Veltman v. Astrue , 261 F. App'x 83 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 15, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
WINFRED VELTMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-4075
(D.C. No. 2:04-CV-993-TS)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, (D. Utah)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, HOLLOWAY, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
“The Equal Access to Justice Act [EAJA] provides for the award of fees
and expenses to the prevailing party in a civil action against the Federal
Government, unless the position of the United States was substantially justified.”
Harris v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 990 F.2d 519, 520 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted).
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
In this social security disability case, the district court denied the plaintiff’s
request for an EAJA fee, finding that the Commissioner of Social Security
(Commissioner) had demonstrated that his position was substantially justified.
Because this finding did not represent an abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Winfred Veltman, filed applications for social security
disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits in February 2002,
alleging that he became disabled in 2001 due to depression, anxiety, and back and
neck problems. The agency denied his applications initially and on
reconsideration. Mr. Veltman obtained a hearing before an administrative law
judge (ALJ), who upheld the denial of his applications. He then appealed
administratively to the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied review of
the ALJ’s decision.
Mr. Veltman thereafter sought review of the ALJ’s decision in federal
district court. He asserted that the Commissioner had erred in two respects.
First, he claimed, the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of the
vocational expert (VE) hired to testify at his hearing. The district court rejected
this argument, finding that the ALJ’s analysis of the VE’s opinion was adequate.
Second, Mr. Veltman argued that the ALJ failed to conduct a proper analysis of
the opinions of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Hallett. The district court determined
that “[l]acking a discussion or findings concerning Dr. Hallett’s opinions,” it “had
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no way of assessing whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards with
respect to the appropriate weight to be assigned to Dr. Hallett’s opinion as a
treating physician.” Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 405. It therefore remanded the case to
the ALJ to consider and make further findings concerning Dr. Hallett’s opinions.
Mr. Veltman’s counsel thereafter petitioned the district court for an award
of EAJA fees. The district court denied his petition, concluding that the
Commissioner had demonstrated that his position was substantially justified.
ANALYSIS
An agency position is substantially justified for purposes of the EAJA if it
is “justified in substance or in the main--that is, justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)
(quotation omitted). In other words, the government’s position must have had a
reasonable basis both in law and fact. See id. We review the district court’s
determination that the government’s position was substantially justified for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 559; Gilbert v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir.
1995). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court bases its ruling on
an erroneous conclusion of law or relies on clearly erroneous fact findings,”
Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998), or
when the district court’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious or whimsical, or results
in a manifestly unreasonable judgment,” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504-05
(10th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted).
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The district court gave three reasons for its finding that the Commissioner
had demonstrated that his position was substantially justified. Although two of
these reasons are inadequate to justify the denial of an EAJA fee, the third stands
as an independent basis for the district court’s decision, and does not represent an
abuse of discretion. We will therefore affirm the denial of an EAJA fee.
The district court first found that “viewing the action as a whole, the
Commissioner’s position was reasonable as this Court found in her favor [on] one
of the two issues before it.” Aplt. App., Vol. I, at 8. The issue on which the
Commissioner prevailed, however, was neither related to the issue that resulted in
a remand, nor did it provide a separate basis for affirming the denial of benefits.
As we recently explained, the district court cannot use the Commissioner’s
success on such an unrelated issue as a basis for denying the claimant an EAJA
fee. Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1173 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
The district court next stated that an EAJA fee was inappropriate because
“the Court merely remanded Plaintiff’s action for the ALJ to further elaborate on
a deficiency in the record which precluded proper review by this Court, as
opposed to finding that Plaintiff was entitled to disability benefits.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I, at 8. The parties do not dispute that the district court’s remand was a
“sentence four remand” for further consideration by the ALJ. 1 Nothing in our
1
“Sentence four” remands are authorized under the fourth sentence of
(continued...)
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cases indicates that a claimant’s success in obtaining only a sentence four remand
for further proceedings, as opposed to an award of benefits, provides an adequate
reason for concluding that the Commissioner’s position was substantially
justified. Rather, we have frequently indicated that an EAJA fee award may be
appropriate in a sentence four remand case. See, e.g., Shubargo v. Astrue,
498 F.3d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding for determination of whether
Commissioner’s position was substantially justified); Hackett, 475 F.3d at
1175-76 (reversing denial of EAJA fee and remanding for proper calculation). 2
This brings us to the district court’s third and final reason for denying an
EAJA fee: “the Court is convinced by the Commissioner’s arguments that the ALJ
considered, at least to some degree, the opinion of Dr. Hallet[t].” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I, at 8. Mr. Veltman argues that the district court improperly relied on this
reason because (1) it is inconsistent with the language of the remand order, which
notes the ALJ’s failure to give more than scant mention to Dr. Hallett’s opinions;
(2) “an ALJ’s failure to properly consider a treating source opinion is error,”
1
(...continued)
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which reads as follows: “The court shall have power to enter,
upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying,
or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.”
2
The converse might perhaps be a cognizable factor, however. If the district
court had specifically remanded for an award of benefits, that might provide an
indication that the Commissioner’s position in opposing such benefits was not
substantially justified.
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Aplt. Opening Br. at 18; and (3) “it cannot be reasonable for an ALJ to not
properly address a treating source statement,” id. at 20.
These arguments do not demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in finding the agency’s position substantially justified. The mere fact
that there was error in the ALJ’s decision does not make the agency’s position
unreasonable. An agency’s position can be justified even though it is not correct.
Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1172. As the district court noted in its order denying the
EAJA fee, the ALJ did discuss Dr. Hallett’s opinions to some extent. Moreover,
the ALJ appears to have given considerable weight to the evidence in the record
concerning Mr. Veltman’s mental impairments, including Dr. Hallett’s opinions.
There was serious question in this case concerning the value of
Dr. Hallett’s opinions to the benefits adjudication process. Dr. Hallett did not
discuss the specific occupational limitations posed by Mr. Veltman’s alleged
mental impairments. See Aplt. App., Vol. I, at 124, 174. Mr. Veltman’s counsel
acknowledged as much at oral argument before the district court. Id., Vol. II, at
383. At one point, the agency apparently sent Dr. Hallett a report to complete,
but he chose to respond in narrative form instead. See id., Vol. I, at 124.
More well-defined opinions in the record came from the agency
consultants, who basically imposed no restrictions on Mr. Veltman’s functioning
due to mental impairments. Id. at 150-63; 168-73. The ALJ did not accept these
agency assessments uncritically. In fact, her assessment of Mr. Veltman’s mental
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residual functional capacity is more consistent with Dr. Hallett’s descriptive
narrative than with the consultants’ specific recommendations. Thus, the ALJ
ultimately restricted Mr. Veltman from
work at more than a low stress level, which means:
essentially no working with the general public, minimal supervision
and minimal interaction with supervisors and co-workers, minimal
work setting changes;
work at more than a low concentration level, which precludes such
tasks as mental computation, sustained spontaneous speaking or
sustained reading and writing, but still having average alertness and
attentiveness; and,
work at more than a low memory level, which means the ability to
understand, remember and carry out simple instructions, the option to
use memory aids, and with only minimal changes in the work
instructions from week to week.
Id. at 32 (quote reformatted).
In sum, although the analysis required by the treating physician rule was
not completed, its essential purpose, to require the ALJ to give careful
consideration to the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician, appears to have
been served. While a remand was necessary to permit the ALJ to conduct the
proper analysis of Dr. Hallett’s opinions, and to make appropriate findings, we
cannot say on this record that the district court abused its discretion in finding
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that the agency’s position, taken as a whole, had a reasonable basis in law and
fact. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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