Szymanski v. Benton , 289 F. App'x 315 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 14, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
DOUGLAS P. SZYMANSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-8082
(D.C. No. 2:06-CV-112-WFD)
MARK BENTON, Natrona County (D. Wyo.)
Sheriff, individually; CORPORAL
RODNEY BIRKLE, Natrona County
Detention Center Officer, individually;
JON CAMPBELL, Natrona County
Commissioner, individually;
LIEUTENANT CLARK, Natrona
County Detention Center Officer,
individually; KATHLEEN DIXON,
Natrona County Commissioner,
individually; MATT KEATING,
Natrona County Commissioner,
individually; CATHY KILLEAN,
Natrona County Commissioner,
individually; NATRONA COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER
COMMANDER/ADMINISTRATOR,
individually; DREW PERKINS,
Natrona County Commissioner,
individually,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
(continued...)
Before McCONNELL, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Douglas P. Szymanski, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants on his claims that his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was
violated during his incarceration at the Natrona County Detention Center
(hereafter, “detention center”) in Casper, Wyoming. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
This appeal concerns only Mr. Szymanski’s federal claims against Sheriff
Benton and Corporal Birkle in their individual capacities. He has abandoned or
waived on appeal any claims he had against the remaining defendants by not
raising them in his appellate briefs. See Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo.,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief
are deemed abandoned or waived.”). In addition, Mr. Szymanski attempted to
dismiss these defendants in the district court by filing a notice that he intended
voluntarily to dismiss them. R. Vol. II, Doc. 109. Similarly, by electing not to
*
(...continued)
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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raise in his appellate briefs his claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his pain and suffering, he has abandoned this claim.
Background
Mr. Szymanski’s claims arose from an incident occurring at the detention
center on December 4, 2005, in which another inmate, Kazell Wallace, entered his
cell and assaulted him. Mr. Szymanski asserts that an October 17, 2005, verbal
altercation between him and Mr. Wallace should have alerted defendants to keep
them separated and, in fact, defendant Birkle entered a keep-separate order which
was not enforced. As a result, Mr. Szymanski maintains, Mr. Wallace was housed
in a location that permitted the attack on him.
Mr. Szymanski was housed at the detention center from April to December
2005. Mr. Wallace resided there from September 30, 2005, until his short-lived
release on November 27, 2005. He was arrested again on December 3, 2005, and
placed in a different area than Mr. Szymanski. On December 4, Mr. Wallace’s
racist cellmate violently refused to be housed with an African American and, as a
consequence, Mr. Wallace was moved to a cell near Mr. Szymanski’s. Shortly
after the move, Mr. Wallace assaulted Mr. Szymanski, who claimed he was
seriously injured. Mr. Szymanski sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his
Eighth Amendment rights were violated because detention-center personnel did
not protect him from Mr. Wallace.
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Defendants responded that following the October verbal disagreement,
Corporal Birkle decided to move Mr. Wallace to a different location to obviate
further conflict. It is undisputed that Mr. Szymanski did not request protection
from Mr. Wallace at any time before the December assault, and that there was no
trouble between the two between the argument and the assault.
As relevant to the claims pending on appeal, defendants asserted that
Mr. Szymanski’s claims did not demonstrate deliberate indifference and, further,
that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Mr. Szymanski did not
present evidence to resist summary judgment on his constitutional claims and that
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
On appeal, Mr. Szymanski maintains that summary judgment was improper
because there remained the following disputed issues of material fact:
(1) whether there was long-standing pervasive inmate-on-inmate violence at the
detention center; (2) whether Sheriff Benton was aware of the violence but took
no action to stop it; and (3) whether there existed a written separation order
before the December 2005 assault requiring Mr. Szymanski and Mr. Wallace to be
kept apart. 1 He contends that he has established a violation of his constitutional
1
Mr. Szymanski also claims there was a dispute over the extent of his
injuries. We need not address this issue, however, because our decision is not
based on whether “the alleged injury or deprivation [was] sufficiently serious.”
Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008).
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rights, thus resisting summary judgment and demonstrating that defendants are
not entitled to qualified immunity. He further contends that the district court
erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of detention-center records
showing incidents of violence between inmates. In his reply brief, Mr. Szymanski
asserts that the district court should have allowed him to amend his complaint.
Standards of Review
“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard the district court should apply under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” Steffey v.
Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). For
dispositive issues on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, he
must “go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case
in order to survive summary judgment.” Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205,
1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). “[E]vidence, including testimony,
must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.
Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment
proceedings.” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation and
quotations omitted). Because Mr. Szymanski is representing himself, we liberally
construe his pleadings; however, we do not act as his advocate. Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Deliberate Indifference
“A prison official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious
harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (quotation omitted). Not every injury suffered by a
prisoner, however, gives rise to constitutional liability. Tafoya v. Salazar,
516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). “To establish a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim for failure to protect an inmate from harm by other inmates,
the plaintiff must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm, the objective component, and that the prison
official was deliberately indifferent to his safety, the subjective component.”
Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation and brackets
omitted). Under the subjective component, the official must “actually be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916(quotation omitted). If the official was unaware of the risk, “no matter how
obvious the risk or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it,” his failure
to alleviate it “is not an infliction of punishment and therefore not a constitutional
violation.” Id. Furthermore, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial
risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844.
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We determine that Mr. Szymanski failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
the subjective component to survive summary judgment. He primarily relies on
an internal detention-center document indicating that he and Mr. Wallace were to
be kept apart by the designation “keep separate active.” R. Vol. II, Doc. 123,
Ex. 1. Mr. Szymanski maintains that the “keep separate active” designation was
placed on his file following the October verbal incident, while Corporal Birkle
explains that the designation was not added until after the December assault.
Even if Mr. Szymanski is correct, the allegation that Corporal Birkle violated a
prison rule does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983, “which establishes a
cause of action only for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or
federal law.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1214 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, the “keep separate active” designation does not demonstrate
Corporal Birkle’s awareness that Mr. Wallace posed a physical risk to
Mr. Szymanski. Corporal Birkle stated that in October he separated the two
inmates after he observed them arguing during a meal, but that their voices were
not raised, none of the other inmates appeared to notice the exchange, and he did
not observe anything indicating a physical threat to Mr. Szymanski. R. Vol. II,
Doc. 106, Ex. A at 3-4. Although Mr. Szymanski asserts that Mr. Wallace
threatened him with physical violence, he does not claim that the threat was made
known to Corporal Birkle or any other defendant.
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Mr. Szymanski points to no facts from which the inference could be drawn
that Mr. Wallace posed a substantial risk of serious harm as a result of the
October argument. Not only was the argument nonviolent, but Mr. Szymanski
and Mr. Wallace coexisted at the detention center for six weeks afterward without
any problems. Therefore, the “keep separate active” designation, even if made in
October, is insufficient evidence of the subjective component for deliberate
indifference.
Turning to Mr. Szymanski’s claims against Sheriff Benton, he asserts that
this defendant is liable under the Eighth Amendment because there was
long-term, pervasive violence at the detention center of which he was aware. But
Mr. Szymanski never claimed to be the victim of pervasive inmate violence. 2
Rather, his complaint is based on the alleged failure of detention-center personnel
to protect him from Mr. Wallace. 3 He also does not claim that pervasive inmate
violence made it possible for Mr. Wallace to assault him. Because
Mr. Szymanski has not shown that Sheriff Benton personally participated in any
2
This argument first appears in Mr. Szymanski’s opposition to defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. He also pursues it in his appellate briefs.
3
Mr. Szymanski is correct that “a prison official [cannot] escape liability for
deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious,
substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was
especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually
committed the assault,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. But his claim is based on the
threat he claims defendants knew came from Mr. Wallace. Therefore, any general
information about other prisoners was irrelevant.
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of the circumstances surrounding the assault by Wallace, summary judgment was
appropriate. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996)
(“[P]ersonal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.” (quotation
omitted)). We also reject any claim that Sheriff Benton is responsible for
Corporal Birkle’s allegedly unconstitutional acts by virtue of his status as the
supervisor of the detention center. “[G]overnment officials are not vicariously
liable for the misconduct of their subordinates. There is no concept of strict
supervisor liability under § 1983.” Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146,
1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation and brackets omitted).
Mr. Szymanski further contends that defendants were aware of the risk
posed by Mr. Wallace because another officer walked between him and
Mr. Wallace when escorting him to the medical unit to receive his medication.
But this officer was not named as a defendant and Mr. Szymanski makes no
showing that any of the defendants even knew about this activity. Therefore, this
evidence cannot resist summary judgment.
Next, although he concedes that he did not inform detention-center
personnel that he feared that Mr. Wallace would injure him or seek protection, he
maintains that this fact cannot be counted against him because announcing this
fear in front of other inmates would have labeled him a “snitch.” Relying on
Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001), Mr. Szymanski argues
that an experienced correctional officer should never compel a prisoner to identify
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himself as an informant. In Benefield, however, the prisoner alleged that a prison
guard labeled him a snitch, communicated that label to other inmates, and “was
aware of the obvious danger associated with a reputation as a snitch.” Id. at
1271. Under those circumstances, the guard violated clearly established law. Id.Here, in contrast, Mr. Szymanski does not allege that he could never have found
an opportunity between the October verbal altercation and the December assault
to privately request protection from Mr. Wallace. We decline to adopt a general
rule imposing on prison guards an affirmative duty to inquire privately whether a
prisoner fears for his safety, absent a showing that the prisoner could not
reasonably voice those concerns without such an inquiry. Accordingly, we
conclude that Mr. Szymanski did not adduce sufficient evidence of the subjective
component to withstand summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim.
We turn briefly to the issue of qualified immunity, which the district court
granted to defendants as an alternate ground for summary judgment. To avoid
summary judgment in the face of a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must
satisfy a “heavy two-part burden” to show: (1) the defendants “violated a
constitutional or statutory right,” and (2) the right “was clearly established at the
time of the defendant[s’] unlawful conduct.” Serna, 455 F.3d at 1150 (quotations
omitted). Because Mr. Szymanski failed to establish the violation of a
constitutional right, the district court correctly determined that defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.
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Discovery
Mr. Szymanski claims the district court erred in denying his motion to
compel defendants to produce documents showing the incidents of
inmate-on-inmate assaults at the detention center. Defendants responded that they
were prohibited from producing the documents because they were “criminal
history records which cannot be disseminated pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-19-101
et seq.” and “also prohibited from dissemination pursuant to the confidentiality
requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 16-4-203(b)(i).” R. Vol. II, Doc. 118, Attach. at 2.
We review discovery rulings, including the denial of a motion to compel
discovery, for an abuse of discretion. Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered
Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Szymanski asserts that the court
abused its discretion in denying him the requested records and then granting
summary judgment to defendants because he had failed to produce evidence that
the sheriff knew about pervasive inmate-on-inmate violence at the jail.
As discussed above, Mr. Szymanski’s claim was not that he was a victim of
pervasive inmate violence, but that officials should have protected him from
Mr. Wallace based on their verbal altercation. Under these circumstances, we
find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling that Mr. Szymanski’s
request for documents pertaining to institutional security did not overcome the
privilege asserted by defendants. We also find no abuse of discretion in the
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district court’s decision foreclosing plaintiff’s attempt to “use discovery as a
fishing expedition,” Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 880 (10th Cir. 1981),
in the hope that the requested documents would reveal some wrongdoing by
defendants.
Leave to Amend
Finally, we consider Mr. Szymanski’s argument that the district court erred
in not inviting him to amend his complaint a second time in order to correct any
deficiencies. The district court granted his first request to amend his complaint,
which he did. He did not seek leave to amend again, and the district court was
not required to solicit another amended complaint. Moreover, Mr. Szymanski
raised this claim for the first time in his reply brief, so we deem it waived or
abandoned and do not address the merits. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). Even if we did, Mr. Szymanski
has offered no information on how another amendment would cure the
deficiencies in the amended complaint. Consequently, we perceive no error.
Conclusion
The district court granted Mr. Szymanski’s request to proceed on appeal
without prepayment of costs and fees. He is reminded that he is obligated to
continue making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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