Cosgrove v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitative [Sic] Services ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 12, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES PATRICK COSGROVE,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
No. 10-3274
v. (D.C. No. 2:07-CV-02125-SAC-GLR)
(D. Kansas)
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
AND REHABILITATIVE [sic]
SERVICES; DONNA WHITEMAN;
MICHAEL VANLANDINGHAM; LOIS
MITCHELL; SYDNEY KRAFT;
ALBERTA BRUMLEY; DELMAR
BRUMLEY,
Defendants–Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Charles Cosgrove appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983
case on various grounds. In his pro se § 1983 complaint, Plaintiff alleged his civil rights
were violated when as a young child he was removed from his biological parents’ custody
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and placed with abusive foster parents. Plaintiff alleged he was kept in the abusive foster
home for over eight years despite repeated complaints made by Plaintiff, his biological
parents, and others, finally being removed in 1992 only after another child in the home
died as a result of extreme physical abuse. This action was filed against the abusive
foster parents, the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, and four
State officials in both their individual and official capacities. The district court dismissed
the complaint based on, inter alia, the doctrine of res judicata and the failure to allege a
cognizable claim for relief under § 1983.
We first consider the district court’s dismissal of most of Plaintiff’s claims on res
judicata grounds, reviewing this decision de novo. See Mactec, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d
821, 831 (10th Cir. 2005). The instant complaint is nearly identical to a state-court
complaint Plaintiff filed in 2004, differing in only two substantive ways: (1) it includes
the phrase “sexual abuse,” and (2) it names the State employees in their individual as well
as official capacities. The 2004 state-court complaint was dismissed with prejudice based
on the applicable statutes of limitations, and the district court concluded that it had
preclusive effect as to all of Plaintiff’s claims except his claims against the State
employees in their individual capacities.
As the district court correctly noted, the preclusive effect of the 2004 state-court
judgment is determined by Kansas law. See Jarrett v. Gramling, 841 F.2d 354, 356 (10th
Cir. 1988) (“The claim-preclusive effect of a state-court judgment in the context of a
subsequent suit in federal court under § 1983 is therefore determined by state law.”).
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Under Kansas law, res judicata prevents relitigation of previously litigated claims when
the following four elements are present: “(1) same claim; (2) same parties; (3) claims
were or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits.” Winston v. Kan.
Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 49 P.3d 1274, 1285 (Kan. 2002). Plaintiff concedes the
state court’s dismissal of the 2004 complaint based on the statute of limitations was a
final judgment on the merits, and we therefore consider only the application of the first
three elements to this case.
“The test for determining whether the claims for relief are the same is whether the
primary right and duty and delict or wrong is the same in each action.” Dexter v. Brake,
269 P.3d 846, 853 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). “It should be noted that the doctrine of res
judicata prevents the splitting of a single cause of action or claim into two or more suits.
The doctrine of res judicata requires that all the grounds or theories upon which a cause
of action or claim is founded be asserted in one action or they will be barred in any
subsequent action.” Parsons Mobile Prods., Inc. v. Remmert, 531 P.2d 435, 437 (Kan.
1975). In this case, the 2004 complaint alleged the same primary right and duty as the
instant complaint—the constitutional right of children in state custody to be “reasonably
safe from harm” and the duty of state officials to exercise professional judgment in foster
care decisions. Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir.
1992). The complaints also alleged the same primary wrong—Plaintiff’s placement from
1984 until 1992 in a foster home where there was a pattern and practice of abuse. The
fact that Plaintiff did not explicitly mention sexual abuse in his earlier complaint does not
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create a new claim under the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual
abuse could have been raised in the 2004 complaint and are part of the same cause of
action, and we therefore conclude that both the first and third elements of the Kansas
claim-preclusion test are satisfied in this case.
As for the second element, the instant complaint lists all of the same Defendants as
the 2004 complaints, but it differs from the earlier complaints in that it raises claims
against the four State officials in their individual as well as official capacities. Kansas
follows the Restatement view that “a party in an action in one capacity is not bound by or
entitled to the benefits or rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears
in another capacity.” Betz v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Agency, 8 P.3d 756, 759 (Kan. 2000)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36 (1982)). Thus, the district court
correctly held that Plaintiff’s claims against the State officials in their individual
capacities—and only these claims—were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Although the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims
against the four State officials were not barred by res judicata, the court concluded that
these claims should be dismissed because they failed to state a plausible claim for relief
under § 1983. We review this conclusion de novo. See Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v.
Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment, equal
protection, and due process rights. As for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, the
Eighth Amendment’s protections do not apply to children in foster care, who are instead
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protected by the “Fourteenth Amendment right to reasonable protection from physical
harm.” Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 893; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16
(1979). We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this claim. As for the
remaining claims, the district court concluded that the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint
were insufficient to support a claim for relief. Specifically, Plaintiff’s equal protection
claim was not supported by any allegations regarding his membership in a defined class
or Defendants’ different treatment of similarly situated individuals, and his due process
claim was not supported by allegations specifically linking each Defendant to the alleged
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm while in foster
care. We agree that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient specificity to state a
plausible claim for relief under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009), and we
therefore affirm the dismissal of these claims as well.
The district court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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