Borelli v. TRUE ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 14 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HENRY J. BORELLI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 99-3234
v.
(D.C. No. 97-CV-3217-RDR)
(Kansas)
PAGE TRUE, Warden,
USP-Leavenworth,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
In 1986 Henry Borelli was convicted in the Southern District of New York
for his participation in a stolen car ring. He was sentenced to ten years for each
of fifteen violations, to be served consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of
150 years. He is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in
Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. Borelli appeals the district court’s denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) abolished the United States
Parole Commission (Commission) and repealed federal parole statutes in favor of
a determinate sentencing scheme employing sentencing guidelines. Pub. L. No.
98-473, Title II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017-2034 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3551-3742 (1994)). The SRA became effective on November 1, 1987.
See Lewis v. Martin, 880 F.2d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1989); Lightsey v. Kastner, 846
F.2d 329, 331-32 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1988). Because Mr. Borelli was convicted
prior to the effective date of the SRA, he was not sentenced pursuant to the new
system and he remains under the jurisdiction of the Commission, subject to the
parole eligibility in effect under his sentence.
Congress originally extended the Commission’s existence for five years
after the SRA’s effective date so that the Commission could continue to process
“old law offenders” like Mr. Borelli, whose crimes were committed prior to the
effective date. This five year time frame was later extended to ten, and then to
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fifteen years, so that the Commission is currently scheduled to expire on October
31, 2002. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title III, § 316, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115
(extension to ten years); Pub. L. No. 104-232, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 3055 (extension to
fifteen years). The SRA, as amended, requires the Commission to set a release
date according to parole guidelines for all individuals sentenced under the old
system who will still be incarcerated when the fifteen year phase-out period ends.
It must set this date within enough time to permit consideration of an appeal
before the Commission expires. See SRA § 235(b)(3), 98 Stat. at 2032.
Mr. Borelli first argues that the extension of the Commission’s life violates
the Due Process and Ex Post Facto clauses of the U.S. Constitution. In making
this argument, Mr. Borelli apparently assumes that the only thing preventing him
from being re-sentenced under the new system is the continued existence of the
Commission, and that the prolonged life of the Commission thus constitutes an
impermissible “waiting period.” He is mistaken.
The district court correctly pointed out in its memorandum and order that
the extension of the Commission’s phase-out period does not bear upon the
constitutional analysis. Indeed, it affects Mr. Borelli’s situation very little.
While it may result in a longer period of time before the Commission sets a
release date for him, it does not alter what his parole eligibility or release dates
will actually be. See, e.g., Lewis, 880 F.2d at 290 (§ 235(b)(3) does not entitle
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defendants to release within guideline range). The length of Mr. Borelli’s
incarceration is not related to the length of the Commission’s life, and nothing in
the SRA gives the Commission or any other entity the ability to re-sentence
individuals who were sentenced under the old system. See id. at 291. 1
Mr. Borelli next argues that the existence of the dual systems violates equal
protection. This argument is also unavailing. Because prisoners are not a suspect
class, see Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989), the SRA need only
withstand rational basis scrutiny. Legislative distinctions affecting the portions
of sentences that must be served in prison satisfy equal protection standards when
they are rationally related to legitimate state purposes. See Romano v. Luther,
816 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 1987).
Congress enacted the SRA with the goals of streamlining the sentencing
process and equalizing terms of incarceration for similarly situated prisoners.
Congress clearly made the SRA prospective in application, see Pub. L. No. 100-
182, § 2(a), 101 Stat. 1266 (1987), because to do otherwise would subject “old
1
Although Mr. Borelli has been eligible for parole since 1996, he has
waived his parole consideration and has failed to appear before the Commission
for parole hearings. This is apparently because of his misconception that the
Commission and the parole system are preventing him from receiving a more
lenient sentence under the new system. If this is the case, Mr. Borelli is making
an improvident decision to waive participation in the only mechanism which
might enable him to obtain release from prison. Without parole, his mandatory
release date is 2072.
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law” prisoners to a change in their sentences. This would expose the SRA to
challenge as an unconstitutional ex post facto law. In addition, it would be costly
and burdensome for the courts to re-sentence offenders who were properly
sentenced under the applicable law at the time. See Swinson v. United States
Parole Comm’n, 682 F. Supp. 29, 31 (E.D.N.C. 1988). Because Congress had a
rational basis for creating a new sentencing system and applying it prospectively,
the existence of two separate categories of federal prisoners does not violate
equal protection.
Mr. Borelli has not shown that his rights are violated by the continuation of
the Commission, nor has he presented any viable argument as to why or how he
could be re-sentenced under the new system. Accordingly, the district court’s
decision denying Mr. Borelli’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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