Gross v. General Motors LLC , 441 F. App'x 562 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 6, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
LISA PATRICE GROSS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-3236
(D.C. No. 2:06-CV-02452-JAR)
GENERAL MOTORS LLC, * (D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
*
General Motors Corporation was the original appellee in this appeal, which
was effectively abated as of June 8, 2009, pursuant to the automatic stay in the
General Motors Corporation bankruptcy. In July 2011, the bankruptcy court
granted limited relief from the stay to allow the appellant to substitute the real
party in interest, General Motors LLC, as the appellee in this case. On August
19, 2011, this court entered an order substituting General Motors LLC as the
appellee, thereby permitting the court to proceed with disposition of the appeal.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Lisa Patrice Gross, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal
of her action as a sanction for her failure to comply with a discovery order.
Ms. Gross also seeks review of the district court’s interlocutory order granting
summary judgment in favor of General Motors Corporation (GM) on three of her
four claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Background
Ms. Gross was employed by GM from February 2004 until January 13,
2006. During her employment with GM, she took three medical leaves due to
stress, depression, and anxiety. She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in
November 2005, and she began her third medical leave from GM on November 13
or 14. Plaintiff did not thereafter return to work at GM. A doctor who examined
her in December 2005 recommended that she return to work on January 9, 2006.
GM deemed her employment terminated when she failed to return to work within
three days after that date.
Ms. Gross filed a complaint against GM in October 2006, alleging
violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She
claimed that certain conduct by her co-workers and one supervisor, which she
considered to be sexual harassment, created a hostile work environment. She also
alleged that GM failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, and that GM
retaliated against her for attempting to report an incident of sexual harassment
and for seeking accommodations for her disability. The district court granted
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summary judgment in favor of GM on all but one of plaintiff’s claims, preserving
for trial only her claim that GM retaliated against her for seeking
accommodations for her disability. See Gross v. Gen. Motors Corp., 533 F. Supp.
2d 1128 (D. Kan. 2008). Trial on the one remaining claim was scheduled to begin
on July 22, 2008. But on that date the district court granted GM’s motion for
sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and 41(b), and dismissed Ms. Gross’s action
with prejudice based upon her failure to comply with a discovery order. See
Gross v. General Motors Corp., 252 F.R.D. 693 (D. Kan. 2008). She filed a
timely appeal.
Discussion
Dismissal As Sanction for Discovery Violation
“[W]e review a district court’s decision to dismiss for discovery violations
under an abuse of discretion standard.” Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916,
920 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1188
(10th Cir. 2002) (reviewing for abuse of discretion “decision to impose the
sanction of dismissal for failure to follow court orders and rules” under Rule
41(b)); LaFleur v. Teen Help, 342 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2003) (reviewing
for abuse of discretion district court’s imposition of sanctions under its inherent
powers).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Ms. Gross’s case. In its motion GM presented the following chronology of events
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related to its attempts to obtain discovery of certain medical records pertaining to
Ms. Gross: GM first requested production of plaintiff’s medical records in
March 2007. In response, plaintiff identified Barbara Mason-Palmer as one of her
doctors and provided a medical records authorization form permitting
Dr. Mason-Palmer to disclose medical records to GM. But in response to its
request for records from Dr. Mason-Palmer, GM received only a summary memo.
That memo indicated that Ms. Gross had discussed with Dr. Mason-Palmer her
alleged emotional distress, her bipolar condition, and her employment with GM.
Dr. Mason-Palmer advised GM that plaintiff had directed her not to produce any
underlying treatment notes.
Plaintiff’s counsel 1 subsequently agreed with GM’s counsel that the records
were relevant and should be produced, and the district court advised GM to serve
Dr. Mason-Palmer with a subpoena. But Ms. Gross once again directed her
doctor not to produce the records. The parties then agreed to defer further
consideration of this issue pending a ruling on GM’s summary judgment motion.
After the district court partially denied GM’s summary judgment motion,
GM filed a motion to compel plaintiff to execute another medical records
authorization for Dr. Mason-Palmer. During a hearing on June 12, 2008, the
district court found that the records were relevant and discoverable and granted
1
Ms. Gross was represented by appointed counsel for a majority of the time
that this case was pending in the district court.
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GM’s motion to compel. The court then ordered plaintiff to provide the records
authorization by the following day. During the same hearing the court set this
case for trial on July 22, 2008.
Ms. Gross represented to GM’s counsel on June 13 that she had provided
Dr. Mason-Palmer with an authorization for the release of her records. But on
July 1, 2008—only three weeks before trial was scheduled to begin—the doctor’s
assistant informed GM’s counsel that plaintiff never provided the authorization as
ordered by the district court. GM immediately filed a motion for sanctions,
seeking dismissal of Ms. Gross’s case. In response to GM’s motion, plaintiff
claimed that GM was lying in its presentation of the facts and contended that the
records GM sought were irrelevant. She concluded by asking the court to order
GM to settle the case for $25 million. The district court granted GM’s motion
and dismissed Ms. Gross’s action with prejudice.
Both Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v) and Rule 41(b) permit a court to dismiss a case in
whole or in part as a sanction for a party’s failure to comply with a discovery
order. In doing so, a district court should ordinarily consider the following
factors: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of
interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant;
(4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action
would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser
sanctions.” Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921 (quotation, ellipsis, and citations
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omitted). “These factors do not constitute a rigid test; rather, they represent
criteria for the district court to consider prior to imposing dismissal as a
sanction.” Id.
Here the district court evaluated each of the Ehrenhaus factors. Regarding
the prejudice suffered by GM, it addressed the relevance of the records to GM’s
defense, as acknowledged by plaintiff’s former counsel, and GM’s repeated
attempts to obtain the records from Dr. Mason-Palmer, which were met by
plaintiff’s persistent refusals to permit production, even on the eve of trial. The
court also noted that, while plaintiff continued to refuse to produce her medical
records, GM had to contend with mounting attorney fees in responding to her
numerous motions seeking reconsideration of the court’s summary judgment
ruling and to restate her claims. With respect to interference with the judicial
process and plaintiff’s culpability, the district court concluded that Ms. Gross had
willfully disobeyed the court’s order and that she was fully responsible for doing
so. The district court also observed that it had warned plaintiff, before she
responded to GM’s motion for sanctions, that GM was justified in asking for
dismissal. It found that this admonition constituted constructive notice sufficient
to satisfy the notice element of the Ehrenhaus factors. See Ecclesiastes
9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1150 (10th Cir. 2007)
(highlighting possibility of dismissal sufficient to provide constructive notice).
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Finally, the district court concluded that no sanction less than dismissal would be
effective based upon plaintiff’s history of repeatedly ignoring the court’s orders.
Ms. Gross does not contest in her appellate brief any of the district court’s
reasons for dismissing her case. Although she acknowledges that her case was
dismissed as a sanction, we can discern only two references to this issue in the
argument section of her brief, consisting of unsupported statements that GM lied
to the district court about her failure to obey the court’s order. An appellant’s
opening brief must identify “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them,
with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(a). “[T]he omission of an issue in an opening
brief generally forfeits appellate consideration of that issue.” Bronson v.
Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). Although we liberally construe a
pro se party’s appellate brief, see Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613
(10th Cir. 1998), pro se litigants nonetheless must follow the same procedural
rules as other parties, Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836,
840 (10th Cir. 2005). We will not “construct a legal theory on a [pro se]
plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir.
1997).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Ms. Gross’s case. The court thoroughly considered all of the Ehrenhaus factors.
We have reviewed the record on appeal, and we are not persuaded that the court
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“made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in
the circumstances.” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quotation omitted). Moreover, Ms. Gross’s waiver of this issue by failing to
raise it in her appellate brief serves as an additional basis for our affirmance of
the district court’s order granting dismissal of her case as a sanction for her
discovery violation.
Interlocutory Order Granting Summary Judgment
Ms. Gross also seeks review of the district court’s interlocutory
summary-judgment order in favor of GM on three of her four claims. See Gross
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 533 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Kan. 2008). We decline to
review that order.
Ordinarily, an interlocutory order merges into the final judgment and
becomes appealable along with the final judgment. See Montgomery v. City of
Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926, 934 (10th Cir. 2004). But where a final judgment is a
dismissal for failure to prosecute, we have adopted a “prudential rule” by which
this court will review a preceding, interlocutory order only in rare cases.
AdvantEdge Business Group, L.L.C. v. Thomas E. Mestmaker & Assocs., Inc.,
552 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2009). Applying that rule in AdvantEdge Business
Group, we found no good reason to review. See id. at 1238. In the factual
context of that case—a dismissal for failure to prosecute—we focused on the
litigant’s underlying conduct that led to the dismissal, reasoning that a litigant
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should not be permitted to manipulate “district court processes to effect the
premature review of an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order.” Id. at 1237-
38.
Here the district court likewise found that Ms. Gross’s willful failure to
comply with its discovery order interfered with the judicial process. Thus, the
concerns raised by Ms. Gross’s attempt to appeal the district court’s interlocutory
order in this case are similar to those at issue in AdvantEdge Business Group, and
we conclude that the prudential rule applies.
The application of the prudential rule requires that the party seeking review
of an interlocutory order must demonstrate good reasons why this court should
allow appellate review. Ms. Gross advances no such reasons here. As in
AdvantEdge Business Group, this is an “unremarkable case” and Ms. Gross is an
“unexceptional plaintiff.” 552 F.3d at 1238. Cf. Sere v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ.
of Ill., 852 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1988) (declining to review interlocutory
dismissal order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) which preceded dismissal of
remaining claim as sanction for discovery violation); John’s Insulation, Inc. v. L.
Addison & Assocs., Inc., 156 F.3d 101, 107-08 (1st Cir. 1998) (declining to
review interlocutory orders preceding dismissal and default judgment imposed as
sanction for plaintiff’s delay and failure to follow court orders).
As a further basis for our decision not to review, we note that Ms. Gross’s
refusal to allow production of her medical records to GM infected not only her
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surviving retaliation claim, but also the three other claims that the district court
had previously dismissed. 2 Although the exact content of the records is unknown
due to plaintiff’s refusal to allow production, 3 the summary document produced
by Dr. Mason-Palmer indicated that Ms. Gross discussed with the doctor her
alleged emotional distress, her bipolar condition, and her employment with GM.
Thus, the records were equally relevant to her claims of a sexual-harassment
hostile work environment, retaliation for reporting sexual harassment, and failure
to accommodate her disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (a)(2) & (b)(3)
(providing for recovery of compensatory damages, including damages for
emotional distress, for unlawful intentional discrimination under Title VII and the
ADA).
Reconsideration of Denial of
Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Ms. Gross filed her original complaint pro se, but shortly thereafter the
district court granted her motion to appoint counsel, finding that one or more of
2
We reach this conclusion in support of our decision under the prudential
rule not to review the district court’s summary judgment order. Cf. Sere,
852 F.2d at 288. We are not, as urged by General Motors LLC in its appellate
brief, applying an alternative ground to affirm the district court’s order. See
Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir. 2003) (remanding to district
court to perform sanction analysis in the first instance, rather than affirming
dismissal on that alternative rationale).
3
Ms. Gross argued in response to GM’s motion for sanctions that
Dr. Mason-Palmer’s treatment records were not relevant to her claims, but there is
no indication in the record that plaintiff sought to present the records to the
district court for in camera examination.
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her claims had sufficient merit to warrant such an appointment. In early 2008 the
district court granted her counsel’s motion to withdraw. Ms. Gross filed a second
motion to appoint counsel, which the district court again granted. Less than one
month later, plaintiff sought to have her second appointed attorney withdraw.
After admonishing her that the court would not appoint a third lawyer to represent
her, the district court granted Ms. Gross’s motion and allowed her second
appointed attorney to withdraw. She has proceeded in this case pro se as of
June 12, 2008.
This court denied Ms. Gross’s motion for appointment of counsel in this
appeal. We also deny her request for reconsideration of that order, which was
referred to this panel for decision. As a civil litigant, plaintiff has no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. See Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217
(10th Cir. 2006). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a “court may request an
attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” But appointment of
counsel is left to the discretion of the court. Johnson, 466 F.3d at 1217. “In
determining whether to appoint counsel, the . . . court should consider a variety of
factors, including the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the factual
issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the
complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims.” Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d
994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991). None of these factors weighs in favor of appointing
counsel to represent Ms. Gross in this appeal, which would amount to her third
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appointed lawyer in this case. Counsel is rarely appointed in civil cases, and
particularly not in a serial fashion as urged here by plaintiff.
Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal
Ms. Gross filed a motion asking this court to supplement the record on
appeal with additional documents from the district court. All of the documents
she references relate to her contention that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on three of her claims. In light of our decision not to review
that order, we deny Ms. Gross’s motion as moot.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Ms. Gross’s motion to
reconsider the court’s denial of appointment of counsel is DENIED. Her motion
to supplement the record on appeal is DENIED as moot. Ms. Gross’s Motion for
Order of Release of Records is also DENIED. General Motors LLC’s motion to
strike Ms. Gross’s supplemental brief is DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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