United States v. Ruby , 706 F.3d 1221 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH January 29, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-1441
JOEY ISAAC RUBY,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 1:10-CR-00598-CMA-1)
Barry A. Schwartz, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Appellate Division
(Raymond P. Moore, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Office of
the Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant.
Michael C. Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney (John F. Walsh, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief) Office of the United States Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Before KELLY, SEYMOUR, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Joey Ruby was on supervised release following a conviction for being a
felon in possession of a gun. One of the conditions of his supervised release was
that Ruby not commit any other crimes. He was unable to abide by this condition,
and was convicted of third-degree assault in Colorado state court. As a result, the
district court revoked Ruby’s release and sentenced him to eighteen months’
imprisonment.
He now appeals the sentence on the grounds that the district court erred in
considering hearsay testimony at sentencing from three witnesses to the assault.
Because we conclude the district court did not err in considering the testimony,
we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.
I. Background
Ruby was placed on supervised release after being released from prison in
October 2009. He had finished serving a thirty-seven month prison sentence
stemming from a conviction for being a felon in possession of a gun. A year
later, Ruby was arrested in Colorado for a traffic incident that led to charges of
third-degree assault, DUI, domestic violence, reckless driving, and driving under
restraint.
The parties advance differing versions of what transpired the night of the
traffic incident. The following is undisputed: Ruby was in a car with three other
individuals that crashed into a tree. The three individuals were Ruby’s girlfriend,
Melody Apodaca; Apodaca’s daughter, Anastasia Aguilar; and another friend,
Brandy Bobian. After the crash, Ruby and Apodaca got out of the car; there was
some shouting, and some physical contact between Apodaca and Ruby. A
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passerby, Cari Wojick, who was walking her dog at the time, saw Ruby throw
Apodaca to the ground twice and heard him yell at her, “What are you doing? Are
you trying to ruin my life?” R., Vol. 1, at 15–16.
At Ruby’s trial in Colorado state court in April 2011, he was convicted of
third-degree assault, but acquitted of the other charges. At sentencing, the trial
judge speculated that the jury had based its conviction solely on the testimony of
Wojick, who only saw Ruby throw Apodaca to the ground—and not that of
Apodaca, who testified to a more brutal assault. Ruby was sentenced to time
served.
After the trial, Ruby’s federal probation officer filed a Petition for Arrest
based on Ruby’s conviction. The officer then submitted a Supervised Release
Violation Report. The Petition and the Report detail a version of events much
more violent than the undisputed version: Ruby had been driving the car home
from a restaurant where the occupants of the car had eaten dinner and where Ruby
had been drinking. During the drive, Ruby started yelling at Apodaca and driving
recklessly. While still driving, Ruby punched Apodaca in the face. He then lost
control of the car, which crashed into a tree. Ruby then dragged Apodaca out of
the car, threw her to the ground, and continued punching her.
The events narrated in the Petition and the Report are copied from the
Probable Cause Statement filed in county court, which, in turn, comes from the
offense report completed by the police department. The offense report contained
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Apodaca’s statements to police and those of the other three witnesses (Wojick,
Aguilar, and Bodian).
Prior to his revocation hearing, Ruby filed a written objection to the
version of events contained in the report. He painted a very different picture of
what happened: He claimed that Apodaca had been driving. They had an
argument, then she “went crazy” and hit him in the face. R., Vol. 1, at 9. As a
result, she crashed the car. Ruby then got out of the car and started walking
away, as he had been instructed to do in his anger management class. Apodaca
followed him and continued to hit him. He pushed her to the ground twice in his
attempt to escape the situation.
At the revocation hearing, Ruby stipulated to the fact that he had violated
his supervised release conditions. He also agreed that his conviction for third-
degree assault was a crime of violence and that he had a Criminal History
Category of III—resulting in a recommended sentencing range of eighteen to
twenty-four months’ imprisonment. But he did ask the court for a downward
variance from the recommended sentence.
The district court denied Ruby’s request for a downward variance. The
court did not believe Ruby’s version of events, instead crediting the version
contained in the Violation Report. The court stated, “So I, frankly, Mr. Ruby,
don’t believe that you didn’t punch her with a closed fist, that you merely threw
her to the ground.” R., Vol. 2, at 14–15. The court noted that Ruby’s presentence
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report described an incident in 2004—which resulted in a 2005 guilty
plea—where Ruby had repeatedly punched Apodaca in the face, breaking her
nose.
Ruby’s counsel objected to the court’s reliance on the Violation Report:
“We are very hamstrung coming into this courtroom and having the facts of the
case basically decided by a probable cause statement, with no really sort of
safeguards against that, no testimony, no things like that.” R., Vol. 2, at 15. But
nonetheless, Ruby did not ask for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 6A1.3 or otherwise make specific objections at
sentencing to the version of the accident produced by the government.
The district court imposed an eighteen-month prison sentence (the bottom
end of the guidelines range) as well as twelve months of supervised release.
Ruby now appeals his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Analysis
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) provides that at a
revocation hearing, the defendant must have “an opportunity . . . to question any
adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not
require the witness to appear.” This means that a court at a revocation hearing
may consider hearsay evidence as long as it makes the necessary “interest of
justice” determination.
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Ruby argues the court did not comply with Rule 32.1’s procedures and then
compounded the mistake by basing his sentence on unreliable hearsay testimony.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court’s sentence following revocation of release,
we look to whether the sentence was “substantively reasonable” and “procedurally
reasonable.” United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2011).
We review for abuse of discretion. See id. at 1232. We review findings of fact,
however, for clear error and legal determinations de novo. United States v. Kristl,
437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006). Ruby’s argument is not that his sentence
was substantively unreasonable, but that his due process rights were violated
because of unreliable hearsay evidence. Because unreliable hearsay evidence can
result in a sentence based on erroneous facts, we construe Ruby’s argument as an
objection that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (noting that procedural error in sentencing includes
“selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts”).
Objections to procedural reasonableness that are not contemporaneously
raised, however, are subject to plain error review. See United State v. Gantt, 679
F.3d 1240, 1246–47 (10th Cir. 2012) (reviewing for plain error non-
contemporaneous objection to court’s alleged procedural failure to explain
reasoning behind sentence). Under plain error review, the defendant must
demonstrate (1) there is error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects substantial
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rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings. United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.
2007).
B. Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) and Sentencing Hearings
Ruby first contends the court erred in relying on hearsay at his revocation
hearing without making the requisite “interest of justice” finding under Rule
32.1(b)(2)(C). Because Ruby did not invoke Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) below, we review
his objection on appeal for plain error. He argues that Rule 32.1 applies not only
to the guilt phase of a revocation hearing, but also to the sentencing phase. We
disagree.
Rule 32.1 was enacted to codify due process guarantees that apply to
revocation hearings. See Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 545 (10th Cir. 2010).
In particular, the rule was designed to ensure at revocation hearings the ability of
defendants to an independent judicial officer and the right to adversary
proceedings. In this way, the Rule embodies the holdings of two Supreme Court
cases, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973).
Morrissey acknowledged that while a parolee facing revocation of his
liberty does not have “the full panoply of rights due a defendant” in a criminal
prosecution, he is entitled to an independent officer at the preliminary hearing and
the right to be heard at a final revocation hearing before entry of judgment. 408
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U.S. at 480, 485–90. A parolee also has the right “to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation).” Id. at 489.
Following the lead of Morrissey, the Supreme Court in Gagnon held that
the due process interests at stake when revoking parole are identical to those at
stake when revoking probation. 411 U.S. at 781–82. Though parole no longer
exists in the federal sentencing system, supervised release is its functional
equivalent and thus involves the same due process interests. Cf. Curtis, 626 F.3d
at 545 (suggesting equivalency of parole, probation, and supervised release for
purposes of due process).
The purpose of these hearings is to ensure that the decision to revoke a
parolee or probationer’s freedom is not based on “erroneous information.”
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484. To guarantee the accuracy of the revocation decision,
the rule ensures, among other things, that a probationer or parolee has notice of
the alleged violation, the opportunity to present evidence, and the opportunity to
question adverse witnesses unless the court determines otherwise. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(C). Once a probationer or parolee admits his guilt, as was the
case here, there is no danger that the revocation decision will be based on
erroneous information. Because the only task left to the court is to determine the
proper sentence, the sentencing phase of a revocation hearing is governed by the
rule surrounding normal sentencing, Rule 32, not Rule 32.1. See United States v.
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Carper, 24 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 32.1 thus governs the decision
of whether or not to revoke supervised release, while Rule 32 governs the
decision of what sentence to impose.”).
Consistent with these cases, we discern no meaningful difference between
sentencing at a revocation proceeding and sentencing after a guilty plea or jury
verdict of conviction. In both instances, a violation or criminal offense has been
proven or admitted and the only task of the court is to determine the proper
sentence. The task of sentencing is distinct from the task of adjudicating guilt,
and therefore warrants a different set of rules. See United States v. Littlesun, 444
F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A court is presented with quite a different set
of circumstances when it has to decide whether someone is guilty and must go to
prison than when it is deciding how long a convicted criminal must serve.”
(emphasis in original)).
Unlike at a criminal trial where the Federal Rules of Evidence limit the
types of admissible evidence, at a sentencing hearing the court can have access to
any relevant information, as long as it adheres to a preponderance of the evidence
standard. See USSG § 6A1.3. Sentencing courts historically rely on a wide array
of information relevant to the individualized needs of the offender, including
hearsay evidence containing a minimal indicia of reliability. United States v.
Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1995).
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Under these principles, a sentencing court need not make an “interest of
justice” determination in the circumstances here. First, Ruby did not ask to
present witnesses, nor did the court deny him any opportunity to produce
evidence demonstrating his version of the facts. Even so, he suggests we extend
Rule 32.1 to enact a heightened standard of reliability for evidence proffered at
revocation sentencing by adopting a balancing test. The balancing test would
require a court to balance the offender’s right to confront witnesses with the
government’s good cause for denying the right.
In support of this argument, Ruby points to United States v. Lloyd, 566
F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2009). In Lloyd, the defendant was on supervised release when
he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun in another jurisdiction.
When he refused to stipulate to the fact of his conviction at the revocation
hearing, the government offered proof of conviction with the judgment and plea
agreement from the other jurisdiction. The government also claimed that the
defendant had committed domestic battery against his girlfriend, a fact which it
supported with her out-of-court statements. The district court determined that the
battery had occurred, which increased the defendant’s sentencing range from 4-10
months to 12-18 months.
On appeal, the Third Circuit found that the firearms violation, proven by
non-hearsay evidence, was sufficient to justify the revocation. The only question
was whether the sentencing range had been properly calculated based on the
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girlfriend’s hearsay statements contained in a violation report. Id. at 344. The
Third Circuit assumed that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) applied and adopted the balancing
test. Id. at 344–45. Because the district court had not made the requisite finding
under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) to justify the absence of the witness, the court vacated
the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 346.
Lloyd’s treatment of Rule 32.1 is not persuasive. First, the court did not
address the predicate question of whether Rule 32.1 should even apply at the
sentencing phase because the question was not raised on appeal—and (most
likely) because the district court appeared to have accepted all the evidence
during the guilt phase of the hearing, where Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does apply.
Furthermore, other courts have concluded in unpublished opinions the exact
opposite of Lloyd at the sentencing phase (though also without discussion) and
assumed Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply. See United States v. Prescott, 360 F.
App’x 209, 211 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting, in the context of the sentencing phase of a
revocation proceeding, that “it has long been held that a district court may
consider hearsay evidence in sentencing proceedings”); United States v. Pardee,
224 F. App’x 650, 651 (9th Cir. 2007) (refusing to apply Rule 32.1(b)(2) to the
admissibility of hearsay when defendant already admitted to having violated his
supervised release conditions). We agree with those courts and the logic behind
the relaxed standard at sentencing.
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As a final argument, Ruby points to the plain language of Rule 32.1(b)(2),
arguing that it does not differentiate between the guilt and sentencing phases of a
revocation hearing. Yet this silence cuts against Ruby’s argument. Following
Morrissey, Rule 32.1(b)(2) was promulgated in the background of established
case law that allowed the admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing. See
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249–52 (1949) (admission of hearsay
evidence at sentencing did not violate due process). And “neither Morrissey nor
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure say anything about Williams or the right
to examine adverse witnesses at sentencing.” Littlesun, 444 F.3d at 1200. Given
the similar interests at stake—and the absence of evidence to the contrary—we
cannot conclude that the Supreme Court sought to carve out an exception to
normal sentencing law in revocation proceedings.
In sum, nothing in Rule 32.1 requires that the hearsay evidence at issue
here be subject to a different, or higher, level of admissibility than it would be at
other types of sentencing proceedings. Ruby did not seek to examine the
government’s witnesses, nor was he prevented from producing corroborating
witnesses or other evidence. Thus, he has less reason to complain about the
procedures the court used at sentencing.
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We conclude that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the sentencing phase
of a revocation proceeding. 1 Accordingly, the court made no error.
C. Admissibility of Hearsay at Sentencing
Even though Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the sentencing phase of a
revocation proceeding, Ruby challenges the evidence the district court relied on at
sentencing. He argues the evidence was unreliable because it consisted of
hearsay from a police report of his accident and assault. Ruby did not make a
specific hearsay challenge to the evidence below, nor did he attempt to show the
evidence was flawed through his own testimony, the testimony of other witnesses,
or the police statement itself. We therefore review Ruby’s objection for plain
error. 2
District courts are not strictly bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence at
sentencing hearings. United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 755 (10th Cir.
1
Because we conclude that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the
sentencing phase of a revocation proceeding, we decline to address Ruby’s
argument that we should jettison the “reliability test” for what constitutes good
cause under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) and instead adopt a “balancing test.” See Curtis
v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 546 (10th Cir. 2010) (declining to address whether the
balancing test should prevail over the reliability test because hearsay evidence at
revocation proceeding was admissible under either test).
2
During the sentencing phase of the revocation proceeding, Ruby’s
counsel stated, “We are very hamstrung coming into this courtroom and having
the facts of the case basically decided by a probable cause statement, with no
really sort of safeguards against that, no testimony, no things like that.” R., Vol.
2, at 15. This is not a clear enough objection to avoid plain error review on
appeal.
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1995); see also USSG § 6A1.3, cmt. (“In determining the relevant facts,
sentencing judges are not restricted to information that would be admissible at
trial.” (citations omitted)). As a result, “hearsay statements may be considered at
sentencing if they bear some minimal indicia of reliability.” United States v.
Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 847 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). This reliability
floor is a requirement of due process. See United States v. Cook, 550 F.3d 1292,
1296 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the due process clause protects a defendant’s
right not to be sentenced on the basis of materially incorrect information”).
Corroborating evidence is often key to determining whether a statement is
sufficiently reliable. See United States v. Todd, 515 F.3d 1128, 1136 & n.6 (10th
Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s reliance on hearsay evidence regarding drug
sales by defendant where other evidence corroborated it); United States v.
Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, 813–14 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court where
sentencing enhancement was based solely on hearsay statement by defendant’s
ex-girlfriend with no other corroborating evidence); United States v. Beaulieu,
893 F.2d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming sentencing judge where
enhancement based on defendant’s leadership role in drug operation was
“corroborated by physical and documentary evidence at the trial and by
appellant’s admissions at his sentencing hearing”).
Ruby argues the district court erred in relying on the statements contained
in the Petition and Violation Report when it refused to grant Ruby a downward
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variance from the guideline range. On appeal, Ruby contends that the petition
contains several layers of hearsay which make the statements particularly
unreliable. Yet Ruby exaggerates the extent of the hearsay. In fact, all the
documents at the hearing were based on the post-accident police report, and Ruby
did not even raise in the district court any hearsay-on-hearsay concerns. 3
Ruby relies largely on two cases, Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, and Lloyd, 566 F.3d
341, to argue that the hearsay in this case was unreliable. In Fennell, we
reviewed a sentence enhancement for possession of a machine gun based solely
on his estranged girlfriend’s unsworn telephone statement to a probation officer
that the defendant had fired the machine gun at her. 65 F.3d at 813. The court
found her statement insufficiently reliable because the girlfriend did not prepare a
sworn affidavit, the interviewing officer was not able to observe her demeanor,
and there was no other corroborating evidence. Id. Similarly, in Lloyd, the
district court enhanced a defendant’s sentence based on allegations of domestic
battery. 566 F.3d at 344. Yet there was no independent corroborating evidence
for the battery beyond the victim’s cursory statement. Id. at 345.
3
Ruby implies that the admitted documents might have contained some
transcription errors, but if there was any doubt that the statements had been
distorted or lost in the transcription from the original police report to the
Violation Report, Ruby could have easily pointed it out below. He provided
excerpts from the original police report as an attachment to his written objection
to the Report, which suggests he had access to the entire report. Because he did
not object to multiple levels of hearsay, and did not introduce the full police
report below, we will not further discount the reliability of the statements in the
Violation Report.
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The statements here are more reliable. Unlike in those cases, where the
sole witness had reasons to lie, here the corroborating statements of three
relatively neutral witnesses help establish the reliability of Apodaca’s statement
to the police officer. Apodaca’s daughter and the other female passenger
contemporaneously confirm Apodaca’s version of the events, while Wojick (the
uninvolved witness) saw Ruby throw Apodaca to the ground twice and yell at her,
an observation entirely consistent with Apodaca’s version of events. These
additional witnesses, who spoke in person to the police officer, dispel the doubt
that might otherwise hang over the out-of-court testimony of a witness with an
axe to grind. See United States v. Caiba-Antele, No. 11-2140, --- F.3d ---, at *10
(10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2013) (finding sufficient indicia of reliability in corroborating
statements given in person to detectives by multiple victims of sexual abuse).
Nor did Ruby testify at the sentencing hearing to a contrary set of facts, or ask the
court to consider additional documents—other than his written objection to the
Report—or the testimony of other witnesses.
The district court also relied on the fact that Ruby pleaded guilty to an
assault charge in 2005 for having punched Apodaca in the face in 2004. The
incident helps amplify Ruby’s capacity for violence and further supports
Apodaca’s statement that she was struck in the face. While prior incidents are not
necessarily probative of later conduct, Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), this type of evidence
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may help establish another piece of the “minimal indicia of reliability” necessary
to consider hearsay at sentencing. Damato, 672 F.3d at 847; see also USSG
§ 6A1.3(a) (“In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without
regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial . . . .”);
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which
a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence.” (emphasis added)). Ruby’s prior conduct thus is
certainly relevant to the district court’s findings of fact and this court’s overall
assessment of the reasonableness of the sentence.
Ruby tries to discredit Apodaca’s statements by pointing to the acquittals in
his state court trial. The fact that Ruby was only convicted of third-degree assault
in his state court trial, and not the other offenses—which relied upon Apodaca’s
testimony—bears little on whether the district court was justified in considering
the proffered evidence. As the government points out, a jury needs to be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant, whereas a court
imposing a sentence need only make a finding of fact by a preponderance of the
evidence. Thus, little can be inferred from Ruby’s acquittal on the other charges.
To be sure, none of the facts surrounding the incident resolve concerns
about the level of hearsay between the interviewing officer and the reporting
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officer (if that level of hearsay even existed), or about the officer’s accuracy in
writing down the witnesses’ statements. See, e.g., Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 346 (noting
that “police reports are neither ‘inherently reliable [nor] . . . inherently
unreliable’” (citations omitted)). Yet because Ruby did not place the full police
report in the record, there is nothing to support his claim that someone other than
the interviewing officer wrote the report.
In the end, Ruby did not object below to the admission of hearsay, let alone
multiple levels of hearsay. We review for plain error, and even if the district
court erred we cannot say that any error was “plain, . . . affects substantial rights,
and . . . seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we must reject Ruby’s challenge
to the evidence offered at sentencing.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
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