Brown v. Unified School District No. 501 , 459 F. App'x 705 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 1, 2012
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARK E. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-3170
(D.C. No. 6:10-CV-01096-JTM)
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (D. Kan.)
NO. 501, SHAWNEE COUNTY,
STATE OF KANSAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Mark E. Brown appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
his former employer, Unified School District No. 501 (“School District”) on his
race-discrimination and retaliation claims brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 1 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
Background
Mr. Brown alleged that the School District refused to rehire him due to his
race. In a prior appeal, this court described the underlying facts.
Plaintiff is a black male who was employed by the school
district from 1980 to 1996 as a physical education teacher and, for
some of that time, as a basketball coach. During that period, he
received a number of critical teacher evaluations, was transferred
from coaching girls’ basketball based on a report of inappropriate
conduct, and was discharged as a boys’ coach due to performance
issues. He sued the school district for race discrimination and
retaliation in 1991. The suit failed and he was ordered to pay
attorney fees. [Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, No. 94-3319,
1995 WL 590605 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (“Brown I”)].
He continued teaching in the school district until 1996, when he
relocated to Texas.
He later returned to Kansas and on June 20, 2000, submitted an
application for teaching and coaching jobs to the school district. The
school district’s human resources manager, Lynn King, interviewed
plaintiff in August 2001. After the interview, Ms. King sent a letter
to plaintiff relating the superintendent’s decision that, due to his past
employment record with the school district, he “will not be
considered for rehire by this district.”
Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, 465 F.3d 1184, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted) (“Brown II”). Brown II determined that
Mr. Brown’s claims were time-barred because he failed to file suit within the
statutory time limit after the alleged discriminatory failure to rehire and, further,
1
Mr. Brown has abandoned his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
-2-
that his subsequent attempts to revisit those claims did not revive them. Id. at
1188.
In the summer and fall of 2009, Mr. Brown applied for three positions with
the School District: head coach, substitute teacher, and special education teacher.
He claimed that in June 2009, while they were both at a local YMCA, a high
school principal, Dale Cushinberry, told him that he would hire Mr. Brown as
head coach if the current coach left. Although Mr. Brown later complained that
he was denied an assistant coach position, it is undisputed that he did not apply
for the assistant coach position. Mr. Brown was invited to meet with the
substitute services coordinator on October 2, 2009. Mr. Brown did not meet with
the coordinator, however, because he was then already working as a substitute
teacher for another school district. School Board Member Janel Johnson reported
to Mr. Brown that Board Member Nusbaum commented during a September 17,
2009, Board meeting, that “All [Mr. Brown] wants to do is sue us.” See Aplt.
App. Vol. 2 at 458. Ms. Johnson also told Mr. Brown that at an October 1, 2009,
Board meeting the attorney for the Board, David P. Mudrick, advised the Board
that the School District might face liability if Mr. Brown were hired and a sexual
incident occurred between a student and Mr. Brown. On October 6, 2009,
Mr. Brown’s attorney received notice from the School District that Mr. Brown
would not be considered for any position.
-3-
Mr. Brown filed the underlying lawsuit on March 31, 2010, alleging that
the School District’s refusal to hire him for three separate positions in the summer
and fall of 2009 was based on his race, in violation of Title VII. The district
court granted the School District’s motion for summary judgment on the
following grounds: (1) Mr. Brown’s claims were time-barred because they were
premised on the School District’s policy announced in 2001 that it would not
rehire him; (2) Mr. Brown’s claims were subject to dismissal pursuant to the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel due to the preclusive effect of
Brown II; (3) even if Mr. Brown had established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, he failed to demonstrate that the School District’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring him was a pretext for unlawful
discrimination; and (4) Mr. Brown failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation because he did not present any admissible evidence that his prior
protected activity was causally related to the School District’s decision not to
rehire him. Mr. Brown appeals.
Legal Standards
We review the district court’s summary judgment order de novo, applying
the same legal standards as the district court. Swackhammer v. Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is
appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
-4-
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Pursuant to this standard, “we must view the evidence and
draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Swackhammer, 493 F.3d at 1167 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess whether a
trial is necessary. In other words, there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211,
1216 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Because our review is de novo, we need not separately address [Mr. Brown’s]
argument that the district court erred by viewing evidence in the light most
favorable to the [School District] and by treating disputed issues of fact as
undisputed.” Rivera v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 920 (10th Cir.
2004).
The district court granted summary judgment on alternative grounds.
We affirm the determinations that Mr. Brown failed to establish pretext for his
racial discrimination claim and that he failed to establish a prima facie case of
unlawful retaliation. “We may affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on any ground adequately supported by the record.” Mauerhan v.
Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
-5-
Discussion
(1) Race Discrimination Claim
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . .
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). We evaluate Mr. Brown’s
claim under the three-step McDonnell Douglas framework. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Riggs v. AirTran
Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff does so, the
employer “must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Id. If this is done, “the burden shifts back to the employee
to prove that the proffered legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination.”
Id. at 1114-15. These burdens are burdens of production, rather than persuasion,
at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 1115.
With regard to the pretext inquiry, a plaintiff can withstand summary
judgment if he or she presents evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact regarding whether the defendant’s articulated reason for the adverse
employment action is pretextual. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 147-49 (2000). Pretext may be shown by “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
-6-
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the
employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Rivera,
365 F.3d at 925 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case turns on whether the School District’s decision not to rehire
Mr. Brown was a pretext for racial discrimination. Mr. Brown contends that the
following evidence demonstrated pretext: (1) the School District retained him as
an employee from 1980 to 1996, and his performance reviews during that period
included positive statements; (2) his 2001 meeting with the School District’s
human resources manager, Lynn King, demonstrated Ms. King’s view that he was
a “worthy candidate,” Aplt. Br. at 38; (3) Principal Cushinberry’s 2009 comment
that he would hire Mr. Brown for a head coaching position indicated that
Mr. Brown was eligible for rehire; (4) the substitute services coordinator’s
invitation to meet demonstrated that “certain members of the district felt
[Mr. Brown’s] qualifications were sufficient for rehire,” id. at 39; (5) Robert
McFrazier, a School District superintendent who made the decision in 2001 not to
rehire Mr. Brown, did not consult Mr. Brown’s personnel file before making the
decision, which itself was unusual because superintendents normally were not
involved in such decisions; (6) Mr. Brown was improperly required to go through
the formal job-application process, while some employees were hired outside the
process, as evidenced by a 1987 newspaper article and his own opinion;
-7-
(7) between 1999 and 2009, the School District hired numerous white female
teachers and few African-American teachers; (8) other employees who were
“convicted of crimes,” id. at 45, were not discharged and still others were rehired
even though they had been terminated for misconduct; (9) the School District had
a fear of litigation and acted upon that fear when it refused to rehire Mr. Brown;
and (10) the remarks allegedly made at school board meetings about Mr. Brown
wanting to sue and his being a risk demonstrated discriminatory and retaliatory
motives.
Mr. Brown does not dispute the district court’s finding that Kevin Singer
was the 2009 decisionmaker who refused to change the School District’s 2001
decision not to rehire him. In his unchallenged affidavit, Dr. Singer stated that he
had reviewed Mr. Brown’s file in September 2009, and noted “many negative
documents about Mr. Brown’s performance from several different sources.” Aplt.
App. Vol. 1 at 430. Dr. Singer also made inquiries to ascertain whether other
information was available to cause him to change the prior decision, but he
received no such information. The decision not to rehire Mr. Brown was made
solely by Dr. Singer, not the school board or any of its members. Dr. Singer
stated that although he was aware of Mr. Brown’s prior lawsuits, neither those
lawsuits nor Mr. Brown’s race affected his decision not to rehire him.
Accordingly, Mr. Brown’s reliance on statements made by Human
Resources Manager King, Principal Cushinberry, Superintendent McFrazier, and
-8-
the substitute services coordinator, is misplaced. He has adduced no evidence
that any of those individuals participated in, or indeed had authority to participate
in, the decision to not rehire Mr. Brown. Moreover, Mr. Brown has not attempted
to controvert Dr. Singer’s affidavit; rather, he contends that his evidence
demonstrates that Dr. Singer should have recognized that he was qualified for
employment, especially since he had received some positive performance reviews
during his employment from 1980 to 1996 and he had not been fired. But the
court’s role “is to prevent intentional discriminatory . . . practices, not to act as a
super personnel department, second guessing employers’ honestly held (even if
erroneous) business judgments.” Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1250
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that this
evidence does not show pretext.
Mr. Brown also asserts that the fact that he was required to go through the
formal job-application process while others were not, demonstrates pretext. This
claim, however, is not supported by competent evidence. His own opinion and a
vague reference to “two people” he believed were hired by a coach, Aplt. App.
Vol. 2 at 600, and a 1987 newspaper article apparently describing the hiring of a
coach, are insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether the School District’s articulated reason for the adverse employment
action is pretextual. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-49.
-9-
Turning to Mr. Brown’s statistical evidence of the gender and race of
teachers the School District hired between 1999 and 2009, we agree with the
district court that this evidence “is meaningless without any additional
information as to how many persons from different races applied for each
position.” Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 824. See Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.,
563 F.3d 1136, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding plaintiff’s statistical evidence
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of gender
discrimination because it did not account for numerous relevant variables, such as
“the number of male and female applicants, interviewees, and the like”).
Similarly, the district court correctly rejected Mr. Brown’s claim that other
employees who had been convicted of crimes or discharged for misconduct were
not terminated, thus showing pretext, because he “fail[ed] to show the existence
of any racial disparity in [the School District’s] treatment of employees accused
of harassment.” Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 825.
Finally, we consider Mr. Brown’s claim that the remarks allegedly made at
school board meetings to the effect that he wanted to sue the School District and
was a risk were evidence of pretext. The district court ruled that neither remark
was admissible. “We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of
evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d
1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005).
-10-
The court ruled that the remark that the School District might face liability
if a sexual incident occurred between a student and Mr. Brown was legal advice
from the Board’s attorney and thus was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Mr. Brown does not challenge this ruling. The other remark was allegedly made
by Board Member Nusbaum and repeated to Mr. Brown by Board Member
Johnson. Mr. Brown contends that it was a statement of a party opponent so was
not hearsay. However, neither Dr. Nusbaum nor Ms. Johnson was “involved in
the decisionmaking process affecting the employment action involved,” so the
statement does not “qualify as an admission of a party opponent.” Jaramillo v.
Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1314 (10th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Ms. Johnson’s report of
Dr. Nusbaum’s alleged statement was inadmissible hearsay. “Hearsay testimony
that would not be admissible at trial is not sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Id.We conclude that Mr. Brown failed to establish that the School District’s
proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for refusing to rehire him were
pretextual. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on
the race-discrimination claim.
-11-
(2) Retaliation Claim
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “forbids an employer from
‘discriminat[ing] against’ an employee . . . because that individual ‘opposed any
practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in’ a Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
To state a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, a plaintiff must show
“(1) that [he] engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,
and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the
materially adverse action.” Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987,
998 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2
The disputed element is causation. Mr. Brown points to the statements
discussed above allegedly made at school board meetings and the School
District’s “strong fear of litigation,” Aplt. Br. at 54. The board-meeting
statements are inadmissible, as discussed above. Particularly when those
statements are put aside, any claimed fear of litigation on the School District’s
part is pure speculation by Mr. Brown. “[M]ore than pure speculation is required
2
A plaintiff may alternatively establish retaliation if he can “directly
establish that retaliation played a motivating part in the employment decision.”
Twigg, 659 F.3d at 998.
-12-
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1230
(10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Brown’s failure to
establish a causal connection between his protected activity and an adverse
employment action was fatal to his retaliation claim.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
-13-