Espinoza v. Estep , 276 F. App'x 781 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 1, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
PHILLIP ESPINOZA,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 07-1428
v. (D. Colorado)
AL ESTEP; COLORADO (D.C. No. 05-cv-1112-MSK-PAC)
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Phillip A. Espinoza, an inmate in the custody of the Colorado Department
of Corrections, requests a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the
denial by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado of his
application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Espinoza has failed to
make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, as required by
28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a COA.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Espinoza was convicted by a jury on January 14, 1994, of distribution
of a controlled substance and of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.
He received a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 40 years.
The key evidence at trial against Mr. Espinoza was a tape recording made
by a confidential informant of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The
informant, Norma Jean Lopez, was unavailable to testify because she was
murdered a few days after the recording was made. The DEA, which had been
investigating a man named Eugene Velarde, arranged for Lopez to engage in a
controlled purchase of heroin from Velarde through Mr. Espinoza. Agents fitted
Lopez with a radio transmitter and a tape recorder and dropped her off near
Mr. Espinoza’s apartment. Mr. Espinoza’s girlfriend, Kathleen Bugarin,
answered the door, and Lopez asked for Mr. Espinoza, referring to him by his
nickname, “Lipe.” Bugarin told Lopez that he was there and that he had just
awakened. Lopez then said, “Get up, lazy. . . . I need to cop [get some drugs].”
A man responded, asking Lopez how much money she had and what quantity of
drugs she wanted. The man then spoke with someone over the phone and told
Lopez that it would take about 45 minutes for his supplier to deliver the drugs.
While they waited, Lopez audibly counted out the money that she had been given
by the DEA to purchase the drugs.
According to Lopez’s voice on the recording, when a van owned by
Velarde pulled into the apartment’s parking lot, the man called Lipe had grabbed
the money from Lopez’s hand. DEA agents observed Mr. Espinoza exiting the
apartment, followed by Lopez. The agents then lost sight of Mr. Espinoza but
shortly thereafter saw him returning to the apartment, meeting Lopez on the stairs
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to the apartment. As they entered the apartment, Lopez insisted that she had
wanted to see “Gene.” The man said that Gene was in a hurry and would call her
later. Lopez then left the apartment and turned over heroin to the DEA agents.
Bugarin later testified at trial that Lopez had visited the apartment that day, that
Mr. Espinoza had been there, that he had made a phone call in Lopez’s presence,
and that both he and Lopez had left and returned to the apartment.
After the jury convicted him, Mr. Espinoza appealed to the Colorado Court
of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. People v. Espinoza, No. 94CA0453
(Colo. Ct. App., Feb. 15, 1996) (Espinoza I), cert. denied, No. 96SC158 (Colo.,
Sept. 3, 1996). Mr. Espinoza, assisted by counsel, then moved for postconviction
relief under Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c). This motion was denied,
and the denial was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals, People v.
Espinoza, No. 01CA1909 (Colo. Ct. App., Nov. 29, 2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL
1958679 (Colo., Apr. 28, 2003). Mr. Espinoza, acting pro se, then filed a second
motion for postconviction relief, whose denial was also affirmed by the Colorado
Court of Appeals, People v. Espinoza, No. 03CA1588 (Colo. Ct. App., Dec. 9,
1994). The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 18, 2005.
Espinoza v. People, 2005 WL 878591 (Colo., Apr. 18, 2005).
On June 6, 2005, Mr. Espinoza timely commenced an application for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting 12 grounds for relief. The magistrate judge to
whom the case was referred recommended that seven of the claims be denied as
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procedurally defaulted and that the other claims be denied as without merit.
Mr. Espinoza filed objections to the report and recommendation. The district
court rejected Mr. Espinoza’s arguments and denied the application. The court
also denied (1) Mr. Espinoza’s motion to stay the § 2254 proceedings so that he
could exhaust certain of his claims before the state courts, and (2) his motion for
the appointment of counsel.
Mr. Espinoza’s application requests a COA on seven issues. He argues that
the district court (1) should have appointed counsel to represent him in his § 2254
application, (2) should have stayed his § 2254 proceedings to give him an
opportunity to exhaust certain of his claims in state court, (3) should have granted
him relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim regarding his trial
counsel, (4) should have granted him relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim regarding his postconviction counsel, (5) should have granted him
relief on his objections to the admission at trial of the taped conversations with
Norma Jean Lopez, (6) should have granted him relief on his objections to
evidence at trial of prior drug deals, and (7) should have granted him relief on his
claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him.
II. DISCUSSION
A COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This “substantial
showing” requires that the applicant demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could
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debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved [by the district court]
in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Appointment of Counsel
We lack jurisdiction under § 2254 to grant a COA on Mr. Espinoza’s
argument that the district court should have appointed counsel for him. It is true
that a district court has discretion to appoint counsel, see id., and that an applicant
has a federal statutory right to counsel if an evidentiary hearing is required, see
Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. But, as Mr. Espinoza
acknowledges, there is no constitutional right to assistance of counsel in pursuit
of habeas relief. See Swazo v. Wyo. Dept. of Corrs. State Penitentiary Warden,
23 F.3d 332, 333 (10th Cir. 1994). And § 2253(c)(2) restricts the issuance of
COAs to violations of the federal constitution.
B. Stay of Application
Mr. Espinoza next argues that the district court should have granted his
request to stay his § 2254 proceedings so that he could return to state court to
present certain claims that may not have been exhausted. The court denied this
motion on the ground that Mr. Espinoza’s unexhausted claims were then time-
barred in Colorado courts, so a stay would be futile. In Colorado, postconviction
challenges with respect to felonies (other than class 1 felonies) must be brought
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within three years after the conclusion of the direct appeal, a date long since
passed in Mr. Espinoza’s case. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402; People v.
Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Colo. 1994). Mr. Espinoza contends that a recent
Colorado Supreme Court decision, Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 (Colo. 2007)
(en banc), permits him to raise his unexhausted claims in state court even though
the statutory time period for postconviction challenges has expired. We agree
with the district court that Silva offers Mr. Espinoza no such opportunity.
In Silva the Colorado Court of Appeals had affirmed the denial of Silva’s
first postconviction motion three weeks after the statutory time period for filing
postconviction challenges had expired. 156 P.3d at 1166–67. Two weeks after
that affirmance Silva brought a second postconviction motion, raising, among
others, a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Id. at 1166.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that this claim was not time-barred because
Silva could establish “justifiable excuse or excusable neglect” for raising the
issue after the statutory time period, as the issue of postconviction ineffective
assistance of counsel could not have been raised before the court’s order in
Silva’s first postconviction motion. Id. at 1166–67. Nevertheless, the court held
that Silva’s claim failed because there was no right to effective assistance of
postconviction counsel. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals on this last issue, holding that there is a limited statutory right to counsel
in state postconviction proceedings. Id. at 1167.
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Mr. Espinoza claims that Silva permits him to present new issues now
because his failure to present them earlier was a result of his postconviction
counsel’s refusal to do so. He is allowed to bring these claims, he argues, if he
alleges ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. But even if we assume
that Colorado’s limited statutory right to postconviction counsel extends to
Mr. Espinoza, nothing in Silva suggests that the Colorado courts would be willing
to hear his new claims today. Mr. Espinoza already raised the issue of ineffective
assistance of postconviction counsel before the Colorado courts, in his second
postconviction proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of this claim
because it was conclusory, not because it was time-barred or because
Mr. Espinoza had no right to postconviction counsel. Silva hardly indicates that
the Colorado courts will entertain a late motion on an issue already decided. It
was therefore reasonable for the district court to decline to stay Mr. Espinoza’s
§ 2254 proceedings.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
In his § 2254 application Mr. Espinoza claims that “none” of his counsel
challenged his arrest and indictment for lack of probable cause. R. Doc. 5 at 6e.
To the extent that this claim refers to his trial counsel, the district court found
that this claim was unexhausted, because Mr. Espinoza, in his first state
postconviction petition, had challenged his trial counsel’s performance only on
grounds unrelated to his current claims. Even if Mr. Espinoza could show cause
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for not exhausting the issue, the court held, he could not show prejudice because
the claim had no merit. In his request for a COA Mr. Espinoza does not attempt
to refute the district court’s conclusion that the claim is unexhausted and
concedes that he cannot show prejudice regarding his claims of unlawful arrest
and detention. He does argue that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to
object to the admission of the tape recording on the ground that it violated
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. But
Mr. Espinoza did not present this argument to the district court, so we will not
consider it here. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th
Cir. 1992).
D. Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel
The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to counsel
in state postconviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555,
(1987). In Finley the Court stated: “Our cases establish that the right to
appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.” Id.Mr. Espinoza argued in district court that a claim in a postconviction proceeding
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel should be viewed as an appeal of right,
because the postconviction proceeding is the first opportunity in Colorado to
argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Given that there is a constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel on an appeal of right, see Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985), he argues that there is a constitutional right to
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postconviction counsel, at least for the limited purpose of arguing the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. And in his COA application Mr. Espinoza further
argues that a limited state right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel,
as in Colorado, creates an interest that cannot be denied without violating the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We are not at liberty to consider
these arguments, however, because § 2254(I) expressly provides that “[t]he
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-
conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief.” Mr. Espinoza’s
challenge clearly falls within the prohibition of the statute, and he has not
challenged the constitutionality of § 2254(I)
E. Residual Hearsay
On direct appeal Mr. Espinoza asserted that his rights under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission of
hearsay statements on the tape recording. The Colorado Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, holding that the statements were sufficiently reliable that
they did not violate Mr. Espinoza’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. See
Espinoza I at 10.
Under § 2254, relief may not be granted with respect to any issue
adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication “was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an
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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A habeas court considers
the state of constitutional law at the time that the applicant’s conviction became
final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 (2000). The Colorado Supreme
Court denied certiorari on Mr. Espinoza’s direct appeal on September 3, 1996, so
his conviction became final when his time to seek certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court expired 90 days later. See Allen v. Reed, 427 F.3d 767, 774
(10th Cir. 2005). At that time the admission of hearsay testimony did not violate
the Confrontation Clause if the statement fell within a “‘firmly rooted’” hearsay
exception, or if the statement was supported by “‘particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.’” Stevens v Ortiz, 465 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
In this case the Colorado Court of Appeals relied upon “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness” to conclude that the hearsay statements did not
violate Mr. Espinoza’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, the
court found that if Lopez’s assertions—for instance, that the person she was
talking to was “Lipe,” that she was counting out $300 for the purchase, or that the
man on the recording snatched the money from her hand—had been inaccurate,
other people present were in a position to correct her and likely would have done
so. The Supreme Court stated in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990), that
“courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors” in
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determining whether a statement bears the necessary guarantees of
trustworthiness. We agree with the district court that the Colorado court’s
reliance on the presence of others likely to contradict Lopez was not contrary to
and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and Mr. Espinoza has not pointed to any specific hearsay statement not supported
by this rationale. Nor is this determination of trustworthiness undermined, as
Mr. Espinoza argues, by any personal interest that Lopez may have had in making
the tapes appear to reflect a successful drug transaction; as the Colorado Court of
Appeals stated, see Espinoza I at 9, the likelihood that other persons would
correct Lopez is unrelated to Lopez’s motives for cooperating with the DEA.
F. Statement about Prior Drug Transactions
At trial Mr. Espinoza objected to the introduction of a statement by a DEA
agent that Lopez had told them that she had bought heroin from Mr. Espinoza in
the past. The trial court admitted the testimony for the purpose of explaining
what had prompted the investigation, and it instructed the jury to consider the
statement for that purpose only, not for the truth of the assertion. On direct
appeal the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. See id. at
10–11.
Mr. Espinoza argues that the admission of the statement was in error
because (1) it was hearsay and (2) it was more prejudicial than probative.
Although the statement would have been hearsay had it been admitted for the
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truth of the matter asserted, the trial court did not admit the statement for that
purpose and gave the jury a limiting instruction to that effect. Whether evidence
was incorrectly admitted as a matter of state law is “no part of a federal court's
habeas review of a state conviction.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991).
Instead, we review only whether, “considered in light of the entire record, its
admission resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.” Knighton v. Mullin, 293 F.3d
1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2002). Mr. Espinoza has not made this showing. We
presume that a jury will follow a limiting instruction, see United States v. Eads,
191 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999), and Mr. Espinoza has not explained how
that presumption was rebutted here, merely asserting that after the statement
about prior drug transactions, it was “a foregone conclusion” that the jury would
convict him. No reasonable jurist would debate the district court’s ruling that the
statement did not deny Mr. Espinoza a fair trial.
G. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Espinoza challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal,
arguing that the identity of the voice on the tape was never established and that
the rest of the evidence was circumstantial. The Colorado Court of Appeals
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the voice was that of
Mr. Espinoza and that reasonable jurors could draw inferences to establish all the
elements of the crime. See Espinoza I at 11–12. The standard for whether
evidence supporting a conviction is constitutionally sufficient is “whether, after
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viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Given the
contents of the recording (e.g., Lopez asking for “Lipe” and being told he was at
home), Bugarin’s testimony that a conversation between Mr. Espinoza and Lopez
took place that morning, and the testimony from DEA agents that they saw
Mr. Espinoza leaving from and returning to the apartment during the tape
recording, it is clear that the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals was not
“contrary to, [nor did it] involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” nor was it “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-
(2).
III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Espinoza has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right because “reasonable jurists” could not “find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529
U.S. at 484. We therefore DENY his application for a COA. His request to
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proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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