Qep Energy Company v. Sullivan , 444 F. App'x 284 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 27, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
QEP ENERGY COMPANY,
a Texas Corporation,
Plaintiff-Counter-
Claim-Defendant-
Appellee, No. 11-4012
(D.C. No. 2:08-CV-00859-TC)
v. (D. Utah)
CHRISTOPHER M. SULLIVAN,
Defendant-Counter-
Claim-Plaintiff-
Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
In this appeal we are asked to construe a contract assigning an oil and gas
lease. More specifically, the dispute centers on the nature of the interest reserved
by the assignor. The district court ruled in favor of QEP Energy Company (QEP)
on the contract-interpretation question. After a bench trial, the court entered
judgment against Christopher M. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan now appeals pro se the
district court’s judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
I.
In 1970 the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a federal oil and
gas lease to Joseph A. Thomas on 2,556.61 acres of land located in Uintah
County, Utah. The lease, which was assigned the identifying number U-11001,
had a primary 10-year term, but would continue as long as oil and gas was
produced in paying quantities. Lease U-11001 was subject to a 12½ percent
royalty on the mineral production removed or sold from the leased lands, payable
to the federal government as lessor.
BLM regulations require all assignments of record title to be executed on
an official BLM form or an exact copy of the official form. On February 2, 1972,
Mr. Thomas assigned all of his record title in lease U-11001 to Raymond
Chorney, using a copy of the official BLM assignment form (hereafter Thomas
Assignment). The BLM form asked a series of questions and provided spaces for
filling in the parties’ responses. It also included printed instructions for
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completing and filing the form with the BLM. Section 5 of the Thomas
Assignment states as follows, with the parties’ typewritten insertions on the BLM
form shown in bold:
5a. What overriding royalty or production payments is the assignor
reserving herein? (See Item 4 of General Instructions; specify
percentage.) Three Percent (3%) of 8/8, see attached rider.
b. What overriding royalties or production payments, if any, were
previously reserved? (Percentage only) NONE
R., Vol. 3 at 95. Item 4 of the General Instructions provided:
Overriding royalties or payments out of production – Describe, in an
accompanying statement, any overriding royalties or payments out of
production created by assignment but not set out therein. If
payments out of production are reserved by assignor, outline in detail
the amount, method of payment, and other pertinent terms.
Id. at 96. The “attached rider” referenced by the parties in the Thomas
Assignment was another pre-printed form, which provided, in relevant part, as
follows (again, with the parties’ typewritten insertions shown in bold):
Assignor hereby excepts and reserves an obligation equal to
$ 300.00 per acre for the number of acres assigned hereby, the same
to be paid out of 3% of the market value at the wells, as produced,
of all the oil and gas which may be produced, saved and marketed
from the above described lands under the terms of said lease or any
extensions or renewals thereof. All payments made on account of
said obligation shall be computed and paid at the same time and in
the same manner as royalties payable to the Lessor under the terms of
said lease are computed and paid. . . .
Id. at 97.
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In October 1974 a portion of lease U-11001 was committed to a unit plan of
development, 1 which resulted in segregation of the lease. See id., Vol. 4 at 116;
see also 43 C.F.R. § 3107.3-2 (providing for segregation of leases, with “one
covering the lands committed to the plan, the other lands not committed to the
plan”). The acres of land committed to the unit agreement retained lease number
U-11001, and that lease expired in 1987. The remaining acres were assigned
lease number UTU-28652, and that lease remains active.
In late 1998 or early 1999, Mr. Sullivan learned through a business
acquaintance, Robert Weaver, that revenue payable to Mr. Thomas from his
reserved interest in lease U-11001 was about to be abandoned to the State of Utah
as escheat property. Mr. Weaver and Mr. Sullivan decided to try to acquire
Mr. Thomas’s interest, and Mr. Sullivan located Mr. Thomas’s widow, Martha
P. Thomas. On May 13, 1999, Ms. Thomas assigned all of her interest in lease
U-11001, including any segregated portions thereof, to a middleman, Dennis
Oliver. Mr. Oliver then assigned his interest to Mr. Sullivan and to Mr. Weaver’s
company, B&A Properties, LLC. That assignment provided, in relevant part:
1
“Unitization refers to the consolidation of mineral or leasehold interests in
oil or gas covering a common source of supply.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann,
904 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Lewis C. Cox, Jr. & Gregory J.
Nibert, Law of Federal Oil & Gas Leases § 18.01[2] (Matthew Bender & Co.
2011) (“Unitization is the agreement to jointly operate an entire producing
reservoir or a prospectively productive area of oil and/or gas. The entire unit area
is operated as a single entity, without regard to lease boundaries, and allows for
the maximum recovery of production from the reservoir.”).
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Dennis Oliver . . . does hereby, assign, transfer and quit claim that
certain 3.0% Overriding Royalty interest previously reserved by
Joseph A. Thomas on 2-2-72, to:
B&A Properties, LLC . . . (an undivided ½ or 1.50%); and
Christopher M. Sullivan . . . (an undivided ½ or 1.50%);
. . . to include all of Assignor’s right, title and interest in and to
U.S.A. Lease U-11001, and any extensions, renewals, or segregated
portions thereof, including Lease UTU-28652 . . . .
R., Vol. 4 at 120 (emphasis and all caps omitted).
Mr. Sullivan initially received disbursement of half of the funds that had
been scheduled for abandonment to the state. The then-current operators of the
wells on lease UTU-28652 made regular payments to Mr. Sullivan for several
years. QEP later acquired its interest in lease UTU-28652 and began making
payments to Mr. Sullivan as well. In early 2006 QEP determined that the total
payments to Mr. Sullivan by all operators exceeded his interest in the leases, as
construed by QEP. QEP therefore ceased further payments and sought
reimbursement of the overpayment from Mr. Sullivan. He disputed the claim,
asserting that QEP owed him additional payments.
QEP brought this action in Utah state court, seeking a declaration that the
Thomas Assignment reserved a three percent production-payment interest capped
at $300 per acre on the U-11001 lease. QEP alleged that the total amount of the
production payment was $766,983.00 ($300 x 2,556.61 acres). It also sought
recovery from Mr. Sullivan of an alleged overpayment of $86,351.12.
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Mr. Sullivan removed the case to federal district court and filed a counterclaim
for declaratory relief. He alleged that the Thomas Assignment reserved both the
$300-per-acre obligation and a separate three percent overriding-royalty interest.
He brought additional claims seeking the balance of the payments that he alleged
remained due to him from QEP.
Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment on their claims for
declaratory relief. The district court held that the Thomas Assignment
unambiguously describes only a three percent production-payment interest and
therefore granted partial summary judgment in favor of QEP. After a bench trial
on the remaining claims, the district court found that QEP established it had
overpaid Mr. Sullivan and was entitled to repayment under a theory of unjust
enrichment. The court entered judgment awarding QEP $86,351.12 in damages,
plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest and costs. It dismissed
Mr. Sullivan’s counterclaims with prejudice. He filed a timely appeal in which he
challenges the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment to QEP. He
contends that the court misconstrued the Thomas Assignment, requiring reversal
of the final judgment in favor of QEP. 2
2
Other than as they relate to construction of the Thomas Assignment,
Mr. Sullivan does not raise any claim of error with respect to the district court’s
findings of fact or conclusions of law following the bench trial.
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II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 584 F.3d 988, 992 (10th Cir.
2009). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The district court’s interpretation of the
Thomas Assignment is likewise subject to de novo review. See Allison v. Bank
One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1244 (10th Cir. 2002). 3
A.
The parties agree that Utah substantive law applies in this diversity case.
“Utah courts apply the general principles governing the interpretation of contracts
to documents conveying mineral interests.” Trans-Western Petroleum, 584 F.3d
at 993. Our first task is to determine whether the Thomas Assignment is
ambiguous with respect to the interest or interests reserved by Mr. Thomas.
If the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties’ intentions are determined from the plain
meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be
interpreted as a matter of law.
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.
3
Although we ordinarily liberally construe a pro se party’s filings, that rule
does not apply when, as here, the appellant is also an attorney. See Mann v.
Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Id. (citation omitted). Both Mr. Sullivan and QEP contend that the language of
the Thomas Assignment is unambiguous, but they advance conflicting
constructions. The fact of their differing positions does not mean that the
contract is necessarily ambiguous. See Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State
Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (“To demonstrate ambiguity,
the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable.”); Trans-Western
Petroleum, 584 F.3d at 993 (“[A] finding of ambiguity is justified only if the
language of the contract reasonably supports the competing interpretations.”). 4
1.
The pertinent language—“Three Percent (3%) of 8/8, see attached
rider.”—was inserted by the parties to the Thomas Assignment in section 5a on
the BLM form. QEP and Mr. Sullivan concur that the referenced rider describes a
production-payment interest entitling Mr. Thomas to receive payments capped at
$300.00 per acre. They also agree that the production payment would be paid out
over time from three percent of the production, as defined in the rider. Their
dispute centers on whether “Three Percent (3%) of 8/8, see attached rider”
reserved only the production-payment interest described in the rider, as QEP
4
Utah courts will consider “extrinsic evidence offered to demonstrate that
there is in fact an ambiguity.” Trans-Western Petroleum, 584 F.3d at 993.
Neither QEP nor Mr. Sullivan argues that extrinsic evidence establishes that the
Thomas Assignment is facially ambiguous.
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contends; or two, separate interests, as Mr. Sullivan contends, namely a three
percent overriding royalty and the undisputed production-payment interest.
2.
Despite Mr. Sullivan’s contentions otherwise, there is no dispute here
regarding the similarities and differences between an overriding royalty and a
production payment. 5 Both are nonoperating interests in an oil and gas lease,
“that is, an interest which is entitled to receive some percentage of the production
or income attributable to the lessee’s estate but is not obligated to bear any of the
development (e.g., drilling) or operation (e.g., lifting) costs associated therewith.”
Frank W.R. Hubert, Jr. & James A. Taylor, Oil & Gas § 14.01 (Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Inst. 1985); see also Aplt. Opening Br. at 35 (acknowledging
overriding royalties and production payments are “separate and distinct interests,
paid from a non-operating share of lease production”). An overriding royalty is
most commonly understood as “an interest in oil and gas produced at the surface,
free of the expense of production, and carved from the working interest held
under an oil and gas lease.” Hubert & Taylor, § 14.02[1] (quotation omitted). An
overriding royalty continues for the entire duration of a lease. Id.
5
Mr. Sullivan asserts that, contrary to QEP’s contention, overriding royalties
and production payments are not synonymous. But QEP did not advance that
argument, nor did the district court adopt that position.
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Similarly, a production payment (sometimes called an oil payment),
“refer[s] to an interest created out of the lessee’s estate which is a share of the
minerals produced from described premises, free of the costs of production at the
surface.” Id. But a production payment terminates when the lease expires, or
sooner if the owner of the interest has received the agreed quantum of production
or dollar amount from the sale of production. See id.; see also Sullivan v. Utah
Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 189 P.3d 63, 65 n.2 (Utah 2008) (“An overriding
royalty is an interest running throughout the term of the lease, while a production
payment is an interest running only until it has yielded a specified sum of
money.” (quotation, ellipsis & brackets omitted)); Williams & Meyers, Oil & Gas
Law § 422.3 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2011) (“An oil payment differs from an
overriding royalty in that its duration is limited to the time required for the stated
number of units of production or the sum specified in the instrument creating the
oil payment to be realized; an overriding royalty, on the other hand, normally has
the same duration as the working interest out of which it was created. In most
other respects, however, an oil payment and an overriding royalty have
substantially identical characteristics.”).
B.
Although the terms “overriding royalty” or “production payment” are not
found in the Thomas Assignment, QEP and Mr. Sullivan agree that other words
can be used to reserve these types of interests. Regarding the language at issue
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here—“Three Percent (3%) of 8/8, see attached rider.”—QEP and Mr. Sullivan
concur that the term “8/8,” as used in the oil and gas industry, refers to 100
percent of the production from a well. As QEP explains, the BLM’s standard
landowner royalty is 12½ percent, which is equal to 1/8 of the production. Thus,
stating a reserved interest as a percentage of 8/8 confirms that payment will be
made from 100 percent of production, rather than from only 7/8 of the production
net of the BLM’s 1/8 royalty.
Mr. Sullivan argues that “3% of 8/8” is common industry terminology used
to reserve an overriding royalty. He contends that, standing alone, “Three Percent
(3%) of 8/8” specifies an overriding royalty to be paid out of three percent of 100
percent of gross production from the wells. QEP does not challenge these
contentions. But as QEP points out, the language Mr. Sullivan emphasizes does
not stand alone in the Thomas Assignment. First, this language is followed by a
comma and the words “see attached rider.” Second, the language was inserted on
the BLM form in response to the question, “What overriding royalty or production
payments is the assignor reserving herein?,” and the additional instruction,
“specify percentage.” R., Vol. 3 at 95. 6
6
QEP does contest Mr. Sullivan’s further assertion that “8/8” is used
exclusively to define the extent of production from which an overriding royalty
will be paid out and never to define that same term with respect to a production
payment. Whether a contractual term has a specialized meaning in the relevant
industry is a question of fact. See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc.,
(continued...)
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1.
The district court concluded that the words “see attached rider,” which
were separated from “Three Percent (3%) of 8/8” by a comma, related back to the
preceding text, such that the rider provided a more-detailed description of the
terms of the stated three percent interest. The court therefore rejected
Mr. Sullivan’s contention that the operative language reserved two interests.
Mr. Sullivan argues on appeal that the words before and after the comma form
two separate, independent clauses, and he maintains that the district court’s
holding ignores a long-standing rule of grammar used to identify independent
clauses in a sentence. He contends that the first clause, “Three Percent (3%) of
8/8,” stands alone to describe in clear industry terms the reservation of an
6
(...continued)
936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). While Mr. Sullivan repeats his contention
regarding this specialized meaning of “8/8” numerous times in his briefs, he fails
to cite to evidence in the record supporting it, as required by Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(9)(A) (providing appellant’s argument “must contain . . . appellant’s
contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of
the record on which the appellant relies” (emphasis added)); see also Reinhardt
v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“Unsupported conclusory allegations do not create a genuine issue of fact.”
(quotation omitted)). We therefore decline to consider Mr. Sullivan’s argument.
See Aquila, Inc. v. C.W. Mining, 545 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008) (refusing
to consider argument where appellant provided no citation within voluminous
record to support factual claim). Were we to consider his contention, however,
we note that at least one commentator has emphasized the importance of
specifying the fraction of production from which a production payment will be
made. See Williams & Meyers, § 422.4(d) (“[I]t is important to specify clearly
whether the payment is to be made from a fraction of 8/8ths of the production or a
fraction of a fraction of production . . . .”).
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overriding royalty, while the second clause, “see attached rider,” stands alone to
reference and incorporate the rider, which describes and creates an unrelated
production-payment interest. But Mr. Sullivan’s construction requires the court
to ignore, rather than apply, the grammar rule he cites. See William Strunk Jr. &
E.B White, The Elements of Style 5 (50th ed. 2009) (instructing “[d]o not join
independent clauses with a comma” (emphasis omitted)); see also William A.
Sabin, The Gregg Reference Manual § 1088 (10th ed. 2005) (noting the error in
separating two independent clauses solely by a comma).
2.
QEP’s construction of the Thomas Assignment does not rest entirely on the
parties’ use of a comma. QEP also notes that the operative language was added in
response to a question on the standard BLM form: “What overriding royalty or
production payments is the assignor reserving herein?” R., Vol. 3 at 95. 7 In
responding to this question, the form referred the parties to Item 4 of the General
Instructions and further instructed them to “specify percentage.” Id. The form
also required the parties to disclose the percentage of overriding royalties or
production payments, if any, that were previously reserved.
7
Despite the BLM form’s use of the term “or,” neither Mr. Sullivan nor QEP
contends that the parties could only create an overriding royalty or production
payments, but not both, in the Thomas Assignment.
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QEP points to a then-current regulation to explain why the BLM form
sought disclosure of the percentage of these types of interests, both new and
previously reserved. At the time the Thomas Assignment was executed, a
regulation precluded agreements creating overriding royalties or production
payments which aggregated in excess of 17½ percent, when added to the royalty
payable to the United States and to previously reserved overriding royalties or
production payments. See R., Vol. 3 at 83 (text of 43 C.F.R. § 3103.3-6 (1972)). 8
Thus, to the extent they aggregated more than five percent, overriding royalties or
production payments would be considered “excess” when added to the United
States’ standard 12½ percent royalty. But such excess reservations did not violate
the terms of a lease if the agreement provided that the obligation to pay them
would be suspended when average production fell below a minimum amount. See
id.
8
The then-current regulation provided:
An agreement creating overriding royalties or payments out of
production of oil which, when added to overriding royalties or
payments out of production of oil previously created and to the
royalty payable to the United States, aggregate in excess of 17½
percent shall be deemed a violation of the terms of the lease unless
such agreement expressly provides that the obligation to pay such
excess overriding royalty or payments out of production of oil shall
be suspended when the average production of oil per well per day
averaged on the monthly basis is 15 barrels or less.
R., Vol. 3 at 83 (text of 43 C.F.R. § 3103.3-6 (1972)). As indicated by the text,
this provision applied only to oil production. See id.
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We assume that the parties to the Thomas Agreement contracted with
knowledge of the existing regulatory scheme. See Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
Sherwood Assoc., 795 P.2d 665, 669 n.7 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, consistent with
the then-current regulation, we construe the instruction to “specify percentage” in
section 5a of the BLM form as requiring the parties to specify the total percentage
of the two stated types of interests being reserved in the assignment, whether they
be overriding royalties or payments out of production. See id. at 669
(“[C]ontracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge,
and enforcement.”) 9
3.
Under Mr. Sullivan’s construction of the Thomas Assignment, Mr. Thomas
reserved a three percent overriding royalty and a three percent production
payment, for a total new reserved-interest percentage of six percent. Yet the
parties specified only three percent in section 5a. Mr. Sullivan attempts to
explain this discrepancy by pointing to the language of Item 4 of the General
Instructions, which directed the parties to “[d]escribe in an accompanying
statement, any overriding royalties or payments out of production created by
9
QEP points to the lack of an express provision regarding the suspension of
excess royalties in the Thomas Assignment, as further evidence that the parties
did not reserve interests aggregating greater than five percent. Mr. Sullivan
responds that the Thomas Assignment does contain the required suspension
provision. We need not resolve that dispute in order to construe the operative
language in the Thomas Assignment.
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assignment but not set out therein.” R., Vol. 3 at 96 (emphasis added). He notes
that a production-payment interest could not feasibly be described in full in the
small space provided on the BLM form. Therefore, he contends the General
Instructions permitted the parties to “set out” the terms of a production-payment
interest entirely in a separate statement rather than on the assignment form
itself—and that is what the parties to the Thomas Assignment did in this case.
We are not persuaded. We must “consider each contract provision in
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring
none.” Café Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 207 P.3d 1235, 1240
(Utah 2009) (quotation & ellipsis omitted). “Seeming contradictions must be
harmonized if that course is reasonably possible.” Vitagraph, Inc. v. Am. Theatre
Co., 291 P. 303, 306 (Utah 1930). Thus, “[a] construction which entirely
neutralizes one provision should not be adopted if the contract is susceptible of
another which gives effect to all of its provisions.” Id.
Mr. Sullivan’s construction of Item 4 of the General Instructions as
permitting the parties to describe a production payment being reserved, including
the percentage of production from which it would be paid, solely in a separate
statement, contradicts section 5a. That section asked what overriding royalty or
production payments were being reserved in the assignment and explicitly
directed the parties to specify the percentage. Because we must give effect to
both of these instructions in the BLM form, Mr. Sullivan’s interpretation is not
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tenable. Thus, we construe Item 4 of the General Instructions as directing the
parties to set out in a separate statement any terms of an overriding royalty or
production payment reserved in the assignment other than the percentage of the
interest that the parties were explicitly directed to specify in section 5a. The
parties to the Thomas assignment did just that by stating “Three Percent (3%) of
8/8,” in section 5a, followed by a reference to the rider, which described the
additional terms of the three percent production payment, as required by Item 4 of
the General Instructions. See R., Vol. 3 at 96 (directing parties reserving
payments out of production to “outline in detail the amount, method of payment,
and other pertinent terms”).
III.
Read as a whole, we find no ambiguity in the language of the Thomas
Assignment with respect to the interest reserved by Mr. Thomas. The language
does not reasonably support Mr. Sullivan’s interpretation that Mr. Thomas
reserved both a three percent overriding royalty and the three percent production
payment described in the rider. See Trans-Western Petroleum, 584 F.3d at 993
(“[A] finding of ambiguity is justified only if the language of the contract
reasonably supports the competing interpretations.”). We hold that the parties’
insertion of the words “Three Percent (3%) of 8/8, see attached rider” in
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section 5a of the BLM form created the three percent production-payment
interest, the terms of which were further defined in the referenced rider.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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