Arriaga-Alvarado v. Holder , 483 F. App'x 520 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit
    TENTH CIRCUIT                              June 6, 2012
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    PABLO FIDELINO ARRIAGA-
    ALVARADO,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                           No. 11-9582
    (Petition for Review)
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
    Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
    Pablo Fidelino Arriaga-Alvarado petitions pro se for review of a final order of
    removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado
    *After examining Petitioner’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
    of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
    binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed.
    R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    challenges the BIA’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his appeal because
    he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. Exercising jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), (2)(D), we deny Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado’s petition for
    review.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    In 1995, Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the
    United States illegally. On April 13, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security
    instituted removal proceedings against Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado for being an alien present in
    the United States without inspection. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(6)(A)(i). On June 14, 2006,
    Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado appeared in Immigration Court and conceded his removability.
    Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado requested a continuance to prepare any applications for relief and
    requested a Spanish language interpreter. Both of his requests were granted.
    On August 3, 2011, Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado appeared in Immigration Court with
    counsel. During the hearing, Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado’s counsel requested that the court
    grant Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado a 120-day pre-conclusion voluntary departure. An
    immigration judge (“IJ”) may grant a 120-day voluntary departure only if the individual
    meets certain conditions, including waiving appeal of all issues. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1240.26
    (b)(1)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1). Thus, before granting Mr. Arriaga-
    Alvarado’s request, the IJ stated: “[Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado], I just want you to understand,
    if you’re asking for voluntary departure . . . for the full 120 days, that means you’re not
    going to appeal this case to a higher court. Do you understand that? This is it. Do you
    -2-
    understand?” ROA, at 36. Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado responded, “Yeah.” Id. The IJ also
    ensured that Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado’s counsel understood that a grant of a 120-day
    voluntary departure was a final order that could not be appealed. Id. After these
    colloquies, the IJ entered a final decision granting Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado a pre-conclusion
    voluntary departure for 120 days.
    Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado timely filed a pro se petition for review with the BIA.
    Citing Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado’s appeal waiver, the BIA dismissed his petition for lack of
    jurisdiction. Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado now seeks review by this court.
    II. DISCUSSION
    “The BIA lacks jurisdiction to review an [IJ’s] decision if an alien has knowingly
    and [voluntarily] waived his right to appeal.” Kohwarien v. Holder, 
    635 F.3d 174
    , 179
    (5th Cir. 2011); see also In re Rodriguez-Diaz, 
    22 I. & N. Dec. 1320
    , 1322 (B.I.A. 2000).
    “The finding of a knowing and [voluntary] waiver is inevitably a fact-specific inquiry.”
    Kohwarien, 
    635 F.3d at 179
     (quotations omitted).
    In his petition for review, Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado contends that he did not
    knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal the IJ’s order and that the BIA
    therefore erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition.1 We review
    1
    In his petition for review, Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado also argues that his counsel was
    ineffective. Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
    his petition to the BIA, but the BIA concluded that only the IJ had jurisdiction to consider
    such a claim. In his petition for review, Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado has not challenged the
    BIA’s jurisdictional conclusion regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He
    Continued . . .
    -3-
    the BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its “factual findings for substantial
    evidence.” Witjaksono v. Holder, 
    573 F.3d 968
    , 977 (10th Cir. 2009). Under the
    substantial evidence standard, “factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable
    adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 
    Id.
     (quotations omitted);
    see also 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    During the August 3, 2011 hearing, the IJ explained to Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado that
    he was statutorily required to waive his right to appeal before he could receive a 120-day
    voluntary departure. Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado stated that he understood that requirement.
    This colloquy provides substantial evidence to support the BIA’s finding that Mr.
    Arriaga-Alvarado knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the IJ’s order.
    Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court
    carry a strong presumption of verity.”). And, after reviewing Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado’s
    petition for review and the record in its entirety, we conclude that Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado
    has failed to demonstrate any evidence that would compel a reasonable adjudicator to
    disagree with the BIA’s finding. Because Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado knowingly and
    voluntarily waived his right to appeal the IJ’s order, the BIA correctly determined that it
    lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition. See, e.g., Narine v. Holder, 
    559 F.3d 246
    , 248
    _______________
    Cont.
    has therefore waived any challenge to the BIA’s conclusion. See, e.g., United States v.
    Redcorn, 
    528 F.3d 727
    , 737 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that issues not raised in an
    opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived).
    -4-
    n.2 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Once an alien waives his right to appeal, the BIA no longer has
    jurisdiction to review a decision of an IJ.”).
    III. CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we deny Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado’s petition for review. We also
    deny Mr. Arriaga-Alvarado’s request to proceed in forma pauperis.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-9582

Citation Numbers: 483 F. App'x 520

Judges: Lucero, Matheson, O'Brien

Filed Date: 6/6/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023