Lovell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance , 466 F.3d 893 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
October 18, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
LOIS LOVELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1429
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 02-RB-1152 (PAC))
Michael G. Sawaya (Donald J. Banovitz with him on the briefs), Sawaya, Rose &
Sawaya, P.C., Denver, Colorado for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Heather Perkins (Michael S. McCarthy and Michael S. Freeman with her on the briefs),
Faegre & Benson, LLP, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellee.
Before KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.*
JOHNSON, District Judge.
*
The Honorable William P. Johnson, District Court Judge, District of New Mexico,
sitting by designation.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs below, Lois Lovell and Floyd Gibson,1 brought a putative class action
lawsuit in Colorado state court seeking reimbursement from their automobile insurer,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), for the diminution in
value of their vehicles. Lovell and Gibson were involved in separate automobile
collisions in which their vehicles were damaged. Each vehicle was insured by State Farm
and it reimbursed Lovell and Gibson for repairs to their respective vehicles, but Lovell
and Gibson sought additional reimbursement for the diminished value of their vehicles.
In their First Amended Class Action Complaint, Lovell and Gibson alleged that the
Colorado Auto Reparations Act, hereinafter referred to as the “No Fault Act,” mandates
that insurers provide diminished value compensation through collision insurance.2
Lovell and Gibson alleged that State Farm, with knowledge of its statutory
obligation to provide diminished value compensation through collision insurance, failed
to pay diminished value compensation, and in some insurance contracts expressly
excluded diminished value as a covered loss. They also alleged that State Farm failed to
inform policyholders of diminished value coverage and failed to establish proper
procedures for handling the diminution in value component of claims.
1
Gibson is not a party to this appeal.
2
The No Fault Act in effect at the time of Lovell’s and Gibson’s collisions,
codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-701 et seq. (2003), was repealed by sunset effective
July 1, 2003. The relevant terms of the No Fault Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-710, were
reenacted and recodified effective July 1, 2003 at Colo Rev. Stat. § 10-4-621 (2005).
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Lovell and Gibson brought their action on behalf of themselves and all others who
were not informed or notified of their diminished value coverage and who were not paid
diminished value compensation by State Farm. They sought declaratory relief in the form
of a declaration that all automobile policies issued by State Farm in which the insureds
selected collision coverage include diminished value coverage. They also sought a
declaration that a failure to inform policyholders of diminished value coverage and the
failure to pay diminished value claims is contrary to Colorado law, and that it is State
Farm’s obligation to give notice to insureds of the element of diminished value coverage,
to evaluate all claims to determine if diminution in value is owed, and to pay diminution
in value if owed. Lovell and Gibson sought equitable and injunctive relief to require
State Farm to notify its insureds of diminished value coverage and to establish a
procedure to handle claims in order to honor its obligation to pay diminution in value.
State Farm removed the action to federal court alleging removal jurisdiction on the
basis of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1441and 28 U.S.C. § 1332. After
removing the case to federal court, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) arguing that Lovell’s and Gibson’s insurance policies expressly stated
that their collision coverage did not include payment for any diminished value of the
vehicles after repair, and that these provisions were entirely consistent with the No Fault
Act. In response, Gibson and Lovell argued that the No Fault Act requires insurers to
offer collision coverage, that collision coverage under the No Fault Act must include
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coverage for losses resulting from the diminution of value of an insured vehicle, and thus
policy exclusion of diminished value compensation is void as against public policy.
Plaintiff Gibson subsequently moved for remand arguing that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 was not met.3 He stated that the damages he sought for diminished value
could not be more than $9,000.00, the full value of his vehicle before his automobile
accident. He argued that the amount in controversy must be met by each Plaintiff, and
that the Plaintiff class members’ damages could not be aggregated to meet the amount in
controversy requirement.
In response to the motion to remand, State Farm argued that the amount in
controversy requirement was met because its costs of compliance with any declaratory or
injunctive relief may be considered to determine the amount in controversy, this amount
would far exceed the $75,000.00 requirement and the costs may be aggregated among the
class of plaintiffs because the class has a common interest in the relief such that it could
only benefit the class as a whole. State Farm also urged that the amount in controversy
requirement is met because the cost of compliance for any single plaintiff would exceed
$75,000.00.
By Memorandum Opinion and Order, the district court denied Gibson’s motion to
remand concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case and granted State
3
Lovell did not join in the motion to remand.
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Farm’s motion to dismiss. The district court entered judgment for State Farm on
September 20, 2004.
Lovell appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims on the merits but does
not appeal the district court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
those claims. Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, this Court has an
independent obligation to examine its own jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the lower
court in a case under review even when the parties have not raised jurisdiction as an issue.
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S. Ct. 1326, 1331
(1986); Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 2001).
Upon review of the jurisdictional issue, we conclude that the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction of this cause of action. Upon further review of the district
court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we AFFIRM for
the following reasons.
II. DISCUSSION
A. JURISDICTION
This Court reviews a district court’s ruling on the propriety of removal de novo.
Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001). Jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship exists when a dispute between citizens of different states
involves an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). State Farm
presented undisputed evidence below that its costs of compliance with Lovell’s and
Gibson’s requested injunctive and equitable relief exceeded $75,000. In this case, it is
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undisputed that there is complete diversity among the parties. The jurisdictional issue
then is whether the amount in controversy requirement is met.
In cases seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, “the amount in controversy is
measured by the value of the object of the litigation.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977). The Tenth Circuit has followed what has
commonly been referred to as the “either viewpoint rule” which considers either the value
to the plaintiff or the cost to defendant of injunctive and declaratory relief as the measure
of the amount in controversy for purposes of meeting the jurisdictional minimum. Justice
v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 927 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). However,
in multiple plaintiff cases, including class actions, the “either viewpoint rule” does not
override the well established principle that each plaintiff or member of the class must
individually satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332, 335 (1969); Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co., 421 F.2d 597, 599 (10th Cir. 1970).
Class members’ claims may be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy
requirement only when they “unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a
common and undivided interest.” 4 Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335. When plaintiffs’ claims arise
from individual contracts with a defendant, the plaintiffs are not suing to enforce a
4
The Court recognizes that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 amended the
diversity jurisdiction statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under the amended statute, class
members’ claims are now aggregated to determine whether there is the requisite amount
in controversy in excess of $5,000,00. However, the Class Action Fairness Act, effective
on February 18, 2005, is not retroactive to cases filed before the effective date. Pub. L.
No. 109-2 § 9, 119 Stat. 4, 14 (2005).
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common title or right to which they have a common and undivided interest. See Kessler
v. Nat’l Enter., Inc., 347 F.3d 1076, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that class members
seeking to enforce rights obtained through individual contracts could not aggregate their
claims in order to meet the amount in controversy requirement); Smith v. GTE Corp., 236
F.3d 1292, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (“When plaintiffs assert rights that arise from individual
contracts with a defendant, those rights are separate and distinct, and thus, their claims
may not be aggregated.”) (citing Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143, 145-48
(1832)).
In this case, each Plaintiff’s and putative class member’s claims arise from
individual insurance contracts, and the Plaintiffs are not uniting to enforce a single title or
right in which they have a common interest. Thus, the claims of the Plaintiffs and
putative class members cannot be aggregated to meet the requisite amount in controversy.
The district court concluded that the amount in controversy requirement was met
in this case because the injunctive relief sought by the Plaintiffs would not inure to any
single plaintiff but would benefit the class as a whole. However, the test for whether
multiple plaintiffs’ claims may be aggregated requires a court to look at the nature of the
claims. See Lonnquist, 421 F.2d at 599. There is no authority in this Circuit for looking
at the divisibility of the benefit of injunctive relief to determine whether claims can be
aggregated. While there are cases from other jurisdictions, cited by the district court,
supporting this method of determining the amount in controversy, this method cannot be
reconciled with this Court’s holding in Lonnquist.
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In a Seventh Circuit case addressing the “either viewpoint rule” in multiple
plaintiff cases, the court held that each plaintiff’s claim must be examined separately, and
that the defendant in such a case is deemed to face multiple claims for injunctive relief.
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 619 (7th Cir. 1997).
The court further reasoned that, in order to avoid violating the nonaggregation rule, the
cost to the defendant of the injunction running to a single plaintiff is the measure of the
amount in controversy. Id.
We find the Seventh Circuit reasoning persuasive and consistent with this Court’s
prior rulings. Thus, while a court may look to the compliance costs of a defendant in
multiple plaintiff cases to determine the amount in controversy, the cost running to each
plaintiff must meet the amount in controversy requirement unless the plaintiffs’ claims
may be aggregated.
In the current case, State Farm has shown that its costs of compliance running to
any single Plaintiff or putative class member would exceed $75,000 because the
requested relief would require it to make significant changes to its business practices by
developing a new system for adjusting and paying diminished value claims and providing
extensive notice in Colorado. Because the compliance cost to any single plaintiff exceeds
the requisite amount in controversy, the jurisdictional threshold is met and the district
court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
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B. MERITS OF LOVELL’S APPEAL
The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. This Court reviews a district court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173,
1181 (10th Cir. 2002). We accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sutton v. Utah
Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). A dismissal pursuant to
12(b)(6) will be affirmed “only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of the claims that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” McDonald v.
Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 2002).
1. The Colorado No Fault Act
Lovell urges that the district court erred in dismissing her case because the court
incorrectly concluded that the term “damage” as used in the No Fault Act does not
unambiguously and necessarily include diminished value. Lovell also contends that the
district court erred in determining that State Farm’s exclusion of diminished value
coverage in its policy is a valid exclusion in light of the No Fault Act.
When federal courts are called upon to interpret state law, they must look to
rulings of the highest state court, and if no such rulings exist, must endeavor to predict
how the high court would rule. Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1118 (10th Cir. 2002);
Lampkin v. Little, 286 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002). No Colorado authority has yet
determined whether the term “damage” as used in the No Fault Act includes coverage for
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diminished value to an insured vehicle and, assuming “damage” includes diminished
value, whether an insurer’s attempt to exclude such coverage is void as against public
policy.5 Thus, this Court must attempt to predict how the Colorado Supreme Court would
decide these issues.
The No Fault Act in effect during all relevant times states that, “All insurers shall
offer collision coverage for damage to insured motor vehicles . . .. Collision coverage
shall provide insurance without regard to fault against accidental property damage to the
insured motor vehicle . . ..” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-701(3) (2003). The language of the
No Fault Act with regard to collision coverage is mandatory. Thus, insurers must offer
collision coverage. The No Fault Act does not, however, clearly delineate the scope of
that coverage other than indicating that it must cover “damage” to insured motor vehicles.
The No Fault Act does not contain a definition of the term “damage.”
Lovell contends that insurers in Colorado are obligated under the No Fault Act to
“cover all scenarios of physical damage to vehicles and to compensate individuals for
every aspect of damage that they might incur, including diminished value.” Appellant’s
Opening Br. p.5. In support of this argument, Lovell notes that the Colorado Legislature
included in the No Fault Act Declaration that the purpose of the No Fault Act is “to avoid
inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents; to require registrants of
5
While there is no direct mention in the parties’ briefs, in response to questioning
during oral argument over whether the issues raised in this appeal should be certified to
the Colorado Supreme Court, counsel stated that the district court certified these
questions to the Colorado Supreme Court, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined to
accept the certified questions.
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motor vehicles in this state to procure insurance covering legal liability arising out of
ownership or use of such vehicles and also providing benefits to persons occupying such
vehicles and to persons injured in accidents involving such vehicles.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §
10-4-702 (2003). Colorado courts have determined that the No Fault Act must be
liberally construed to further its remedial and beneficial purposes. Brennan v. Farmers
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. App. 1996). Lovell points out that the
Colorado Legislature did not include a specific provision in the No Fault Act permitting
insurers to exclude diminished value from coverage. Thus, she argues, “damage” must
include all economic losses including diminished value or the express purposes of the No
Fault Act would be frustrated.
As further support for her argument, Lovell turns to the legislative history of the
No Fault Act. Senator Plaut, one of the sponsors of the bill that became part of the No
Fault Act, gave a speech during the Colorado Senate’s consideration of the bill. In that
speech, he stated that insurance rates for consumers in other states that had adopted
similar legislation had not increased because those consumers were being “paid promptly
and fairly for their total economic loss and don’t feel compelled to sue.” Transcript of
Senate Consideration on House Bill 1027 and Senate Bill 200, Appellant App. 105.
Lovell argues that “total economic loss” necessarily includes diminished value, and that
Senator Plaut’s statements show the Colorado Legislature’s intent that diminished value
be included in “damages” under the No Fault Act. Accordingly, argues Lovell, a
determination that diminished value is not an element of collision coverage inherent in
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the term “damage” in the No Fault Act is contrary to the legislative intent of the No Fault
Act.
The No Fault Act provides that every owner of a motor vehicle shall have a
complying policy of insurance covering the motor vehicle. Colo. Stat.§ 10-4-705 (2003).
The section that delineates a complying policy is titled “Required coverages -- complying
policies -- PIP examination program.” Colo. Stat. § 10-4-706 (2003). The portion of the
No Fault Act that requires insurers to provide collision coverage is in a section titled
“Required coverages are minimum.” Colo. Stat. § 10-4-710 (2003). This section of the
No Fault Act makes clear that Colorado consumers may purchase more extensive
coverage than the mandatory minimum coverage set forth in section 10-4-706, but
consumers are not required to purchase these additional coverages.
By requiring that insurers offer collision coverage but allowing consumers to
choose whether to purchase such coverage, the Colorado Legislature clearly intended for
consumers to have a choice in whether to contract for such coverage. A reasonable
consumer would likely make this choice based on the amount of coverage, the amount of
the deductible and the premium to be paid. Under Lovell’s interpretation of the No Fault
Act, an insurer would be required to provide coverage that included diminution in value,
and a consumer would then have to choose between purchasing this coverage at whatever
the cost or purchasing no collision coverage at all. This is not a reasonable interpretation
of the No Fault Act. It is more reasonable to assume that the Colorado Legislature
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intended for consumers to have a broader range of choices in purchasing optional
coverage.
The No Fault Act expressly limits an insurer’s ability to provide for exclusions
from or conditions on mandatory coverage. See Colo. Stat. § 10-4-712 (2003). However,
an insurer is permitted to make mandatory coverage subject to certain conditions and
exclusions. Id. The No Fault Act does not expressly limit an insurer’s ability to make
optional collision coverage subject to conditions or exclusions. Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that the Colorado Legislature did not intend to limit an insurer’s ability to
provide for exclusions from optional collision coverage.
Lovell argues that the absence of any provision expressly permitting exclusions
from collision coverage, coupled with the Colorado Legislature’s demonstrated ability to
draft such a provision, evidences the Legislature’s intent that insurers not be permitted to
make collision coverage subject to exclusions. This argument ignores the fact that the
express provision regarding exclusions from mandatory coverage is a limitation on an
insurer’s ability to contract with consumers - it is not a grant of authority or permission to
contract. In the absence of such limitation, insurers retain the same right to contract with
consumers that existed prior to the Act. Moreover, Lovell’s interpretation of the No Fault
Act would lead to the absurd result that insurers could provide mandatory coverage
subject to exclusions, but would be unable to provide for exclusions from optional
collision coverage.
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With regard to the speech by Colorado State Senator Plaut, his use of the phrase
“total economic loss” is no more inclusive of diminished value than the term “damage” in
the No Fault Act. Neither Senator Plaut’s speech nor the No Fault Act itself gives any
indication that the Colorado Legislature intended the No Fault Act to require insurers to
provide diminished value compensation under optional collision coverage. We conclude
that the No Fault Act does not require an insured to pay diminished value as an element
of “damage” under collision coverage.
Lovell cites Hyden v. Farmers, 20 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Colo. App. 2000) for the
proposition that Colorado courts have already recognized diminished value as an element
of property damage. Lovell’s reliance on Hyden is misplaced. In Hyden, the court was
interpreting the language of an insurance policy and was addressing only whether the
language of the policy, construed to give effect to the intent of the parties but with
ambiguous terms construed in favor of the insured, required the insurer to pay diminished
value. 20 P.3d at 1224. The court ultimately held that, “when an automobile insurer
promises to provide an insured with a vehicle ‘of like kind and quality,’ the insurer must
provide the insured, through repair, replacement, and/or compensation, the means of
acquiring a vehicle substantially similar in function and value to that which the insured
had prior to his or her accident.” Id. at 1226. The court did not discuss or have before it
any issue regarding the requirements under the No Fault Act. Nor does its holding, based
entirely on principles of contract interpretation, have any relevance to an interpretation of
the No Fault Act.
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2. Plaintiff’s Insurance Policy
Lovell’s insurance policy with State Farm provides that State Farm would pay for
the “loss” to her insured vehicle, in excess of the deductible, caused by collision.
Appellant’s App. 129. “Loss” is defined in the policy as “loss of or damage to your car.”
Id. The policy limits State Farm’s liability for loss to “the lower of: 1). the actual cash
value, or 2). the cost of repair or replacement.” Id. “Actual cash value is determined by
the market value, age and condition at the time the loss occurred.” Id. Under the policy
provision for settlement of loss for collision coverage, State Farm has “the right to settle a
loss” in one of two ways. Id. at 130. First, it may pay the agreed actual cash value of the
property at the time of the loss. Id. Alternatively, State Farm may repair or replace the
damaged property. Id. If State Farm repairs or replaces damaged property and this
results in betterment, the insured must pay for the amount of betterment. Id.
An endorsement to the policy amended the definition of “loss” stating that “loss
does not include any reduction in the value of any vehicle . . . as compared to its value
before it was damaged.” Id. at 134. The endorsement also changed the limit of liability
for collision coverage such that the limit of State Farm’s liability for loss to property to
“the lower of : 1) the actual cash value; or 2) the cost of repair or replacement. The cost
of repair or replacement does not include any reduction in the value of the property after
it has been repaired, as compared to its value before it was damaged.” Id.
Lovell argues that the language in her insurance policy that requires an insured to
pay for any betterment to property after repair or replacement is at odds and inconsistent
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with any exclusion of diminished value coverage and is thus evidence that diminished
value coverage is included in her policy. While the betterment provision may appear
unfair or unequal in light of policy provisions that State Farm’s liability for loss is limited
to the lower of actual cash value or the cost of repair or replacement, the parties were free
to include whatever terms in the contract they desired, and Lovell was not compelled to
purchase collision coverage. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 947 P.2d
341, 346 (Colo. 1997) (recognizing a strong policy of freedom of contract in Colorado).
“Courts should not rewrite insurance policy provision that are clear and unambiguous.”
Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 613 (Colo. 1999). The terms of
Lovell’s insurance policy, even without consideration of the provisions of the
endorsement, are clear and unambiguous in limiting State Farm’s liability for loss in such
a manner as to exclude any coverage for diminished value. The endorsement expressly
excludes diminished value coverage. This Court cannot remedy Lovell’s dissatisfaction
with the terms of her policy by rewriting the terms to equalize the betterment provision
with the provision limiting State Farm’s liability for loss.
Lovell’s primary argument that her insurance policy includes diminished value
coverage relies on her interpretation of the No Fault Act as requiring collision coverage to
include coverage for diminished value of an insured’s vehicle. Lovell is correct that, if
the No Fault Act mandated that collision coverage include diminished value
compensation, State Farm’s attempt to exclude diminished value coverage would be void.
See McConnell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 906 P.2d 109, 112 (Colo. 1995) (“any
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clause of a policy that attempts to dilute, condition, or limit statutorily mandated
coverage” is void and unenforceable.”). However, we have concluded that the No Fault
Act does not require an insurer to pay diminished value as an element of “damage” under
collision coverage. Accordingly, State Farm’s exclusion of diminished value
compensation from its collision coverage is not void and unenforceable as against
Colorado public policy.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the No Fault Act does not require State Farm to pay diminished value
compensation under its collision coverage of Lovell’s vehicle, and Lovell’s insurance
policy contains an enforceable exclusion of such coverage, Lovell can prove no set of
facts in support of her claims that would entitle her to relief. Thus, the district court did
not err in granting State Farm’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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