Couture v. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 25, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
JOHN COUTURE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 04-1397
BELLE BONFILS MEMORIAL BLOOD (D. Colorado)
CENTER,
(D.C. No. 02-RB-2319 (OES))
Defendant - Appellee.
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AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION;
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF COLORADO; AIDS ALLIANCE FOR
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES;
ASSOCIATION OF NURSES IN AIDS
CARE; BOULDER COUNTY AIDS
PROJECT; NORTHERN COLORADO
AIDS PROJECT; WHITMAN-WALKER
CLINIC; AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
HIV MEDICINE; INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF PHYSICIANS IN
AIDS CARE; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF PEOPLE WITH AIDS; WESTERN
COLORADO AIDS PROJECT; WOMEN’S
LIGHTHOUSE PROJECT; TRAINING
AND ADVOCACY SUPPORT CENTER;
NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION; COLORADO CROSS
DISABILITY COALITION; CENTER’S
LEGAL INITIATIVES PROJECT;
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES; and AMERICA’S
BLOOD CENTERS
Amici Curiae.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , ANDERSON , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
John Couture appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for
partial summary judgment and granting defendant Bonfils Memorial Blood
Center’s motion for summary judgment. That order disposed of all of Couture’s
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
213, and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”), Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-34-402, as well as his Colorado common law claims of promissory estoppel
and outrageous conduct. 1
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Bonfils is a nonprofit corporation and Colorado’s only community blood
center. In July 2001, Couture learned that Bonfils had openings for
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Couture does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in granting
1
summary judgment to Bonfils on his common law claims. We accordingly
conclude he has waived any argument concerning those claims.
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phlebotomists, individuals who draw blood from blood donors. Although he had
no experience in the medical field, Couture submitted an application to become a
donor technician, an individual whose primary duty was to perform all aspects of
phlebotomy on donors wishing to give blood to Bonfils. 2
Bonfils hired Couture. On his first day of work, August 6, 2001, Couture
filled out a “Post Employment Employee Profile” on which he responded “no” to
the question of whether he was “disabled.” After completing the orientation
session for all new Bonfils employees, Couture embarked on phlebotomy training
with all other newly hired donor technicians.
On August 20, 2001, as Couture and his fellow trainees were preparing to
practice drawing blood from each other, Couture told Dwayne Chavez, Bonfils’
Collections Trainer, that he was HIV-positive. With Couture’s permission,
Chavez informed Karen McBreen, the Director of Community Donor Operations,
and Anne Rooney McCord, the Vice President of Human Resources, of Couture’s
status.
Over the next three days, McCord met several times privately with Couture
and consulted with Bonfils’ Medical Director, Dr. William Dickey. Dr. Dickey
Bonfils summarizes the duties of a donor technician as follows: “register,
2
interview, screen and select potential donors; perform sample and whole blood
collections; provide donor care; and conduct equipment quality control while
delivering excellent customer service and adhering to company standards.”
Appellant’s App. at 368.
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determined that Couture could no longer continue his phlebotomy training
because he was HIV-positive. Dr. Dickey testified that he “thought it was
inappropriate to terminate [Couture]” and that he “encouraged [McCord] to find
something [else at Bonfils].” Dickey Dep., Appellant’s App. at 156. He further
testified that he and McCord agreed that “[t]he pay should be something
comparable” in terms of “pay and benefits” at any other position at Bonfils. Id.McCord testified that, when she met with Couture, Couture “said that
maybe this position wasn’t a good fit, and were there other positions that he could
do in the company?” McCord Dep., id. at 191-92. She further testified that she
“printed out a copy of openings on [Bonfils’] Web site.” Id. at 192. They
“specifically talked about the community relations representative in Boulder and
the laboratory production tech” positions. Id. 3 McCord told Couture that he was
“the type of person that [they] wanted to have as an employee and that [they]
hoped that [they] could come up with something that would meet his needs.” Id.
at 193.
The next day, Couture met with McCord to further discuss these other
positions. McCord testified that Couture “said that he was very appreciative . . .
[that] it had been handled professionally and respectfully.” Id. at 194. However,
There was some confusion in the terminology used to describe some of the
3
other available positions.
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Couture “had thought about it overnight. He really considered it, and he really
wanted to be a phlebotomist, and that he would take the precautions necessary.”
Id. McCord testified that she told him she would discuss the situation again with
Dr. Dickey and “get back to him.” Id.McCord met again with Dr. Dickey, who said that he was not “comfortable”
with Couture continuing to train for the donor technician position but “that . . . he
certainly, absolutely supported finding a position for [Couture] in the
organization.” Id. Accordingly, McCord met again with Couture and “told him
that those positions that [they] had talked about the day before, [she would] be
happy to set up some interviews for him and that [she would] . . . pay him for his
time over that day and the next day to get . . . some interviews done and see if
there was a position that he was interested in.” Id. at 196.
Couture interviewed for the position of product management technician,
one of the available jobs he and McCord had discussed. Following the interview,
he told McCord he “would try it.” Couture Dep., id. at 357. Couture testified that
the base pay rate was the same for the product management technician position
and the donor technician position. Id. at 355. McCord testified that, in
considering the product management technician position for Couture, she “wanted
him to be financially whole, however that occurred.” McCord Dep., Appellee’s
Supp. App. at SA24. Couture likewise testified that McCord told him that the
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“laboratory position that [he] was applying for had a lower rate of pay than the
community blood drive phlebotomist, but she said she was willing to . . .
compensate [him] so there would be not that much difference between the two
salaries.” Couture Dep., Appellant’s App. at 354.
McCord further testified that Couture thought “that the advancement
opportunities as a donor tech were greater than those he could hope for” in the
product management technician position. McCord Dep., id. at 197. However,
she stated that Bonfils was “going through some significant restructuring” and
that “they were designing a system to have more opportunity for advancement” in
the management technician position. Id. In comparing the two positions, she
stated that the donor technician position “had more interaction with donors”
whereas the “product management tech position had more interaction with the
customers in our hospitals.” Id.Couture began training for the product management technician position on
Monday, August 27. On Thursday, August 30, he “punched in for 5 or 10
minutes” and then left. Couture Dep., id. at 221. Later that morning, he left a
voicemail message for McCord indicating that “[he] appreciate[d] the job offer,
but this wasn’t what [he] was looking for.” Id. He explained that the job “just
wasn’t a good fit. [He] just wasn’t happy doing the tasks assigned to [him].” Id.
at 220. He further stated he “just chose not to [do the job], because [he] was just
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unhappy.” Id. Couture also testified that he thought the “opportunity for
advancement” was better with the donor technician job, id. , and that he preferred
that position because it involved “local travel” and he “could wear scrubs that
were Bonfils-provided.” Id.Still later that day, McCord called him and “said that she was sorry to lose
[him] as an employee; that in the brief time that [he] was there, [he] exhibited
qualities that Bonfils was looking for,” and that “she would continue to keep her
eyes open for positions that [he] was qualified for.” Id. at 335.
On September 11, 2001, McCord drafted, but apparently never sent, a letter
to Couture, stating that she was “disappointed that [he] chose not to stay with the
company,” and inviting him to let her know if there were other positions at
Bonfils “[he] would like to be considered for.” Id. at 398. In October 2001,
Bonfils’ counsel sent a letter to Couture stating its “unqualified willingness (and
desire) to reinstate [Couture] in the last position he held.” Id. at 401.
After receiving, at his request, a notice of right to sue from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Couture filed this action. After both
parties filed motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Bonfils’
motion and dismissed all of Couture’s claims. This appeal followed. Couture
argues the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Bonfils on
the ground that Couture suffered no adverse employment action when Bonfils told
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him he could no longer continue training for the donor technician job, but could
train for the product management technician job. He further argues the district
court should have denied summary judgment for Bonfils, and granted his motion
for partial summary judgment, on the grounds that: (1) Bonfils regarded Couture
as disabled, Couture is in fact disabled, and Bonfils terminated him from the
donor technician position because of that disability, in violation of the ADA and
the CADA; and (2) Bonfils failed to conduct an individualized inquiry into
whether Couture could safely perform the donor technician job, and Couture
presented undisputed evidence that he could perform it safely, thereby refuting
Bonfils’ claim that Couture presented a direct threat to the safety of others.
DISCUSSION
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as did the district court. MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver , 414
F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2005). “Summary judgment is appropriate if there are
no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Id. Further, we review the record and any reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.The ADA provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
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to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms
conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The CADA similarly prohibits an employer from
discriminating on the basis of disability against an otherwise qualified individual.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402(a). “To establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the [ADA], a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [he] is qualified for [his] employment
position; and (3) the defendant discriminated against [him] because of [his]
disability.” Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. , 342 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir.
2003). Under both the ADA and the CADA, a plaintiff must show that he
suffered an “adverse employment action” as part of his prima facie case. See
Meiners v. Univ. of Kan. , 359 F.3d 1222,1228-29 (10th Cir. 2004); Lawley v.
Dep’t of Higher Educ. , 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
The district court granted summary judgment to Bonfils, concluding that
Couture had suffered no adverse employment action when he was reassigned from
the donor technician position to the product management technician position
because Couture’s “mere dissatisfaction with the alternative job is not sufficient
to transform the transfer into an adverse employment action.” Order at 5,
Appellant’s App. at 147. The court accordingly did not reach the remaining
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issues. We agree with the district court that Couture’s failure to demonstrate that
he suffered an adverse employment action is fatal to his claims.
The Supreme Court has stated that employer conduct is adverse
employment action if it “constitutes a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Our circuit
“liberally defines the phrase ‘adverse employment action.’” Sanchez v. Denver
Pub. Schs. , 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998). It is “not simply limited to
monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits. Instead, we take ‘a case-by-
case approach,’ examining the unique factors relevant to the situation at hand.”
Id. (citation omitted). “One factor that strongly indicates a challenged action is
an ‘adverse employment action’ is that the action causes ‘harm to future
employment prospects.’” Hillig v. Rumsfeld , 381 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir.
2004) (quoting Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet , 74 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir.
1996)).
However, “we will not consider ‘a mere inconvenience or an alteration of
job responsibilities’ to be an adverse employment action.” Sanchez , 164 F.3d at
532 (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank-Trust Co. , 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.
1993)). We have similarly stated that “not everything that makes an employee
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unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Otherwise, minor and even trivial
employment actions that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like
would form the basis of a discrimination suit.” Mackenzie , 414 F.3d at 1279(quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ. , 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also
James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. , 368 F.3d 371, 377 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that “an employee’s dissatisfaction with this or that aspect of work does
not mean an employer has committed an actionable adverse action”).
In this case, Couture concedes that the base pay rate was the same in the
product management technician position as in the donor technician position. He
asserts that he would have had more opportunity to earn extra pay at the donor
technician job. However, he has not alleged with any specificity the degree to
which he would be entitled to such extra pay. “Unsupported conclusory
allegations . . . do not create an issue of fact.” MacKenzie , 414 F.3d at 1273.
Furthermore, McCord testified that Bonfils was undergoing a restructuring that
would have created more opportunities to earn similar shift differentials at the
product management technician job.
Couture also alleges that the product management technician job was less
interesting and involved less contact with donors and less local travel. He
testified that he “just wasn’t happy doing the tasks assigned to [him],” and that
the job “wasn’t what [he] was looking for.” Couture Dep., Appellant’s App. at
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220-21. Mere dissatisfaction with the job to which an ADA plaintiff has been
reassigned is insufficient to establish that the reassignment constituted an adverse
employment action. Nor does Couture contest the fact, set out above, that he was
offered other jobs at Bonfils, including the job of community relations
representative in Boulder, where he would directly interact with the public and be
the “face” of Bonfils in the community. While reassignment to an undesirable job
may constitute an adverse employment action, reassignment to one which is
simply undesired by the plaintiff is not. 4
Couture places great reliance upon our decision in Hillig , in which we
reiterated our policy of “liberally defin[ing]” the phrase “adverse employment
action,” Hillig , 381 F.3d at 1031, and indicated it is not necessarily limited to a
“tangible employment action” such as “‘hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.’” Id. (quoting Burlington Indus. , 524 U.S. at 761).
However, we also acknowledged that a plaintiff claiming a reassignment was an
adverse employment action must show more “than a requirement to develop new
4
Couture also attempts to cast his reassignment as a “firing” from his job as
a donor technician and “rehiring” at the product management technician position.
However, it is undisputed that he continued to be paid the entire time he worked
at Bonfils and that Bonfils management engaged in an ongoing dialogue with him
in an attempt to find another job to which he could be reassigned. Thus, we reject
his argument that Bonfils “terminated” him and then “rehired” him.
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skills.” Id. at 1033 (discussing Tran v. Trs. of State Colls. , 355 F.3d 1263, 1268
(10th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, in Hillig itself, the plaintiff demonstrated a “harm
to future employment prospects” by showing that severely negative job references
harmed her prospects of future employment. Id. at 1035. Nothing about
Couture’s reassignment to the product management technician position could
conceivably hurt his future employment prospects. Hillig accordingly does not
compel the conclusion that Couture suffered an adverse employment action.
In sum, as the district court found, Couture was merely dissatisfied with his
new position. That alone is insufficient to establish that he experienced an
adverse employment action.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Bonfils. 5
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
5
Couture has filed a motion to strike portions of Appellee’s supplemental
appendix on various grounds. The motion has been referred to this panel. At the
heart of the motion to strike lies a dispute about whether certain materials
contained in the supplemental appendix were before the district court. For
example, the parties disagree on whether certain pages from McCord’s deposition
testimony, which we quote infra, were before the court. That very language was
in fact quoted to the district court, without objection by Couture, in Bonfils’
motion for summary judgment. We are unconvinced that these materials were not
fully before the court. We therefore deny the motion to strike.
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