United States v. Hernandez ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 22, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-2267
WILLIAM ANGEL HERNANDEZ, (D.C. No. CR-05-1486-BB)
(D. New Mexico)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant William Hernandez pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eighty-four months. Hernandez now appeals,
challenging two Sentencing Guideline enhancements imposed by the district court, as
well as the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
Factual background
On June 4, 2004, officers from the Farmington, New Mexico, Police Department
received a call indicating that an individual was selling drugs at a particular location.
Upon arrival at the scene, officers observed a vehicle previously described by the caller
parked in front of a motel. Officers approached the driver of the vehicle and, after
repeated inquiries, determined his name was William Hernandez (the defendant). The
officers arrested Hernandez after learning that he had outstanding warrants. A subsequent
search of the vehicle, for which the officers located no registration record in Hernandez’s
name, revealed a black nylon bag in plain view on the right front passenger seat. The bag
contained a nine millimeter semi-automatic pistol, with nine rounds of ammunition in the
magazine. Also inside the black nylon bag were two plastic baggies containing 34.1
grams of marijuana and 2.0 grams of psilocybin (mushrooms), two small scales, empty
plastic baggies commonly used for weighing and packaging controlled substances, and a
pill bottle containing 52 diflunisal tablets.
On July 1, 2004, Hernandez was involved in a traffic stop initiated by Farmington
police officers based on their observation that Hernandez was driving with an expired
license plate. Hernandez initially failed to pull his vehicle over, but ultimately stopped.
When Hernandez got out of his vehicle, he ignored the officers’ commands to back away
from the vehicle and to raise his hands. Accordingly, the officers pushed Hernandez to
the ground and handcuffed him. A search of Hernandez’s clothing revealed a plastic
2
baggie containing .5 grams of methamphetamine in his pocket. During a search of
Hernandez’s vehicle, the officers found in the middle of the back seat a black bag
containing a Bryco .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol. The pistol was loaded with six
rounds of ammunition in the magazine and one round in the chamber.
On September 13, 2004, New Mexico State Police officers were dispatched in
response to a report of a one-vehicle crash in a ditch on a county road in Bloomfield, New
Mexico. While en route to the scene, the officers were informed by dispatch that the
vehicle reportedly involved in the crash had been pulled from the ditch by another
vehicle. The officers subsequently came into contact with the vehicle reportedly involved
in the crash and initiated a traffic stop on it because it appeared the occupants were not
wearing their seat belts. The driver of the vehicle was identified as defendant Hernandez.
The passenger, identified as Frank Martinez, was found to be the owner of the vehicle.
The officers arrested Hernandez after determining he had two outstanding warrants. A
search incident to arrest revealed that Hernandez was carrying two knives and a box of
.22 caliber ammunition in his pocket. Martinez admitted to the officers that he had used
methamphetamine prior to the traffic stop. Accordingly, the officers decided to tow the
vehicle. An inventory search of the vehicle revealed, in plain view on the rear floorboard
behind the driver’s seat, a loaded .22 caliber revolver and five baggies containing,
respectively, 28.7 grams of marijuana, 28.8 grams of marijuana, 2.8 grams of
methamphetamine, 1.5 grams of methamphetamine, and 6.6 grams of methamphetamine.
Spoons with suspected methamphetamine residue were found on the center console. In
3
the trunk of the vehicle, officers found an unloaded 12 gauge shotgun, a leather holster
for a .22 handgun, six shotgun shells, and nine .22 caliber cartridges.
Procedural background
On July 12, 2005, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against
Hernandez charging him with being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), on each of the three dates outlined
above. More specifically, Count 1 pertained to the June 4, 2004 incident, Count 2
pertained to the July 1, 2004 incident, and Count 3 pertained to the September 13, 2004
incident.
On October 12, 2006, the government filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum. The motion indicated that Hernandez was confined in the San Juan
County Detention Center, Aztec, New Mexico, and asked the district court to direct that
San Juan County authorities surrender Hernandez to the custody of the United States
Marshal “until the federal prosecution [wa]s complete.” ROA, Vol. 1, Doc. 3 at 1. The
district court granted the United States’ motion on October 17, 2006.
On December 4, 2006, Hernandez pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to Count 2 of the indictment. The probation office subsequently prepared and
disclosed to the parties its presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR imposed a
base offense level of 20 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4).1 The PSR then imposed a
1
Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) provides for the imposition of a base offense level of 20
for an offense involving possession of firearms or ammunition if “the defendant
(continued...)
4
two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because the offense
involved three or more firearms. In imposing this enhancement, the PSR noted that
“[w]hile the offense of conviction consists of one firearm, relevant conduct authorizes the
consideration of all acts and omissions committed by the defendant,” and, “[a]s such, his
possession of different firearms as charged in the . . . Indictment ha[s] been included.”
Id., Vol. 2, PSR at 9. The PSR also imposed a four-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) because Hernandez “possessed a firearm and ammunition in
connection with another felony offense . . . .” Id. at 10. In support of this enhancement,
the PSR noted that each of the three incidents giving rise to the three counts in the
indictment resulted in drug-related charges being filed against Hernandez in New Mexico
state court, and concluded that Hernandez’s possession of firearms and ammunition
during each incident were “in connection with” the possession and/or “distribution of
illegal substances.” Id. After imposing a three-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1 for Hernandez’s acceptance of responsibility, the PSR arrived at a total offense
level of 23. Combining this total offense level with Hernandez’s criminal history score of
10 and his criminal history category of V, the PSR calculated a guideline range of 84 to
105 months.
Hernandez filed written objections to the PSR. In particular, Hernandez objected
1
(...continued)
committed any part of the . . . offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of
either a crime of violence of a controlled substance offense . . . .” U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
5
to the two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), arguing that “[t]he
offense to which [he] pled guilty involved [only] one (1) firearm,” and that “[i]t [wa]s not
sufficient to show that he had been charged with other offenses involving firearms.” Id.,
Vol. 1, Doc. 23 at 2. Hernandez also objected to the four-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), arguing that, at the time he entered his plea to Count 2 of the
indictment, “[h]e made no other admission indicating that he possessed the firearm in
connection with another felony.” Id. at 3. Hernandez further argued that “the small
quantity of methamphetamine found in this case [in connection with Count 2] was not for
sale but for personal use . . . .” Id. at 4. In addition, Hernandez argued that he “did not
make any factual statements at the time of his plea regarding the other felonies that might
have been connection to Count I and Count III” and, “[a]s a result, the relevant conduct
relied upon by Probation [wa]s not adequate to support a four (4) level upward
adjustment.” Id.
Hernandez also filed a sentencing memorandum asking the district court to impose
a below-Guidelines sentence of 36 months. In support of his request, Hernandez pointed
to the following factors: (1) his “horrible childhood where he suffered extraordinary
physical abuse” at the hands of his stepmother; (2) “[n]eurological injuries caused by
brain trauma [he] sustained” during his childhood and as an adult; (3) “[l]ack of parental
guidance while growing up”; (4) “[m]ental health issues that c[ould] be traced to his
abusive childhood and injuries he suffered while growing up”; and (5) the fact that the
PSR utilized relevant conduct “that substantially increase[d] the sentence he” was facing
6
in federal court. Id., Doc. 28 at 6. In addition, Hernandez noted that he was facing “a
lengthy sentence . . . in the State District Court in Farmington for offenses that all
relate[d] to the firearm charges in his federal case.” Id. at 5.
The government filed a response in opposition to Hernandez’s request for a below-
Guidelines sentence. The government asserted that Hernandez was “a highly dangerous
individual and . . . someone that the public need[ed] to be protected from.” Doc. 29 at 1.
In support of this assertion, the government noted that Hernandez’s “prior crime of
violence [wa]s for robbery and involved [Hernandez] placing a knife to a victim’s neck,
demanding money, and a threat of death.” Id. In addition, the government noted that
Hernandez was facing a charge of felonious assault in New Mexico state court, arising
out of an incident in which Hernandez was “shot several times after pointing a firearm out
his car window towards officers.” Id. at 2. Lastly, the government argued that “[t]he
other offenses and arrests reflected in the PSR” established that Hernandez was “a
violent, dangerous individual that [wa]s an ever-present threat to society when not
incarcerated.” Id.
The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on October 17, 2007. To address
Hernandez’s objections to the two sentencing enhancements, the government presented
two witnesses. The first witness, Steven Smith, a former officer with the Farmington
Police Department, was involved in the June 4, 2004, incident that gave rise to Count 1 of
the indictment. The second witness, Jacob Garcia, is a New Mexico State police officer
who was involved in the September 13, 2004 incident that gave rise to Count 3 of the
7
indictment. At the conclusion of their testimony, the district court overruled Hernandez’s
objections to the two enhancements. In doing so, the district court found that “the facts
testified to” by Smith and Garcia “indicate[d] the defendant had access to firearms on at
least two occasions.” Id., Vol. 4 at 45. The district court further found, based on the
evidence presented, that Hernandez was “likely dealing drugs” at the time of the two
incidents. Id. “The fact that . . . Hernandez ha[d] the good sense to use someone else’s
car in both these instances,” the district court stated, was not “particularly probative of the
fact that he was not dealing.” Id. at 46. The district court then rejected Hernandez’s
request for a below-Guidelines sentence and imposed a sentence of 84 months.
II.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) enhancement
Hernandez contends the district court erred in finding that he possessed three or
more firearms and, based on that finding, imposing a two-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). In determining whether the district court properly applied the
challenged enhancement, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir.
2007). In reviewing the district court’s factual findings, we “view the evidence and
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination.”
United States v. Mozee, 405 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2005).
Section 2K2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines establishes the base offense level, as
well as certain enhancements, for offenses involving the unlawful receipt, possession, or
8
transportation of firearms or ammunition. At issue here is subsection (b)(1)(A), which
requires a two-level enhancement to the base offense level if the offense at issue involved
“3-7” firearms. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A).
As with any guideline provision, a district court, in deciding whether this
enhancement is applicable, must consider “relevant conduct,” as outlined in U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3. Section 1B1.3 provides, among other things, that “all acts . . . committed . . . by
the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense” shall be taken into account. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
The commentary to § 1B1 .3 states that offenses may be considered part of a “common
scheme or plan” if they are “substantially connected to each other by at least one common
factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar
modus operandi.” Id. cmt (n.9(A)). That same commentary further provides that
offenses will
qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently
connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are
part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. Factors that
are appropriate to the determinations of whether offenses are sufficiently
connected or related to each other to be considered as part of the same
course of conduct include the degree of similarity of the offenses, the
regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the
offenses. When one of the above factors is absent, a stronger presence of at
least one of the other factors is required.
Id. cmt. (n.9(B)). In determining relevant conduct, the district court may consider the
dismissed counts of an indictment. United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1229 n.6 (10th
9
Cir. 2001).
Hernandez’s challenge to the § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) enhancement in this case is
narrowly focused on the district court’s findings that he possessed all of the firearms
involved in the three incidents giving rise to the three counts of the indictment. Although
Hernandez concedes he “pleaded guilty to possessing one firearm” in connection with
Count 2, he argues “the government failed to prove he possessed the three additional
firearms specified in the two dismissed counts.” Aplt. Br. at 19. With respect to the
firearm involved in Count 1 (pertaining to the June 4, 2004 incident), Hernandez asserts
“[t]here was no evidence that he had actual possession of the gun, and there was no
evidence that he knew or should have known a gun was in the bag [found on the front
passenger seat].” Id. As for the two firearms involved in Count 2 (arising out of the
September 13, 2004 incident), Hernandez argues they “were in a car occupied by
[himself] and Frank Martinez, the owner of the car.” Id. According to Hernandez, he
“did not have actual possession of the guns, both of which were out of his reach and out
of sight, one behind the [driver’s] seat and the other in the trunk of the car.” Id.
Turning first to the firearm involved in Count 1, we conclude the district court did
not clearly err in finding that Hernandez knowingly possessed that firearm. As outlined
above, on June 4, 2004, Farmington police officers were dispatched to a hotel parking lot
in response to a call that someone was selling drugs out of a vehicle. When they arrived
at the hotel, the police observed a vehicle matching the description offered by the caller.
The police approached the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle and, after initially
10
being lied to, determined him to be defendant Hernandez. The police determined there
were outstanding warrants for Hernandez and, accordingly, placed him under arrest.
During their ensuing inventory search of the vehicle, the police discovered a black nylon
bag in plain view on the front passenger seat. As noted, that bag contained a loaded semi-
automatic pistol, marijuana, mushrooms, a vial of prescription drugs, some small plastic
baggies, and a small scale. According to the testimony of one of the officers, Steven
Smith, the amount of marijuana found in the bag was consistent with distribution, and the
scales were of a variety sometimes used by traffickers of illegal narcotics. Smith further
testified that drug traffickers often carry firearms “either for their protection or maybe to
protect their property.” ROA, Vol. 4 at 17. Together, this evidence was more than
sufficient to have allowed the district court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Hernandez knowingly possessed the firearm and was engaged in the sale of illegal
drugs. Although it is true that Hernandez informed the officers the vehicle did not belong
to him, and police dispatchers were unable to identify the owner of the vehicle, these facts
alone are not sufficient to undermine the district court’s factual findings. Indeed, the
district court was well-justified in finding that Hernandez simply had the “good sense to
use someone else’s car” to carry out his drug-trafficking activities. Id. at 46.
We next turn to the evidence pertaining to the two firearms involved in Count 3 of
the indictment. On September 13, 2004, New Mexico State Police officers were
dispatched to the scene of a one-vehicle crash in a ditch and, after learning that the
vehicle had been pulled out of the ditch and had left the scene, ultimately stopped the
11
vehicle after observing that the driver and passenger were not wearing their seatbelts.
The officers determined that the driver of the vehicle, Hernandez, had two outstanding
warrants for his arrest. Accordingly, the officers conducted a pat-down search of
Hernandez and placed him under arrest. During the pat-down search, the officers found
.22 caliber ammunition in Hernandez’s front pocket. The passenger, Frank Martinez, was
determined to be the owner of the vehicle. Although Martinez had a valid identification
card and no outstanding warrants, he was extremely nervous and jittery, wouldn’t look at
the officers, and ultimately admitted that he had ingested methamphetamine. Given
Martinez’s situation, the officers decided to tow the vehicle. Before doing so, they
conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. The officers found, in plain view on the
floorboard behind the driver’s seat, three small baggies of methamphetamine and a large
plastic baggie containing two smaller baggies of marijuana. In the same vicinity as the
narcotics, the officers also found a loaded .22 revolver. Notably, the cartridges found by
the officers in Hernandez’s pocket fit the .22 revolver. In the trunk of the vehicle, the
officers found an unloaded, sawed-off shotgun.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s factual
findings, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in finding that Hernandez
possessed the .22 revolver found in the vehicle. Although the vehicle itself did not
belong to Hernandez, and indeed the vehicle’s owner was a passenger in the vehicle, the
fact that Hernandez personally possessed ammunition that fit the revolver, and the fact
that the revolver was found in plain view near Hernandez’s position in the driver’s seat,
12
was clearly sufficient to tie Hernandez to the revolver. Further, although Hernandez
argues that the revolver was not reachable from his position in the driver’s seat, the
district court could have reasonably inferred that Hernandez dropped the revolver on the
rear floorboard immediately prior to being stopped by the police. Alternatively, the
district court could have reasonably inferred that Hernandez placed the firearm there at
some point prior to encountering the police. Either way, the evidence presented by the
government was more than sufficient to have allowed the district court to find that
Hernandez knowingly possessed the revolver.
It is admittedly a closer question whether the evidence was sufficient to allow the
district court to reasonably find that Hernandez knowingly possessed the unloaded sawed-
off shotgun found in the trunk of the vehicle. Given the fact, however, that the district
court did not clearly err in finding that Hernandez possessed the three other firearms at
issue (i.e., the firearm from the June 4, 2004 incident, the firearm from the July 1, 2004
incident, and the loaded revolver from the September 13, 2004 incident), we conclude it
is unnecessary for us to resolve this issue. That is, even if we were to conclude that the
district court clearly erred in finding that Hernandez possessed the shotgun, the district
court’s application of the § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement would remain valid because the
minimum number of firearms necessary for application of that Guideline would be
satisfied.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement
In his second issue on appeal, Hernandez contends the district court erred in
13
imposing a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6).2 That guideline
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection
with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or
ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be
used or possessed in connection with another felony offense, increase [the
base offense level] by 4 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). “[W]e have generally held that if the weapon [at issue]
facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the underlying felony, then [the] enhancement .
. . is appropriate.” United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir. 1998).
Hernandez begins his attack on the district court’s application of § 2K2.1(b)(6) by
arguing that, “[f]or the same reason the government failed to prove [he] possessed the
guns in Counts 1 and 3, it failed to prove he possessed the drugs associated with those
counts.” More specifically, he argues that “[t]he drugs were in the same bag as the gun in
the June incident, and the drugs were out of sight and reach along with the gun, behind
the seat, in the September incident.” Aplt. Br. at 27.
Hernandez’s arguments in this regard lack merit for the reasons already discussed
above in our analysis of his challenge to the § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement. During the
incidents giving rise to Counts 1 and 3, the drugs seized by the police were found in close
proximity to not only Hernandez himself, but to the loaded firearms as well. More
2
In his opening appellate brief, Hernandez erroneously refers to U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(5), rather than U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6). This error is likely based on the fact
that, prior to November 1, 2006, what is now § 2K2.1(b)(6) was designated as §
2K2.1(b)(5).
14
specifically, the drugs seized during the June 4, 2004 incident were found on the front
passenger seat of Hernandez’s vehicle, inside the same black nylon bag as the loaded
semi-automatic pistol that Hernandez was charged in Count 1 with illegally possessing.
Similarly, the drugs seized during the September 13, 2004 incident were discovered by
the police on the rear driver’s side floorboard of the vehicle Hernandez was driving, in
close proximity to the loaded .22 revolver that formed the basis of Count 3. Thus, the
district court did not clearly err in finding that Hernandez possessed the drugs seized
during each of these incidents.
Hernandez also attacks the district court’s application of the § 2K2.1(b)(6)
enhancement on the grounds that the amounts involved in each of the three incidents were
“small, user amounts, not trafficking amounts, and not amounts worth significant amounts
of money.” Aplt. Br. at 28. Hernandez’s argument in this regard lacks merit. Although
the government did not present any evidence at the time of sentencing regarding the
incident giving rise to the count of conviction (Count 2), it did present testimony from
officers involved in the two incidents giving rise to Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment.
Both of those officers testified that the quantities of drugs seized during those two
incidents were consistent with drug trafficking. ROA, Vol. 4 at 16 (testimony of
Farmington police officer Steven Smith that the 34 grams of marijuana seized from
Hernandez’s vehicle would be consistent with distribution); id. at 28, 35 (testimony of
New Mexico State police officer Jacob Garcia that the quantities, as well as the
packaging, of the drugs seized from Hernandez’s vehicle would be consistent with
15
distribution). In light of this testimony, we conclude the district court did not clearly err
in finding that Hernandez was “likely dealing drugs” at the time of those two incidents.
ROA, Vol. 4 at 45.
Relatedly, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in finding that, during
each incident, Hernandez possessed the loaded firearms “in connection with” his drug-
trafficking activities. In each instance, the loaded weapons were in extremely close
proximity to the seized narcotics. See Bunner, 134 F.3d at 1006 (concluding that “a
weapon’s proximity to narcotics may be sufficient to provide the nexus necessary to
enhance a defendant’s sentence under [then] § 2K2.1(b)(5) [which has now become §
2K2.1(b)(6)].”). In addition, the government presented testimony that firearms are
commonly used by drug traffickers as protection for themselves and their merchandise.
ROA, Vol. 4 at 17 (testimony of Farmington police officer Steven Smith). Thus, the
district court was well-justified in determining that the firearms at issue had the potential
to facilitate Hernandez’s drug-trafficking activities.
District court’s authority to impose below-Guidelines sentence
In his third issue on appeal, Hernandez contends, in somewhat confusing fashion,
that the district court “erroneously determined that it lacked authority, apparently by
statute, to set a below-guidelines sentence to account for the consecutive state sentences
[he] faced for state charges that addressed the same behavior that resulted in the
enhancement of his federal sentence.” Aplt. Br. at 34-35. In support of this contention,
Hernandez notes that, at the time of his sentencing in this case, he had six pending
16
criminal cases in New Mexico state court. Id. at 36. Three of those six cases, Hernandez
asserts, “encompassed precisely the same charges leveled against [him] in federal court as
both indicted offenses and as guideline enhancing relevant conduct: possession of guns
and drugs in June, July, and September, 2004.” Id. at 36-37. Hernandez notes that his
federal base offense level was “enhanced by two levels for possessing the very guns for
which he w[ould] be punished in state court,” and “by four levels for the very same drugs
for which he w[ould] be punished in state court,” “result[ing] in a sentence over three
years longer than it otherwise would have been.” Id. at 37. Hernandez further argues that
“[t]he government did not controvert [his] proffer that he faced lengthy consecutive
sentences of ten to twelve years for the pending state charges,” and “[t]he district court
accepted [his] position that the Bureau of Prisons would not treat any federal sentence as
running concurrently with a state sentence.” Id. In conclusion, Hernandez argues that the
district court “should have known that there were no constraints keeping it from
sentencing [him] below the guideline level in consideration of the additional consecutive
time he faced in state court, for criminal behavior which largely overlapped that for which
he was being punished in federal court.” Id. at 37-38.
“[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they
are ‘reasonable.’” Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594 (2007). In determining
whether a sentence is reasonable, an appellate court applies “the familiar abuse-of-
discretion standard of review . . . .” Id. “The abuse-of-discretion standard includes
review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.”
17
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
Here, Hernandez appears to be asserting that the district court’s exercise of its
sentencing discretion was guided by an erroneous legal conclusion, i.e., that it was
impermissible to impose a below-Guidelines sentence on the basis that Hernandez was
potentially facing “additional consecutive time” in the New Mexico state court for
essentially the same criminal behavior that gave rise to his federal sentence. For the
reasons outlined below, however, we conclude the district court did not commit any such
legal error in imposing Hernandez’s sentence.
At the time Hernandez was indicted in this case, he was in New Mexico state
custody facing approximately forty criminal charges (including approximately thirty-six
charges arising out of the incidents underlying the three counts of the federal indictment).
ROA, Vol. 2, PSR at 21-26 (detailing pending state criminal charges). According to the
PSR, “the attorneys representing the State and Federal cases . . . agreed to allow . . .
Hernandez to refrain from entering a formal plea of guilty in the State case[s] until the
Federal case ha[d] been sentenced.” Id. at 26. Accordingly, the United States sought and
was granted by the district court a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for Hernandez.
Thereafter, Hernandez entered into a written plea agreement with the United States.
Prior to sentencing, Hernandez filed a memorandum asking the district court to
impose a below-Guidelines sentence because, in pertinent part, Hernandez was facing “a
lengthy sentence . . . in the State District Court in Farmington for offenses that all
relate[d] to the firearm charges in his federal case.” Id., Vol. 1, Doc. 28 at 5. At the
18
sentencing hearing, Hernandez’s counsel, government counsel, and the district court
engaged in the following colloquy regarding Hernandez’s request:
MR. PADILLA [Defense counsel]: * * * What I’ve asked the Court to
do in my sentencing memorandum is to impose a sentence of three years, 36
months, which again will not start until after [Hernandez] finishes his state
time. And to consider the fact that he is going to be taken into state
custody. So that when he – at some point in the future, even if the sentence
is three years, will likely serve a sentence that’s going to be close to 10
years, and probably definitely more than the seven years that this Court
could impose, if you impose a sentence at the low end of the applicable
guidelines.
THE COURT: Do you have some reason to think the state judge won’t
run this sentence concurrent – or hers?
MR. PADILLA: I don’t. I can’t say one way or the other. But I can say
this, Your Honor, even if the district court judge in Farmington – and I’m
sure Probation can verify this – that if the district court judge runs – let’s
say a sentence of 10 years, or even, let’s say six years, concurrent with the
federal sentence, the Bureau of Prisons isn’t really going to give a damn.
What they are going to do is simply require – even if the state judge runs it
concurrent, they are going to require that he serve his state time.
Irregardless of that state court judge’s intention, they are going to want to
let him finish his state time. And they won’t even pick him up until after he
finishes his state time. They’ll lodge a detainer against him, and they will
go ahead and let him serve his state sentence, and then pick him up and take
him into federal custody.
I’ve seen this happen many times before. * * * But I think it’s clear,
that even if the state judge runs the time concurrent, because he is primarily
in state custody, the Bureau of Prisons will require that he remain in state
custody until he finishes that time, again, irregardless of that judge’s
intention, and will not pick him up to serve his federal sentence until after
he’s released or discharged from the state.
I mean, that’s my concern. And, again, I would like some input from
Probation. But that’s my understanding, that he will not be taken into – or
that a concurrent sentence ordered by a state judge will not have any effect
on what sentence he faces in federal court.
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THE COURT: So it’s really a question of timing. If it came the other
way around, I would run it concurrent potentially, and he would serve his
time in federal prison and not be required to serve additional time in state
prison?
MR. PADILLA: It may all come out in the wash, and it may all come
out the same. But I know that because of his position; that is being in
federal custody on a writ, he’s considered to be primarily in the custody of
the state. And as far as the Bureau of Prisons is concerned, they don’t want
to have anything to do with him until he finishes his state time.
THE COURT: How is it they held him for a year in federal custody?
MR. PADILLA: He was brought here on a writ. He was in state custody
awaiting the charges that are charged in the Four Corners area. He was
brought here on a writ to deal with these federal charges. Once he’s
finished with his business here, he’s simply going to be given back to the
state.
Now, if it was the other way around, he was primarily in federal custody,
and he wanted – and you gave him a sentence, and then he went into state
custody, at that point, the state court judge could run it concurrent, and, I
think, release him back to the feds. But, otherwise, there is a major problem
with that, Your Honor. I mean, whether it’s your intention or the district
court judge’s intention to run it concurrent, the way that’s worded, the way
that is done and the timing of that is extremely important.
THE COURT: Mr. Walsh [government counsel ], do you wish to be
heard?
MR. WALSH: Yes, Your Honor, real briefly. One thing I’d like to
throw into the mix was that the defendant did receive the benefit, in terms
of his criminal history [score under the Sentencing Guidelines], as far as
being writted out here and having his federal case taken before he
eventually – assuming a conviction – that he finished up his case in state
court.
I think that, you know, all things considered –
THE COURT: That would have bumped him into criminal history
category 6?
MR. WALSH: I believe so, especially since it probably would have been
20
at least three points that would have been added to the ten [points of
criminal history score].
I think we are pretty generous to offer a low-end recommendation in this
case, given the defendant’s criminal history.
Id., Vol. 4 at 52-56.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court rejected Hernandez’s request for
a below-Guidelines sentence, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
All right. You do have a very challenged background, Mr. Hernandez.
The Court has a good deal of sympathy for the situation you were put in
early in life. You were not dealt a fair hand; there is no question about that.
On the other hand, since that time, you have managed to be in trouble
with the law on repeated occasions and for serious and violent acts. I can’t
ignore that. I have trouble with – the Bureau of Prisons may take it upon
themselves to bring up any concurrent sentences. Again, however, the
system, the judiciary is fairly constricted on what we can do. And I think
that’s by the intent of congress.
Hopefully, the state judge who does not have such constraints can take
account of your federal sentence and adjust theirs accordingly to what they
think the state actions require.
I don’t think a downward departure or a variance is appropriate given the
facts in this case. I’ve looked at 18 United States Code, 3553, and I have to
say the seriousness of the offense and the protection of the public strongly
inclined me to require that you serve at least the minimum guideline
sentence.
Id. at 61-62.
Contrary to Hernandez’s assertions, the above-quoted statements make clear that
the district court knew it had authority to impose a sentence below the advisory guideline
sentencing range, but that it simply chose not to do so after considering the various
factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See generally United States v. Clark, 385 F.3d
21609, 623 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The Court presumes that the district court understood its
discretion to depart, absent clear evidence in the record to the contrary.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because the New Mexico state charges were still pending
against Hernandez at the time he was sentenced in this case, the district court did not
know how those pending criminal charges would ultimately be resolved, nor was it in a
position to order that the federal sentence it imposed on Hernandez should run
concurrently with any state sentence(s) that might be subsequently imposed on
Hernandez. See 18 U.S.C. § 3484(a) (outlining a district court’s authority to impose
concurrent or consecutive terms of imprisonment; noting that “if a term of imprisonment
is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of
imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively”) (emphasis added); see
also U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (outlining how a district court is to impose a sentence on a
defendant subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment). Thus, we construe the
district court’s statements about “the Bureau of Prisons . . . tak[ing] it upon themselves to
bring up any concurrent sentences,” and “the judiciary [being] fairly constricted on what
[it] can do” in that regard as referring to the fact that, by statute, it would ultimately fall
within the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons to determine in Hernandez’s case whether
to award him credit for any time he might serve in New Mexico state prison. See 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b); see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992) (“After a
district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney General, through the BOP, has the
responsibility for administering the sentence.”).
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We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Hernandez’s request to impose a below-Guidelines sentence on the basis of the possibility
that Hernandez might be exposed to New Mexico state sentences for the same criminal
conduct. As noted, the outcome of Hernandez’s state criminal proceedings remained
uncertain at the time of Hernandez’s sentencing in this case. Thus, there was no
reasonable basis from which the district court could have calculated a downward
variance. Instead, it would simply have been speculating about the possible outcome and
sentence(s) in Hernandez’s pending state criminal cases. Moreover, as both the
government and the district court noted during the sentencing hearing, Hernandez actually
benefitted in terms of his federal sentencing guideline calculations from the fact that his
state criminal charges remained unresolved. That is, although the pending state criminal
charges were noted in the PSR, they did not increase his criminal history score or
category, as would have occurred had Hernandez first been convicted in New Mexico
state court and then proceeded to federal court for sentencing.
Substantive reasonableness of sentence
In his final argument, Hernandez asserts that the sentence imposed by the district
court was substantively unreasonable. As noted, we review criminal sentences for
substantive reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v.
Thompson, 518 F.3d 832, 869 (10th Cir. 2008). If the district court properly calculated
the Guidelines range and sentenced the defendant within that range, the sentence is
considered presumptively reasonable. United States v. Arrevalo-Olvera, 495 F.3d 1211,
23
1213 (10th Cir. 2007). “The defendant may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that
the sentence is unreasonable in light of the other sentencing factors laid out in [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a).” Thompson, 518 F.3d at 869 (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in
original).
It is uncontroverted that the district court in this case imposed a sentence at the
bottom of the Guideline range. Accordingly, we must presume the sentence to be
reasonable, and the burden is on Hernandez to rebut that presumption. In an effort to do
so, Hernandez asserts that, given the impact his history of abuse as a child had on his
criminal behavior, as well as the demonstrated betterment of that behavior through
diagnosis, therapy and medical treatment, and in light of the lengthy consecutive
sentences he faced in state court for offenses arising in large part out of the same
underlying facts as his federal sentence, the eighty-four month sentence imposed by the
district court was substantively unreasonable.
Hernandez raised these same arguments below and the district court expressly
rejected them. To begin with, Hernandez argued to the district court at the time of
sentencing that his history of physical and emotional abuse at the hands of his stepmother
while growing up was a major factor in his criminal behavior and was a mitigating factor
that warranted a below-Guidelines sentence. Hernandez further argued, as he does here,
that he has recently improved his behavior through a combination of proper medical
diagnosis of his psychological issues and treatment, including therapy and medication.
The district court, however, concluded that neither factor warranted a below-Guidelines
24
sentence. With respect to Hernandez’s upbringing, the district court noted he “ha[d] a
very challenged background,” and it expressed its “sympathy for the situation
[Hernandez] w[as] put in early in life.” ROA, Vol. 4 at 61. The district court noted,
however, that since his childhood, Hernandez “ha[d] managed to be in trouble with the
law on repeated occasions and for serious and violent acts.” Id. at 62. As for
Hernandez’s assertion that his behavior had improved with therapy and medication, the
district court noted that Hernandez’s history indicated that it was “only when [he was] in
custody or in some kind of supervised setting” that he consistently maintained his
medication and therapy regimen. Id. at 57. Otherwise, the district court noted, “he goes
off his medication and self-medicates, usually with methamphetamine.” Id. Although
Hernandez’s counsel responded that Hernandez could “get[] into a treatment program and
. . . stay[] on his medication” during a “period of supervised release,” the district court
concluded: “Well, sadly, supervised release doesn’t guarantee any of those things, in my
experience.” Id. at 58.
Hernandez also argued at the time of sentencing that he was entitled to a below-
Guidelines sentence because of the likelihood that he would have to serve lengthy
criminal sentences in the New Mexico corrections system as a result of the same criminal
behavior that gave rise to his offense of conviction and to the sentencing enhancements
imposed by the district court. As we have already discussed, the district court responded
to that argument by noting that Hernandez had benefitted, in terms of his Sentencing
Guideline calculations, from the fact that his state criminal proceedings remained
25
outstanding. More specifically, the district court noted that, had Hernandez pled guilty or
been convicted of the pending state criminal charges, his criminal history score and
criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines would have been substantially
higher, and would have resulted in a higher Guideline range. Thus, the district court
concluded that a further adjustment, in the form of the imposition of a below-Guidelines
sentence, was not warranted on this basis.
Hernandez has failed on appeal to establish that the district court’s rejection of
each of these alleged bases for departure was unreasonable. Moreover, it is worth noting
that Hernandez has failed to substantially rebut the district court’s conclusion at
sentencing that “the seriousness of the offense [of conviction] and the protection of the
public strongly” warranted the imposition of “at least the minimum guideline sentence.”
Id. at 62. Thus, we conclude that Hernandez has failed to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness afforded to the sentence imposed by the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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