Gomez v. Davis , 514 F. App'x 825 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 29, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PETER E. GOMEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 13-1004
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-03008-LTB)
JOHN DAVIS, B.V.M.C.; ROGER (D. Colo.)
WERHOLTZ, Interim Executive Director
DOC*; JOHN SUTHERS, Attorney
General of the State of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS**
Before HARTZ, GORSUCH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Peter E. Gomez, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA)
to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his unauthorized second or successive
28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for a writ of habeas corpus. We deny a COA an
dismiss the matter.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Roger Werholtz, Interim Executive
Director DOC, is substituted for Tom Clements, Executive Director DOC, as a
Respondent-Appellee in this action.
**
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
In 2002, Mr. Gomez pleaded guilty in Colorado state court to (1) possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance and (2) possession of a controlled
substance. He was sentenced to twenty-four and six years’ imprisonment,
respectively, with the sentences to run consecutively.
In 2009, Mr. Gomez filed in state court a motion for expungement of court
costs due to his indigency. On February 20, 2009, the state trial court entered a
minute order vacating court costs related to Mr. Gomez’s controlled substance
convictions. Aplt.’s Combined Opening Br. & Appl. for COA, Ex. A at 1-2.
In 2011, Mr. Gomez filed his first § 2254 application, asserting that the state
trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for his controlled substance
convictions. The district court denied the application as time-barred.
In 2012, Mr. Gomez filed a second § 2254 application. It challenged the same
Colorado convictions and sentences as his first § 2254 application. This time he took
issue not only with his consecutive sentences, but also with his plea agreement. The
district court decided this filing was an unauthorized second or successive § 2254
application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Declining to transfer it to this court, the
district court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1252
(10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (stating that, when a district court is presented with an
unauthorized second or successive § 2254 claim, it “may transfer the matter to this court
if it determines it is in the interest of justice to do so under [28 U.S.C.] § 1631, or it may
dismiss the motion . . . for lack of jurisdiction”).
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Mr. Gomez now seeks a COA to appeal from the district court’s dismissal.
When, as here, a district court dismisses a habeas application on procedural grounds,
a petitioner is entitled to a COA only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would
find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable
whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
We construe Mr. Gomez’s pro se filings liberally. Sigala v. Bravo, 656 F.3d
1125, 1126 (10th Cir. 2011). As best we can discern, he argues that the state trial
court’s February 20, 2009, minute order waiving court costs qualifies as a new
judgment under the Supreme Court’s holding in Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct.
2788 (2010), so the § 2254 application he filed in 2012 was not a second or
successive application. Mr. Gomez’s argument is misplaced.
In Magwood, the Supreme Court held that when “there is a ‘new judgment
intervening between the two habeas [applications],’ an application challenging the
resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all.” 130 S. Ct. at 2802(citation omitted). In reaching this determination, the Court addressed the meaning
of “second or successive” in § 2244(b), concluding that the use of the term
“judgment” in § 2254(b) was “significant” and “that the phrase ‘second or
successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.” Id.
at 2797.
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In this case, the state trial court’s 2009 minute order vacating court costs is not
a new judgment entered between Mr. Gomez’s 2011 and 2012 applications for § 2254
relief. Despite Mr. Gomez’s statements to the contrary, the § 2254 application he
filed in 2012 challenges the same judgment that he challenged in his 2011 application
for § 2254 relief: the judgment entered after he pleaded guilty in 2002 to two
controlled substance violations.
Mr. Gomez also argues that the district court should not have found the § 2254
application he filed in 2012 to be second or successive because the district court did
not adjudicate the merits of his first application, but instead dismissed it as
time-barred. Mr. Gomez is mistaken. “The dismissal of [his] first habeas petition as
time-barred was a decision on the merits, and any later habeas petition challenging
the same conviction is a second or successive subject to the AEDPA requirements.”
In re Rains, 659 F.3d 1274, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Because reasonable jurists could not debate that the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling—to treat Mr. Gomez’s § 2254 claims as an unauthorized
second or successive § 2254 application and to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction—we
deny a COA and dismiss this matter. We also deny Mr. Gomez’s motion for leave to
proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees because he has failed to
advance “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the
issues raised on appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505
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(10th Cir. 1991). Mr. Gomez is therefore directed to pay the full amount of the filing
fee forthwith.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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