Penner v. City of Topeka, Kansas , 437 F. App'x 751 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 1, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JERRY L. PENNER, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 11-3080
(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-04108-RDR)
v. (D. Kansas)
CITY OF TOPEKA, KANSAS,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff and appellant, Jerry L. Penner, appeals the grant of summary
judgment to the defendant, City of Topeka, in his case alleging that the City
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it denied him a provisional use
request for a salvage yard license. For the following reasons, we affirm the grant
of summary judgment to the City.
BACKGROUND
We derive the uncontroverted facts from the district court’s decision.
Mr. Penner has applied to the City on numerous occasions for permission to
operate a salvage yard at 417 S.E. 13 th Street, in Topeka, Kansas. 1 In January
2003, he actually received a salvage yard permit from the City, but it was revoked
in March 2003. Mr. Penner then applied for a provisional use permit to conduct
vehicle salvage, which was denied in March 2003. He unsuccessfully sought
reconsideration of that denial. Mr. Penner then filed another application for a
salvage yard license, which was denied in September 2003. A state court
overturned the denial, but that decision was, in turn, reversed by the Kansas Court
of Appeals on August 19, 2005, which had the effect of upholding the City’s
decision to deny the license.
On January 5, 2006, Mr. Penner filed yet another application to operate a
salvage yard on the same property, which the City denied on March 21, 2006. A
1
The district court described the process through which applications are
made for permits to operate salvage yards: they “are made through the city fire
department. The city fire chief makes an inspection of the location, verifies
whether the land is zoned appropriately, and reports whether the proposed salvage
yard will result in a public health or safety hazard.” Mem. & Order at 1-2.
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state court upheld the denial on November 17, 2006. The court noted the
following concerns about permitting Mr. Penner to operate a salvage yard at that
particular location:
From a review of the record, it is apparent that the Topeka
City Council relied heavily upon the report prepared by the Planning
Department. The Planning Department’s report set forth several
concerns, including “increased truck traffic through the
neighborhood” which “could have a negative impact on the
[Williams] magnet school, as well as the viability of the Brown v.
Board of Education site.” The Planning Department found in its
report that “[w]ith so many children and visitors coming to the area,
safety is also a concern.” In addition, the Planning Department
report noted that the “property does not comply with the City’s
Subdivision Regulations.” Based on these concerns, the Planning
Department report recommended: “Disapproval-due to illegal
subdivision and impact upon neighborhood.”
Mem. & Order at 3. The court detailed these concerns further, indicating that “it
was reasonable for the Topeka City Council to have found that such an operation
raised legitimate safety concerns in one of the most unique neighborhoods in the
State of Kansas.” Id. at 4. Undaunted, Mr. Penner filed yet another application
on February 22, 2008, which was denied by the City on July 1, 2008.
As the district court explained, Mr. Penner’s property is zoned for heavy
industrial use, which is compatible with use as a salvage yard. The City planning
department “recommended disapproval of [Mr. Penner’s] 2008 application based
upon compatibility with the surrounding neighborhood.” Id. at 4-5. While the
planning department would make recommendations, the ultimate decision to issue
a provisional use application is made by the City Council. There are apparently
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other salvage yards which dismantle automobiles in the neighborhood of Mr.
Penner’s property.
Mr. Penner brought this action, arguing that he was denied his
constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and the equal
protection of the laws by the City’s denial of his request for a provisional use
permit. Eventually, the City moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that Mr. Penner was
unable to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals existed who were treated
differently than Mr. Penner, and that the City’s action was reasonable. 2 This
appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using
the same legal standard as did the district court. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210,
1216 (10 th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,
the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there
is no genuine issue as to any fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applying this standard, we view the
2
In so doing, the court rejected the City’s other theories supporting its
motion for summary judgment, in particular that the doctrine of res judicata
and/or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Mr. Penner’s claims. On appeal,
Mr. Penner obviously challenges only the district court’s rejection of Mr.
Penner’s claim of class-of-one equal protection violation.
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evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, Mr. Penner. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1216.
To succeed on an equal protection claim as a “class of one,” a party must
demonstrate that (1) it has been intentionally treated differently than those
similarly situated, see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)
(per curiam), and (2) the difference in treatment was objectively irrational and
abusive, see Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty., 440 F.3d 1202, 1211
(10 th Cir. 2006). Class-of-one claimants must show similarity in all material
respects. See id. at 1212. This is a substantial burden. Id. at 1213. “[A] court
may properly grant summary judgment where it is clear that no reasonable jury
could find that the [similarly] situated requirement has been met.” McDonald v.
Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7 th Cir. 2004). Additionally, if there is an
objectively reasonable basis for a difference in treatment, summary judgment is
appropriate. Jicarilla, 440 F.3d at 1210. “We ask not whether the [d]efendants’
proffered justifications were sincere, but whether they were objectively
reasonable.” Id. at 1211.
We agree with the district court’s analysis of this issue and affirm the grant
of summary judgment to the City for substantially the reasons stated in the court’s
Memorandum & Order. As the court stated, “[i]t does not appear possible that
[Mr. Penner] could establish that he was treated differently from other persons or
entities whose situations were identical in all material respects and that the
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difference in treatment was objectively irrational and abusive.” Mem. & Order at
14-15. 3
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
3
As we have stated before, “[f]ederal courts should be reluctant to interfere
in zoning disputes which are local concerns.” Nichols v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
506 F.3d 962, 971 (10 th Cir. 2007) (further quotation omitted).
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