Garside v. Barnhart , 113 F. App'x 300 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 7 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TANYA R. GARSIDE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7006
(D.C. No. 02-CV-157-S)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E.D. Okla.)
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges, and KANE , ** Senior
District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff-appellant Tanya R. Garside appeals the Commissioner’s decision
denying Garside disability benefits. Garside alleges she has been disabled since
January 18, 2000, from an unspecified connective-tissue disease similar to chronic
fatigue syndrome or fibromyalgia, as well as headaches, anxiety, depression, and
diminished memory and concentration. However, the administrative law judge
(ALJ) determined at the relevant analysis’ fifth step, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
that Garside remains capable of performing simple, routine sedentary work not
involving contact with the public. Based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the
ALJ found Garside could still work as a non-construction laborer or a surveillance
system monitor.
The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the
Commissioner’s final determination. See, e.g., Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758,
759 (10th Cir. 2003). Reviewing that decision only to determine whether the ALJ
applied the law correctly and whether there was substantial evidence to support
the decision, see Hamlin v. Barnhart , 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004),
we affirm.
Garside first contends the ALJ failed to consider fully Garside’s mental
limitations before determining that she retains the residual functional capacity
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to perform simple, routine sedentary work not involving contact with the public.
Our review of the record persuades us to the contrary. The record contains
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Garside’s mental
condition does not further limit her ability to work.
Garside also asserts the ALJ erred in “determin[ing] that there is no
objective medical evidence in the records that would substantiate Garside’s
diagnosis of fibromyalgia.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. But the ALJ did not make such
a determination. Rather, the ALJ’s references to which Garside objects are
accurate restatements of Garside’s medical records. Those records indicate that
Garside’s treating physicians had difficulty identifying the specific
connective-tissue disease causing her symptoms, offering several different
diagnoses, such as lupus, chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia. See
generally Adams v. Chater , 93 F.3d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting doctors
diagnose chronic fatigue syndrome by excluding other possible disorders).
Nevertheless, the ALJ specifically found that Garside does suffer from a severe
connective-tissue disease that “more than minimally limit[s] [her] ability to
perform some” basic work activities. Aplt. App. at 14; see also id. at 354 (ALJ
noted, at hearing, “it may not be entirely clear whether it’s fibromyalgia, Epstein
Bar[r] syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, but there’s enough medical findings
here to conclude there’s a medical condition involving one of these problems.
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The symptom complex . . . is fairly well established . . . .”). Moreover, the ALJ
did not discount Garside’s treating physicians’ opinions, as she asserts.
We have thoroughly reviewed the entire record in light of all Garside’s
arguments. Based on the governing standards, we are unable to conclude the ALJ
erred in finding that Garside is not disabled. We therefore AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court upholding the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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