenberg. But, again, as we have explained the
comparative weight appropriately given conflicting evidence is not, at least absent
extraordinary circumstances, an availing basis for appeal. See supra p. 5; see
also Hansen v. Director, OWCP, 984 F.2d 364, 370 (10th Cir. 1993). In any
event, Energy W est’s primary attack on Dr. Poitras – that he did not have the
benefit of medical tests performed in September 2002 – appears to fail on its own
terms. Energy W est contends that Dr. Poitras’ report was dated July 25, 2002;
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yet, the record reflects that Dr. Poitras actually signed his report on September
25, 2002 – and that he did consider the September medical test results.
R. Director’s Ex. 15, at 3-4. 2 Affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M . Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
2
Energy W est’s concern that the A LJ assumed erroneously that Dr. Elmer’s
diagnosis of chronic bronchitis was “legal pneumoconiosis” under 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.201(a)(2), is similarly misplaced because the ALJ did not appear to rely on
Dr. Elmer’s opinion.
In a final and brief aside, Energy W est claims that the ALJ failed to consider the
medical evidence of the CT scan, the treatment records from LDS H ospital, and
the office notes from Dr. Dean. But Energy W est has not explained to us why
those records are relevant and in so doing has left us w ith no choice but to
dismiss this argument for lack of sufficient development to allow for meaningful
judicial review. See Simpson v. T.D. Williamson Inc., 414 F.3d 1203, 1206 n.4
(10th Cir. 2005); see also Zam ora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1184
(10th Cir. 2007) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (adjudicating an issue that is not
properly briefed “runs the risk of an improvident or ill-advised result given our
dependence as an Article III court on the traditions of the adversarial process for
sharpening, developing, and testing the issues for our decision”).
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