United States v. Cornelio-Legarda , 514 F. App'x 771 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 10, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 13-8001
v. (D.C. Nos. 2:12-CV-00107-NDF and
2:07-CR-00239-NDF-1)
ESTEBAN CORNELIO-LEGARDA, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
A jury convicted Esteban Cornelio-Legarda of a number of drug-related
crimes, a result this court affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Cornelio-
Legarda, 381 F. App’x 835 (10th Cir. 2010). Mr. Cornelio-Legarda then filed a
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to undo his conviction. The district court
found nothing meritorious in the motion and denied relief in a thorough 39-page
order. Mr. Cornelio-Legarda now asks us for a certificate of appealability
(“COA”), as he must in order to challenge that decision.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
We may grant a COA only if Mr. Cornelio-Legarda makes a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To do
this, he must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Cornelio-Legarda tries to surmount this standard by arguing his
lawyer’s assistance at trial was ineffective because of a conflict of interest that
arose when he filed a grievance with the state bar association. We don’t doubt
there’s a potential for a conflict to arise when a client files a bar grievance about
his lawyer’s conduct, but to state that an actual conflict always and necessarily
does arise is not entirely accurate either. As the district court observed,
sometimes a complaint may actually have the opposite effect, lighting a fire under
the lawyer and encouraging him to do his best in order to prove that the complaint
has no merit. That’s what the district court found happened in this case, and Mr.
Cornelio-Legarda supplies no basis on which reasonable people might debate its
conclusion.
The district court also acknowledged that sometimes complaints and
conflicts can lead to a total breakdown in attorney-client communications and that
this may itself give rise to a presumption of ineffectiveness. See Hale v. Gibson,
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227 F.3d 1298, 1313 (10th Cir. 2000). But the court again found no such problem
arose here and we see nothing debatable in its conclusion. Neither is the
unrealized potential for a conflict legally sufficient for us to grant relief: “a
defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate” not merely that a
potential for a conflict of interest existed, but “that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
348 (1980); see also United States v. Alvarez, 137 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir.
1998) (declining relief when there is no evidence a potential conflict matured into
an actual conflict where “counsel was forced to make choices advancing other
interests to the detriment of his client”).
Separately, Mr. Cornelio-Legarda says the district court improperly denied
his request to amend his § 2255 motion. Mr. Cornelio-Legarda says he wanted to
add another claim of ineffective assistance, this one on the basis that his lawyer
failed to procure grand jury transcripts for use at his trial. He also wanted to
examine those transcripts himself. But these were entirely new claims, as Mr.
Cornelio-Legarda conceded, see R., Vol. 1, at 88, and they came two months after
§ 2255’s one-year limitations period expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).
Separately still, Mr. Cornelio-Legarda contends the district court abused its
discretion by failing to rule on his request for the appointment of counsel. See 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). While “an order . . . that denies a motion for appointment
of counsel . . . is . . . not subject to the COA requirement,” Harbison v. Bell, 556
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U.S. 180, 183 (2009), we nevertheless conclude that the district court didn’t
commit reversible error. Mr. Cornelio-Legarda only asked for counsel to help
him prepare for an evidentiary hearing on his claims. See R., Vol. 1, at 15, 21.
But the district court was able to resolve Mr. Cornelio-Legarda’s claims without
an evidentiary hearing, id. at 188, and that made his appointment-of-counsel
motion besides the point on its own terms.
Mr. Cornelio-Legarda’s request for a COA is denied, and this appeal is
dismissed. The district court’s decision not to appoint counsel is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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