United States v. Villalobos-Varela , 440 F. App'x 665 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 28, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-2011
(D.C. No. 2:10-CR-2363-BB-1)
LAZARO ABRAHAM (D. N. Mex.)
VILLALOBOS-VARELA,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, and
FREUDENTHAL, District Judge **.
Defendant Lazaro Villalobos-Varela appeals the district court’s sentence of
thirty months imprisonment for re-entry of a removed alien in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). According to Villalobos-Varela, the district court
incorrectly concluded that his Colorado felony menacing conviction was a crime
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
of violence and subjected him to a 16-Level Enhancement under the United States
Sentencing Guideline Manual (USSG) § 2L1.2. 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
I
Factual Background
Villalobos-Varela, a Mexican citizen, was brought to the United States
when he was three years old and lived continuously in the United States from then
until he was deported in May 2010. ROA. Vol. 2 at 24. The Colorado felony
menacing conviction at issue stems from events in 2006. At that time, Villalobos-
Varela was living in Longmont, Colorado, with his then girlfriend, now wife,
Mayra Canales. Id. Vol. 2 at 17. On or about March 11, 2006, Villalobos-Varela
got into a physical altercation with Ms. Canales. Id. Vol. 2 at 21. In the course of
the altercation, Villalobos-Varela threw her to the ground and choked her. Id.Officers arrived at the scene and arrested Villalobos-Varela. Id. On August 18,
2006, Villalobos-Varela pled guilty in the District Court of Boulder County to
felony menacing with a deadly weapon in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-
206. Id. Vol. 2 at 20-21. Villalobos-Varela received six months jail and two years
probation. Id. Vol. 2 at 20. While there is little information in the record
1
All USSG citations refer to the 2009 U.S. Sentencing Commission
Guidelines Manual.
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regarding the events of the intervening months, Villalobos-Varela was deported to
Mexico on May 18, 2010. Id. Vol. 2 at 23.
Approximately a month later, on June 24, 2010, an Agent of the Santa
Teresa, New Mexico Border Patrol encountered Villalobos-Varela in Santa
Teresa. Id. Vol. 1 at 4. The Agent questioned Villalobos-Varela as to his
citizenship and Villalobos-Varela stated that he was a citizen and national of
Mexico, present in the United States without Immigration Documents that would
allow him to be or remain in the United States legally. Id. Villalobos-Varela was
arrested and charged with violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b). Id. Vol. 1 at
7.
Sentencing
On August 17, 2010, Villalobos-Varela pled guilty to re-entering the United
States after having been deported in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b),
without the benefit of a plea agreement. Id. Vol. 2 at 16. The district court set a
date for sentencing, and the probation officer prepared a presentence report. The
probation officer determined that Villalobos-Varela’s base offense level was 8. Id.Vol. 2 at 16. Applying USSG § 2L1.2(b), the probation officer concluded that the
2006 menacing conviction qualified as a crime of violence, requiring a 16-level
increase to Villalobos-Varela’s base offense level for an adjusted offense level of
24. Id. Villalobos-Varela received a 3 level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility for a total offense level of 21. Id. Vol. 2 at 20. Villalobos-Varela’s
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criminal history was calculated at a category III, for an advisory sentence of 46 to
57 months, with 2 to 3 years of supervised release. Id. Vol. 2 at 26.
Villalobos-Varela’s counsel filed formal objections to the PSR claiming,
among other things, that the 2006 Colorado menacing conviction should not be
considered a crime of violence under the Guidelines because a person can be
convicted of felony menacing in Colorado without the use of physical force and
without the victim feeling or being in danger. Id. Vol. 1 at 8-20. Villalobos-
Varela argued that under the categorical approach, menacing is not a crime of
violence under USSG. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
At sentencing, the district court rejected Villalobos-Varela’s arguments that
Colorado felony menacing is not a crime of violence. In determining the
appropriate sentence, the district court applied the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553 and ruled that the appropriate sentence was 30 months, with 2 years of
supervised release. Id. Vol. 3 at 18.
II
Standard of Review
“Whether a prior offense constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under § 2L1.2
presents a question of statutory interpretation, and we review the district court's
conclusion de novo.” United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1116-1117
(10th Cir. 2008)(citation omitted). “In interpreting the Guidelines, we look at the
language in the guideline itself, as well as at the interpretative and explanatory
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commentary to the guideline provided by the Sentencing Commission.” United
States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 2010)(citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Commentary to the Guidelines is authoritative unless
it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly
erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Analysis
Section 2L1.2 of the Guidelines applies to defendants who have been
convicted of unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States. The
Guidelines establish a base offense level of eight, but § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) requires a
district court to impose a sixteen-level enhancement if the defendant has been
previously convicted of “a crime of violence.” Application Note 1(B)(iii) defines
“crime of violence” as:
[A]ny of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse
of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,
burglary of a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state, or local
law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another.
To determine whether Villalobos-Varela’s Colorado felony menacing
conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, we apply the categorical approach set
forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). “As the Supreme
Court recently explained, under the categorical approach ‘we consider the offense
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generically, that is to say, we examine it in terms of how the law defines the
offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it
on a particular occasion.’” United States v. Rooks, 556 F.3d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir.
2009)(quoting, Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008)). “The
categorical approach looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and the
fact of conviction.” Rooks, 556 F.3d at 1147. 2
Villalobos-Varela was convicted for a felony under Colorado’s menacing
statute which provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or
physical action, he or she knowingly places or attempts to place
another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Menacing is
a class 3 misdemeanor, but, it is a class 5 felony if committed:
(a) By the use of a deadly weapon or any article used or
fashioned in a manner to cause a person to
reasonably believe that the article is a deadly
weapon; or
(b) By the person representing verbally or otherwise that
he or she is armed with a deadly weapon.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-206.
2
In some circumstances, criminal statutes contain separate subsections,
each of which can be charged separately and violation of one section would
qualify as a crime of violence, but violation of another would not. In these cases,
a court may consider a limited set of documents to determine under which
subsection the defendant was convicted. This approach is known as a modified
categorical approach. However, we believe, and both parties agree, that the
modified categorical approach is not applicable in this case.
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This court previously concluded Colorado felony menacing is categorically
a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).
United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005). 3 More recently,
this court, relying on its holding in Herron, determined that Colorado felony
menacing is categorically a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2(a). United
States v. Armijo, 651 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2011). In Armijo, the Court
noted that the term “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2 is identical, in pertinent
part, to the definition of crime of violence set out in § 4B1.2(a)(1). Id. at 1233, n.
4.
While Armijo was decided after the briefing in this case was complete,
Villalobos-Varela argues that Armijo does not control the outcome of this appeal.
Villalobos-Varela argues that Armijo failed to address his issues that Colorado’s
felony menacing does not necessarily entail “physical force” and that Colorado
felony menacing does not constitute a crime of violence because it can be
committed by a “threat” that need not be communicated to the victim.
The phrase “physical force” under the ACCA “means violent force - that is,
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v.
3
“Given the similarity in language between the ACCA and USSG, we have
occasionally looked to precedent under one provision for guidance under another
in determining whether a conviction qualifies as a violent felony.” United States.
v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663, 671 (10th Cir. 2010)(citation and quotation marks
omitted).
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United States, ---U.S.---, 130 St. Ct. 1265, 1271, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (emphasis
in original). We conclude that Colorado felony menacing satisfies this
requirement. In Armijo, this court specifically found that Colorado felony
menacing requires as an element the use or threatened use of physical force, even
if the deadly weapon is a poison or pathogen. Id. at 1233. In Armijo, this court
joined the Ninth and Eighth Circuits in rejecting arguments to the contrary. Id. at
1232 (citing United States v. Melchor-Meceno, 620 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir.
2010)(“One cannot knowingly place another in fear of being poisoned [under
Colorado law] without threatening to force the poison on the victim); United
States v. Forrest, 611 F.3d 908, 910-911 (8th Cir. 2010)(“A threat that creates a
fear ‘of imminent serious bodily injury’ is a threat of physical force.”)).
Therefore, Villalobos-Varela’s argument that Colorado felony menacing does not
require physical force, was discussed and rejected in Armijo. This court has
determined that Colorado felony menacing does entail the use or threatened use of
physical force.
Villalobos-Varela also argues that Colorado felony menacing does not
require the victim to be aware of the threat or in fear of injury. See People v.
Saltray, 969 P.2d 729, 732 (Colo. App. 1998)(threat against victim was
communicated to third party, not the victim, the court found the proper focus of
whether defendant has committed crime of menacing is intent and conduct of
defendant, not the victim). Villalobos-Varela argues that the definition of threat
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requires some communication of the threat to the victim. Thus, if a victim is
unaware of any danger, there has been no communication and without
communication, there can be no threat.
We are not persuaded by Villalobos-Varela’s argument that the victim must
actually perceive the threat to qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2. This
determination is consistent with the interpretation of the term “threat” in other
areas of federal law. See United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir.
1998)(finding that threats under 18 U.S.C. § 115 are not required to be made
directly to the proposed victim); United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 829, 832
(10th Cir. 1986)(holding threats made against President to psychiatric nurse
violated 18 U.S.C. § 871).
None of Villalobos-Varela’s arguments casts any doubt on this court’s
reasoning in Herron and Armijo that led to the conclusions that Colorado felony
menacing is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA and a violent crime under
§ 4B1.2(a). Because the relevant language of § 4B1.2(a)(1) is identical to the
relevant language in the term “crime of violence” for § 2L1.2(b)(1), we conclude
that Armijo and Herron compel the determination that Colorado felony menacing
is a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2(b). Accordingly, the district court
correctly determined that Villalobos-Varela’s 2006 Colorado felony menacing
conviction was categorically a crime of violence and correctly applied the 16-
level enhancement to his offense level.
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III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Nancy D. Freudenthal
Chief District Court Judge
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