United States v. Limon , 483 F. App'x 522 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 6, 2012
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-3164
RICARDO LIMON, a/k/a Gordo, (D.C. No. 2:09-CR-20119-JWL-JPO-11)
(D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.**
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Defendant pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the Second Superseding Indictment, which
charged conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 5
kilograms of cocaine, more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, and a detectable amount
of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), (b)(1)(A)(viii),
(b)(1)(D), 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. While in custody awaiting sentencing, Defendant
threatened a co-defendant, Cesar Bonilla-Montiel, forcing Mr. Bonilla to sign affidavits
that exonerated Defendant of involvement in drug-related criminal activity. At
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the parties’ briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
sentencing, the district court determined Defendant’s base offense level was 36. See
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2) (2010). The district court then added two levels for obstruction
of justice pursuant to § 3C1.1 for Defendant’s conduct in forcing Mr. Bonilla to sign
affidavits exculpating Defendant. The district court found Defendant “engaged in
coercive behavior which caused Mr. Bonilla to prepare false affidavits exonerating
[Defendant].” Rec. vol. 2, at 814–15. The court further commented: “I do not believe
that Mr. Bonilla signed the affidavits out of the kindness of his heart. I believe he felt
threatened . . . by the presence of [Defendant] . . . .” Id. at 815. “[S]o [Defendant’s
offense level adjustment for] obstruction of justice by procuring these false statements
was appropriately administered. . . . I’m basing my finding on the affidavit issue, and that
is sufficient as far as I am concerned.” Id. at 815–16. The two-level adjustment for
obstruction of justice resulted in an offense level of 38. The district court denied
Defendant’s request for a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Based on Defendant’s criminal history of I and an offense level of 38,
the Guidelines range was 235 to 293 months. Without the obstruction of justice
adjustment, the offense level would have been 36, with an applicable Guidelines range of
188 to 235 months. The district court then sentenced Defendant to 235 months
imprisonment. Defendant now appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742,
we affirm.
Defendant only challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, “which
requires, among other things, a properly calculated Guidelines range.” United States v.
Saavedra, 523 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008). “When evaluating the district court’s
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interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review legal questions de
novo and factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to the district court’s
application of the guidelines to the facts.” United States v. Mollner, 643 F.3d 713, 714
(10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Munoz-Tello, 531 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir.
2008)) (internal quotations marks omitted). “To be clearly erroneous, the finding must be
‘simply not plausible or permissible in light of the entire record on appeal.’” United
States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Morales,
108 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Defendant first argues “the district court failed to make any particularized findings
concerning [Defendant’s] intent to obstruct justice,” and therefore the two-level increase
for obstruction of justice is erroneous. Aplt. Br. at 10. Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines
reads as follows:
If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s
offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.
(emphasis added). The Guidelines’ commentary lists examples of obstruction of justice,
including: “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant,
witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(A).
Defendant argues our decision in United States v. Gardiner, 931 F.2d 33 (10th Cir.
1991), requires “the district court to make an express finding concerning the defendant’s
intent” to obstruct justice. Aplt. Br. at 9 (emphasis added). Defendant’s reliance on
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Gardiner is misplaced. In Gardiner, the defendant repeatedly used an alias in court
proceedings and did not confirm his true identity until the F.B.I. had determined his
identity based on his fingerprints. Gardiner, 931 F.2d at 35. The presentence report
stated the defendant intended to obstruct justice by using an alias. Id. The district court
adopted the presentence report and added two levels to the defendant’s offense level for
obstruction of justice. Id. We affirmed, determining the facts supported the district
court’s finding that the defendant intended to obstruct justice. Id. Next, we said the
district court had made the necessary finding of defendant’s intent to obstruct justice by
adopting the presentence report. Id. We said in Gardiner that “a defendant must have
consciously acted with the purpose of obstructing justice.” Id. But we didn’t require the
district court to make an express finding to that effect. Tenth Circuit precedent, in fact,
indicates intent to obstruct justice can be inferred from the evidence. For example, in
United States v. Bedford, 446 F.3d 1320, 1325 (10th Cir. 2006), a defendant admitted he
swallowed cocaine to prevent the police from finding the drugs on him because
possession of drugs would result in a revocation of his probation. We held this
“admission indicates that he acted consciously . . . with the purpose of obstructing
justice.” Id. (emphasis added). In United States v. Pretty, 98 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir.
1996), we allowed a district court to make “fairly conclusory findings” regarding a
defendant’s intent to commit perjury and enhance his sentence for obstruction of justice.
Likewise, in United States v. Hankins, 127 F.3d 932, 934–35 (10th Cir. 1997), we held a
defendant’s intent to obstruct justice can be shown based on his intent to conceal material
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evidence when a defendant’s conduct indicates “sufficiently unique, conscious action
with a purpose of obstructing justice.”
In our case, the district court found Defendant “engaged in coercive behavior
which caused Mr. Bonilla to prepare false affidavits exonerating [Defendant].” Rec. vol.
2, at 814–15. The court further averred: “I do not believe that Mr. Bonilla signed the
affidavits out of the kindness of his heart. I believe he felt threatened . . . by the presence
of [Defendant] . . . so [Defendant’s] obstruction of justice by procuring these false
statements was appropriately administered.” Id. at 815. In United States v. Heckard, 238
F.3d 1222, 1232–33 (10th Cir. 2001), we used similar findings by a district court to
affirm the obstruction of justice adjustment. The defendant had threatened and forced a
witness to sign a sworn statement exculpating the defendant. Id. at 1232. We concluded
a “district court could easily have found Defendant’s act to be an unlawful attempt to
influence a witness, suborn perjury, or produce a false document during an official
investigation.” Id. The findings by the district court in Heckard align with the findings
in the instant case because the district court here found Defendant had threatened and
forced Mr. Bonilla to sign a sworn statement exculpating Defendant of involvement in
drug-related criminal activity. Therefore, the statements by the district court were
sufficient findings that Defendant willfully obstructed justice when he obtained false
affidavits by threat.
Defendant alternatively argues his intent in obtaining these false affidavits was not
to obstruct justice, but “to save skin and face in a jailhouse setting” because he “did not
wish to be labeled a snitch.” Aplt. Br. at 10–11. The district court rejected this argument
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based on facts sufficient to support a finding that Defendant intended to obstruct justice.
Furthermore, Defendant’s argument the affidavits were to protect himself is implausible
because the affidavits included only information exonerating Defendant from criminal
liability, not information relating to whether Defendant was a jailhouse snitch. In short,
the district court’s finding that Defendant obstructed justice is not clearly erroneous, and
the court was not required to make a separate and explicit finding as to Defendant’s
willfulness. Therefore, Defendant’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
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